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Introduction
Introduction
On Sunday 28 January 2007, at a specially convened Extraordinary Ard Fheis 
(party conference) Sinn Féin, the dominant political voice within modern Irish 
republicanism, voted in favour of endorsing the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland (PSNI). The party rank and file backed a leadership proposal to 
‘support the PSNI and criminal justice system’ so that ‘a civic policing service, 
accountable and representative of the community is delivered as quickly as 
possible’.1 The motion was carried by a comfortable majority despite some 
internal disquiet. The Sinn Féin leadership had ‘won’ the debate and avoided the 
public walk out previously seen at pivotal Ard Fheissana.2 The move marked a 
comprehensive redefinition of the relationship between the policing apparatus 
upholding the Northern Ireland state and Irish republicans with fundamental 
ideological opposition to that state. Sinn Féin’s formal endorsement of policing 
was notable for both the historical relationship between Irish republicans and 
policing in the North of Ireland, and for the wider transitional backdrop against 
which it occurred.3 
To grasp the magnitude of the move in terms of the former, one must 
first acknowledge that Irish republicans have traditionally had a fractious 
relationship with Northern Irish police forces – most notably the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC). This was characterised by violent opposition, mutual 
suspicion and political antagonism. Irish republicans and policing agents 
in Northern Ireland have been a source of violence, suffering and, on many 
occasions, death for one another. Given this fraught historical backdrop one 
 1 ‘Motion Passed by Sinn Féin at Extraordinary Ard Fheis on Policing, RDS, Dublin 
(28 January 2007)’: www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/sf/sf280107motion.
htm (accessed 24 April 2012).
 2 Morrison, 2013.
 3 In reflecting the world-view of the research group, the author will use the 
terms Northern Ireland, the North of Ireland and the six counties interchangeably 
throughout the book.
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may ask how a relationship of ‘critical engagement’ with those long considered 
the perennial ‘other’ was even possible. To understand ‘critical engagement’ 
in its proper context, one must not only remain cognisant of this historical 
relationship but also look beyond it to evaluate the move in accordance with 
political developments unfolding at the time. 
If Sinn Féin endorsement of policing is to be truly understood, it must be 
necessarily viewed as a component of a choreographed process of political 
transition rather than an aberration that materialised in an apolitical vacuum. 
The veracity of this is borne out in the Ard Fheis motion itself, which stated that 
its implementation would occur ‘only when the power-sharing institutions are 
established’.4 While the move was seminal in its own right, it must nonetheless 
be viewed cumulatively with events that preceded and followed it. Although the 
1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) significantly reduced political violence, 
the steady political progress it was expected to deliver remained elusive. 
Power-sharing institutions were established but they quickly became hostages 
to fortune of wider disagreement over decommissioning.5 Following the 
‘Stormontgate’ affair, the devolved institutions fell into prolonged suspension 
in October 2002. Direct rule from Westminster was reimposed in the absence 
of any solution to the political impasse, and even though political violence did 
not re-erupt the political process had stalled. Making continued and signif-
icant electoral gains but faced with an environment of political stagnation, 
Irish republicans exhibited a growing willingness to pursue ideological goals 
through exclusively peaceful means. 
In the months prior to the policing debate, Irish republicanism had made 
tentative moves to commit irrevocably to conflict transformation. In July 
2005, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) moved from a position of being on a 
permanent ceasefire to order a formal end to its armed campaign. IRA volunteers 
were instructed to ‘assist the development of purely political and democratic 
programmes through exclusively peaceful means’.6 After completing the 
protracted process of placing its weapons beyond use, the St Andrews Agreement 
set out a detailed series of proposals designed to resuscitate the power-sharing 
institutions via a compromise involving Sinn Féin and the hard-line Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP). Accordingly, if Sinn Féin formally endorsed policing and 
 4 ‘Motion Passed by Sinn Féin at Extraordinary Ard Fheis on Policing, RDS, Dublin, 
28 January 2007’: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/sf/sf280107motion.htm 
(accessed 24 April 2012).
 5 Dixon, 2013.
 6 ‘Text of Irish Republican Army (IRA) Statement on the Ending of the Armed 
Campaign (28 July 2005)’: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/ira280705.htm 
(accessed 10 March 2014).
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criminal justice then the DUP would enter government with them. In furtherance 
of securing the return of the devolved institutions, Sinn Féin duly moved to 
instigate ‘critical engagement’ with policing. Consequent to this decision, the 
power-sharing institutions were re-established following elections in March 
2007. Sinn Féin entered into government with the previously anti-power-sharing 
DUP as a lead partner that May. ‘Critical engagement’ was therefore the zenith 
of a protracted process whereby the Sinn Féin brand of Irish republicanism 
abandoned armed struggle, brought itself in from the political wilderness and 
pursued its goals by working the state from within. This, however, was not without 
internal opposition within the wider Irish republican constituency. Carrying on 
the unerring tradition of dividing over political compromise,7 the policing debate 
not only gave renewed impetus to criticism of Sinn Féin by long-term detractors 
but it also hastened further departures. This birthed new political and militant 
groups to contest the field with the hitherto dominant Provisionals. It is worth 
briefly outlining the multifarious groups with whom Sinn Féin now competes for 
hegemony within the modern Irish republican constituency. 
Republican Sinn Féin (RSF) are a traditionalist party with a purist approach 
to Irish republicanism. Rejecting every, and any, form of compromise, their 
loyalty is to a form of Irish republican doctrinarism that Kevin Bean labels 
‘the politics of faith’.8 They split from the Provisionals in 1986, when the latter 
dropped their policy of abstentionism to Dáil Éireann (the Irish parliament). 
Their rejection of ‘British policing’ mirrors their rejection of any parti-
tionist administration of ‘British rule’ in Ireland. The 32 County Sovereignty 
Movement (32CSM) split from Sinn Féin over pre-GFA acceptance of the 
Mitchell Principles of non-violence. They are hardline but less puritanical than 
RSF, having remained in the Provisional fold following the abstentionism 
policy change. Both these groups have been unapologetic in their support for 
continued armed struggle. They are generally regarded as the political wings 
of the Continuity IRA and Real IRA respectively.9 The Real IRA subsequently 
merged with vigilante group Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) and 
non-aligned militant cells into the ‘New IRA’, while the Continuity IRA has 
factionalised into competing groups.10 The Irish Republican Socialist Party 
(IRSP), the political wing of the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), who 
formally ended their campaign in 2009,11 also opposed the move. They are not, 
 7 Morrison, 2013.
 8 Bean, 2007a, 181.
 9 Whiting, 2015.
 10 Morrison, 2013.
 11 ‘“Armed Struggle is Over” – INLA’, BBC News, 11 October 2009: http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/8301241.stm (accessed 6 October 2015).
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however, an offshoot of the Provisional movement. Having opted to stay with 
the Officials following the Official–Provisional split in 1970, they later split from 
the Officials in 1974.12 Opposition was also forthcoming from socialist repub-
lican group Éirígí, which had been founded just prior to the policing debate 
amidst discontent with the changing direction of Sinn Féin policy. Focused 
on non-violent direct action to promote left-wing internationalism and anti-
imperialism, the party has no formal links to militant ‘spoiler’ groups. IRSP 
and Éirígí criticism of Sinn Féin policy, not just on the matter of policing but 
on other social and economic issues addressed through the devolved assembly, 
has been decidedly leftist in nature and devoid of the hard-line militarism RSF 
and 32CSM relies on. More specifically, the move was opposed by a disaffected 
group of former prisoners who broke ranks during the debate. The group later 
morphed into the political party Republican Network for Unity (RNU). The 
RNU relationship with militant groups is more ambiguous, having expressed 
an affinity of sorts with Óglaigh na hÉireann.13 RNU espouses criticism of 
Sinn Féin that is a hybrid of the hard-line militarism of RSF and the 32CSM, 
and the leftist critique of Éirígí and the IRSP. More recently the move has been 
opposed by the 1916 Societies which are a commemorative group with the 
policy of excluding those supportive of the PSNI from its membership.14 The 
move was also opposed by a number of independent republicans – including 
some who were later elected to political office. In September 2016, Saoradh, an 
‘unashamed [sic] revolutionary party’, was launched. The party was endorsed 
by New IRA-aligned prisoners, and presented itself as a radical republican 
socialist political alternative to post-GFA Sinn Féin. Outlining its opposition 
to current Sinn Féin strategy, chairman Davy Jordan rounded on the ‘false 
prophets … defeated and consumed by the very system they claim to oppose’ 
and rejected devolved institutions for being ‘designed to prevent the Irish 
people regaining their national sovereignty’.15 How and if Saoradh can provide 
a greater electoral challenge to the Sinn Féin hegemony than Éirígí and RNU 
have (should they contest elections) is at the time of writing largely a matter of 
conjecture. Evidently, then, modern Irish republicanism is a densely populated 
political domain where contestation cannot be falsely reduced to the matter 
of being either for or against continued armed activity. Disagreement within 
 12 Hanley and Millar, 2010.
 13 Frampton, 2011.
 14 Hearty, 2017.
 15 Connla Young, ‘New “Revolutionary” Republican Party Saoradh Launched’, Irish 
News, 26 September 2016: www.irishnews.com/news/politicalnews/2016/09/26/
news/new-revolutionary-republican-party-saoradh-launched-708613/ (accessed 4 
October 2016).
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modern Irish republicanism is multivalent: something that a reduction of the 
matter to being for or against armed struggle, or being for or against Sinn Féin 
does not quite cover. Despite a false conflation of all those opposed to the 
‘mainstream’ republicanism of Sinn Féin under the imprecise ‘dissident’ tag, 
arcane disagreement and competition exists among anti-policing militant and 
political groups.16 That said, this book does not delve into this more nuanced 
disagreement in any particular depth, largely due to the fact that the memory 
politics of the policing debate falls neatly along fault lines of being either 
supportive of or against policing. That does not, however, deny or overlook 
the importance of division among anti-policing Irish republicanism itself 
– something alluded to in the interview process where members of certain 
groups were keen to distance themselves from other ‘impure’ or ideologically 
tainted groups.
Why this book?
Drawing on the historical, political and transitional contexts of the Irish repub-
lican policing debate, this book looks beyond sensationalist headlines and 
political soundbites trumpeting the historicity of the decision to interrogate the 
fundamental issues that lie behind ‘critical engagement’. The formal acceptance 
of policing by Sinn Féin posed just as many quandaries as it remedied. Obvious 
questions arose: how did former combatants circle the square peg of policing 
with everything held as irrefutable during 30 years of conflict? How can a 
radical departure from physical force republicanism be reconciled with the 
sacrifices made by the Irish republican war dead? What of those unwilling to 
circle this most problematic of square pegs? How and where can they broadcast 
their opposition to policing? And what of those ideological purists who opposed 
the current Sinn Féin strategy from its very inception– where do they fit in 
during the policing debate?
This book addresses each of these quagmires by critically evaluating the 
role that memory plays in the continuing Irish republican debate on policing. 
It examines the interlocking questions of what role memory plays in the debate 
and how it performs this role. Specific emphasis is placed on the ‘memory 
politics’ of the debate: in other words, the process of selectively ‘remembering’ 
or ‘forgetting’ the past through the construction, maintenance and challenging 
of politically motivated discourses.17 However, this book also recognises that 
 16 Horgan, 2013.
 17 Hearty, 2016b.
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the role of memory in the debate was not strictly confined to the internal 
politicking of competing Irish republican hegemons, but is evident in other 
ways and on other levels too. In particular, this book draws on the concept 
of the ‘malleability of memory’ – the ability to mould and remould memory 
in accordance with present needs18 – to interrogate how and why memory 
is moulded by different actors, in different contexts and in different ways 
throughout the debate. To this end, the book examines how memory is used 
at the individual and collective level, how it is used at grassroots and at an 
elite level, and how it is used in contestation over the past between and within 
opposing ethno-nationalist blocs embarking on transition. The book uses the 
Irish republican policing debate as an empirical case study for providing an 
insight into the relationship between memory and elite agendas, the emergence 
of subaltern voices in transitional processes and the interaction and tension 
between individual and collective memory during periods of transition. As 
Frank Haldemann highlights, the term ‘transitional justice’ denotes a process 
of transition, which in turn raises the question of what society is transi-
tioning from and what it is transitioning to. In answering his own question, 
Haldemann argues that in the North of Ireland this is transition from a 
‘conflicted democracy’ beset by political violence to a post-conflict society of 
‘peace’ narrowly defined as the absence of such violence.19 It is worth briefly 
drawing out his point through further examination of the concept of transi-
tional justice and the concept of transition within peace processes as relevant 
to the North of Ireland.
Jon Elster argues that, at its most based understanding, transitional justice 
represents movement from one political state to another.20 Ruti Teitel goes 
further in her conceptualisation by arguing that transitional justice does not 
just include a process of political change but also includes processes to address 
past wrongdoing.21 The paradigmatic understanding of transitional justice 
states is those that move from authoritarian rule to democracy while seeking to 
address the legacy of state repression during the previous era of dictatorship.22 
Latin American transitions like Chile are often cited as examples of this model. 
However, there are also non-paradigmatic transitions, characterised by the 
reform of states that were regarded as democratic and based on the rule of law 
but were nonetheless challenged by the political violence of non-state actors and 
defended through a combination of emergency provisions and low-level state 
 18 Brown, 2009b.
 19 Haldemann, 2006.
 20 Elster, 2012.
 21 Teitel, 2000.
 22 McAuliffe, 2011.
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violence.23 This is the ‘conflicted democracy’ framework within which transi-
tional justice academics like Haldemann have placed the North of Ireland. For 
Padraig McAuliffe, this means that the Northern Ireland transition has been 
movement from a state beset by political violence and human rights abuses 
into a reformed state built on consociational power sharing where political 
disagreement continues but the violence and abuses of the past are less likely 
to happen.24 Accordingly, unlike other transitions, Northern Ireland has not 
witnessed a clean break with the past.25 There has been no removal of an old 
dictatorial regime or military junta. Nor was there any decisive military victory 
for the state or non-state groups that had fought each other to stalemate. 
Rather, a negotiated settlement arose whereby under the GFA the systems of 
governance were reformed to allow those previously excluded and engaged 
in political violence to participate. In effect, those who resisted the pre-GFA 
state and those who presided over it now sit with each other in governance of 
the post-GFA state. However, while governing parties in the post-GFA state 
have committed to non-violence and power sharing, they have not decommis-
sioned their irreconcilable ideological aspirations, nor have they repudiated 
their pasts. What has emerged from this peculiarity is fierce competition over 
how political violence in the pre-GFA state is now represented and interpreted. 
This has seen the past simultaneously framed by competing frameworks as a 
sectarian conflict, as a campaign of ‘terrorism’ and as a war. Ongoing debates 
over the past in the six counties speak to the magnitude in difference between 
the above interpretations in a region that might have moved on from the worst 
of the violence but has not yet effectively addressed its legacy. In the post-GFA 
state, the political and emotive energy previously expended physically fighting 
the conflict has now been channelled into defining what the conflict was about 
and how its legacy should be recorded.
The non-paradigmatic nature of the Northern Ireland transition and the 
lack of a clean break with the past also impacts on the perception of transition 
within peace processes, particularly among constituencies formerly engaged 
in or supportive of political violence. On the one hand, processes of political 
transition are seen as possessing potential to further advance ideological goals 
or revolutionary change.26 On the other hand, a more sceptical reading sees 
them as processes that ultimately end up with the leadership of previously 
excluded groups being co-opted into the hegemonic project of the liberal 
 23 Bell, Campbell and Ni Aolaín, 2004; Campbell and Ni Aolaín, 2005.
 24 McAuliffe, 2011.
 25 Bell, Campbell and Ni Aolaín, 2004.
 26 Elster, 2004, 60.
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state.27 Although these observations have been made about transitional justice 
processes in general, they have a significant relevance to post-GFA Irish repub-
licanism, where views diverge over whether involvement in the transition 
equates with the continuation of armed struggle by other means or co-option 
into the Northern Ireland state that was previously opposed. This in turn has 
created differences of opinion concerning how the promotion of transition by 
former combatants has been played out within Irish republican communities. 
Depending on one’s perspective of the GFA and transition, the driving of 
political transition by former combatants has been interpreted as a positive 
force of change that is advancing peace building or as post-conflict manageri-
alism designed to ease Sinn Féin’s party modernisation by reducing the ambit 
for dissent.28 Disgruntlement like the latter mirrors the discontent seen in 
Algeria and South Africa when transition from conflict to politics failed to 
deliver on promises made by leaderships during conflict.29
Locating itself within the disciplinary spheres of memory studies and 
transitional justice, this book examines the continuing impact of memory in a 
political debate that is intrinsically linked to a wider transitional process. The 
overlap between memory studies and transitional justice that characterises 
this theoretical approach is symptomatic of the wider prevalence that memory 
studies is beginning to enjoy in the study of transitioning societies.30 Scholars 
familiar with both fields will know that there is a common ground on which 
they naturally converge: the past. Memory studies examines collective pasts of 
conflict, suffering and violence, while transitional justice examines how various 
acts of past wrongdoing are addressed following transition from conflict. 
However, there is natural tension too. While memory studies concerns itself 
with the representation of the past from a particular perspective,31 transitional 
justice, on the other hand, must grapple with notions of truth, justice, account-
ability and victimhood that extend beyond a particular group perspective. In 
locating itself within the realms of this inter-play, this book aims to contribute 
to a greater academic understanding of how memory can enhance or impede 
transitional justice processes by framing reform processes with assertions of 
change or continuity, by becoming an ideologised resource to mobilise in 
favour of or opposition to transitional processes, or by underpinning emerging 
demands for post-conflict human rights agendas and demands for truth. The 
book is nonetheless realistic about its aims and scope. It is, after all, an empirical 
 27 Renner and Spencer, 2015.
 28 Shirlow and McEvoy, 2008; Hearty, 2016a; Hearty, 2016c; Whiting 2016.
 29 Fanon, 1967; Mattes, 2002.
 30 Hamber and Wilson, 2002; Brown, 2011. 
 31 Wertsch, 2009, 127.
9Introduction
case study of how one collective in one transitioning society contests the past. 
That said, the empirical and theoretical basis of the book means that the 
observations made and conclusions reached herein may be extrapolated and 
applied to the study of how other collectives in other transitions are wrestling 
particular localised challenges of ‘dealing with the past’, police reform and 
‘spoiler’ activity.
Following on from that latter point, it should be noted that this book 
is primarily an academic study of memory contestation within Irish republi-
canism. The main thrust of the book is to examine the much overlooked and 
under-researched intra-communal dimension to memory politics in Northern 
Ireland. This is not to deny that considerable inter-communal disagreement 
over the past remains – it evidently does. Nonetheless, the remit of this book 
is primarily to move the study of memory politics in Northern Ireland beyond 
a generic, yet flawed,32 ‘two tribes’ approach. As such, it is not intended to 
be a narrative balancing act. It critically examines memory contestation 
beyond easily digestible Orange and Green master narratives to illustrate how 
other less visible binaries such as having ‘moved on’ or being ‘left behind’ by 
transition impacts on how transitional processes and the past are interpreted 
and represented. This approach has admittedly led to the exclusion of other 
memories of policing. Other studies have, however, provided a valuable insight 
from these perspectives; Cheryl Lawther provides insightful academic enquiry 
into Unionist and former RUC perspectives on the policing legacy,33 Aoghan 
Mulcahy has produced a useful study on the organisational memory of the 
RUC34 and Kirk Simpson has researched Unionist memories of the conflict.35 
These provide a fuller examination of divergent narratives not exhaustively 
covered in this book.
At this introductory juncture, a brief methodological note is warranted. 
Data for this book has been drawn from archival sources including the Conflict 
Archive on the Internet (CAIN) and the Northern Ireland Political Collection 
at the Linenhall Library, Belfast, from various Irish republican publications, 
including An Phoblacht, Saoirse, Sovereign Nation and the Starry Plough, from 
existing academic literature and from semi-structured interviews with 30 Irish 
republican former combatants, political activists and community activists. 
Interviewees were drawn from both genders, from different geographical 
locations, from different generations and from across the spectrum within 
modern Irish republicanism, including: those who actively participate in 
 32 Shirlow and McGovern, 1997.
 33 Lawther, 2010; 2014.
 34 Mulcahy, 2000.
 35 Simpson, 2009.
10 Critical Engagement
‘critical engagement’, independent republicans, those from republican parties 
opposed to policing and to ‘spoiler’ violence, those imprisoned before and 
after the GFA, and those from political organisations with a close association 
with ‘spoiler’ groups. This book therefore represents, to borrow from Richard 
English in his study on Irish nationalism, a study of Irish republicanisms rather 
than Irish republicanism.36 Given that the book addresses the legacy of conflict 
and continuing ‘spoiler’ violence in a post-conflict environment where some 
have not bought into transition and where the past has yet to be ‘dealt with’, it 
is perhaps advisable to offer a brief note on the perils of conflating the researcher 
with views espoused by the researched. 
While conducting field research, this author adhered to the principles of 
‘research participant respect’, which involves ‘treating people with dignity 
when we do not condone their beliefs and actions’, ‘searching for their meanings 
and understanding their actions as they see them’ and ‘finding out how they 
view their worlds’.37 Furthermore, John Morrison rightly points out that the 
rationale behind researching political violence is ‘not to condemn or condone’ 
it but to get ‘closer to an understanding’ of the phenomenon.38 Failure to grasp 
this point has led to academics in Northern Ireland having to stave off reckless 
‘fellow traveller’ claims,39 claims of being ‘one of them’40 and ‘guilt by associ-
ation’ claims.41 With this in mind, it is worth clarifying, perhaps somewhat 
unnecessarily, that the aim of this book is not to offer justification or apology 
for past or current Irish republican political violence, nor is it designed to be a 
polemic in favour of or against ‘critical engagement’. This book represents an 
academic study of the role memory played in the policing debate within Irish 
republicanism as told by those in the thick of the debate.
Overview
At this stage in the introduction, a brief synopsis of the chapters that follow is 
required. Chapter 1 sets out the historical context to the relationship between 
Irish republicanism and policing in Northern Ireland. It traces the development 
of divided-society policing in Ireland from the colonial policy of plantation 
that deliberately created a distinction between the privileged ‘planter’ and 
 36 English, 2006.
 37 Charmaz, 2004.
 38 Morrison, 2011, 18.
 39 McEvoy and Shirlow, 2013.
 40 Reed, 2012.
 41 Sluka, 2012, 182. 
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the dispossessed ‘native’. Cognisant of this historical backdrop, it critically 
evaluates how ‘divided-society’ policing impacted on relations between the 
minority Irish nationalist community and the Northern Ireland state after 
partition created a ‘Protestant state for a Protestant people’. The chapter draws 
on archival sources and existing academic work to evaluate how the Irish 
republican approach to policing was ultimately responsive to their changing 
relationship with the Northern Ireland state and changing policing realities on 
the ground in Northern Ireland. 
Although the primary aim of the book is to further the academic under-
standing of intra-communal memory contestation, there is an important 
inter-communal dimension to disagreement over the past in Northern Ireland 
that cannot be overlooked. Chapter 2 therefore highlights how, based on 
observations from Northern Ireland and elsewhere, the collective memory of 
violence and victimhood becomes ‘war by another means’ during transition. It 
examines the counter-memory function that Irish republican policing memory 
assumes in the continuing meta-conflict in Northern Ireland, where dominant 
Unionist, state and RUC narratives attempt to silence Irish republican experi-
ences by monopolising victimhood and apportioning blame for the conflict 
exclusively to Irish republicans. 
Chapter 3 provides an insight into the overarching ideological dimension 
to the policing debate by interrogating how competing views of where Irish 
republicanism is currently at during transition are construed through value-
laden interpretations of where it has come from. As such, the chapter argues 
that ‘critical engagement’ is interpreted through long-held belief systems that 
frame the move in terms of congruence with or contradiction of past ideological 
positions. It posits that there are two contesting mnemonic-ideological models 
for understanding ‘critical engagement’: the ‘progressive republican’ model 
that interprets current Sinn Féin strategy as a change of tactics moving the 
pursuit of ideological goals from an armed struggle to a ‘political struggle’ and 
the ‘constitutional nationalist’ model that interprets Sinn Féin strategy as the 
abandonment of Irish republican principles in favour of a reformist working of 
the partitionist neoliberal Northern Ireland state. This chapter examines the 
interaction between individual and collective memory, as those who subscribe 
to the competing models use their own lived experience to locate their under-
standing within competing master narratives. It also assesses how these master 
narratives contribute to a wider hegemonic battle between the drivers and 
‘spoilers’ of transition within modern Irish republicanism.
Drawing on theoretical and empirical observations on commemoration 
elsewhere, Chapter 4 critically evaluates the role that the collective memory 
of the Irish republican ‘patriot dead’ plays in the wider policing debate. The 
chapter examines how the patriot dead become a useful political resource 
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for competing ‘memory entrepreneurs’42 – those seeking to appropriate and 
monopolise collective memory – to sanctify their current strategies during 
transition, as commemoration becomes a resource for mobilising in support of 
or opposition to transitional processes. It investigates the main components of 
the policing narrative proffered by each ‘side’ in relation to the patriot dead: the 
narrative of ‘critical engagement’ being the extension of the courage shown by 
the dead during armed struggle, and the counter-narrative that endorsement 
of policing represents a self-defeat of the goals for which the dead sacrificed 
themselves. It will also examine how the memory of past armed struggle frames 
competing discourses on continuing post-GFA ‘spoiler’ violence. 
Chapter 5 interrogates the range of views within modern Irish republi-
canism on truth recovery, ‘moving on’ and ‘dealing with the past’. It undertakes 
an examination of how the memory of human rights violations framed the 
policing debate, and how this shaped a master narrative of ‘never again’ whereby 
the value of ‘remembering’ past abuses lies in guarding against future 
repetition. The chapter examines how individuals ‘move on’ in the aftermath 
of such abuse to engage in a new ‘working relationship’ with former enemies. 
It probes the interaction between individual and collective memory, whereby 
individual memories of human rights violations are located within a narrative 
of collective human rights abuse and the tension that exists between individual 
and collective memory when ‘moving on’ at the individual level is a difficult 
process. Examination then turns to recent attempts at addressing the ‘dealing 
with the past’ impasse including the (now defunct) Historical Enquiries Team 
(HET), the Haas/O’Sullivan proposals and the Stormont House Agreement 
(SHA). This allows critical evaluation of how Irish republicans, as a principal 
party to the conflict, approach the difficult issue of ‘dealing with the past’ as 
both collective victims and perpetrators of human rights abuses.
Chapter 6 critically examines how police reform has interacted with 
individual and collective memory to fashion opposing narratives on 
community policing in Northern Ireland. Establishing the overarching 
context of post-conflict police reform within which opposing narratives are 
constructed, the chapter opens with an interrogation of changes in police 
symbolism, police composition and the nature of the core policing function 
of the PSNI. It establishes that there are currently two competing master 
narratives on community policing within modern Irish republicanism: the 
‘critical engagement’ narrative constructed by those in favour of policing 
that uses the memory of past ‘suspect community’ policing to frame itself 
with assertions of newness, change and of the primary policing function now 
 42 Jelin, 2007.
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being to provide a policing service to local communities, and the anti-policing 
counter-narrative of ‘cosmetic reform’ that uses memory in a more ideologised 
manner to dismiss police reform as the normalisation of ‘British’ policing in 
Ireland. Critically evaluating the ‘black-and-white’ views proffered by these 
competing narratives, the chapter draws on the nuances of the overlapping 
‘grey’ areas that define lived reality on the ground in republican communities. 
Viewing this lived reality through competing lenses of continuity and rupture, 
this chapter highlights where aspects of reform have successfully cultivated a 
new image of the PSNI within Irish republican communities and areas where 
reform has been less successful.
Establishing the overarching context of institutional crossover within 
which competing policing narratives are fashioned, Chapter 7 conducts a 
thematic examination of opposing narratives on political policing. The chapter 
interrogates how those supportive of ‘critical engagement’ have constructed 
a narrative that is premised on a notion of rupture seeking to differentiate the 
PSNI from the RUC. In doing so, this narrative will be shown to have drawn 
on thematic tropes including pragmatism and negotiation in a post-conflict 
environment, disaggregating the policing monolith into ‘good’ policing and 
‘bad’ policing, proactively fighting the ‘roll back’ of change, and of police reform 
as a component of an ongoing process of wider equality-based transformation of 
the ‘Orange state’. The chapter will contrast this with the anti-policing narrative 
that is conversely predicated on drawing a line of continuity between the RUC 
and the ‘PSNI/RUC’. It will interrogate how themes like the continued abuse 
of ‘anti-terror’ legislation, the retention of RUC ‘political policing’ methods 
and the refined targeting of Irish republicans by the PSNI frame this narrative. 
It will illuminate how this latter narrative is constructed through ideological 
appeals with a basis in deeper cultural memory that is more conducive to its 
narrative end point, but also how, in a post-9/11 context, it has adopted a wider 
human rights discourse to frame itself within more prevalent global concerns 
of the human rights implications of ‘anti-terror’ provisions and the ongoing 
‘war on terror’. 
Establishing a theoretical framework
Having outlined the context to the Irish republican policing debate, the 
rationale for this book and what each chapter covers, attention now turns to 
providing a theoretical overview that will contextualise the arguments made 
throughout this book. This overview has four strands: the construction of 
collective memory, the role of collective memory during conflict, memory 
contestation during transitional processes and how this all applies to modern 
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Irish republicanism. Each of these strands is vital in their own right, yet they 
also form part of a necessarily collective overview. If the arguments made 
throughout this book are to be truly understood, it is necessary to appre-
ciate the cumulative theoretical underpinnings to them. The phenomenon of 
memory itself must be grasped before its application can be robustly critiqued. 
Any adequate understanding of the role that memory played within the Irish 
republican policing debate must be preceded by a sufficient awareness of the 
dynamics that lie behind memory construction. Likewise, familiarity with the 
dynamics that underline collective memory during conflict and the changing 
dimensions transition out of conflict brings to this, are prerequisites to appre-
ciating fully the particularities of memory contestation within contemporary 
Irish republicanism. In essence, this overview represents a theoretical skeleton 
that is fleshed out with empirical data and further original argument throughout 
the chapters of this book. 
The construction of memory
Memory is not a pre-existent entity that neatly defines our past experiences 
or validates our own historical perception of who and what we are. It does 
not exist in this sense. Memory, rather, is constructed through cultural and 
social processes. These processes incorporate commemoration, memoriali-
sation and narration as building blocks to define who we are, where we have 
come from and, more often than not, where we are headed. For Pierre Nora, 
‘memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains in 
permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, 
unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and 
susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revised’.43 Memory, then, 
is formed through the dualities of ‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’, with an 
understanding of ‘remembering’ premised on a mutual understanding of 
‘forgetting’.44 Thus memory comprises the positive (that which we actively 
‘remember’, narrate and commemorate) and the negative (that which we 
‘forget’, silence and erase). The intrinsic importance of ‘forgetting’ to the 
mnemonic process means that ‘full memory’ is an illusion.45 In transitioning 
societies where there is a need to ‘construct collective memory’,46 the fallacy 
of ‘full memory’ is particularly jarring.47 
 43 Nora, 1989.
 44 Connerton, 2009.
 45 Jelin, 2003, 16.
 46 Teitel, 2000, 116.
 47 Osiel, 1997.
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To appreciate fully the dialectics of ‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’, it is 
imperative to acknowledge that the primary function of memory is to provide a 
‘usable’ past – that being ‘an account of events and actors that can be harnessed 
for some purpose in the present’.48 Thus we ‘remember’ all that is required for 
a ‘usable’ past and ‘forget’ that which has no place in this preferred account. 
‘Structural amnesia’ expunges that which has no currency in present inter-
ests.49 Memory becomes favourable to who we regard ourselves to be in the 
present, whether this entails selective ‘remembering’ or wholesale ‘forgetting’. 
The practical applicability of this to the memory politicking of competing 
hegemons in an ever-changing political landscape such as Northern Ireland 
cannot be overstated.
But, if memory is constructed for present consumption through the 
processes of ‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’, who then determines what to 
‘remember’ and what to ‘forget’? One school of thought argues that the only 
‘genuine memory’ is the memory of the individual, as groups do not have a 
common mind capable of direct memory.50 By this reading, collective memory 
can be seen as the means through which the collective – or those at its apex – 
coaxes the individual into distorting, revising and changing their individual 
memories to adhere to the collective master narrative. Collective memory can, 
after all, make individuals ‘remember’ events they have no experience of and 
‘forget’ others they have direct experience of.51 In subscribing to collective 
memory the individual commits to ‘complex negotiations about what is 
acceptable and what is to be silenced, what can and cannot be said in the 
disjunctions between private narratives and public discourses’.52 However, it 
must be acknowledged that group membership is dependent on the individual 
giving assent – they can of course withhold this.53 If the individual finds that 
their individual memory is so overwhelmingly incongruous with the collective 
master narrative, they can step ‘outside’ the group and create counter-memory. 
Options beyond mere acceptance of the dominant master narrative of the group 
do exist. Furthermore, willingness to articulate personal experience through, 
and marry it with, collective memory can exist. Rather than being a process of 
competition and displacement, the process can be seen as one of interaction 
between the individual and the collective.54 This suggests a mutual interaction 
 48 Wertsch, 2002, 31.
 49 Tota, 2001.
 50 Khazanov and Payne, 2008.
 51 Olick, 1999.
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 53 Gook, 2011.
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premised on a give–take relationship paradigm where memory is constructed 
pluralistically through social processes. This is reflective of the worldly reality 
that it is virtually impossible to live life in total solitude; meaning that when 
we ‘remember’ we must therefore recall in some form other people and factors 
external to our being that have featured in or shaped our past experiences. 
Those external to our being will also inevitably recall these events and experi-
ences too. This is the embryonic basis upon which a wider, more substantial 
collective memory is formed. 
This line of reasoning is famously evinced by Maurice Halbwachs, the 
most notable exponent of collective memory. Halbwachs contends that while 
memory may reside within the individual ‘it is in society that people normally 
acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognise and 
localise their memories’.55 Paul Connerton has expanded on this to emphasise 
the role that the collective can play in helping individuals ‘remember’. He 
argues: ‘if I recall something that is because others incite me to recall it, because 
their memory comes to the aid of mine and mine finds support in theirs’.56 No 
matter how individualistically personal a recollection may seem, then, it is still 
influenced by external social factors such as date, place and others present. 
The role of the collective in helping flesh out the memory of the individual is 
evidenced in the remarks of one interviewee who alluded to discussions they 
had with family and friends about the past:
When we’re in our own gang of friends from the past – ‘Do you remember 
that night such and such happened’. Incidents with UDR and RUC, you 
know. I’d remember most of the names and I certainly remember all of 
the faces because they were so horrible – you’ll always remember that! I’ll 
never forget them. But you know other things – maybe some of the where 
you were going, ‘do you remember when you were going to such and such a 
disco?’ and I’m thinking, ‘Jesus I forgot all about that’.57
Moreover, individuals belong to ‘mnemonic communities’.58 When individuals 
‘remember’ they do so not solely as an individual but as a member of a 
particular social class, national collective, generation, family etc. As such, 
collective memory can assume a communicative value whereby it proffers a 
common denominator understanding of the past that binds individuals in these 
 collectives. This common denominator is shaped by external social factors, 
 55 Halbwachs and Coser, 1992, 38.
 56 Connerton, 1989, 36.
 57 AB, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
 58 Kansteiner, 2002.
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cultural factors and collective needs It invests symbols, myths and memories 
with a sense of commonality that deflects from internal variance by creating 
a sense of togetherness among those identifying with the shared past they 
engender, and a sense of hostility towards those foreign to this shared past.59 
Subscription to this shared past underpins the personal, familial, communal, 
ethnic or national identities individuals simultaneously possess.60
By dint of membership of ‘mnemonic communities’, we come to possess 
‘the ability to experience events that happened to groups and communities to 
which we belong long before we joined them’.61 The collective past, whether 
personally experienced or not, becomes part of the individual’s identity as an 
indistinguishable component of their own past. This is particularly relevant 
in relation to collective memories of historical injury and injustice. Holocaust 
memory, for example, continues to impact heavily on the identity of secular 
Western Jews with no personal connection to the horrors of Nazism, even 
decades after the original horror.62 More specifically to Northern Ireland, not 
every Nationalist witnessed, has first-hand experience of or was personally 
affected by Bloody Sunday, yet, through social interaction with the wider milieu 
and the dynamics of identity politics, they collectively ‘remember’ it as part of 
a ‘community of memory’.63 Collective memory of this nature can also be used 
to give political meaning to and contextualise the exigencies of the present. 
Collectives come to view the struggles, dangers and enemies of today through 
the prism of the struggles, dangers and enemies of yesterday. For example, 
a culture of resistance and suffering has informed Palestinian narratives of 
struggle from the Nakba to the first intifada through to the present conflict.64 
The other side of this coin is that the ancient siege of Masada continues to 
inform modern Israeli narratives of defence against a foreign enemy.65 When 
one moves beyond the cultural and social dimensions of memory and into the 
purely politicised domain of memory politics, this becomes incredibly potent 
– especially in contexts where collectives are emerging from political violence 
and grappling with the new challenges transition poses. When faced with the 
demands of transition, the urge to frame these challenges with reference to 
the collective past of struggle and sacrifice is irresistible. In seeking to marry 
their current positions, strategies and self-image during the transitional period 
 59 Smith, 1996.
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with those held during the conflict, political elites become extremely adept at 
mastering the processes of ‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’. 
Collective memory during conflict
Collective memory underpins communal identity during ethno-nationalist 
conflict – something particularly relevant in Northern Ireland as ‘the archetype 
of a society deeply divided by collective identity conflict’.66 Ties of kinship 
and common experience become magnified in the face of the threat from 
the ‘other’. For Irish republicans, the threat from the ‘other’ was bifurcated: 
that from the internal six counties ethno-nationalist ‘other’ (the Protestant/
Unionist/Loyalist constituency) and from the external occupying ‘other’ 
(the British Army). The harsh realities of ethno-nationalist conflict create the 
context whereby communities lead their lives within polarised confines. This 
polarisation means that life is, by necessity, conducted on the basis of cognitive 
maps of ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ places.67 The divisive premise of ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ 
survives by dint of the fact that education, housing, employment and sociali-
sation occur along these defined lines. The conflict is understood through 
‘us/them’ binaries, meaning that the importance of knowing who a person 
is and what ‘side’ they belong to becomes exponentially heightened. In the 
North of Ireland, this gave rise to the curious process of ‘telling’; using name, 
place of residence, phonetics and (somewhat bizarrely) physical appearance to 
determine to which community a person belongs.68 To know who you stand 
with is then to know where you stand. Leading life in the midst of the ‘in 
group’, being educated, housed and, in a way, developed with those of our own 
ilk, cocoons us from the potential harms of the ‘out group’. The benefit may be 
communal safety but at the price of almost total exclusion from the ‘other’. This 
exclusion conditions how we interpret the conflict and its origins, causes and 
consequences.
Within such destructive environs, you will identify with your group and 
view harm against the ‘other’ as a form of self-defence. Collectives adopt an 
inward-looking view of injury inflicted during the conflict, as the ‘collective 
self ’ becomes the victim of the ‘collective other’.69 The ‘genealogy of the 
dead’ collectivises death and suffering because the individual victim killed by 
‘them’ is tied to place, community, narrative and group, making the harm a 
 66 Aiken, 2013.
 67 Shirlow, 2003b.
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 69 Shirlow, 2003a.
19Introduction
‘collective act of defilement’.70 Perceptions of collective guilt allow the violent 
events of the conflict to be viewed through the axis of the ‘abuser’ and the 
‘abused’.71 This notion of the ‘abuser’ and the ‘abused’ enables happenings to 
be linked together, even where no causal link exists. As Spillman and Conway 
highlight, the memory of Bloody Sunday is ‘widespread and powerful’, with 
the event now being placed in protracted conflict narratives that link it to 
other events like Bloody Friday.72 No direct causal link exists per se, but in 
the intricate weaving together of communal narratives of the conflict a link 
can nonetheless be fabricated to lay the blame at the door of the ‘other’. The 
implication of this is that collectives selectively construct a master narrative 
of the conflict that locates fault and blame with the ‘other’. These master narra-
tives of the conflict relate ‘the causes for its outbreak, the reason for its lack of 
resolution, the major events that shaped the conflict, particularly malevolent 
acts perpetrated by the adversary and the sacrifices that the in group incurred 
during the conflict, including its heroes’ sacrifices. These beliefs are one-sided 
and selective’.73 Whilst, as Bruce acknowledges, narratives of ‘they started 
it’ seem infantile, they nonetheless serve ‘to make people feel better about 
their own sins’.74 In facilitating selective finger-pointing and clouded moral 
judgement of the ‘other’, collective memory functions to exonerate the ‘in 
group’ as the ‘abused’ because they are, after all, ‘us’ and ‘safe’, and to condemn 
the ‘other’ for their role in the conflict as they are the ‘abuser’, ‘them’ and 
‘unsafe’.
In an ‘us versus them’ environment, communal solidarity embeds itself into 
the wider collective, amplifying the commonality of shared past experience. 
In the face of threat from the ‘other’, this commonality of background, past 
experiences and culture transforms the community into ‘a source of collective 
organisation and survival’.75 External threats push the ‘in group’ closer 
together, allowing any internal heterogeneity to be overlooked through magni-
fying difference from the ‘other’. This is not confined to the North of Ireland. 
Merridale, for example, highlights how the violent excesses of Nazism ‘united’ 
the Soviet people in a ‘common cause’ during the ‘Great Patriotic War’.76 The 
threat of the ‘other’ largely precludes any intra-communal questioning of 
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master narratives as ‘guilt transfer’ and ‘group think’ prevail.77 The narrative 
as related by ‘us’, who share the same communal experience, is accepted and 
repeated unquestioningly, whilst that told by ‘them’ is dismissed, contested 
and repudiated. In the North of Ireland, this meant that during the zenith of 
conflict there was what equated to wholesale internal acceptance of master 
narratives. Shanahan ventures as far as to argue that the Irish republican 
narrative on the outbreak of conflict ‘has been repeated so often that it goes 
largely unquestioned, especially by working class Catholics, the republican 
movement’s main audience’.78
Collective memory during transition
When the shackles of conflict loosen and the perceived threat of the ‘other’ is 
no longer as pressing, scope opens to ‘remember’ differently than during the 
highly strung ‘us versus them’ environment of conflict. Suspicion of the ‘other’ 
does of course remain – they are, as Karstedt notes, ‘still enemies’.79 In Northern 
Ireland, this has been most notable in post-conflict politicking over perceived 
attempts by the ‘other’ to deny ‘us’ communal identity, cultural recognition or 
acknowledgement of victimhood. High-profile instances of this have caused a 
hasty retreat from the ‘middle ground’ back into polarised trenches at certain 
key junctures. Consequently, divisive issues like flags, parading, symbols and 
victimhood become re-politicised during transition as dominant ethno-nation-
alist elites use them to set ‘the limits to compromise’.80 
Post-conflict contextual change, nonetheless, develops new critical 
narrative space. Whilst contestation naturally continues in some vein on 
an inter-communal basis, a new intra-communal questioning of collective 
memories and master narratives also surfaces. When the threat of the ‘other’ 
subsides, ‘us’ no longer retains the same value, meaning that hitherto masked 
heterogeneities emerge and mature. The commonality of past experience, 
rather than being a unifying factor, now becomes a battleground for hegemons 
intent on using the collective past to legitimise their current position. In South 
Africa, the collective memory of the black liberation struggle is contested by a 
number of schools who accuse the African National Congress (ANC) of using 
it to strengthen their hegemony.81 In transitioning Argentina, the human rights 
movement had to reflect on its own internal cleavages, resulting in differences 
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that had previously been contained eventually forcing a split in Las Madres de 
la Plaza de Mayo.82 Internal division surfaced among Greek-Cypriots following 
inter-ethnic conflict, with hegemonic rivals in Dimokratikos Synagermos and 
Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú proffering their own narrative of the 
conflict.83 Observations like the above are easily extrapolated to post-conflict 
Northern Ireland, where there has been an unprecedented fragmentation of 
previously tight knit collectives. In addition to the previously outlined unpar-
alleled fissuring identified within modern Irish republicanism, contemporary 
Unionism and post-conflict loyalism have witnessed continuing division, 
splitting and internal feuding.84 The growth of intra-communal division during 
transitional periods is symptomatic of the fact that ‘during an armed conflict 
we need to know where we stand, who is the enemy, who is the ally. Now that 
the period of armed conflict is drawing to a close, we… move beyond such 
black and white thinking’.85
Transition out of political violence allows reflection on the violence 
inflicted by ‘us’ not only on ‘them’ but on those within the ‘in group’ too. 
In Northern Ireland, the Ardoyne Commemorative Project asked tough 
questions about intra-communal violence, as well as that committed by the 
state and ‘other’.86 A dimension opens up for deep probing questions previously 
gagged by communal loyalty to now be asked. New victims and voices emerge 
to pose difficult unanswered questions about the conflict.87 These voices come 
from within the ‘in group’, where periods of gestation and reflection facilitate a 
deeper examination than the unthinking reaction typical during the conflict. 
When we reflect on events post-conflict, we are no longer blinded by the threat 
of the ‘other’ and can take a different reading of taken-for-granted versions of the 
past. Even narratives once considered unassailable, such as the Irish republican 
master narrative on the 1981 hunger strike, are prone to internal challenge.88 
This creates ‘increased struggle over the meaning of the past’, reflecting the 
friction between reluctance to abandon old beliefs and values and the necessity 
to ‘refashion’ memories for ‘new interpretations’ in a ‘new era’.89 There will 
inevitably be a degree of tension between the old, traditional meanings and 
interpretations that were prominently held during the conflict and these new 
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interpretations more apposite to a post-conflict environment. This tension is 
channelled into dichotomous positions adopted by competing hegemons who 
use the past to justify their current position and to  simultaneously undermine 
that of their rivals. 
Intra-communal memory contestation is not limited to the memory 
politicking of elites vying for hegemonic influence within their collective. It 
can also manifest itself at grassroots level where victims may oppose what 
they perceive to be attempts to ‘forget’ and move on. In post-conflict societies 
‘the hardening of feelings of revenge and anger may be seen as one method 
of keeping faith with the dead in not allowing the injury to be forgotten or 
trivialised’.90 Reconciling these feelings with transitional ‘moving on’ agendas 
is a mammoth task. Where the task falters, contestation over the past thrives, 
complicated further by the fact that those in political power (invariably those 
driving ‘moving on’ agendas) allow those voices that strike the same chord as 
‘moving on’ agendas to have the loudest hearing. In tandem with this, there is 
an attempt to suppress subaltern voices opposing ‘moving on’ agendas or new 
interpretations of the past. However, memory remains an outlet to challenge 
this hegemonic activity. Where hegemons fail to silence dissenting voices, 
memory becomes a tool of resistance for those ‘left behind’ by transition to 
challenge transitional ‘moving on’ processes and hegemonic accounts of the 
past.91
Mnemonic contestation within modern Irish republicanism
These observations are highly relevant to contemporary Irish republicanism. 
Transition in the North of Ireland has witnessed the majority of Irish repub-
licans abandoning armed struggle (or at least supporting abandonment moves) 
and embracing purely political means. There is nonetheless a significant, and 
growing, minority – both violent and non-violent – within the constituency 
who have been ‘left behind’ by transition. They have not bought into Sinn 
Féin’s political project, have not engaged with transitional processes and have 
sought to tear up the ‘moving on’ script in Northern Ireland. The emergence 
of an ideological rearguard opposed to transition has fuelled a whirlwind of 
mnemonic contestation within modern Irish republicanism. Given the extent 
of division evident in the earlier examination of the multifarious groups now 
in existence, it seems impossible to argue with meaningful conviction that any 
Irish republican master narrative can adequately represent the cacophony of 
 90 McLernon, Cairns, Hewstone and Smith, 2004.
 91 Rigney, 2008.
23Introduction
multitudinous Irish republican voices shouting to be heard in the twenty-first 
century.
This disagreement is problematic, least not due to the fact that ‘repub-
licans have often been described as having their own insular … worldview 
that brooks no dissent from within and recognises as valid no critique from 
without’.92 Compounding this is the fact that the Provisional narrative has, 
from the earliest stages of the conflict, been synonymous with ‘a fervent 
rejection of any other political group’s ability to represent the Nationalist 
community’.93 Despite having to contend with the Officials and latterly the 
IRSP, the Provisional movement managed to attain relative hegemony within 
republican communities. Despite this hegemony, Jon Tonge argues that the 
Irish republican constituency has traditionally been ‘an eclectic, non-cohesive 
body’, giving it a heterogeneity that invariably leaves it susceptible to splitting 
on major policy issues when the prospect of ‘compromise’ arises.94 It is this 
historical curse of compromise that fuels mnemonic contestation because 
the various anti-policing schools of Irish republicanism deride the Sinn Féin 
leadership for defaulting on past ideological positions. The further Sinn Féin 
travels down the path of post-conflict transition, the heavier condemnation 
becomes – whether that be from militant ‘spoilers’ or from those with leftist 
political opposition. Policy changes during transition are viewed with one 
eye turned towards the past, and although the Sinn Féin leadership has kept 
most of its supporters on board there have been significant departures at 
crucial junctures during the transitional process. Foremost among these was 
the decision to endorse policing and the criminal justice system in the North of 
Ireland – a decision that fostered division even within Irish republican families 
on the matter.95
It is within these broader theoretical parameters that this book will examine 
the memory politics of the Irish republican debate on policing. It will employ 
the theoretical framework outlined in this introduction to determine how and 
why mnemonic contestation continues to define political disagreement over 
the transition within the wider Irish republican constituency today.
 92 Shanahan, 2009, 41.
 93 Wright, 1991, 126.
 94 Tonge, 2004.
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Introduction
This chapter traces the historical development of the changing relationship 
between Irish republicans and the various police forces that have upheld the rule 
of law in the North of Ireland. Accepting that there is an inherent link between 
state legitimacy and police legitimacy, it traces how changing relations with 
policing mirrored changing relations with the state. Views of policing are, after 
all, shaped within broader ‘value systems’ that include perceptions of state insti-
tutions and the political system that decrees the rule of law that the police force 
enforces.1 Building on that observation, this chapter will critically examine how 
the Irish republican position on the legitimacy of policing evolved in tandem 
with a changing political world view of the Northern Ireland state. Many of 
the issues later examined in greater detail are initially established herein; an 
understanding of that examination relies on grasping the trajectory of a wider 
changing relationship identified in this chapter. Rather than being an immediate 
or exhaustive exploration of those issues, this chapter sets out a framework that 
draws on the development of divided-society policing in Northern Ireland and 
the Sinn Féin process of buying into the post-GFA Northern Ireland state in 
order to contextualise the arguments made later in this book.
‘Planters and natives’
To truly comprehend the fraught historical relationship between Irish repub-
licanism and policing, it is necessary to begin with the seventeenth-century 
British colonial policy of plantation: that of dispossessing and displacing the 
 1 Albrecht and Green, 1977.
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hostile Irish Catholic native and redistributing their land to imported loyal 
Protestants of English and Scottish extraction. Ross notes that early narratives 
about plantation were constructed along obvious fault lines, notably a narrative 
of civilisation and advancement, and a competing narrative of displacement 
and dispossession.2 Consequently, competing ethno-nationalist narratives 
have across generations corresponded to diametrically opposed frameworks. 
For Unionist descendants of the ‘planter’ it is one of providential delivery from 
the repeated threat of Catholic rebellion, while for Nationalist descendants of 
the ‘native’ it has been a redemptive one to atone for centuries of heroic defeats.3 
These recurring motifs of repelled assaults while under siege and avenging 
historical defeats created narrative friction that persists today.4 The privileging 
of the ‘planter’ over the ‘native’ heightened religious and political tension, giving 
subsequent conflict an unmistakeable ethno-nationalist flavour. Although 
often erroneously portrayed in simple sectarian terms, political violence in 
the six counties was ethno-nationalist in nature; religion is the most pointed 
to fault line of division (particularly by external observers subscribing to the 
British state narrative) even though competing claims to self-determination, 
competing national allegiances and competing narratives of persecution 
also underpinned disharmony. O’Leary and McGarry argue that plantation 
created a context whereby three different nationalities (Irish, Scottish and 
English), three different religions (Catholic, Presbyterian and Anglican) and 
three different cultures collided in the ‘ethnic frontier’ of Ulster.5 Within time 
this division manifested itself around competing national (Irish and British) 
and religious (Catholic and Protestant) identities, setting in motion a trend 
that would see conflict-era Northern Ireland become ‘a site of twin nation-
building failures’ and a ‘site of two competing sovereignty claims, each of 
which is morally problematic and legally contestable’.6 However, while they 
recognise the colonial origins of the conflict, they have also rejected the colonial 
framing of later conflict. This is premised on a ‘moral statute of limitations’ that 
prevents later generations being held responsible for the conquests of their 
ancestors.7 Of course, while the descendants of the original ‘planters’ cannot 
be charged with creating the systems of inequality they inherited, it is not 
irrational either to argue that they did little to address the inequality inherent 
in these systems when they were gifted control of the Northern Ireland state. 
 2 Ross, 2007, 99.
 3 McBride, 2001, 16.
 4 McDonagh, 1983.
 5 O’Leary and McGarry, 1993, 83.
 6 McGarry and O’Leary, 1995, 348.
 7 McGarry and O’Leary, 1996.
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If anything, they moved to entrench their inherited dominance more deeply. 
O’Leary and McGarry argue further that the doctrines of Irish Nationalism 
and Ulster Unionism that defined later political disagreement and shaped 
competing national identities, were not even conceived at the time of the Ulster 
plantation.8 In rejecting a colonial framing of later conflict, they have offered 
some thoughtful insights into other interpretations, including one that sees the 
conflict as one of competing nationalities fought between Ireland and Britain 
in the Northern ‘ethnic frontier’ that ended in failed state-building projects 
for both the British and Irish.9 Notwithstanding this, insider researchers like 
Mac Ionnrachtaigh, and critical leftists like Scraton, have sympathy with 
neo-colonial interpretations of the conflict.10 This is, of course, an entirely 
legitimate academic position to adopt and it is not one that this author seeks 
to challenge. 
On one level, the plantation policy was reflective of the macro-level 
infighting among contenders to British imperial power. On another level, it 
had particular strategic relevance in Ulster because it was the last centre of 
Irish resistance to English rule.11 Deliberately privileging the ‘planter’ created 
the context whereby:
A relation of mutual dependence developed between Britain, who needed 
Protestant support to secure its own control, and Protestants, who needed 
British support to maintain their position. To hold Ireland for the Crown, 
Protestants had to be accorded power in Ireland; thus British dominance 
over Ireland was further reflected in Protestant dominance within Ireland.12 
The heavy concentration of the plantation policy in Ulster meant that, by 
1705, 93 per cent of land in eight of the nine Ulster counties was in ‘planter’ 
hands.13 The fact that the dominant ‘planter’ was instructed to remain detached 
from the disloyal ‘native’ population inculcated a siege mentality that set the 
two peoples and their respective world-views on a collision course. This siege 
mentality, along with the rhetorical myth of the dangerous ‘native’, became 
the basis on which the ‘planter’ would arm themselves to protect, at all cost, 
the preponderance of their interests over those of the dispossessed ‘native’.14 
 8 O’Leary and McGarry, 1993, 55.
 9 McGarry and O’Leary, 1995, 352.
 10 Mac Ionnrachtaigh, 2013.
 11 Smith, 2011, 27.
 12 Ruane and Todd, 1996, 12.
 13 Smith, 2011, 27.
 14 McIntosh, 1999, 16.
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This arming of the ‘planter’ was accompanied by the systematic use of the rule 
of law to formally privilege the settler over the indigenous. It was within this 
environment that the ‘planter’, and subsequent generations of their descendants, 
would find affinity with and maintain ownership over militias and police forces 
tasked with upholding laws that enshrined their privilege over the ‘native’ into 
the established order. 
In addition to enforcing ‘planter’ privilege, these early-style militias also 
became the bulwark of a drastic state response to even the merest stirrings of 
rebellion in Ireland. Dermot Walsh observes that police forces in Ireland were 
‘always armed and always ready to respond to any hint of rebellion’ by the disaf-
fected ‘native’ population.15 Differentiating the early development of policing 
in Ireland from that in Britain, Jessie Blackbourn further notes:
Policing in Ireland was used to crack down on political dissent, principally 
to prevent any attempt by nationalists in Ireland to secede from the Union. 
Policing was therefore used to retain Ireland’s status as a colony of Britain. 
In contrast, there was no such violent threat in Britain; the police were 
engaged to investigate and prevent ordinary crime.16
By the nineteenth century, the British government would invoke what would 
later transpire to be their principal modus operandi of using the guise of 
‘special disturbances’ to saturate certain areas with military and police.17 In 
consequence, sporadic episodes of Fenian and Young Irelander violence were 
followed by expansive emergency provisions that effectively penalised the 
‘native’ population in its entirety. 
The Act of Union 1800 statutorily entrenched Britain’s colonial domain 
over Ireland, and, with this, further sustained ‘planter’ privilege. The political 
lexicon in Ireland duly altered as the terms ‘Unionist’ and ‘Nationalist’ came 
to supplant ‘planter’ and ‘native’. When the Union came under threat, so too 
did Protestant interests. Unionist dominance in the North East of the country 
was sustained by holding political and economic clout in this highly industri-
alised region – a region decidedly more advanced than the rest of the country.18 
Unionists in Ulster also had an affinity with one another that they did not have 
with those of ‘planter’ stock elsewhere.19 Thus it was in Ulster that Unionists 
exhibited the greatest willingness to arm themselves in defence of the Union. 
 15 Walsh, 1998, 6.
 16 Blackbourn, 2015, 124.
 17 Breathnach, 1974, 24.
 18 Smith, 2011, 27.
 19 Ruane and Todd, 1996, 49.
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As early as the mid-nineteenth century, Unionists could muster 125,000 men 
in Ulster willing to defend their interests.20 This would intensify during the 
‘Home Rule crisis’ of the early twentieth century, when Unionist mobilisation 
reached its zenith with the signing of the Ulster Covenant and establishment 
of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) militia. The ‘Home Rule crisis’ tempo-
rarily abetted when war broke out on the continent – that was until a group of 
rebels launched an attack against the British presence in Ireland during Easter 
1916. Although a spectacular military failure, the event would spark a renewal 
of Nationalist fervour. Sinn Féin stormed to electoral success in the 1918 
general election. Refusing to participate in a British parliament, they convened 
the revolutionary Dáil Éireann as the legitimate government of Ireland in 
anticipation of an intensive guerrilla campaign by the IRA. The increase in 
such violence in the years immediately preceding partition witnessed renewed 
Unionist mobilisation. The UVF were resurrected in 1919, due partly to the 
fact that Unionists in Ulster believed the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) and 
British Army were incapable of protecting Protestant Ulster from the levels 
of IRA violence seen elsewhere.21 Acutely aware of the imperative to protect 
their self-interests, Unionists in Ulster sought to take as much security and 
political power away from Dublin Castle and silo it in the more favourable 
climes of Belfast, where it was better placed for such a purpose.22 A somewhat 
paradoxical relationship existed between Unionists in Ulster and the RIC; 
although innately suspicious of the mainly Catholic force (and of Dublin Castle 
officials whom it was believed would have no qualms about selling out Ulster’s 
interests for political expediency), those members of the force based in Ulster 
tended to share Unionist sympathies.23 Shared sympathies meant there was 
no RIC intervention against, or opposition to, the reorganisation, training 
and arming of the UVF.24 This was matched by a reluctance to use emergency 
provisions to intercede against the sectarian violence and intimidation increas-
ingly exercised by Unionist mobs in Belfast. 
Although far from an exhaustive account of the development of policing 
and the rule of law in pre-partition Ireland, this overview nonetheless points to 
the emergence of early trends: ownership of policing and the rule of law being 
concentrated in Unionist hands, a penchant for reflecting this through misap-
plication of emergency provisions against those deemed subversive by the 
state, and willingness to use legal and, if deemed necessary, extra-legal means 
 20 Rose, 1971, 79.
 21 Hezlet, 1973, 11.
 22 Farrell, 1983, 36.
 23 Farrell, 1983, 18.
 24 Breathnach, 1974, 65.
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to uphold self-interests. These trends would become more apparent following 
partition and the creation of ‘a Protestant state for a Protestant people’ in 
Northern Ireland.
The Protestant state
The Government of Ireland Act 1920 created two regional parliaments: one in 
Dublin and one in Belfast for the six North Eastern counties later to become 
the Northern Ireland state.25 The Anglo-Irish treaty of December 1921, 
between the IRA and British, superseded the 1920 Act by creating an Irish Free 
State, but with a provision that allowed the predominantly Unionist Northern 
parliament to opt out. Partition was, as Ruane and Todd note, ‘an attempt to 
accommodate, rather than to transcend or resolve, the historic conflicts on 
the island’.26 Mac Ionnrachtaigh views partition as a colonial intervention 
that created ‘the northern settler-colonial statelet’ bordering a Free State that 
‘continued neo-colonial administrative rule in indigenous form’.27 The treaty 
was a source of division among Irish republicans, who split along the lines of 
pragmatic acceptance of the Free State on offer and ideological rejection due 
to the exclusion of the six Northern counties. A bitter civil war ensued, ending 
in victory for the pro-treaty Free State forces. The IRA’s capacity and organi-
sational strength sharply declined as increasing numbers subsequently broke 
away to engage in constitutional politics and the political life of the Free State.28
Partition left Irish republicans in a political vortex. Two states now existed 
on the island of Ireland, neither of which they deemed legitimate; one presided 
over by traitorous former comrades, the other by Unionists. Viewing the Free 
State (which became a de facto republic following the 1937 constitution and 
was officially declared a republic under the Republic of Ireland Act 1948 but 
was (and is) pejoratively still referred to as the Free State by Irish republicans) 
as partitionist, and therefore illegitimate, Irish republicans withheld formal 
participation in the state. The Free State, for its part, showed little tolerance for 
this ‘internal subversion’.29 It enacted emergency legislation like the Offences 
against the State Act and the Unlawful Organisations Order to intern, jail 
and ultimately execute Irish republicans.30 Subtle differences in rejection of 
 25 Smith, 2011, 30.
 26 Ruane and Todd, 1996, 48.
 27 Mac Ionnrachtaigh, 2013, 30.
 28 Bowyer Bell, 1997.
 29 Walsh, 1998, 7.
 30 Ó Broin, 2009, 196.
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the Free State and the Northern Ireland state are nonetheless detectible; IRA 
orders eventually prohibited the use of force against the Free State, Sinn Féin 
had their first meaningful tryst with constitutional politics here by dropping 
abstentionism in 1986, and they built an alliance with the Dublin Government 
in the pan-Nationalist front of the 1990s. By the time of the IRA’s ‘Border 
Campaign’ (1956–62), it was apparent that any military activity by the IRA 
would be directed at targets in the Northern state.31
For Unionists, partition brought long-term hegemony and political 
ascendancy in the new state. The inbuilt demographic Protestant majority was 
used simultaneously to uphold pre-existing Unionist privilege and to subjugate 
the ‘disloyal’ Catholic minority community. Commenting on the unassailable 
position partition afforded Unionists, Breathnach argues that ‘the new 
parliament gradually showed the tyrannical potential inherent in its peculiar 
two-against-one democracy. Through nepotism, jobbery, local representation, 
the civil service, education, housing, the trade unions and the cultural and 
economic spheres, the Catholic minority was gradually ghettoised’.32 James 
Whyte is more measured on the matter, arguing that claims ranged from ‘the 
deepest black’ Nationalist assertions that discrimination was the bedrock of 
the state to the ‘purest white’ Unionist denials.33 Although Whyte refused 
to endorse Nationalist claims of systemic discrimination in every sphere of 
governance, he nonetheless accepted that discrimination did occur – the issue of 
contention for him was to what extent it could wholly or partly explain Catholic 
disadvantage. Institutional exclusion left Catholics – whether Irish republican 
or Nationalist (or neither) – in a precarious position. It is perhaps useful to draw 
out slightly the differences between Irish republicans and Nationalists at this 
point. Although both largely emanate from among the Catholic community, 
that constituency is not a homogenous political bloc. Dixon’s differentiation 
is that ‘the term “nationalist” is often used to describe someone who aspires 
to a united Ireland but is opposed to the use of violence to achieve it, while 
a “republican” often shares much of the analysis of the “nationalist” but is 
prepared to use violence’.34 Although there is broad agreement on the ‘national 
question’, arcane differences developed due to Nationalists accepting tacitly 
the principle of majority consent, seeing Unionist objection to Irish unity as 
grounded in real fear and viewing British government policy towards Ireland 
as neutral, while Irish republicans held more purist views of self-determination, 
saw Unionists as the dupes of British colonialism and regarded British policy 
 31 Sanders, 2011, 10.
 32 Breathnach, 1974, 101.
 33 Whyte, 1983, 29.
 34 Dixon, 2008, 6.
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as strategic and imperialist.35 These differences became more apparent with the 
emergence of various power-sharing and joint authority initiatives. 
The Irish republican view of policing in Northern Ireland, at this point, is 
intrinsically shaped by their wider view of the Northern Ireland state. The state 
was regarded as a colonial product ‘brought about by the violence and brute 
force of the British Empire and its Orange-Unionist henchmen in “Northern 
Ireland” between 1920/22’.36 The IRA subsequently began to articulate its 
political rejection of this colonial entity through sporadic political violence, 
although even their most concerted effort, the ‘Border Campaign’, never 
remotely threatened the life of the Northern Ireland state.37 While episodic 
and poorly organised, this violence nonetheless provided the Unionist regime 
with the opportunity to unleash draconian legislation and a formidable security 
apparatus on anyone dissenting from the Protestant supremacy that epitomised 
the state. The Stormont administration afforded itself more draconian legislation 
to face down this violence than the British had equipped themselves with when 
facing pre-partition IRA violence.38 Even when violence waned, the Stormont 
administration froze emergency provisions into the normal legal structure 
rather than revoking them. Walsh observes that while IRA violence never posed 
‘any real threat’, it ineluctably drew an ‘invariably severe and militarily orien-
tated’ state response.39 Emergency legislation was quickly used to curtail any 
semblance of political affinity with or support for Irish republicanism – violent 
or otherwise. Commemorative parades celebrating 1916 were outlawed by the 
Stormont regime under the Special Powers Act,40 a law reported to be the envy 
of the Apartheid regime in South Africa. Any legitimate political activity of a 
republican hue fell foul of emergency legislation via the outlawing of seditious 
publications, the prohibition on the flying of the Irish national flag and the use 
of public order provisions to ban assemblies and gatherings.41
Remarking on the sheer breadth of the Special Powers Act, Guelke observes 
that it ‘contained Orwellian provisions that listed offences against the mainte-
nance of law and order and then provided that any other acts that undermined 
law and order, but were not listed, were also offences under the legislation’.42 
For Whyte, the act was so naturally conducive to abuse and bias that one did 
 35 Ruane and Todd, 1996, 72.
 36 ‘Quislings Publicly Thanked’, Republican News, 27 June 1973.
 37 Hanley and Miller, 2010.
 38 Farrell, 1976, 50.
 39 Walsh, 1983, 9.
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 41 Farrell, 1976, 94.
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not have to rely on Nationalist grievances to criticise it as profoundly undemo-
cratic.43 The thrust of the act extended beyond the political suppression of 
Irish republicanism to enable the cultural suppression of Irish Nationalism 
more generally. Rather than simply maintaining law and order, legislation 
was premised on maintaining Protestant supremacy through guaranteeing 
only overt assertions of Britishness within the state. The Flags and Emblems 
Act (1954), for example, outlawed any overt signs of Irishness.44 Expressions 
of Irish identity or culture, much less any assertion of violent or non-violent 
political opposition to the state, drew the rigours of emergency legislation.45 
The minority community in its entirety became a ‘suspect community’ as the 
rule of law and policing in the North of Ireland predicated itself more towards 
keeping ‘order’ (i.e. the socio-political order of Protestant supremacy) than 
fighting ‘normal’ crime.46 Unionists would defend this approach on the grounds 
of having an ‘enemy within’.47 The mistreatment of the minority community 
was no doubt further driven by a siege mentality arising from having an aggres-
sively Catholic conservative Free State that bordered it (and laid claim to it) 
and by the need to prevent any class split within Unionism that might aid the 
‘enemy within’. But, as Patterson notes, this only explains rather than excuses 
the actions of the Stormont administration.48 In the face of this, Nationalists 
quickly withdrew from state life and found themselves resident in a state that 
regarded them not as model citizens but as the ‘enemy’. 
If the Unionist regime had at its disposal discriminatory legislation to 
uphold Protestant supremacy, it could similarly rely on the RUC to enthusiasti-
cally enforce it. Mulcahy notes: 
From the outset, the Northern Irish government conceived of the RUC as 
a paramilitary police force that would play a direct role in the maintenance 
of the state and its unionist character. In addition to the RUC, an auxiliary 
police force called the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC, or ‘B-Specials’) 
was set up.49
From the foundation of the state, then, policing in the six counties was 
markedly disparate from that seen in most liberal democracies. The RUC was 
 43 Whyte, 1983, 25.
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not bound by traditions of minimum force, policing by consent or an arm’s 
length relationship with the Unionist government.50 McGarry highlights the 
reality of the RUC’s function thus:
It was armed and paramilitary in character, unlike police forces in Britain, 
or even the new police in the Irish Free State … to assist it in its paramilitary 
role, it was equipped with some of the most draconian police powers ever 
passed in a liberal democracy … the RUC contravened the standard norm 
in liberal democracies that the police exercise a semi-autonomous or arm’s 
length relationship with civil and political authorities. Its senior officers 
were subordinate in practice to the political direction of the Northern 
Ireland government … this government was always Unionist, and with 
the exception of one cabinet minister appointed towards the end, always 
Protestant.51
Even prior to conflict in 1969, the RUC exhibited demonstrable signs of divided-
society policing; it showed systematic bias in law enforcement, carried out a 
politicised policing function, enjoyed special powers, was monopolised by the 
dominant group and had a dual purpose of internal security and ‘ordinary’ law 
and order.52 The implication this had for police ownership in Northern Ireland 
reflects a broader phenomenon highlighted by Brewer and Magee whereby 
‘subordinate groups view the police as agents of oppression or occupation and 
show a minimal commitment to them, while the dominant community tend to 
look on the police as its own and the guarantor of its position’.53
Compounding difficulties in relation to the function of the RUC was 
the massive imbalance in the force’s composition. Although it was initially 
envisaged that one-third of the force would be Catholic, recruitment figures 
never came close to this,54 leaving it as Protestant and Unionist in personnel as it 
was in function and ethos. Beyond the mere religious imbalance, there was also 
the fact that the most ardent anti-Catholic elements in pre-partition Ulster had 
been subsumed into the security apparatus of the state. This security apparatus 
comprised ‘thousands of Protestants … who had gained experience in the hard 
school of civil war from 1916 to 1922’.55 Their absorption into the state security 
apparatus saw the underlying function of the previously paramilitary UVF 
 50 McGarry and O’Leary, 1999, 28.
 51 McGarry, 2000.
 52 Weitzer, 1995, 5.
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‘legitimised’.56 The crossover between the UVF and the security apparatus of 
the Northern Ireland state is best examined through the paramilitary police 
reserve the ‘B-Specials’. Even after the imposition of partition, the ‘B’ division 
of the USC were retained as a part-time reserve to help combat prospective 
IRA violence. The ‘B-Specials’ were to batten on ‘emergency situations’.57 That 
such emergencies seldom arose did not alter this one iota. The USC drew its 
membership from the ranks of the UVF and the Ulster Imperial Guards – 
both mired in intense anti-Catholic sentiment and violence.58 This tactic of 
channelling potential Unionist discontent away from challenging the state 
by merging armed organisations into the state security apparatus became a 
‘perennial security arrangement in Northern Ireland’.59 Founded by Unionist 
politicians to protect Unionist interests, the USC adopted a world view that 
Protestants were ‘loyal’ and Catholics were ‘disloyal’.60 As a consequence, the 
force became the natural home for Protestant extremists and a cold house for 
Catholics. Unionists attributed religious imbalance to the Roman Catholic 
hierarchy and the Ancient Order of Hibernian (AOH) instructing their 
followers not to engage with the force.61 A much greater likelihood is, however, 
that the pro-Unionist outlook of the force and its tenuous origins meant the 
minority community, in the words of Nationalist MP Joe Devlin, ‘would not 
touch your special constabulary with a 40-foot pole’.62
It is within this divided-society policing climate that not just Irish repub-
lican but more general minority community disconnect from policing must 
be viewed. Mirroring the relationship between state legitimacy and police 
legitimacy, those on the outside of the state found themselves on the outside 
of policing, having little input into, control over or affinity with either. They 
were given little reason to identify with or align themselves to the state or 
police. Rather, the minority community found itself at the mercy of laws 
formulated and administered by Unionist politicians who had been integral 
in the formation of the UVF and had spent years inculcating the mentality 
that Catholics were a ‘disloyal’ threat to Protestant interests. Moreover, the 
enforcement of this legislation was delegated to those who had previously 
shown no hesitation in foisting violence and intimidation on the minority 
community. The links between the state and the security apparatus, and the 
 56 Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard, 1980, 32.
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sense of Protestant supremacy that underpinned this, meant that any change 
was not of function, but the fact that those indulgent in sectarian exclusion 
now had legislative power and loyal followers in state uniform to back it up. It is 
therefore unsurprising that from the very establishment of the RUC Catholics 
refused to get ‘involved’ with policing.63 
Into the conflict
The outbreak of conflict in 1969 was preceded by two significant develop-
ments: increased leftist politicisation of the IRA and the Northern Ireland Civil 
Rights Association (NICRA) campaign of peaceful protest. The public-apathy-
induced collapse of the Border Campaign demonstrated IRA failure to garner 
sympathy or strength from the populous. An internal IRA newssheet argued:
There are many lessons to be learned from the last campaign, the most 
notable being that it is not enough to have men with guns in their hands … 
We must have men who are capable of teaching the people what is wrong in 
this country of ours. We must have men who are capable of working with 
and for the people.64
As a result, the IRA began to align itself with those ‘fighting social injustice’ in 
order to broaden its sphere of influence.65 Class-based political agitation, partic-
ularly in the Free State, would be the method of translating this broad front 
approach into practice. As Morrison notes, however, introducing a stronger 
political emphasis is a prelude to Irish republican splitting.66 Even prior to the 
1970 Official–Provisional split, the Saor Éire breakaway faction derided the 
IRA leadership for degenerating from a ‘radical movement’ into ‘parliamentary 
reformists’.67 Underlying tension persisted to eventually manifest itself in the 
1970 split. Although the reasons behind the split are manifold and complex, 
as exhaustively examined by others,68 for the brevity of this overview they 
will be reduced to leadership attempts to politicise the republican strategy 
by dropping abstentionism and avoiding where possible military action in 
the North so class-based solidarity with the Protestant working class could 
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be built. Coincidentally, the NICRA campaign was seen as the appropriate 
vehicle for building a broad front approach capable of incorporating inter-
communal class-based solidarity. Irish republicans were openly supportive 
of and active participants in the NICRA campaign.69 It should, however, be 
cautioned against taking this tactical alliance as evidence of IRA control over 
the NICRA or NICRA sympathy for the IRA. The demands of the NICRA 
were not ostensibly Irish republican; they wanted reform of the Northern 
Ireland state not its complete destruction; they sought ‘British rights for British 
citizens’ not Irish reunification, and they had a number of Protestants among 
their membership. Henry Patterson argues that the earliest permutations of 
the civil rights movement did not seek a British withdrawal but rather a new 
form of British intervention to tackle discrimination.70 He also points out that 
during the NICRA era the Dublin-based IRA leadership was more concerned 
with agitating against the Free State, and that the then IRA would not have 
had the capacity to mobilise on the scale that the civil rights movement did.71 
The civil rights movement was therefore a ‘new way of conceptualising an old 
problem’ because Nationalist demands for an end to discrimination were being 
articulated outside the traditional framework of calling for resolution through 
settlement of the national question.72 Paisleyite vilification would nonetheless 
condemn it as an IRA front, thus invoking a ferocious Unionist backlash. Bob 
Purdie has argued that the outbreak of this violence demonstrates the failure 
of the NICRA to successfully channel the tension created into compelling 
Stormont to concede demands rather than allowing this tension to be released 
through violence.73 He further argues that the decision to turn to street demon-
stration tactics was a misguided one that allowed old fault lines about the 
national question to emerge and subsequently dominate the campaign.74 This, 
he concludes, reduced the scope the Unionist government had for making 
concessions without upsetting the populism it relied on.75 
Reactionary police violence towards peaceful NICRA marches dispelled 
any lingering pretence of police neutrality. There was official acknowledgement 
of this in the Scarman Report, which conceded that violent RUC misconduct 
left the impression that ‘the police would be used as a partisan force to suppress 
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… those opposed to the Northern Ireland government’.76 More tellingly, it 
recognised ‘the fateful split between the Catholic community and the police’.77 
Accordingly, complaints about discrimination soon became complaints about 
policing.78 This reflected the growing police tendency to participate in, rather 
than curtail, violence directed at NICRA marches.79 As this violence escalated, 
the notion of police complicity became central to Irish republican depictions 
of the police as the violent guardians of a corrupt ‘Orange state’. The outbreak 
of violence in Derry in August 1969 following clashes between Catholics and 
Paisleyite mobs was narrated along the lines that ‘[the] RUC immediately 
attacked Nationalists with batons, wearing helmets and shields. The inevitable 
had happened and the fight was on. The rest is history’.80 Similarly, the Belfast 
pogroms were orchestrated by ‘the combined UVF, RUC and B-Specials 
forces’.81 Irish republicans drew on the sectarian origins of the ‘B-Specials’ to 
frame its current activity with reference to this past: ‘recent events in Derry, 
Belfast and elsewhere have shown they have not changed their colours one 
whit since 1920. They have not lost their addiction to violence nor their strictly 
sectarian character’.82
In foregrounding the police role in violently marginalising the minority 
community, ‘boundary work’ establishing defined categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
continued to condition Irish republican attitudes to policing.83 This drew on 
the historical origins of the ‘Orange state’ and the divided-society policing 
model it was sustained through, to communicate the message that the failed 
state that had privileged ‘them’ by disadvantaging ‘us’ was beyond reform. 
This countered the impact of the belated, yet tokenistic, concessions by the 
Stormont administration to NICRA demands, and the Hunt Report attempt 
to salvage the police reputation. An ‘injustice frame’ recognising violent police 
defence of the exclusionary ‘Orange state’ as a ‘political wrong’ soon gained 
traction.84 Usefully, this gave meaningful articulation to traditional Irish 
republican opposition to the very existence of the Northern Ireland state. 
Peaceful demands for the reform of the ‘Orange state’ had only succeeded in 
incurring the wrath of the security apparatus of that very state. The argument 
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that ‘a tyranny that is maintained by force can ultimately be only overthrown 
by force’ seemed increasingly plausible.85
The deployment of British troops in August 1969 saw Irish republicans 
retain their colonial interpretation of the turmoil in the North of Ireland. 
Refusing to countenance that the British Army was a neutral peacekeeping 
force, they evinced traditionalist interpretations of British involvement in 
Ireland: ‘the fact is Britain is not unwilling to have a civil war so that she 
can arrive again as a “saviour”, abolish Stormont, and have the anti-Unionist 
population delighted to be fully absorbed in the United Kingdom’.86 The Lower 
Falls curfew in July 1970 and internment in August 1971 provided succour on 
the ground to those questioning the role of British troops in Nationalist areas.87 
As British Army visibility increased, it was met by the violent outworkings of 
the fledgling Provisional IRA’s escalation policy of moving from a defensive to 
an offensive position, engaging British troops and bringing down the ‘Orange 
state’ in the process.88 When the British government prorogued Stormont in 
1972, a colonial framing of the conflict was adjusted to replace rhetoric about 
the ‘Orange state’ with that of ‘occupation’. By this stage, the Provisionals 
had ‘changed the terms of the debate’ in the six counties.89 From a repub-
lican viewpoint, instead of facing the British occupier’s colonial dupes, they 
were now pitted against the British occupier itself. Political resentment of the 
predominantly Unionist police force protecting Protestant supremacy in order 
to prop up the colonial statelet now became political resentment of foreign 
troops who were enforcing military occupation directly on the ground in the 
North of Ireland. The narrative of occupation became integral to Provisional 
rejection of the electoral and political process in the post-1972 state:
Elections are not free when armed troops with cameras are posted inside 
and outside polling booths, when ballot boxes are held overnight in the 
custody of enemy soldiers, when the major opposition party Sinn Fein is 
not allowed to put up candidates, when opposition areas are saturated with 
troops, and candidates are liable to internment, in short a state of police and 
military dictatorship.90 
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Strident in their opposition to any political settlement that guaranteed the 
existence of a Northern Ireland state, the Provisionals made appeals to 
Unionists to ‘accept the hand of friendship’ and reject the ‘cancer of sectari-
anism which a foreign power through its agents has inoculated into our 
people’.91 Similarly, they presented their rejection of the 1974 Sunningdale 
Agreement as being premised on the fact it was a ‘life belt for the Protestant 
and Catholic upper and middle classes’ who were enriched by the colonial 
divide-and-conquer policy. Behind this rhetorical appeal to working-class 
Unionists, there was, of course, fundamental ideological opposition to 
Sunningdale’s partitionist power-sharing assembly too. This ideological purity 
was also reflected in the IRA leadership’s public line that the prerequisite for 
any political settlement in Northern Ireland was a British declaration of intent 
to withdraw: 
Only a solution arrived at by Irishmen and women, in light of an English 
declaration of withdrawal, will achieve a lasting peace for this province of 
Ulster, and indeed, for the whole of Ireland … Only then, acting in concert 
with each other, free from any outside interference, can we come to an 
honourable agreement.92
‘Ulsterisation’
By the mid-1970s, it was clear that there would be no quick victory for either 
side in the conflict. British government policy and IRA strategy adapted to 
this reality. Dropping the rhetoric of impending victory, a restructured IRA 
adopted a ‘long war’ strategy.93 The British government’s ‘The way ahead’ 
security policy adopted a three-track approach of ‘Ulsterisation’, normalisation 
and criminalisation. ‘Ulsterisation’ was designed to starve the IRA of propa-
gandistic oxygen by relying primarily on the RUC to combat IRA violence. 
Pitting British soldiers against the native Irish gave credence to the IRA 
assertion it was waging a legitimate war of national liberation. ‘Ulsterisation’ 
was premised on the calculation that ‘it would be more difficult for the IRA 
to depict the British as occupiers if it was confronted with a local police rather 
than a “foreign” army’.94 The criminalisation policy meant that IRA and INLA 
violence would be treated as ‘normal’ crime and dealt with by the police, rather 
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than the military. The policy coincided with a dipping in morale within Irish 
republican communities as ‘war weariness’ crept in.95 The government wrong-
fully surmised that deflecting away from the political nature of Irish republican 
violence and depicting it as normal crime would lessen support for it.96 Instead, 
the policy popularised the republican cause during the 1981 hunger strike and 
laid the foundations for unprecedented support for Sinn Féin. Normalisation 
tried to create a facade of normality during the conflict, with the intention 
being to use a ‘normal’ police force to fight ‘normal’ crime.
‘Ulsterisation’ gave the RUC the lead role in counter-insurgency opera-
tions, making it responsible for undertaking the more contentious activities in 
Nationalist districts. Upon taking up this role, the RUC ‘encountered some of 
the same difficulties which the Army has long faced in carrying out an effective 
policing operation without being drawn into the kind of confrontations and 
incidents which are likely to cause an escalation in communal antagonism’.97 
The policy eradicated any salvageable relationship the RUC may have still had 
with the Nationalist community on two accounts. First, it placed the RUC 
inconspicuously in the firing line of republicans, and secondly, it meant the 
RUC would now be performing tasks that had led to Nationalist discontent 
with the military. As McGarry and O’Leary note, the policy ‘reduced the 
likelihood of a gentle policing touch in predominantly Nationalist areas’.98 The 
RUC was seen not as a ‘normal’ police force but as the extension of the British 
military apparatus in the six counties.99 This became a central tenet of the Irish 
republican narrative, as it provided justification for violence directed at the 
supposedly ‘normal’ police force. 
Counter-insurgency policing is militarised, aggressive and intrusive in 
nature. Giving the RUC such a function in the midst of political violence created 
an environment on the ground conducive to claims that Nationalist districts 
were under militarised occupation. Heavily fortified police stations, armed 
police officers jointly patrolling with armed British soldiers and widespread 
checkpoints pointed to no other conclusion. Just as the RUC had violently 
defended the ‘Orange state’, so too in the aftermath of ‘Ulsterisation’ would 
it be charged with enforcing British occupation in the six counties. This was 
again framed as a political wrong, again framed in terms of the force’s innate 
enmity towards Nationalists, and again premised on trying to justify violence 
directed at the force. Using the reality on the ground that ‘Ulsterisation’ had 
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created, republicans argued, ‘it is us, the Nationalist people … who daily bear 
the brunt of the now naked sectarian RUC. All pretence at playing community 
policing has gone being replaced by the ruthless and calculating systematic 
harassment of this community’.100 
This not only portrayed the RUC as the front line of occupation, but 
also drew on historical tropes of RUC collaboration with loyalists. Initially, 
this involved claims of ‘collaboration of the RUC by neglect’.101 Essentially, 
this argument maintained that while the RUC took a hard line on Irish 
republican violence it was at very best negligently indifferent towards loyalist 
violence. Following a murder by the infamous loyalist ‘Shankill Butchers’, 
republicans protested that ‘the RUC remain indifferent towards the plight of 
innocent Catholics … these gangs of loyalists remain intact simply because 
the RUC allows them to’.102 To this end, it was argued that ‘the RUC are not 
a police body’ but ‘an extension of the loyalist paramilitary groups’.103 By the 
late 1980s, a more sinister proactive policy of RUC collusion with loyalist 
paramilitaries became the more pressing issue. Loyalist attacks were labelled 
‘semi-official killings’.104 The lack of proper investigation into these killings, 
the public dismissal of concerns on the matter and the vilification of the dead 
and their relatives strengthened, rather than assuaged, suspicions within the 
Nationalist community.105 
Collusion was not the only concern with RUC counter-insurgency policing 
that began leaving an indelible mark on Nationalist communities by the 1990s. 
Cases of shoot-to-kill and plastic bullet deaths – and the associated impunity 
– began to generate concern outside the Irish republican constituency.106 Such 
blatant wrongdoing, and the complete lack of accountability for it, became the 
‘moral shocks’107 that would make the issue of counter-insurgency policing one 
much wider than a mere Irish republican one. Collusion, shoot-to-kill and the 
killing of civilians by plastic bullets expanded the counter-insurgency policing 
issue beyond the Irish republican constituency by sufficiently concerning 
human rights activists, academia and more moderate Nationalist elements 
perturbed by events on the ground. 
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External condemnation of the RUC was invaluable in what Dixon refers 
to as ‘the propaganda war’ that ran in parallel with the physical war.108 The 
relevance of this was heightened following the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement 
(AIA). O’Malley argues that the AIA was a governmental, and to a lesser 
degree SDLP, response to the nascent electoral threat posed by Sinn Féin in 
the aftermath of the hunger strikes.109 By providing an ‘Irish dimension’ to 
proposed political settlement of the conflict, it was hoped that support for 
Sinn Féin and for the IRA campaign would wane. The AIA also heralded closer 
security co-operation between the British and Irish states in tackling IRA 
activity. In accordance with a changing security context, Irish republicans had 
to ensure that the RUC remained ‘othered’ from the Nationalist community. 
To this end, Irish republicans maintained that the RUC was still sectarian, 
still unacceptable and still the coercive arm of the British occupying state. This 
fuelled opposition to attempts at rehabilitating the image of the RUC following 
the AIA.110 To Irish republicans, the RUC remained ‘another section of Britain’s 
military forces’.111 The implication of this, then, was that the force, contrary 
to the normalisation policy, was an integral component of the British ‘war 
machine’ in Ireland and as such prone to attack. Despite the AIA appeasement 
of the SDLP, the RUC remained ‘legitimate targets’.112 This discourse was 
vital in cultivating continued rejection of the RUC, continued rejection of 
moderate supported internal settlements and continued justification for the 
IRA campaign. As conflict lessened and talk of peace emerged, Irish republican 
discourse would again change to mirror their changing relationship with the 
Northern Ireland state. 
Patten politicking
The preceding pages evidence how the Irish republican attitude towards 
policing is ultimately conditioned by the contemporaneous state of play in 
the wider political environment. Until the mid-1990s, that environment was 
defined by divided-society policing in the throes of political violence. The 
tentative emergence of the peace process and the advent of the ceasefires altered 
this dynamic. Even if the IRA ceasefire did not remove political contestation 
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over policing, it nonetheless enabled a protracted debate to take root.113 Irish 
republicans and the RUC began posturing around dichotomous positions; 
one pushing for complete disbandment of the RUC on historical and political 
grounds, and the other railing for minimal reform given the force’s apparent 
increase in professionalisation and normalised function.114
The changed political climate birthed a narrative moving beyond the RUC 
being ‘legitimate targets’ to argue instead that policing reform required the 
complete disbandment of the RUC.115 Most notably, this saw the lexicon of inter-
national human rights displace ideological rhetoric in the Sinn Féin policing 
discourse.116 Moving beyond crude depictions of an ‘Orange’ force, the RUC was 
now presented as an obstacle to lasting peace in the North of Ireland. Refuting 
a ‘Hans Christian Anderson’ RUC self-narrative,117 Irish republicans refused to 
countenance any notion of RUC involvement in the political or social life of post-
conflict Northern Ireland. Simple ideological rejection became redundant, as 
police reform seemingly became a prerequisite to any lasting political settlement 
on human rights, political and historical grounds.
Violent eruptions over contentious Orange Order marches ignited the 
human rights dimension to calls for RUC disbandment. RUC conduct at 
Drumcree, the Ormeau Road and in Derry provided plentiful sustenance for 
Irish republican grievances. RUC heavy-handedness and their discharging 
of thousands of plastic bullets at Nationalist residents, was criticised and 
contrasted with the restraint it had previously shown towards loyalists.118 
A ‘Disband the RUC’ campaign involving letter writing, a poster campaign 
and co-ordinated pickets soon followed. Violent public order policing had 
a resonance with all too familiar past problems, thus RUC short-sight-
edness in forcing the Orange march down the Garvaghy Road inadvertently 
strengthened the Irish republican argument. Moreover, scenes of RUC violence 
were hardly doing the force’s assertions of heightened professionalism and 
increased normalisation any favours. Mulcahy places this into the perspective 
of the pre-Patten debate: ‘the impact of Drumcree was profound. Not only did 
it implicate the RUC in familiar troubles and controversies surrounding public 
order, excessive force and use of plastic bullets, but it re-immersed it in debates 
on its respective relationships with the communities in Northern Ireland’.119
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Amidst this chaos, political negotiations edged towards the GFA. Given the 
inherent link between state legitimacy and police legitimacy, it became evident 
that Nationalist acceptance of reformed policing could only be precipitated 
by their acceptance of any proposed political settlement.120 Both Nationalist 
parties accepted the GFA – albeit with division within Sinn Féin on acceptance 
of the sacrilegious ‘principle of consent’.121 The GFA, however, barely addressed 
the issue of policing directly. While it recognised that a ‘new beginning’ for 
policing was required, it delegated out resolution of the issue to the Independent 
Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (commonly known as the Patten 
Commission). Such a move, as Christine Bell notes,122 typifies the political 
choreographing that had seen consensus for the GFA achieved by removing 
the most divisive issues from negotiations via delegating them to separate 
commissions. This meant that while a peace agreement had been brokered, and 
power-sharing institutions established, policing remained a yet to be resolved 
issue that would be dealt with somewhat paradoxically as separate from, yet 
also relevant to, the rest of the political process. 
As part of its remit, the Patten Commission instigated a wide-ranging 
consultation process to gather policing experiences from across the North of 
Ireland. Localised meetings that allowed people to relate at first hand their 
individual and communal experiences were an integral component of this 
process. It also entailed receiving written submissions from various interested 
parties across the political and social spectrum. Sinn Féin engaged with this 
consultation process, and articulated their opposition to the RUC. Several 
other interested groups within the wider Nationalist community did likewise. 
When the Patten Commission finished this process, it produced an official 
report on policing that contained a voluminous catalogue of proposals for 
reform. Although cautiously welcoming the Patten proposals, Sinn Féin was 
nonetheless reticent about prematurely calling for support for policing.123 That, 
it seemed, hinged on how the proposals translated into practice. When the 
Policing Act diluted the Patten proposals beyond recognition, the scope for 
Sinn Féin acceptance of reformed policing dissipated. Sinn Féin remained 
opposed to the PSNI and refused to become involved with the Northern Ireland 
Policing Board (NIPB) unless reform was brought into line with Patten.124 The 
SDLP, who had initially been sceptical about the Policing Act, later accepted 
it following the Weston Park talks. There was now an evident split within the 
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Nationalist constituency on the matter: Sinn Féin continuing to disengage 
from reformed policing and the SDLP promoting it. Political jostling between 
the parties on the matter naturally ensued.125
Although the disconnect from policing remained, by this stage it had a 
decidedly less absolutist flavour. This reflects Sinn Féin’s acceptance of the de 
facto existence of the Northern Ireland state as laid out in the GFA – after all, 
how could they reject policing on an ideological fundamentalist basis if they had 
endorsed the GFA and were active participants in the power-sharing government 
established thereafter. An increasingly pragmatic and less ideological approach 
to policing became discernible. The gradual navigation from a position as 
‘outsiders’ in the Northern Ireland state to post-GFA political ‘insiders’ led to 
less fundamental opposition to ‘British policing’ and greater political inter-
rogation of the post-conflict reform process. Moving away from ideological 
absolutism, there was, for example, acknowledgement that a post-conflict state 
would need a police service, that Nationalist communities were suffering in the 
absence of any such force, and that any reformed policing body would inevitably 
see some element of RUC crossover.126 These considerations would later come 
to frame debates in the prelude to formal Sinn Féin endorsement of policing.127 
In retrospect, it seems that in light of accepting the GFA and departing from 
ideological absolutism it was, at this point, not a matter of if Sinn Féin would 
come to endorse policing but how it would choreograph the process of doing so, 
and what exactly was required to secure formal engagement.
‘Critical engagement’ and beyond
Continued Sinn Féin participation in the power-sharing institutions exposed 
the increasing peculiarity of its position; legislating laws in the post-GFA 
state but withholding support for the police force enforcing these laws. 
Excising ideological fundamentalism, their opposition to policing was now 
presented, not as opposition to policing per se, but opposition to ‘political 
policing’ by the ‘securocrats’ who had crossed over from the RUC Special 
Branch into the PSNI.128 The collapse of the power-sharing institutions amidst 
the ‘Stormontgate’ affair in October 2002, provoked outrage from Sinn Féin, 
who claimed it had been concocted by ‘securocrats’ to damage the peace 
process. The ‘securocrats’ were using ‘political policing’ in an attempt to defeat 
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republicanism, having failed to defeat it militarily during the conflict.129 Having 
already relinquished ideological absolutism by tacitly accepting the need for a 
police force in the post-GFA state, Sinn Féin discourse after ‘Stormontgate’ was 
not about ideology, but whether policing could be ‘depoliticised’ as a means of 
furthering political goals.130 ‘Stormontgate’ was evidence that if approached 
‘strategically’, engagement with policing would thwart those who ‘do not want 
a Shinner about the place’.131 Adopting a discourse of advancing the ‘republican 
agenda’ from within,132 Sinn Féin orientated its support base towards formal 
acceptance of the PSNI.
As the formal policing debate commenced, Sinn Féin rebranded policing 
as a site of Irish republican struggle. This resonated more generally with their 
discourse on equality-based change of the Northern Ireland state. To this end, 
Adams asserted that Sinn Féin wanted ‘a service for citizens who are nation-
alists, republicans, unionists, of different racial or ethnic backgrounds. We 
don’t have it at the moment but we have the ability to get it, and that’s what 
Sinn Féin is about’.133 Although indubitably ‘an emotive issue’, delegates at the 
Ard Fheis were urged to view engagement with post-Patten policing ‘strategi-
cally’ and for the political benefits in the present, rather than the historical 
baggage of the past.134 The increased political strength of Sinn Féin, it was 
argued, meant that the time was ripe to cash in the chips accumulated through 
disengagement to maximise change and advance the overarching ideological 
agenda.135 Engagement with policing became essential to the process of 
accruing greater political strength; if republicans engaged with policing they 
would be empowered and opponents of republicanism disempowered. To 
continue disengaging, this logic suggested, was to forfeit this site of struggle 
to those anathema to the aspirations of Irish republicanism. Strategy, account-
ability, transformation and empowerment became the staple diet of ‘political 
speak’ enunciated by the Sinn Féin leadership, as it secured the necessary 
support from within its constituency. 
The decision to endorse policing was inescapably a political decision by the 
Sinn Féin leadership and its persuasion of grassroots activists inescapably a 
political sell. Yet the fact remains that this was only possible when it freed itself 
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from the encumbering ideological absolutism it had previously subscribed to 
by embracing the mantra of pragmatism and the realpolitik. Only then was 
it possible to frame policing as a site of struggle and as a process leading to 
ideological goals, rather than an end dropping short of them. It had on occasions 
previous to this shown a willingness to favour realpolitik pragmatism over 
ideological absolutism. The atavistic rejection of the application of ‘British law’ 
in Ireland had given way to the pragmatic realisation that tactical engagement 
with ‘British law’ could create political and material capital.136 Contempt for 
the supine collaborators in Dublin and the SDLP had also come to pass when 
the opportunity to engage them as ‘fellow travellers’ in a pan-Nationalist front 
arose.137 Likewise, the changed relationship with policing has been followed 
by further removal from ideological absolutism. Most notably, this has seen 
increased Sinn Féin engagement with the British Royal Family being couched 
in the language of redefining the relationship between those of the Irish repub-
lican tradition and those who represent the imperial and military tradition of 
the British state.138 A colonial interpretation has been displaced by one that 
engorges talk of peace and reconciliation and speaks of Britain and Ireland 
sharing a special relationship as geographical neighbours. This has also seen 
Sinn Féin representatives officially attending Remembrance Day commemora-
tions – previously seen as the valorising of Britain’s imperialist war dead – as an 
act of outreach to Unionists.139 According to Garry and Matthews, such moves 
have been forced by the need to popularise Sinn Féin’s electoral appeal beyond 
its traditional support base.140 If it was guided by ideological purity in the past, 
Sinn Féin is led today by ‘electoral logic’.141 
When located within this wider post-GFA political geography, the formal 
acceptance of policing is not an isolated move, but one that must be viewed 
in terms of an ongoing continuum away from ideological absolutism and into 
constitutionalism. Increased involvement in the post-GFA state came at the 
price of being led by the diktats of realpolitik pragmatism, rather than relying on 
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the comforts of unerring ideological purity. Standing on the outside is straight-
forward, the argument is easily digestible and every course of oppositional action 
can be reduced to ideological absolutism. For all that, it is hardly progressive. 
Becoming a political ‘insider’ ill affords the luxury of simple purist rhetoric, and 
relies instead on rhetoric about strategy and tactics. As Sanders argues,142 the fact 
that the route to political power lies within government rather than a protesting 
position outside it, removes the option of ideological rigidity from Irish repub-
licans who engage in electoralism. Formal engagement with state structures 
through electoral intervention may be tentative and minimalist to begin with, 
but once the initial act occurs further engagement is a natural consequence. 
Tonge, for example, argues that Sinn Féin engagement with the Northern Ireland 
state can be traced back to its first engagements with local council committees 
after realising the administrative power that lies within such bodies.143 Over 
time, this engagement evolved into the creation of what Bean calls the ‘Sinn 
Féin state’ in Nationalist communities.144 Evidently, then, Irish republicans who 
engage with the state adapt their position accordingly, meaning that aspects once 
considered imperative for a political settlement (e.g. British withdrawal) become 
long-term aspirational goals instead.145 In tandem with this, the language of 
self-determination is also downgraded to the language of co-determination that 
more accurately reflects the reality of their post-GFA position.146
The realpolitik knife, however, cuts both ways. Presenting policing as a 
progressive site of struggle is premised on the assumption that it can be utilised 
as such. Political speak of accountability and transformation is rhetorically 
powerful but practicably impotent if this assumption proves to be a funda-
mental miscalculation. The logic of strategic interaction essentially becomes 
hoist by its own petard:
Policing will not be sold to the faithful as a maintaining of the status quo, or 
a toll to protect the state but rather a ‘site of struggle’, a means by which to 
hollow out the union and bring down the state of ‘Northern Ireland’ from 
within. The British state in Ireland is comfortable with this knowing that 
they have given the Provisionals no latitude to do this and knowing that 
they have no intention of pulling down the power structure anyway.147
 142 Sanders, 2011, 9.
 143 Tonge, 2006.
 144 Bean, 2007a.
 145 Whiting, 2015.
 146 Tonge, 2009, 170.
 147 ‘An Open Debate, and a Principled Stance’, Sovereign Nation, January/February 
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This challenges the principal precepts of the Sinn Féin argument by locating 
the matter within pre-existing structural boundaries. Essentially, it suggests 
that Sinn Féin cannot dictate the state of play but has to function within 
current power relations that preclude any realisation of a transformative 
project like the one they propose. This argument mirrors critiques found 
in critical criminology whereby the enactment and enforcement of law are 
inseparable from wider power relations that legitimise and protect the status 
quo.148 Within the confines of such an argument, the police force, rather 
than being a tool capable of challenging the prevailing status quo, represents 
the ‘repressive state apparatus’ that works in tandem with the ‘ideological 
state apparatus’ to protect dominant interests.149 This link between state and 
police legitimacy has birthed a polyvalent problematic; the post-GFA state, 
as a partitionist institution, remains propagated by ‘British’ policing, the 
 consociationalism at the heart of the GFA has institutionalised sectarianism, 
and the post-GFA state remains driven by neoliberal interests. Accordingly, 
there is a greater sophistication in criticism of the Sinn Féin position that 
draws on these observations and infuses them with Marxist understandings 
to move the debate beyond simplistic rejection of ‘British’ policing:
It was a stupid thing for politicians to say in the first place. I mean, your 
initial assumption runs through every state in the world – I don’t care 
what the politics and ideology of it are – and that is the purpose – the first 
purpose – of a state police force is to protect the state. That invariably means 
protecting property, but it also means protecting significant individuals so 
putting manners on a police force is basically changing the state and the 
Good Friday Agreement never mentioned the constitutional change of the 
state. Quite the opposite.150
This allows the notion of changing policing in the six counties from within to 
be critiqued in class terms:
I certainly wouldn’t buy into that and I think anybody with any cop on 
doesn’t. Like you don’t go in and join, for want of a better word, your 
enemy – your class enemy, your national enemy – by going and treatising 
with them. Changing things from within – I can’t speak for Sinn Féin, but 
that was something that they were actually preaching against for quite a 
 148 Hepburn, 1977.
 149 Brogden, 1982, 12.
 150 Y, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
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long time. You know, ‘You can’t become involved in the various assemblies 
that was set up, it was irreformable’. And the very fact that the RUC are 
irreformable, a cosmetic name change to PSNI – they’re still irreformable 
as a police force. They are still protecting a sectarian state which is based 
on a sectarian head count, you know. And that would be the republican 
view. A wider Marxist view would be that if a united Ireland was declared 
tomorrow and the PSNI were all called the Gardaí, they would still be class 
enemies, really you know. They would be anti-working class. You see it in 
England, you see it in Germany, France, wherever. The police are no friend 
of working-class people.151
In drawing on long-standing critical observations of the power relations that 
underpin policing, some critics offer a more nuanced analysis of policing that 
transcends the Northern Ireland context. Many referred to how the miners’ 
strikes in the UK were policed to substantiate their argument. By doing so, 
they have mirrored previous criticisms made by Phil Scraton.152 Moreover, 
criminological literature has long ruminated over how effective external 
oversight bodies can actually be when forced to operate within these structural 
confines.153 Again, this allows critics to assess the Sinn Féin line of reasoning in 
view of how policing elsewhere operates:
All police services throughout the world spy, use informers, infiltrate 
political parties, plant agents in the media, recruit academics in the univer-
sities, stitch up so-called subversives and use any and other means necessary 
to maintain specific structures of oppression. It is entirely illusory to 
imagine that the PSNI in Northern Ireland would ever be some kind, 
beneficial or helping-hand institution. It will always be an instrument of 
oppression.154
But what happens, then, to those who engage the apparatus of the state with 
transformatory intent? Critiques offered in critical criminology and neo-colonial 
literature suggest that the reality of how the state–police power relation 
manifests itself means that the edge of this transformative intent smoothes 
over time as the would-be reformers adapt to the prevailing surroundings they 
find themselves in. This, as Scraton argues, sees the state neutralising the threat 
 151 J, critic of Sinn Féin, interview, June 2013.
 152 Scraton, 1985.
 153 Marenin, 1982.
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of would-be reformers by slowly involving them in its hegemonic project.155 
Harris, drawing on the example of Latin America, similarly suggests that 
would-be reformers can be lured away from their counter-hegemonic position 
over time through protracted processes of ‘co-option’ or ‘corruption’.156 This 
often thrives on the would-be reformer’s ignorance of the machinations of 
the system they seek to reform, meaning that by the time the facade of state 
benevolence wears off it is too late to retreat. Critics who frame their rejection 
of the Sinn Féin position in this wider critical landscape thus conclude:
What is happening is we’re looking at a situation where the Sinn Féin party 
– and you know admittedly with the best will in the world, the best inten-
tions in the world – is being drawn into giving support to the establishment 
willy-nilly. Whether they actually see it as such, but it actually does and 
at that stage then your argument is with the local police rather than with 
the system of policing, and you may well then find that the local police 
will say, ‘Well, fine, a little tweak here, a little tweak there’, but the system 
doesn’t change, the legislation doesn’t change and I think that’s where the 
argument has to be … policing ultimately can’t be better than the legis-
lation and/or the state, and if we have problems with the legislation and/
or the state then we are going to have problems with policing and at best 
you’re asking for the coercive arm of that state to pretty its act up but not to 
fundamentally change it.157
Inasmuch as the realpolitik can cocoon Sinn Féin’s policy of ‘critical engagement’ 
from detractors citing absolutist ideological interpretations of Irish republi-
canism, it can nonetheless leave it exposed to the observed wisdom of leftist 
critiques proffered by others.
Conclusion
The historical backdrop to the relationship between Irish republicanism and 
policing in the North of Ireland cannot be critically examined without adequate 
consideration of the political choreographing that birthed measured changes in 
this relationship. Successfully grasping the magnitude of the changes in the 
Irish republican relationship with policing is predicated on firstly grasping 
the magnitude of its changing relationship with the Northern Ireland state. 
 155 Scraton, 2007, 220.
 156 Harris, 2007.
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Rejection of the state led to rejection of the police. Tentative engagement with 
the structures and processes of the state led to tentative engagement with 
police reform and a less ideologically purist view of policing. Acceptance of 
the Northern Ireland state with a long-term view of equality-based reform 
led to similar acceptance of post-Patten policing. ‘Critical engagement’ with 
policing was the totality of a process of adaptation by the ‘native’, the ‘other’ 
and the ‘outsider’ to the changing political environment they were faced with. 
Externally, the process of engagement was driven by the demands of the realpo-
litik that a post-conflict climate threw up for Irish republicanism. Internally, 
however, it would be the very process of engagement itself that would prove 
divisive, not only due to the legacy of generations of divided-society policing 
but also because of the present and future political implications that continued 
movement away from ideological absolutism would herald. The remainder of 
this book uses this chapter as a framework for interpreting and critically evalu-
ating how the politics of memory condition current disagreement on the issue 
of policing within the wider Irish republican constituency. 

Chapter 2
Irish Republican Memory  
as Counter-Memory
Irish Republican Memory as Counter-Memory
Introduction
The previous chapter established how policing lay at the heart of the conflict 
in Northern Ireland. Unsurprisingly, the legacy of policing remains contested 
during post-conflict transition. This is symptomatic of the general fact that all 
transitioning societies witness contestation between parties to the conflict who 
are determined to broadcast their own narrative. More specifically, it reflects 
how views of policing in the North of Ireland were/are inextricably linked 
to differing political perspectives. During the conflict, this was played out 
through the ‘legitimacy politics’ of police and state legitimacy, but in transition 
contestation – between even if not within opposing ethno-nationalist blocs – 
is played out through the memory politics of what policing was, rather than 
what policing is.1 The memory politics of policing gravitate around competing 
narratives that are either favourable to or condemnatory of the RUC. These 
narratives are hardly apolitical; they are engineered through deliberately 
selective ‘forgetting’ and ‘remembering’, articulated with present political 
needs in mind and endowed with post-conflict political functionality. To grasp 
the veracity of this, it is necessary to evaluate the interplay between ‘narrative 
substance’ – what the narrative says – and ‘narrative context’ – why it says this 
– that defines memory politics in Northern Ireland.
Substantively, opposing narratives articulate the ‘remembered past’ rather 
than the ‘actual past’. Unlike the ‘actual past’, which is susceptible to natural 
processes of forgetting, the ‘remembered past’ is manipulated through selective 
‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’ processes that feed into collective memory, 
political identity and group boundaries. As such, the ‘remembered past’ is 
integral to engendering feelings of injustice, a sense of victimisation and the 
 1 Hearty, 2014.
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apportioning of blame to the ‘other’.2 The ‘remembered past’ can then be used 
to apportion blame in accordance with the thrust of master narratives proffered 
by various parties to the conflict; Unionists can blame Irish republicans (and to 
a lesser extent Nationalists) for attempting to overthrow the state by subterfuge 
through the NICRA campaign, the British state can blame warring sectarian 
factions (conveniently excising itself from the post-conflict blame game) and 
Irish republicans can blame the British for creating the discriminatory ‘Orange 
state’ before subsequently laying siege to the six counties through military 
occupation when that state was brought to the point of collapse. Contextually, 
this is incredibly useful in a transitional setting where an end to the violent 
manifestations of political disagreement rarely heralds an end to political 
disagreement itself. Parties formerly locked in physical conflict are unlikely to 
relinquish their previously held world view and subscribe to that articulated 
by the ‘other’ simply because physical violence has given way to non-violent 
politics. Nor are they likely to repudiate their past, even if the means of the past 
are no longer practised. With the exception, perhaps, of acknowledging certain 
occasional deviations from the accepted norms of conflict, they will continue 
to assert the legitimacy of their past actions and the illegitimacy of those of 
their opponents. In transition, memory politics becomes ‘the continuation 
of war by other means’.3 Its value is heightened in transitions, like Northern 
Ireland, that have yet to comprehensively ‘deal with the past’. In the absence of 
consensus over the past, memory politics underpins the meta-conflict over who 
caused the conflict and who suffered most because of it. Indeed, the genesis 
of the meta-conflict lies in the divergent interpretations of its very status; a 
subversive campaign of Irish republican ‘terrorism’ (Unionists), a sectarian 
conflict between opposing factions (British state) or a war of national liber-
ation against British occupation (Irish republicans).
Memory politics and the meta-conflict
Contestation over the what, the when, the how and the why of the conflict 
is directly correlative to contestation over the what, the when, the how and 
the why of policing. For all that they disagree, opposing narratives similarly 
reduce the causes and consequences of the conflict to an easily digestible 
morality play. Common to opposing narratives is a simplistic, yet emotional, 
tale of ‘good versus evil’. Each narrative is resplendent with victims of violence 
 2 Brewer and Hayes, 2015.
 3 Olick, 2013.
57Irish Republican Memory as Counter-Memory
and of the heroics of those who fearlessly defended the community from an 
omnipresent evil. The major divergence, though, is that while sharing the same 
‘good versus evil’ plot, opposing narratives cast different actors in the roles of 
‘good’ and ‘evil’. Commensurability with easily digestible morality plays and 
binary caricatures of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ lies not in their absolute truth, but in the 
fact that these correspond to differing lived experiences of political violence.4 
The RUC, then, can simultaneously be seen as the heroic, much suffering 
‘good’ character in the Unionist morality play and the violent, sectarian ‘evil’ 
character in the Irish republican morality play. Uncoincidentally, the British 
state morality play is broadly analogous to that of Unionists. As the self-
proclaimed neutral arbitrator of the conflict, it constructs a morality play where 
the RUC, supported by their colleagues in the British Army, upheld the ‘good’ 
inherent in the democratic rule of law by combating the ‘evil’ of ‘terrorism’.5 
The common trait is what Assmann calls ‘the memory of perpetrators’ whereby 
‘as easy as it is to remember the guilt of others, it is difficult to remember one’s 
own guilt’.6 Meta-conflict memory politics therefore ‘remembers’ the violence 
of the conflict in accordance with morality play interpretations of the past; we 
‘remember’ the violence of ‘them’ and ‘forget’ the violence of ‘us’. 
The fallout from violence exercised by the RUC and that directed against 
it can be easily situated in communal narratives on the conflict; for the 
Unionist community from which the RUC was drawn there is a predilection 
for viewing the RUC as a victim, and for the Nationalist community subjected 
to the violent manifestations of public order and counter-insurgency policing, 
there is a tendency to see the force as a perpetrator. The dynamic that more 
generally underpins narratives on in-group and out-group violence in post-
conflict societies enjoys increased traction in contestation over the policing 
legacy. Using the co-constitutive processes of ‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’, 
these narratives pre-determine that ‘our’ past transgressions are overlooked but 
‘our’ suffering, endurance and dead are ‘remembered’.7 Admittedly, this is not 
unique to Northern Ireland; it is evident in Turkish narratives on the Armenian 
genocide,8 belated assertions of victimhood among the Argentine right9 and in 
memory contestation in Bosnia.10 It is not difficult to apply these observations 
to the substance of opposing policing narratives. Lawther identifies glaring 
 4 Hearty, 2014.
 5 Hearty, 2016a.
 6 Assmann, 2008, 219.
 7 Paez and Liu, 2009.
 8 Demirici, 2013, 26.
 9 Salvi, 2011. 
 10 Moll, 2013.
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silences of RUC wrongdoing, their active role in the conflict and Nationalist 
victimhood in the Unionist narrative.11 Likewise, it is necessary to acknowledge 
that the impact political violence had on the RUC and the fact that this was 
often construed – rightly or wrongly – as sectarian by the Unionist community 
from which the force was largely recruited, are silenced in the Irish repub-
lican policing counter-narrative.12 The British state narrative is defined by the 
wholesale silencing of security force complicity in the conflict, usefully lever-
aging support for its neutral referee self-image from the Unionist narrative. 
Some illustrative examples may suffice. The protectors of RUC organisa-
tional memory promote a narrative of a heavily victimised force that withstood 
a ‘terrorist onslaught’ for over 30 years in defence of the people of Northern 
Ireland.13 This narrative accentuates the ‘enormous cost in terms of death and 
injury’ that the RUC collectively paid during the conflict, rather than their 
active ‘perpetratorship’ in it.14 Contrast this with the following accounts drawn 
from interview data:
I don’t think they [the RUC] done themselves any favours. I can honestly 
say I didn’t shed any tears if I ever heard that, you know, one was blown up 
or killed and that, and you’d hear on the news, because my own experience 
of them was that they were bad. Very bad. And, as I said at the start of that 
question, I never met a good one – never.15 
Some people did it [joined the RUC] for the financial benefit, which was 
great. Also, that hidden hatred of Catholics and a chance to get a good kick 
into them and a lovely lifestyle. The downside of that was then there was a 
cost to pay for that, and that was with their lives, and then you had the whole 
uproar from the Unionist community and stuff, but if a man is putting on a 
uniform and putting a gun on his hip and getting plenty of money for it … 
he knows what he’s going out to face, and I can never  understand all the 
crying and whinging about it when it happened.16
Disparity between the accounts is clear. Discernible, however, is a common 
reliance on the ‘memory of perpetrators’. Moreover, both chime with differ-
ential lived experiences and communal conflict narratives.
 11 Lawther, 2014.
 12 Hearty, 2014.
 13 Police Federation for Northern Ireland, 1999.
 14 Patterson, 2006.
 15 AB, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
 16 P, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
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Constructing counter-memory
Irish republican policing memory must be looked at in terms of its role as 
counter-memory to official discourses on policing. The ‘official’ memory of 
policing is characterised by the denial of state wrongdoing and the ‘invisibili-
sation’ of Irish republican victimhood.17 This is attributable to the mnemonic 
censuring of critics of the RUC18 and to the fact that ‘official’ memory seeks 
to present an authoritative account of the conflict that silences discordant 
voices.19 Memory, as Gallagher asserts,20 is ‘activated by contest’. As such, those 
denied voice and recognition will articulate a counter-memory challenging 
the exclusion of their experiences from official discourses. Irish republican 
policing counter-memory therefore counters the silences of ‘official’ memory. 
What is often pejoratively dismissed as a ‘rewriting’ of the past, may simply be 
the writing of experiences never acknowledged in ‘official’ memory. This was 
the view of Sinn Féin’s Jim Gibney, who argued during the debate that repub-
lican experiences of policing were ‘an unacknowledged history, ignored in the 
main and dismissed by those who knew and remained silent’.21 The debate 
on policing therefore provided an important platform for Irish republicans to 
broadcast their (counter)memories of policing. The fact that the debate was 
taking place at every conceivable level within the homes, social spheres and 
daily lives of republicans, effectively debarred those who have constructed 
official discourses from wielding any stranglehold over the mnemonic process. 
In challenging the very fibre of state, Unionist and RUC narratives, Irish 
republican policing memory assumed the ‘counter-hegemonic purpose’ that 
Irish republican conflict narratives have traditionally held.22 It is worth noting, 
however, that it is not just Irish republicans who feel their experiences have 
been excluded from official discourse on the past. In the aftermath of the 
Belfast flags dispute, it has become apparent that working-class loyalists feel 
their experiences have been underappreciated too.23
Interviewees exhibited an acute awareness of the value of Irish republican 
memory as counter-memory. One tied its importance to the fact that Unionist 
narratives continue to misrepresent the past:
 17 Lawther, 2014.
 18 Mulcahy and Ellison, 2001.
 19 Rolston, 2010.
 20 Gallagher, 1999.
 21 Jim Gibney, ‘First Step to Accountable Policing is Support’, Irish News, 25 January 
2007.
 22 Hackett and Rolston, 2009.
 23 Mulvenna, 2015.
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You’ve these people who are still in denial that there was discrimination 
went on in this country. They are still in denial that the RUC were a bunch 
of bastards, to the extent that ‘no, no they were good’ and all this here crap 
… there’s a lot of denial going on within Unionism, so I don’t expect them 
to agree with my analysis at all of anything to do with policing.24
Others, however, found alternative value in Irish republican memory as 
counter-memory. A counter-hegemonic broadcasting of the Irish republican 
experience became essential to a process of recognising the experience of the 
‘other’. Elaborating on the importance of this more generally, one republican 
stated, ‘there is no agreed narrative about what actually happened here. There’s 
no agreement about what happened, why it happened’.25 In the absence of 
this, the interviewee asserted, it was imperative that Irish republicans engaged 
with former RUC officers not to perpetuate disagreement but to provide them 
with an alternative insight into the causes and consequences of the conflict. 
While questioning how far outside the republican community the counter-
narrative actually resonated, another republican noted that a post-conflict 
questioning within Unionism and within policing itself on the role of RUC 
Special Branch in lethal intelligence wars was emerging. Assessing whether 
this meant Unionists now accepted the Irish republican counter-narrative, the 
interviewee concluded:
I would doubt it, you know, but I think what you got was a shift in their sort 
of simplistic ‘We’re right, the RUC is right, everything done was right’. I 
think there’s that bit of grey area now for a lot of Unionists who you know in 
the past might have heard things from republicans and they would have just 
immediately dismissed and now they wouldn’t be as quick to.26
The same interviewee noted that after ‘good conversations’ with former RUC 
members, there was a change in their own attitude. Elaborating on how they 
have come to realise that there was a tradition of ‘policing families’ within 
Unionism, the interviewee admitted, ‘it was a step for me at one time to accept 
that not everybody in the RUC was there to smash Fenian skulls’. Similarly, 
another interviewee noted that after an initially fractious first encounter with 
former RUC personnel they had come to a mutual position of being ‘willing to 
listen’. This exchange left the interviewee ‘surprised by some of the stuff they 
 24 K, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 25 A, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, April 2013. 
 26 M, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
61Irish Republican Memory as Counter-Memory
were coming off with. How they felt let down, and how they felt sort of sold 
down the Suwannee and all the rest’.27 
Notwithstanding incipient recognition of the ‘other’, the extended repub-
lican debate on policing became an arena of memory politics in which Irish 
republicans could attest to their past experiences and challenge prevailing 
state and Unionist policing narratives. This chapter now engages in a critique 
of Unionist, state and RUC narratives through the lens of Irish republican 
counter-memory. This is not to suggest, misleadingly, that the Irish republican 
policing narrative itself is not afflicted by its own particular silences. As a 
conflict narrative, it is as selectively constructed by ‘the memory of perpe-
trators’ as the narratives it seeks to counter. Unionists and former RUC officers 
are unlikely to identify with it. However, in accepting this, it must also be 
recognised that it is legitimate for Irish republicans to articulate their own 
conflict experiences and it is also legitimate to use these experiences to critique 
dominant narratives.28 
The Unionist narrative
The Unionist policing narrative cannot be divorced from the relationship 
Unionists had with the Northern Ireland state and the RUC. As the dominant 
group in a state that operated a divided society model of policing, Unionists 
had a natural affinity with the criminal justice system and the police force 
perceived to be the protectors of their material advantage. Such is the strength 
of this historical relationship that Ellison and Martin refer to Unionists and the 
RUC enjoying ‘a shared history’.29 Many of the narrative planks in the Unionist 
narrative can also be found in the narrative proffered by the guardians of RUC 
organisational memory, like the RUC George Cross Foundation (RUC GC) 
and the Northern Ireland Retired Police Officers Association (NIRPOA).30 
Both have core notions of ‘policing by consent’, selfless sacrifice by RUC officers 
and the rejection of moral equivalence between ‘those who set out on a daily 
basis to save life and those who set out on a daily basis to take it’.31 
As a consequence, the Unionist narrative has been built on a central plank 
of pre-conflict ‘policing by consent’ in an ideal pre-conflict state, sustained by 
 27 G, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 28 McIntyre, 2012, 182.
 29 Ellison and Martin, 2000.
 30 RUC GC Foundation, 2003; Northern Ireland Retired Police Officers Association, 
2013.
 31 Northern Ireland Retired Police Officers Association, 2013.
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the erroneous supposition that policing problems emerged only in response to 
Irish republican violence. This portrayal of a pre-conflict ‘golden age’ is sympto-
matic of a general tendency among formerly privileged groups to idealise the 
pre-conflict past. In South Africa, for example, problems with white supremacy 
may have been brought into sharp focus with the introduction of apartheid in 
1948 but they long preceded this.32 In Rwanda, the post-genocide discourse of 
harmonious living between Tutsis and Hutus prior to the genocide of the 1990s 
has selectively ‘forgotten’ episodes of genocide in previous decades.33 In the 
North of Ireland, a narrative of the 1960s being a period of cross-community 
tranquillity is ‘rather superficial’ given the tension that surrounded the 50th 
anniversaries of the Battle of the Somme and the Easter Rising, the Divis Street 
riots of 1964, mobilisation by Paisleyites and the reformation of the UVF in 
1966.34 The Unionist narrative therefore views the pre-conflict state through 
‘rose-tinted spectacles’.35 What gets lost in adopting such a lens, is the historical 
context of divided-society policing. Rather than latently becoming an issue in 
1969, policing was integral to the polarisation of society in the North of Ireland 
from the foundation of the state. It was a key issue in dividing society along 
ethno-nationalist lines rather than belatedly coming to reflect this division 
once events turned violent. The ability to exert such a divisive influence is 
derived from the fact that where divided-society policing is practised the issue 
is not just what the police do but what they represent.36 
Police legitimacy and state legitimacy
What is more pertinent than acknowledging that these observations apply 
to pre-conflict Northern Ireland, is establishing why they apply. There 
must be some reason why Nationalists could not view the RUC in the 
same favourable light as Unionists. The only explanation otherwise would 
be that Nationalists were simply antagonistic to notions of law and order – 
a claim without foundation that is impossible to substantiate. Rather than 
being a product of innate antagonism towards law and order, the differential 
relationship arises from the alienation caused by exclusivist state structures.37 
Their fractious relationship with the state conditioned their relationship with 
the police force upholding the state. As outlined in the preceding chapter, 
 32 Guelke, 2012, 70.
 33 Buckley-Zistel, 2012, 81.
 34 Dixon, 2008, 70.
 35 Ellison and Smyth, 2000, 35.
 36 Hasisi and Weitzer, 2007.
 37 Bew and Patterson, 1985.
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from the foundation of the Northern Ireland state the Nationalist minority 
found themselves occupying a precarious position in a state dominated by the 
ethno-nationalist ‘other’. The exclusion inherent in state structures meant that 
the minority community withdrew from Unionist dominated state life rather 
than integrating themselves into it. The cumulative effect of this was that the 
minority community felt merely ‘resident in the territory which Northern 
Protestants had marked out as their own’.38 If one cannot identify with the 
state, it is only logical that one will not identify with the police force upholding 
that state. If the state is perceived purely as a Protestant state for a Protestant 
people, it is also foreseeable that Protestants will endeavour to take ownership 
of the police force constituted with protecting that state. Thus, notions of 
privilege on the one hand and marginalisation on the other determined how 
different communities interpreted the operation of the state and its policing 
apparatus. Police legitimacy is ultimately reduced to state legitimacy. What 
transpires is that ‘the security forces of a state established for Protestants, a 
state by and large supported by Protestants and by and large not supported 
by Catholics has utterly different relationships with these two communities’.39 
A narrative of pre-conflict ‘policing by consent’ fails to marry with the 
more general policing reality on the ground in pre-conflict Northern Ireland. 
Divorced from the Unionist viewpoint, the reality emerges that the RUC only 
delivered ‘normal’ policing pre-conflict where it was compatible with and coinci-
dental to their key function of suppressing Nationalist dissent and upholding the 
Unionist state.40 The very raison d’être of the force from its outset was to uphold 
Unionist rule and suppress any dissent to this. In times of relative peace, the 
performance of this task may have masqueraded as ‘normal’ policing, but the 
key underlying function was always the same. Normality operated only in so 
far as this key function could be carried out in a manner that vaguely resembled 
‘normal’ policing. The overt aggression of counter-insurgency policing later seen 
during the conflict is admittedly absent, but this should not be fallaciously 
taken as indicative that pre-conflict policing was ‘normal’. As Raimundo and 
Costa Pinto note, using the example of Salazarist Portugal, policing does not 
have to be overtly violent to be repressive but can be highly ‘judicialised’ by 
relying on emergency provisions rather than assassination and torture to silence 
opponents.41 The misuse of emergency legislation identified in the previous 
chapter certainly suggests that the pre-conflict Northern Ireland state adopted 
this modus operandi. The reality of pre-conflict policing, then, is that ‘everyday 
 38 Ruane and Todd, 1996, 95.
 39 O’Dochartaigh, 1997, 316.
 40 Ellison and Smyth, 2000, 42.
 41 Raimundo and Costa Pinto, 2014, 176.
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policing was as much, if not more so, directed towards the cultural and social 
subordination of Nationalists as it was towards the prevention and detection 
of “normal” crime’.42 Seeking middle ground, Whyte argues that the ‘fairest 
summary’ of policing in the Northern Ireland state is that it ‘teeter[ed] uncer-
tainly between impartiality and partisanship’. While he certainly tempers the 
seriousness of claims about the Northern Ireland state, he also recognises that 
aspects of policing were problematic because it failed to apply the law evenly 
to ‘unionist and anti-unionist alike’.43 Unionists were exempt from the adverse 
effects of this two-tiered policing, thus a narrative of pre-conflict ‘policing by 
consent’ chimes with their lived experience. For the minority community, 
however, the pre-conflict state of play involved being policed by the ‘other’.
The veracity of such observations can be found in strong interviewee 
assertions that policing was always far removed from ‘normal’ policing. One 
interviewee, who rather unusually had a neighbour in the RUC, recalled that 
‘you were always very aware even as a child that the policemen were something 
different from us … they weren’t to be trusted, they weren’t our people’.44 
Another revealed the flaws in the Unionist narrative by noting that even though 
they had no personal reason to feel detached from pre-conflict policing they 
nonetheless ‘would’ve had a concept they [the RUC] were not Dixon of Dock 
Green’. Conceding that ‘I didn’t have any personal run-ins with the RUC prior 
to the conflict’, the interviewee was nevertheless ‘aware of what they repre-
sented’ and endeavoured to ‘stay as far away as possible’.45 This sentiment was 
corroborated by another republican who opined:
I do remember policemen in the past and in the 1960s when I would have 
been a teenager, policemen in [area]. They were not necessarily dangerous 
or brutal. We knew them and they were about, but there was always a clear 
understanding that despite how affable they might be on the surface, that 
their primary responsibility was maintaining the state, and the state to 
me was a deeply flawed state. It was discriminatory against me and the 
community I come from and the police were there to uphold the legislation 
that was discriminatory. So that’s the way I looked at policing then.46 
Irish republican counter-memory, as articulated above, evidences how those 
who were the policed in the pre-conflict state and those who policed the 
 42 Smyth, 2002.
 43 Whyte, 1983, 29.
 44 G, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 45 H, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 46 Q , critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
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pre-conflict state have markedly different narratives. Interviewees – the policed 
– used their identity as the ‘other’ in a discriminatory state to explain their 
attitudes to pre-conflict policing. The exclusivity bred by structural discrimi-
nation thus seeped into their understanding of policing from an early age. 
Policing pre-1969 seemed premised less on the notion of normalised consent 
and more on a subconscious understanding that it entailed whatever degree 
of coercion necessary to maintain the status quo of Unionist privilege and 
Nationalist marginalisation. 
‘Tasks of a paramilitary nature’
A further challenge to the Unionist ‘policing by consent’ narrative is the fact 
that in Northern Ireland policing was always in a semi-permanent counter-
insurgency mode. This is completely irreconcilable with the notion of ‘normal’ 
policing. The RUC was equipped with ‘emergency’ legislation to enforce 
internal security of the state long before 1969. If Unionist policing memory 
does not accommodate this fact, the governmental zeitgeist at the time does. 
The Hunt Report, for example, spoke of ‘the special difficulties’ for policing 
in Northern Ireland and ‘those tasks of a paramilitary nature which the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary has shouldered since its inception’.47 That the report 
felt it necessary to mention such ‘special difficulties’ is itself indicative that 
pre-conflict policing was not ‘normal’. Moreover, paramilitary policing is 
anathema to any semblance of ‘normal’ policing. This governmental report 
very clearly states that the RUC was always engaged in paramilitary policing. If 
this is taken to be the official governmental line at the time, then the Unionist 
narrative is contradictory even to this. The reality was that the RUC had at 
its disposal wide-ranging emergency legislation, a vast array of armoury and 
an armed part-time militia (the ‘B-Specials’). While Whyte argues labelling 
Northern Ireland a ‘police state’ is an exaggeration,48 at the same time it is 
hardly unreasonable to argue that none of this fits with a narrative of ‘policing 
by consent’. The reality on the ground can be more accurately gauged through 
one republican’s ‘first real sort of memory’ of policing: 
I remember in 1966, believe it or not, there was an Easter parade … it was 
the 50th anniversary of the [Easter] Rising, but that didn’t mean anything 
to me. I remember the sight then of all the cops everywhere, carrying 
 47 ‘Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland’ (Hunt Report) 
(1969), [8–10].
 48 Whyte, 1983, 23.
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machine guns, you know they had these Sten guns and that was a fairly sort 
of intimidating image walking through them to get to the parade.49
Little seems consensual about this type of policing. The presence of heavily 
armed police officers is by its very nature coercive because it communi-
cates what the cost is of stepping outside the permitted boundaries. This is 
heightened when the specific context of this memory – a republican commem-
orative event – is taken into consideration. Of course, it could be argued that 
this memory is typical of the republican tendency to ‘remember’ the what of 
pre-conflict policing while ‘forgetting’ the why.50 Such activity could only 
reinforce, rather than assuage, the Unionist siege mentality identified in the 
previous chapter.
Perpetuating the myth
How Unionism portrays pre-conflict policing corresponds with their portrayal 
of a harmonious pre-conflict Northern Ireland being unceremoniously wrecked 
by Irish republican violence. Ellison and Smyth dismiss this as ‘mythical Eden 
folklore’, arguing:
The tendency to look back at the two decades between the end of the 
Second World War and the beginning of the civil rights agitation as a period 
of peace and communal harmony is at variance with the facts. The police 
managed to keep the simmering discontent of Nationalists under control 
by a combination of repressive legislation and blanket surveillance, assisted 
to no little extent by the tactical and strategic ineffectiveness of both the 
IRA and constitutional Nationalism.51
Rather than simply accepting that the Unionist narrative is premised on a 
myth, it is important to identify why this myth is perpetuated today.
On one level, the Unionist narrative is reflective of their lived experience 
in the pre-conflict state; the state was theirs, the RUC was theirs, the writ of 
law being enforced sustained a hegemony that was theirs. Policing was indubi-
tably ‘policing by consent’ from such a perspective. On a more complex level, 
attuned to the jostling of meta-conflict memory politics, the reason for perpet-
uating a narrative inconsistent with fact is patently obvious. Having been the 
 49 A, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, April 2013.
 50 Hearty, 2014.
 51 Ellison and Smyth, 2000, 46.
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group in the ascendancy, any admission by Unionists of the shortcomings of 
the pre-conflict state is essentially an admission of their own wrongdoing. As 
Ruane and Todd have noted, even if some Unionists did feel uneasy about 
certain aspects of the discriminatory state, ‘no Unionist saw good reason 
to integrate Nationalists into the institutions of the state’.52 If they concede 
that this was in fact the case, they provide mnemonic ammunition to Irish 
republicans. Republicans could then point to Unionist recognition of the 
exclusionary nature of the Northern Ireland state which would effectively 
vindicate their violent opposition to it. Although the Unionist stance has 
recently softened a little – for example, a dying Ian Paisley’s concession that 
discrimination was ‘no way to run a country’ and Mike Nesbitt’s admission 
that discrimination made Northern Ireland a ‘cold house’ for Catholics53 – 
they nonetheless maintain that a subversive NICRA campaign or violent IRA 
campaign were not measured responses to whatever discrimination existed. 
In making only a minimalist admission of discrimination, Unionism has 
adroitly avoided giving republicans the advantage in memory politics. It is 
by virtue of necessity and the demands of meta-conflict memory politics 
that the narrative persists. There is therefore a favourable juxtaposition of the 
‘order’ of pre-conflict Northern Ireland with the ‘disorder’ of the conflict.54 
The narrative is unambiguous, even if fallacious; there was order, peace and 
harmony in Northern Ireland until the IRA plunged the place into disorder, 
bloodshed and sectarianism. This ‘mythology of a prelapsarian Ulster’ allows 
Unionists to blame the outbreak of conflict on Nationalist demagogues and 
the IRA.55 The detached out of focus ‘remembering’ exhibited in this narrative 
is demonstrative that memory will, much to the cost of historical accuracy, 
only accommodate the facts that suit it.56 Unionist memories of policing 
overlook the underlying problems with policing since the inception of the 
state, shoring up their position on the moral high ground, to buttress them 
from criticism about state discrimination. This then leaves the blame for the 
outbreak of conflict and the resulting decades of devastation at the door of 
 52 Ruane and Todd, 1996, 91.
 53 ‘Ian Paisley Criticised Over Dublin-Monaghan Bombs Comment’, BBC News, 
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Irish republicanism. ‘Forgotten’ amidst the clamour for the meta-conflict 
moral high ground, however, is the fact that policing problems were not a 
by-product of the conflict but ‘part of the problem’.57 
The British state narrative
The British state has perpetuated a ‘two tribes’ narrative that reduces conflict 
in the six counties to inevitable clashes between opposing sectarian factions. 
This is characteristic of British state refusal to acknowledge its role in the 
conflict.58 Such a narrative, as Faligot asserts, distorted events on the ground 
by ‘projecting the irrational image of a war of religion’ through ‘concealing 
the real causes and consequences of the Anglo-Irish conflict’.59 In any event, 
it disguised asymmetries of power. Had the ‘two tribes’ theory any vestige 
of accuracy – highly questionable at best – it overlooked how one ‘tribe’ was 
marginalised in the Northern Ireland state, while the other ‘tribe’ dictated 
social, political and economic matters. If there were indeed ‘two tribes’ battling 
each other, it was not on an even keel. The role of successive British admin-
istrations in creating and subsequently sustaining this inequality is similarly 
neglected. A ‘two tribes’ misconception could perhaps be rhetorically applied 
to externally drawn British Army members. However, it could hardly apply to 
the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) or RUC. After all, these were indigenous 
forces heavily drawn from one ‘tribe’. The facade of being neutral arbitrators in 
a supposedly sectarian conflict would be difficult to sustain – especially when 
‘Ulsterisation’ gave them the lead counter-insurgency role. Normalisation and 
criminalisation would solve this propagandistic quandary. Accordingly, the 
British state narrative proclaimed that the conflict was not a ‘war’ between 
British and Irish parties, but criminal violence undertaken by opposing 
sectarian factions that sparked a public emergency to be dealt with profes-
sionally by the indigenous RUC supported primarily by the indigenous UDR, 
with other British Army regiments acting as further backup. Britain used its 
position as a liberal Western democracy to shield its role in the conflict from 
international scrutiny, thus allowing the erroneous ‘two tribes’ narrative to 
prevail internationally.60
 57 Ellison, 2007.
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‘Ulsterisation’
‘Ulsterisation’ was something of an enigma; narratively it withheld the propa-
gandistic advantage from republicans by reinforcing the ‘two tribes’ narrative 
but practicably it reified historical hostility towards the RUC by implicating 
them in contentious counter-insurgency activities. The wisdom of believing 
that Nationalists would buy into the narrative of a professional and even-
handed indigenous police force when reality on the ground saw that same 
force use counter-insurgency policing disproportionately against them must be 
questioned. The disconnect between the rhetoric and the practice of the policy 
generated republican claims that it was enacted to make occupation ‘seem more 
acceptable’.61 The veracity of this is evident in the following recollection of the 
RUC’s increased counter-insurgency function:
I suppose the earliest memories were constant raids on the family home by 
the British Army. Then you seen a sort of change then that raiding parties 
were being led by the RUC and then really the British Army phased out as 
such and it was then just pure RUC that were raiding and, believe it or not, 
found that to be more sectarian, more vicious in its approach. Where the 
squaddies were coming in and sort of probably creating more damage to 
the home – not abusing physically or verbally anybody – just coming in and 
wrecking the home and leaving, where the RUC were more ruthless, more 
premeditated in what they did.62
Similarly, when reflecting on police primacy, the Sinn Féin motion to the 
Extraordinary Ard Fheis condemned the RUC as ‘a partisan, Unionist militia 
which engaged in harassment, torture, assassination, shoot-to-kill and collusion 
with death squads’.63
Evidently, then, ‘Ulsterisation’ further nurtured an already established 
view that the RUC was a Unionist force. The reasoning behind the policy was 
to deny the IRA propagandistic oxygen by using a home-grown force against 
it. However, the force was not an inherent part of the community per se, only 
an inherent part of the Unionist community. To the minority community 
there could only be suspicions of bias. The RUC was, after all, overwhelmingly 
 61 ‘Comment’, Sceal, 8 (7 August 1896).
 62 P, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
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Protestant, yet its victims were overwhelmingly Catholic.64 This may well have 
been the case before the policy and even prior to the conflict, but ‘Ulsterisation’ 
fuelled rather than ameliorated matters. If RUC conduct towards the NICRA 
led Nationalists to feel that ‘the police were their enemy’,65 then surely the 
more robust targeting of Nationalist areas as a result of ‘Ulsterisation’ could 
only have a similar effect. The salience of this is magnified by O’Dochartaigh’s 
concession that the RUC ‘did not treat these two communities equally – 
whether it be equally harshly or equally gently’.66 ‘Vicarious punishment’ 
of the entire Nationalist community in response to IRA and INLA activity 
produced a disproportionate counter-insurgency impact on that commu-
nity.67 As the community at the rough end of this, it was merely natural that 
Nationalists would develop antipathy towards the RUC. Hostility to the RUC 
was not a result of ‘bias or hatred’ but ‘bitter experience of the RUC’s brutality 
and sectarianism’.68 Of course, one could argue that Irish republicans posed 
the greatest threat to the state and security forces, thus counter-insurgency 
policing would be foreseeably calibrated to reflect this.69 
Notwithstanding this, ‘Ulsterisation’ was clearly problematic in the ‘divided 
society’ environment of the North of Ireland. Having failed to coerce repub-
licans into subscribing to state normalisation and criminalisation narratives, 
the policy simply hardened their resolve towards the RUC and widened the 
gulf between the RUC and Nationalists. Not only was policing seen as highly 
militarised, it was also seen as highly sectarian. The impact that ‘Ulsterisation’ 
had in instilling such an outlook can be seen in how interviewees ‘remember’ 
in a way that juxtaposes their own lived experience of the policy with that of 
their Unionist neighbours. One interviewee who grew up in a predominantly 
Unionist town, alluding to their familial experiences, said:
We would have experienced harassment by the likes of the UDR, the RUC 
quite regularly … the impression the police gave us verbally and by their 
behaviour was that they were most certainly a Unionist force to protect 
the Unionist people. They weren’t in the business of protecting people like 
ourselves.70
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Another spoke of being singled out for ‘special treatment’ at road blocks. This 
‘special treatment’ was reserved solely for Nationalists and was not foisted upon 
the local Unionist population from which the security forces were drawn.71
These memories challenge the ‘Ulsterisation’ portrayal of the RUC as an 
even-handed indigenous police force. The policy failed to gain any meaningful 
contemporaneous traction. Little has changed in the intervening years. Irish 
republicans today – including those who have embraced police reform and had 
meaningful engagements with ex-RUC personnel on the past – continue to 
‘remember’ the RUC as a Unionist counter-insurgency police force rather than 
an impartial normalised police service.
Normalisation
Normalisation depicted the RUC’s counter-insurgency function as a simple 
extension of its professional job fighting ‘normal’ crime. Unlike other 
combatants, where loyalists died in defence of Ulster against republican attack 
and republicans died waging a war of national liberation against occupational 
forces, slain RUC personnel were normal police officers having died for the 
entire community. Their blood was shed not in waging war on the ‘other’, but 
in an attempt to keep peace, restore normality and prevent civil war.72 Were it 
not for the force diligently discharging its duties the North of Ireland would 
seemingly have descended into ‘an abyss of the kind seen in Bosnia, Rwanda 
and Kosovo’.73 The force represented ‘the thin green line standing between 
bloody anarchy and the rule of law’.74 Apparently, then, the only thing distin-
guishing them from other police forces was the environment of heightened 
danger they had to function within – circumstances that were ‘very difficult’ 
incurring ‘considerable sacrifice’.75 The cumulative effect of this was a morality 
play portrayal of the RUC as the quintessential ‘good guys’ fighting against 
the evil ‘terrorist’ on both sides of the political divide. Even if some Unionists 
have deviated slightly from the normalisation script by acknowledging that 
some aspects of policing were abnormal, as Lawther highlights,76 they have 
continued portraying it as a necessary response to republican violence.
 71 AB, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
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The shortcomings of this narrative are obvious. Primarily, it relates a past 
that is depoliticised and ahistorical; it outlines the RUC’s historical role in 
tackling crime and in upholding security of the state and it acknowledges the 
losses of its members but it offers no contextualisation of why they were killed 
or why the force had to assume a dual policing role.77 Like the ‘Ulsterisation’ 
narrative, this hinges on the dissonance between the policy in terms of narrative 
and application on the ground:
The intent behind this [normalisation] at least as far as the use of the RUC 
was concerned, was to create an image of normality on the ground. The 
theory was that a uniformed policeman was much less likely to attract as 
much attention or to provoke a hostile reaction as a fully equipped soldier. 
No steps were taken, however, to disarm them or put them back on beat 
patrol instead of patrolling in the military type Land Rover.78
Furthermore, while the underlying intention of the policy was to give the 
impression of normality, what were apparently ‘ordinary crimes’ were dealt with 
through the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act and the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act rather than through ‘normal’ legislation.79 Although the 
normalisation narrative serves the memory politics needs of the state, it also 
discards certain rudimentary truths about conflict policing more generally. 
Most notably, there is a lack of recognition that ‘in most, if not all, war-torn 
societies (from intra-state conflicts) the police were prior to and/or during the 
conflict period, politically biased, militarised, corrupt, ethnically (or group) 
divided, disrespectful of human rights and inefficient at ensuring the security of 
all citizens’.80 There is similar non-recognition that police forces become active 
participants in – or at the very least contributors to – internal conflict through 
spying, torture and the use of proxy death squads.81 To assert that the RUC 
was somehow an aberration is either naivety or mnemonic cherry-picking. The 
voluminous criticism of the force from human rights groups outside the repub-
lican community demonstrates as much.82 Although criticism from within 
republican communities was dismissed as propaganda,83 external criticism was 
 77 Mulcahy, 2000.
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more problematic. It eventually birthed a ‘bad apple’ narrative whereby the 
transgressions of a few officers should not undermine the integrity and sacrifice 
of the RUC as a whole.84
Favourable narratives highlighting the RUC’s human cost thrive on the 
‘memory of perpetrators’. Whilst the RUC did indeed shoulder considerable 
death and misery from IRA and INLA violence – something admittedly 
silenced by the ‘memory of perpetrators’ in the Irish republican counter-
narrative – it similarly inflicted much death and misery too. Not only were 
they implicated in conflict-related death but they were also responsible for 
other less obvious harms like systematic harassment of target groups at vehicle 
check points and through ‘stop and search’ operations. Ellison maintains that 
‘although the RUC did not cause the conflict that emerged in the late 1960s it 
was nevertheless a key factor in prolonging it’.85 This is a compelling assertion 
that completely undermines the state normalisation narrative. The basis for 
this argument is that ‘the RUC itself could be a catalyst for conflict’.86 Indeed, 
when one considers the lived experience of the RUC reflected in Irish repub-
lican policing counter-memory it is difficult to reach a conclusion that differs 
from Ellison. The logic of this, then, is that it appears misguided to argue that 
a force that contributes to, periodically aggravates and in some cases prolongs 
the conflict is in any guise a ‘normal’ police force. To all intents and purposes, 
the most rational conclusion to make is that any such police force is an active 
party to the conflict whether official discourse concedes this or not.
Inasmuch as the ‘memory of perpetrators’ can be a silencing tactic from the 
pro-state perspective, it can also be a counter-memory tactic frontloading RUC 
wrongdoing from a victim-centric Irish republican perspective. Commentary 
during the policing debate highlighted how ‘the history of policing in Ireland 
is one of oppression and tyranny … it is a record of police forces rather than 
police services’.87 Gerry Adams refuted the normalisation narrative in his 
opening remarks to the Extraordinary Ard Fheis, arguing that ‘we who live in 
the North have never had proper policing. The old RUC and all of its associated 
militia served the Union, upheld the Orange state and repressed everyone 
else’.88 Likewise, interview data reflected how the ‘suspect community’ at the 
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sharp edge of RUC counter-insurgency ‘remember’ experiences of policing as 
far removed from ‘normal’ policing as is imaginable. One interviewee from an 
area that bore the brunt of ‘suspect community’ policing remembered feeling 
that:
It was very much a ‘them and us’, and I suppose looking back on it it’s easy 
to understand as far as they were concerned: everybody, no matter what age 
you were, was the enemy and they expressed that at every opportunity … 
they definitely were not a police service in [area]. They were a police force 
who were, if you like, sent in to put manners on the people of [area].89 
Another recalled growing up in a different republican district, where the 
consensus was:
While there was this mistrust towards policing it wasn’t about policing per 
se, it was about the RUC. It was about the political nature and existence of 
that body and what that body represented … I always remember growing 
up that it wasn’t a lawless society. People did need policing but recognised 
that the RUC wasn’t it. So republicans that I grew up with and republicans 
in my family in particular weren’t against policing. They were against the 
RUC.90
In a further snapshot of this reality on the ground, one interviewee summa-
rised their experiences of policing as being either ‘negative’ or ‘huge periods of 
nothing because to me for a lot of my life the police when it came to protection 
and the rule of law were irrelevant’.91 These autobiographical narratives no 
doubt reflect lived reality from the perspective of these individual interviewees. 
However, on the collective level, there is a silence in relation to how some 
moderate, usually middle-class, Nationalists did engage with the RUC on 
matters of ‘normal’ crime.92 This could be reflective of differential experience of 
the application of normalisation on the ground. In ‘mixed’ middle-class neigh-
bourhoods, where conflict-related activity was minimal, counter-insurgency 
policing easily passed under the guise of ‘normal’ policing.93 In predominantly 
Féin Extraordinary Ard Fheis on Policing, RDS, Dublin (28 January 2007)’: http://
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republican working-class areas it did not. Even though the state was trying to 
roll out normality and police primacy, the RUC still relied on military backup 
when patrolling republican districts. These communities became a clearly 
defined ‘target group’ for militarised ‘over-policing’.94 For those unfortunate 
enough to fall within this ‘suspect community’ population, everyday policing 
was experienced through a system predicated on ‘policing people’ rather than 
‘policing crime’.95 
Unsurprisingly, republicans at the time did not buy into the normali-
sation narrative. Retrospective post-conflict reflection has not changed this. 
Interviewees related a plethora of negative ‘suspect community’ policing 
memories yet no positive memories of ‘normal’ policing. The overwhelming 
effect of the RUC’s counter-insurgency role, as gleaned from the memories 
of interviewees, was a clear identification of the force with the British Army. 
This made the force ‘the enemy’ by precluding any distinction between their 
counter-insurgency role and their ‘normal’ policing function:
My experience with the RUC was they were flown in from other areas to 
fortified barracks. Their function or their role within [area] was very much 
a counter-insurgency role … like most of the Nationalists and republicans 
I’d say … they were a militia but they certainly weren’t what we would see 
in a normal democratic society as a police force … they would have been 
people from Unionist backgrounds, Unionist areas coming into a strongly 
republican/Nationalist area … they came in armed, they were trained and 
they were financed by Britain to play a particular role and that’s what they 
did.96
The recurrence of such a world view throughout the interview process shows 
that it transcended temporal and geographical barriers, which suggests this was 
the collective Irish republican policing experience. Irish republican policing 
counter-memory can be usefully viewed through Kalmanowiecki’s argument 
that counter-insurgency policing blurs the distinction between the military and 
the police because both become tasked with protecting the state from internal 
and external threat. Rather than viewing the two institutions as separate they 
should instead be viewed along ‘a continuum from military to police’.97 The 
overwhelming identification of the RUC with the military and the centrality of 
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its counter-insurgency function in Irish republican policing counter-memory 
offer empirical sustenance to the continuum model.
Irish republican policing counter-memory, fashioned by the ‘memory of 
perpetrators’, is wholly irreconcilable with the state normalisation narrative. 
Articulated by those at the rough edge of conflict-style policing, it is 
constructed and sustained by feelings of victimisation and vulnerability. As 
such, it has adopted narratives put forward by human rights groups outside 
the constituency. Although such a blatant assertion is not explicitly made 
in the counter-narrative itself, the memories proffered by interviewees and 
the narrative gleaned from archival sources exhibit considerable correlation 
with concerns about collusion, misuse of ‘emergency’ provisions and police 
brutality previously raised by human rights groups. As a consequence, human 
rights groups have rather misguidedly been accused of peddling a republican 
agenda.98 This victimhood is precisely what is silenced in the state narrative. 
The British state, for its part, has a vested interest in failing to recognise repub-
lican victimhood. Were it to accept the reality of the ‘suspect community’ 
policing it fostered, it would effectively entangle itself in a web of systematic 
human rights abuse. Instead, it continues to push the demonstrably false line 
that it was a bystander in the conflict, thus conveniently overlooking how their 
actions and misuse of long-standing ‘emergency’ legislation contributed to, 
exacerbated and prolonged political violence.99 Britain is not unique in this 
regard. Indonesia, for example, continues to peddle a similar line in relation 
to their involvement in the conflict in Timor-Leste.100 This narrative may deny 
republicans any belated justification for their violence but, as Rolston argues,101 
it is somewhat self-contradictory given that subsequent police reform repre-
sents implicit acceptance that policing was not ‘normal’ during the conflict.
The RUC narrative
RUC organisational memory regales ‘narratives of public acceptability, political 
neutrality, impartiality and a primary concern with enforcing ordinary criminal 
law rather than exceptional security measures’.102 In line with this, it suggests 
that although it appeared the force had no support within the Nationalist 
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community it actually enjoyed considerable ‘behind closed doors support’.103 
The absence of an open manifestation of this support was attributed to IRA 
threats and violence against anyone seen co-operating with the force. This 
narrative propagated the legitimacy of the force by insulating it from repub-
lican accusations of sectarianism. It was a decidedly clever narrative to adopt 
in the midst of the ‘propaganda war’. Republicans could not, even if they used a 
reality on the ground suggesting otherwise, definitively disprove this narrative. 
They could fundamentally question it to the nth degree. They could stretch 
the fibres of its credibility for sure. But they could not unequivocally disprove 
it. How does one prove or disprove what happens privately behind closed 
doors anyway? On the other hand, the RUC could laud even the most negli-
gible applicability as evidence that the narrative was true, thus engineering 
a sense of legitimacy for itself in the face of visible legitimacy problems in 
Nationalist communities. It extended beyond mere insulation of the RUC 
position, however, to effectively cast aspersions about the amount of support 
the IRA had among working-class Nationalists by questioning whether the IRA 
were their protectors or tormentors. Two principal methods became apparent: 
use of official survey data and magnification of displeasure with IRA internal 
policing. It is worth interrogating these further.
Dissecting hidden support claims
The RUC narrative of cross-community support lacks validation by credible 
empirical evidence.104 Data from attitudinal surveys specifically designed to 
dismiss claims of policing bias is its only supportive ‘evidence’.105 The findings 
of such surveys did indeed suggest that the RUC enjoyed cross-community 
support at an initial glance, but on further examination their worth becomes 
questionable. An argument has long persisted that they were cynically 
manipulated to exaggerate moderate opinion at the expense of accuracy.106 
The socio-economic orientation of the surveys often helped produce findings 
favourable to the RUC. Survey sample pools usually comprised middle-
class professionals rather than lower-class manual workers. Given that the 
former were normally supportive of the cross-community Alliance Party and 
moderate SDLP while the latter were more sympathetic to republican groups, 
findings naturally gravitated towards less critical conclusions. Those included 
in the surveys were middle-class people living in middle-class neighbourhoods 
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– essentially those least effected by the conflict and those least effected by 
counter-insurgency policing. Those at the counter-insurgency policing coalface 
were effectively debarred from surveys. Surveys essentially became a process 
of asking those most likely to concur with the government line their thoughts 
on policing while excluding any possibly dissenting voices. Findings are 
therefore tainted at best and entirely self-serving at worst, leaving their worth 
in measuring the accuracy of ‘hidden support’ claims severely diminished. 
Similarly, pointing to disquiet about how the IRA internally policed its 
own community through ‘rough justice’ as evidence of wide-scale intimi-
dation is also problematic. The process was undeniably brutal and no doubt 
alienated the friends and families of its victims.107 To suggest otherwise is 
to stretch credulity. Beating and kneecapping those deemed to have trans-
gressed communal norms invited foreseeable claims of intimidation. However, 
by focusing on the what of internal policing there is a convenient elision of 
the why. ‘Rough justice’ may have repulsed certain sections of the Nationalist 
population but at the same time it also appeased the demands of other sections 
of that community for criminality to be dealt with.108 One can infer from 
the very existence of these demands that a legitimacy-deficit-induced policing 
vacuum existed in working-class Nationalist communities. ‘Rough justice’ was 
a product of the ‘supply/demand’ conundrum this caused. Blackbourn argues 
that the emergence of the phenomenon is not only indicative of a failure of 
policing but is symptomatic of the more general failure of the entire criminal 
justice system to inspire confidence among or support from the Nationalist 
community.109 The symbiotic relationship between state illegitimacy and IRA 
legitimacy in the Nationalist psyche naturally invited the IRA to plug this 
vacuum. Their response to criticism of ‘rough justice’ was that it was not intimi-
dating the community but rather protecting it in the absence of a ‘normal’ 
police force. This challenged the state normalisation narrative and bolstered 
their communal defender self-image in the ‘propaganda war’. The IRA would, 
it asserted, protect the community from the ‘oppression’ of the occupier, the 
‘other’ and petty criminals.110 In Ardoyne it thanked the local community for 
‘their wholehearted support and assistance’ in enabling them to punish local 
criminality.111 The argument that ‘rough justice’ was symptomatic of the RUC’s 
own shortcomings permeated the synopsis of one interviewee who contextu-
alised it as follows:
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You couldn’t go to a police station and report the theft of your car because 
they would try and turn you into an informer. So people just went to repub-
licans if there was a house break-in or someone was at anti-social behaviour 
and that’s what really created that sort of atmosphere, but it was one where 
you could leave your door open. There was no drugs on the street or knife 
crime.112
Although this account contextualises internal policing it also idealises 
the practice. There is little recognition of the human rights abuse that the 
inarguably brutal process entailed. If the ‘memory of perpetrators’ fails to 
recognise the violence of ‘us’ on ‘them’, it also neglects the internal policing 
violence of ‘us’ on ‘us’. ‘Rough justice’ is simultaneously sanitised by repub-
licans to legitimate it but divorced from its context by the RUC in order to 
reduce it to crude intimidation. The posturing around competing viewpoints 
on the matter is reflective of how discourses on the practice were intricately 
linked to competing narratives on normalisation that underpinned the ‘propa-
ganda war’. As such, two dichotomous frameworks for presenting the practice 
emerged: exaggeration to give any semblance of communal disapproval hyper 
visibility and minimisation that silenced the adverse impact of the practice at 
the intra-communal level through legitimacy claims gleaned from a communal 
demand and/or need.
The ‘hidden support’ narrative is built on an exclusivist premise that 
completely discounts other factors that may have deterred Nationalists from 
openly supporting the RUC. Intimidation is presented as the only obstacle to 
open co-operation.113 Such a narrative, while serving the legitimacy purposes 
of the RUC, ignores how ‘the strength of Nationalist opposition to the police 
suggests that while intimidation is a factor … it is not the only and perhaps not 
the most important factor – it may be more a symptom than a root cause’.114 
Perhaps the lack of open support was due (drawing on O’Faolean’s analogous 
critique of the UDR)115 to the predominantly Protestant membership and 
ethos of the force, its dubious historical roots and their role in the conflict. 
Then there is the historical and traditional loathing of informers in Ireland.116 
Lack of open support can be equally attributable to some unwritten communal 
code about not collaborating with the security forces, meaning that historical 
consciousness and the possibility of wider communal ostracism also prevented 
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open support for the RUC. This wider societal stigma led Ryder to concede 
that republicans ‘rarely needed to resort to threats’.117 That someone as sympa-
thetic to the RUC as Ryder should acknowledge this speaks volumes about the 
exaggerated claims on which the ‘hidden support’ narrative is premised. There 
is also the questionable manner in which the RUC sought to secure Nationalist 
‘co-operation’. Resorting to blackmailing drink-drivers into informing on repub-
licans is hardly supportive of claims of ‘hidden support’.118 Rather, it seemingly 
‘exposes the lack of support Nationalists have for the RUC when they have to 
arrest Nationalists and intimidate them into gathering low level intelligence 
on local republicans’.119 Moreover, the ‘hidden support’ narrative completely 
disregards the adverse effect that ‘over-policing’ had on Nationalist districts. 
In the ‘see-saw’ relationship the Nationalist community had with the IRA, 
any digression by the IRA from ‘acceptable’ conduct led to reduced communal 
support.120 Yet this was also surely the case in relation to attitudes towards the 
RUC. When the RUC was targeting Nationalist communities via ‘Ulsterisation’ 
the ‘see-saw’ tipped against the RUC, either towards indifference or towards 
tacit support for the IRA. With Nationalists having only confrontational experi-
ences of policing, the ‘see-saw’ was more often than not tipped against the RUC. 
While this did not invariably translate into hardened support for the IRA it did 
militate against the RUC nonetheless. Republicans could certainly tap into a 
reservoir of RUC misdeeds to ‘turn’ Nationalists against the RUC via the ‘propa-
ganda war’. Given this, one must question to what extent the IRA even needed to 
resort to the crude intimidation alleged by the RUC.
Multitudinous factors may have impeded open support for the RUC in 
Nationalist areas, yet the force continued to counsel that IRA intimidation 
was the lone determinant. A governmental declaration that ‘the aims of the 
IRA are to intimidate the population by brutal terrorism and so to prevent any 
co-operation with the government, the police and the courts of law’ reinforced 
this.121 That the IRA tried its utmost to prevent the RUC getting a foothold 
in Nationalist communities is incontestable. That it actively discouraged 
Nationalist communities from co-operating with the RUC is also incontestable. 
They were, after all, at war with the RUC and were unlikely to passively tolerate 
the enemy encroaching on its territory and poaching its wider support base. 
These efforts undoubtedly involved the exertion of a certain level and type of 
pressure but hardly by the wholesale, crude intimidation the RUC claimed. 
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Policing ‘hearts and minds’ 
Historically, the IRA response to informing has been unambiguous – the 
death sentence. From 1969 to 2001, the IRA shot dead 59 people as alleged 
informers.122 These included IRA volunteers, republican sympathisers and 
civilians who had passed on information on IRA activity to the security forces. 
The policy has featured in all IRA campaigns since the Tan War in the 1920s.123 
It was justified by the IRA, both at the time and ever since, as a form of ‘necessary 
evil’ spawned by the harsh realities of war. To this end, those fraternising with 
the security forces were advised to desist or be ‘dealt with’.124 But it was not 
enough, in either the physical war or the ‘propaganda war’, to retrospectively 
punish this conventional informing through death. The RUC had to be actively 
‘othered’ from the Nationalist community on every level to prevent it getting 
into Nationalist communities to win ‘hearts and minds’. This required a greater 
effort than simply shooting informers. One aspect of this was a conscious 
tactic of targeting businesses that served RUC members. Fitting into a wider 
strategy of economic sabotage, if the IRA were to blow up businesses it would 
channel its ire towards those engaged in the RUC’s ‘hearts and minds’ games. 
The intent was clearly to stop the RUC from capitalising on a charm offensive 
of using local businesses while also inflicting the necessary damage on the local 
economy so as to make occupation economically unviable – admittedly the 
wider implications of this strategy have been excised from the Irish republican 
narrative by the ‘memory of perpetrators’. In Lurgan, for example, the IRA 
bombed a number of businesses for ‘their refusal to stop serving the security 
forces’, warning further: ‘your shop could be next – STOP SERVING THE 
SECURITY FORCES NOW’.125 In Newry, businesses with a ‘policy of collab-
oration with crown forces’ were issued with a ‘final warning’.126 The campaign 
continued into the late 1980s, extending to a business that was bombed for 
placing an advertisement in an RUC magazine.127 In response to the increased 
militarisation of republican areas following the AIA, the IRA began targeting 
‘contractors supplying and maintaining Britain’s war machine’.128 This led some 
firms to subsequently withdraw their services.129
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This type of discouragement, however, does not mean that the IRA had its 
community in a vice-like grip, where the community was too afraid to speak 
out against the IRA. Open criticism of the IRA from the SDLP, community 
groups and the Catholic clergy in particular, was part and parcel of everyday 
internal politicking within the Nationalist community. For example, an open 
letter from Catholic bishops read to every Catholic congregation in Ireland 
following the Enniskillen bombing stated that it was ‘sinful to join organisa-
tions committed to violence or to remain in them. It is sinful to support such 
organisations or to call on others to support them’.130 It is difficult to envisage 
how castigation of the IRA could be any more open or categorical. Certainly, 
it is difficult to reconcile the many instances of this public criticism with the 
thrust of the ‘hidden support’ narrative. Rather than demonstrating that the 
IRA demanded acquiescence via iron-fist tactics, it shows the complex internal 
‘hearts and minds’ games that republicans and more moderate elements 
had become enmeshed in. The IRA was not hesitant in returning derision 
to its critics. It lambasted the ‘political collaborators, compromisers, beggars 
and crawlers’ that had aligned with the British to ‘discredit the republican 
movement’.131 These exchanges are not evidence of intimidation nor could they 
be conceived to be. Whatever the virulence of the republican retort above, 
it was ultimately responsive to similar virulence directed at the IRA from its 
detractors. That republicans chose to engage in such exchanges is symptomatic 
of the ‘hearts and minds’ game at play within Nationalist communities. This 
is important for two reasons: first, it shows that there were those prepared to 
publicly challenge the IRA, and secondly, the fact that this provoked a repub-
lican response evidences implicit recognition within the IRA that some within 
its own community did not support them. This reality is in clear discord with 
the underlying tenet of the ‘hidden support’ narrative.
The IRA and community support
The ‘hidden support’ narrative is predicated on the assumption that the 
IRA enjoyed no support given willingly by the Nationalist community. 
Notwithstanding the fact that some Nationalists clearly opposed the IRA, 
empirical and documentary evidence is nonetheless indicative that the IRA 
enjoyed sizeable communal support in certain districts.132 In the ‘propaganda 
war’ this became a shield against claims of intimidation; the IRA enjoyed a 
popular support the RUC did not, but this was given not demanded. High levels 
 130 Cited in O’Malley, 1990, 253.
 131 ‘Brits Out’, Freedom Fighter, 4 (December 1976).
 132 Burton, 1978; Sluka, 1989; De Baroid, 2000; McKearney, 2011.
83Irish Republican Memory as Counter-Memory
of community support had apparently raised IRA morale to ‘an all-time high’ 
during testing periods.133 Gerry Adams, in a characteristic defence, classified 
the IRA as ‘a people’s army’ that was:
Closely knit with the Nationalist community, it was made up of the sons 
and daughters of ordinary people, its members indistinguishable to any 
outside observer from the rest of the community. Whether people in the 
Nationalist areas agreed or disagreed with the IRA and all of its actions 
they recognised it as their army, knew for the most part which of their 
neighbours were members, and referred to it as simply the ‘ra’.134
Kevin Bean has previously touched on the relevance of this, noting that ‘given 
the numbers of people who have passed through the IRA and their wider family 
and communal links, it would be an unusual family in the nationalist areas 
that had no links, no matter how tenuous, with the Republican Movement’.135 
One former combatant illustrated the centrality of this argument to the Irish 
republican counter-narrative by arguing that ‘we were respected and admired 
by the populous’, noting further that ‘bullies are feared but they are never 
respected’.136 This reflects how the ‘language of community’ was central to 
republican self-legitimation.137 The IRA, for example, defended its bombing 
campaign through reference to the popular support afforded to volunteers 
active on the ground: ‘behind those bombers, is massive structure based on 
streets and districts, whose existence is dependent upon the active support and 
mandate of the people’.138 Indeed, private assessments of the calibre, capacity 
and support for the IRA contained in internal British Army documents failed 
to match the official position taken during the ‘propaganda war’.139 
There is a simple logic to the Irish republican counter-narrative that feeds 
off the illogicality of suggesting that the IRA only garnered community support 
through intimidation. How could you possibly intimidate a grassroots support 
base your survival is reliant upon into giving this necessary support? Sluka 
characterised the IRA and INLA as ‘community-based’ organisations that 
relied on popular support for their survival, elaborating further that ‘they 
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cannot maintain that support through intimidation’.140 Far from being a convo-
luted argument, this assertion is based on a certain level of common sense. 
Surely the intimidation alleged by the RUC could only prove fatalistic for 
republicans. It would have turned Nationalists against the IRA and pushed 
them to co-operate with the RUC. That this did not ostensibly occur calls 
the ‘hidden support’ narrative further into question. One interviewee used 
this to argue that the ‘hidden support’ narrative was ‘disingenuous’ because 
if it was true then the RUC was ‘incompetent’ for failing to capitalise on 
alleged ill-feeling to defeat the IRA.141 It seems then that the IRA sustained its 
campaign ‘by dint of its popularity’ rather than crude intimidation.142 
The ‘hidden support’ narrative espouses a simplistic ‘black-and-white’ 
approach to communal support that overlooks existent ‘grey’ areas. The chief 
flaw in this ‘black-and-white’ thinking is a perplexing insinuation that not 
supporting the IRA somehow equates with supporting the RUC – if you are not 
with the IRA you are unfailingly against it and with the RUC. Participant obser-
vation in Nationalist districts of Belfast by Burton and Sluka comprehensively 
dispelled this. Two types of community support were observed: ‘hard’ support 
from activists and a support network prepared to offer shelter, intelligence and 
auxiliary support, and a more common ‘soft’ support that was not material or 
active but empathetic.143 Although the ‘soft’ support base did not actively assist the 
IRA it did not hinder them either. The IRA no doubt enjoyed considerably more 
‘soft’ support than ‘hard’ support, yet the ‘hidden support’ narrative is devoid of 
recognition that ‘soft’ support even existed. The ebb and flow of ‘soft’ support that 
defined the ‘see-saw’ relationship between the IRA and Nationalist community 
was often most noticeable at IRA funerals. The underlying sense of self-sacrifice 
for a noble cause mobilised Nationalists who may not have been hardened IRA 
sympathisers yet felt compelled to express solidarity with the deceased – who 
were also, in many cases, friends, relations and neighbours too. The most notable 
manifestation of this was during the 1981 hunger strike when funerals attracted 
up to 100,000 people, not all of whom were ‘hard’ supporters. Referring to the 
complexity of the IRA relationship with the Nationalist community, O’Malley 
has previously argued that these funerals revealed:
The complicated nature of the relationship between the IRA and its 
community, a love–hate relationship that would always resolve itself on the 
side of love, especially in the matter of death, where the quarrels are always 
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internal – almost like family rows – and always misunderstood by outsiders 
who mistook occasional disapproval for disavowal.144 
Even Nationalist critics of republican violence like O’Doherty readily concede 
that even if people did not support the IRA they did not co-operate with the 
RUC in relation to what they knew about IRA activity, and that while they 
frowned upon political violence in general they were acceptant of republican 
violence towards the RUC.145 In totality then, the IRA may have enjoyed the 
‘hard’ support of only a ‘minority within a minority’ in Northern Ireland but 
they nonetheless garnered more ‘soft’ support within the wider Nationalist 
community.146 In accepting such an actuality, Danny Morrison asserts that the 
IRA ‘never claimed to represent the majority of the nationalist community’ but it 
did claim to represent those in the ‘ghettos’ and ‘poor rural areas’ who supported 
its armed campaign and subsequently voted for Sinn Féin in the six counties.147 
Conclusion
The use of memory in the Irish republican policing debate became integral to 
transforming the ‘legitimacy politics’ of the conflict into post-conflict memory 
politics. Narratives selectively constructed during the ‘propaganda war’ were 
transplanted into the policing legacy where the ‘memory of perpetrators’ holds 
political currency. Irish republicans used their policing counter-memory to 
challenge dominant Unionist, state and RUC narratives. It contests notions 
of ‘normal’ pre-conflict ‘policing by consent’, of the RUC being a neutral force 
in a sectarian conflict between ‘two tribes’ and of ‘hidden support’ for the 
RUC among the Nationalist community. As counter-memory, Irish republican 
policing memory seeks to dispel official narratives that discount their policing 
experiences from the very inception of the Northern Ireland state. It is in 
essence the memory of the ‘suspect community’ at the sharp edge of counter-
insurgency policing – essentially the policed – and it stands in contrast to the 
narrative of the police. The acceptance of policing by Sinn Féin has moved the 
matter from ‘legitimacy politics’ to memory politics at the inter-communal 
level where contestation is about what policing was rather than what policing is, 
yet at the intra-communal level policing remains mired in ‘legitimacy politics’. 
It is to this that the next chapter now turns. 
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The policing debate was not the starting point of ideological contestation within 
modern Irish republicanism. As such, it must be mapped onto a bigger picture 
of contestation over the past within contemporary Irish republicanism. This 
chapter therefore interrogates how competing views of where Irish republicanism 
is currently at in transition and where it is believed to be heading are construed 
through value-laden interpretations of where it has come from. Locating the 
policing debate within this wider ideological context, two contesting ideological 
models of the current Sinn Féin strategy in Northern Ireland are proffered: 
the ‘progressive republican’ model and the ‘constitutional nationalist’ model. 
Irreconcilability between these models has generated intense ideological 
debate over what constitutes principles and what constitutes tactics, as well as 
disagreement over what represents continuity with traditional ideology and 
what is a rupture from it. Before delving deeper into this ideological debate, it is 
necessary to outline briefly the historical development of Irish republicanism. 
An exhaustive historical review is beyond the parameters of this book, yet it 
is nonetheless necessary to provide some historical context in order to allow 
present ideological debate within Irish republicanism to be understood.
Historical development
Irish republicanism is invariably traced back to Theobald Wolfe Tone and the 
Society of United Irishmen. This lineage itself arguably contains an element of 
myth because the Society of United Irishmen was initially a political club aimed 
at political reform that only opted for conspiratorial revolution in line with 
developments in France.1 Their initial aim was the unity of the Irish people 
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88 Critical Engagement
via equality rather than through the ending of English occupation.2 By 1798, 
however, their aim had become to ‘break the connection with England’.3 This 
formed the basis of a narrative that has been handed down through successive 
generations within the ‘republican tradition’.4 Ensnared in the third wave of 
major international revolt during the closing stages of 1848, the Young Ireland 
movement tried to resurrect the United Irishmen’s aim of breaking the English 
connection through violent revolt.5 Young Ireland rebellion solidified the 
concept of using physical force, which by the Fenian era was a well-established 
concept in Irish republican ideology. English notes that ‘the Fenians were not 
asking for what England might give, but were demanding what was rightfully 
theirs, and were prepared to take it by force’.6
The 1916 Rising brought a departure from the initial Sinn Féin position of 
seeking a dual monarchy affording Ireland political and economic autonomy to 
an Irish republicanism premised on national self-determination. This allowed 
armed struggle and blood sacrifice to take root within a vaguely defined Irish 
republican ideology.7 Armed struggle was firmly ensconced within the 
ideology when the Second Dáil Éireann vested its authority in the IRA as the de 
facto ‘Government of the Republic’.8 Whilst several members of the Second 
Dáil would later accept the Anglo-Irish treaty and renounce armed struggle 
– and more would do likewise upon the later establishment of Fianna Fail – 
seven members of the body later re-vested this legitimacy into a floundering 
IRA.9 This spawned an ideological interpretation that the IRA, drawing on 
the democratic mandate of the Second Dáil, held authority as representatives 
of the people of Ireland and not those governing the two partitioned states – a 
view still propagated by some purist ideological readings today.
Whilst the above clearly shows that Irish republican ideology has consist-
ently revolved around ‘breaking the connection with England’ and using 
armed force to achieve this, historically there has been little expansion 
beyond these base components. To this end, McGarry contends that Irish 
republicanism is afflicted by an ‘ideological vagueness’ that has defined it 
less like the republican principles of the French or American revolutions and 
 2 Smyth, 2005.
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more as a form of ‘insurrectionist anti-British nationalism’.10 The consistent 
failure to venture far beyond the national question has led Irish republi-
canism to lack political or intellectual continuity in any ideological sense. For 
example, Wolfe Tone’s Irish republicanism largely rejected the Catholicism 
and romantic cultural Nationalism that Pearse’s republicanism embodied.11 
An ideological ambiguity therefore lies at the heart of Irish republicanism. 
It has differed from what has gone before but has paradoxically remained 
the same in terms of base values. This ambiguity reflects how Irish republi-
canism has been cultivated by ‘a complex and diverse range of intellectual 
and ideological antecedents, many of which are often not merely competing 
but contradictory’.12 Thus, despite contemporary elites attempting to draw 
ideological continuity with those espousing past versions of the ideology, the 
reality may in fact be, as McGovern notes, that as a loosely defined ideology 
differing from one historical stage to the next Irish republicanism is ‘charac-
terised by discontinuity’.13 
On one level McGovern’s assertion may seem anomalous. How can an 
enduring political tradition be epitomised by discontinuity? The answer to this 
lies in how Irish republicanism has not been definitively derived from any one 
singular ideological source. By this, the argument is that no one single source can 
be realistically argued to define neatly what Irish republicanism ideologically is 
or was. Hence, on the one hand, there may be the historical discontinuity that 
McGovern alludes to, yet, on the other hand, there has always been adherence 
to minimalist base principles of national self-determination and a right to use 
armed force to achieve this. This in itself becomes problematic. Whilst paradig-
matic documents like the 1916 proclamation and the 1919 Declaration of the 
First Dáil enshrined the right to national self-determination and the right to 
use force against foreign ‘occupation’ into Irish republican ideology, apart from 
brief allusions to ‘equality’, little else of substance was nailed down. Apart from 
an end goal, namely national self-determination, and apart from a right to use 
force to achieve this, little else can be seen to evidence fully what the ideology 
embodies. Furthermore, whilst the right to use force may be enshrined into 
the ideology, there is a failure to clarify whether this ‘right’ should be regarded 
as a principle or a tactic. Clearly, that armed force can be used in pursuit of 
the end goal is outlined, but whether it has to be is open to interpretation. 
This ambiguity over what constitutes tactics and what constitutes principles is 
evident in ideological contestation within contemporary Irish republicanism. 
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Such ambiguity has given Irish republicanism an ideological malleability that 
has allowed it to continue changing as wider political events change. This 
malleability means that:
Republicanism is discursive in that it offers an internally differentiated 
series of ideological possibilities. It contains within it a range of exemplary 
models, memories, stories and rational political arguments that can be 
interpreted and re-interpreted through time. The ‘republican tradition’ may 
therefore be conceived as a discursively constituted, culturally and politi-
cally specific collective resource by which power is contested at the level of 
the idea.14
The historical failure to establish consensus on what Irish republicanism ‘is’ 
beyond an end goal and the right to use armed force has somewhat cocooned 
its contemporary form from fuller ideological development. The ramification of 
this has been Irish republicanism assuming forms that were not only historically 
anomalous but also ideologically irreconcilable: ‘Twentieth century republican 
organisations have been radical and conservative, bigoted and non-sectarian, 
left and right wing, supporters of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, inclusive 
and xenophobic, intransigent and supinely flexible. The more successful and 
enduring of them … accommodate the most disparate interests and outlooks’.15 
The only commonality amongst these otherwise irreconcilable positions has 
been adherence to the historical end goal of independence and the belief in the 
right to use force to achieve it. The subordination of internal differences to the 
‘national struggle’ has the dual effect of placating, yet not actually resolving, 
internal contradictions prone to conflagrate at key political junctures and of 
affording considerable ideological flexibility to embrace or shun particularist 
positions as political needs dictate.16
In one sense, then, contemporary Irish republicanism is a ‘catch-all’ 
ideology enabling those with varying socio-economic views to coalesce around 
the base values of self-determination and a right to use armed force. The 
cohesive quality of a loosely based ideology becomes further apparent upon 
examination of those within the Provisionals who are generally regarded as 
the archetypal contemporary Irish republicans. Many within the founding 
Provisional leadership aspired to the grand ideals of 1916 and 1919.17 For 
others, activism was stimulated by reaction rather than ideology. Motivation 
 14 McGovern, 2000.
 15 McGarry, 2003, 5.
 16 Patterson, 1989.
 17 Tonge, 2008.
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was tempered by a protectionist mentality of defending their community from 
the violence they witnessed around them rather than ideological devotion 
to a United Ireland.18 For Bean, this meant ‘the ashes of Bombay Street were 
more important in shaping the outlook of the young volunteers who flocked 
into the ranks of the IRA than the faintly glowing embers of the GPO’.19 This 
was further echoed in the following account of reactionary involvement in 
 republican activism:
It wasn’t for a 32-county socialist republic. Jesus, I don’t even know if I 
could’ve spelt socialist in those days. I joined the movement because of 
what I witnessed as a child personally on the streets and I knew somebody 
had to do something about it … it was only through maturity and later 
on that I became more aware, if you like, about all of those other things of 
republicanism. You know, I wouldn’t have known what a republican was in 
those days.20 
The narrative of communal self-defence has been complemented by the 
collective remembrance of events built around this notion.21 As a result, 
the discourse of communal defence has been interwoven with ideological 
discourses in the Irish republican conflict narrative.22
This supports the argument that the contemporary IRA was an umbrella 
group of ‘situationists and ideologues’, consisting of older traditional repub-
licans, those who ‘inherited’ their republicanism and those who reacted to the 
violence unfolding around them.23 What bound this broad church together 
was the use of armed force, whether that was to achieve long-held ideological 
goals or in defence of the violence of the ‘other’. This reflects Fanon’s argument 
that armed struggle brings the collective together against the external enemy 
because ‘it throws them in one way and in one direction’.24 The logical conse-
quence of this was that Irish republicanism was able to build a ‘thick’ consensus 
around the use of armed struggle – yet still eschew whether it was a principle 
or tactic – which left ‘thin’ consensus around everything else. In hindsight, 
 18 Morrison, 2011, 25.
 19 Bean, 2007a, 56.
 20 W, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, September 2013.
 21 ‘Remembering the Burning of Bombay Street’, An Phoblacht, 19 August 2004; 
‘Belfast’s “Battle of St Matthew’s” Remembered’, An Phoblacht, 1 July 2014: www.
anphoblacht.com/contents/24150 (accessed 7 August 2014).
 22 Brown and Viggiani, 2010, 227.
 23 Shirlow, Tonge, McAuley and McGlynn, 2010, 95.
 24 Fanon, 1967, 73.
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whilst this may have accommodated a broad church of opinion, it also bred 
the conditions for contestation, as the finer ideological points of purists and 
the left-wing critique of those ‘left behind’ by transition now demonstrate. The 
reality that the Provisionals consisted of ‘situationists and ideologues’ and the 
inherent ideological tension of such disparity grew discernible as the older 
‘ideologues’ became marginalised by a new generation of ‘situationists’ who 
had developed a different ideological interpretation whilst in jail.25 
Contemporary Irish republicanism
By the mid-1970s, a new ideological understanding gravitating towards a ‘long 
war’ involving political mobilisation rather than inevitable military victory 
for the ‘government in waiting’ emerged within the jails.26 Studying struggles 
elsewhere, republican prisoners resolved to raise the collective political 
consciousness by bringing localised radicalism into everyday lives within their 
communities.27 Increased mobilisation during and electoral success following 
the hunger strike heralded a realisation of the potential for mobilising popular 
support via Sinn Féin.28 Whilst still adhering to a militarist ‘Brits out’ agenda, 
Irish republicans nonetheless began building a community-based movement 
to push for their ideological end goal. This began a departure from the ‘elitist, 
conspiratorial assumptions of the armed struggle’.29 This departure was aided 
by the fact that ideological lightness in a conventional sense allowed Sinn 
Féin to implement strategic change to move beyond the politics of Eiré Nua, 
whilst support for the ‘armed tradition’ meant it could retain its identity as 
an Irish republican party.30 Éire Nua, which had been Provisional policy until 
1982, was the brainchild of the Southern-based leadership duo of Dáithi 
Ó’Conaill and Ruairi Ó’Bradaigh.31 It reflected the ‘Ireland united Gaelic and 
free’ outlook of the Provisional movement’s first leadership. Highly critical of 
the Free State, British occupation, European institutions and foreign multi-
nationals, the ‘core value’ of the document was to build a republic based on 
 25 Moloney, 2011.
 26 Shirlow, Tonge, McAuley and McGlynn, 2010, 95.
 27 Mac Ionnrachtaigh, 2013.
 28 English, 2006, 380.
 29 Bean, 1995.
 30 Maillot, 2004, 4.
 31 When the pair resigned from Sinn Féin after abstentionism was dropped at the 
1986 Ard Fheis they founded RSF who adopted the policy. RSF still advocate a 
modernised version of the policy today.
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the ideals of the 1916 proclamation that would give ‘power to the people’.32 
Rejecting any notion of simply subsuming the six counties into the existing 
arrangements of a corrupt Free State, the document advocated a secular 
decentralised system of federal, provincial and local governance based on 
Ireland’s four provinces – crucially with the sweetener that Unionists would 
hold the balance of power in Dáil Uladh (regional parliament for a nine-
county Ulster).33 The policy was dismissed by Northern critics like Danny 
Morrison as being premised on a fundamental miscalculation of the world 
views of Northern Unionists and most people in the Free State, and was seen 
as a traditionalist comfort blanket that was becoming an impediment to 
further growth.34 Discarding Éire Nua was the harbinger that the takeover of 
the republican movement by politically minded and ambitious Northerners 
was complete. Now that the excoriation of the Free State institutions was 
jettisoned, the path towards a more involved electoral intervention there soon 
emerged. Dropping abstentionism to Dáil Éireann in 1986 signalled a further 
departure whereby Sinn Féin would now seek an electoral mandate from the 
people rather than portraying the IRA as a ‘government in waiting’.35 At this 
juncture, Mulholland identifies a strategic change to build Sinn Féin as a 
political party rather than as a radical mass movement. To achieve this, armed 
struggle – increasingly limited to ingenuity rather than intensity – would be 
‘downgraded to extinction’ with time.36 
The increasingly politicised dimension to Irish republicanism led to 
a rethink on the overlap between electoralism and armed struggle. Sinn 
Féin moved from being a peripheral actor to become a central partner in a 
community-based approach that comprised electoralism and armed struggle. 
Post-hunger strike ‘community politics’ duly intertwined social agitation by 
a now electable Sinn Féin with continued support for the armed struggle.37 
Although politics had by no means replaced armed struggle at this juncture, 
it had at least come to complement it. McAllister notes that the ‘Armalite and 
ballot box’ strategy reflected the ‘classic method of Irish republicanism’ of using 
‘any means necessary’ to achieve its goals.38 While this may have allowed Irish 
 32 Sean O’Bradaigh, ‘40 Years of Éire Nua’, Republican Sinn Féin: https://republicans 
innfein.org/miscellaneous/rsfposition/40-years-of-eire-nua-by-sean-o-bradaigh/ 
(accessed 3 October 2016).
 33 Sinn Féin, 1971, 55–56.
 34 Morrison, 2016a.
 35 Tonge, 2008, 60.
 36 Mulholland, 2007.
 37 Tonge, 2009, 167.
 38 McAllister, 2004.
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republicans ideological and tactical flexibility, it nonetheless became as much a 
weakness as it was a strength. Having armed struggle running contemporane-
ously with electoralism may have allowed Irish republicans to garner a certain 
level of popular support without sacrificing the cutting edge that kept its end 
goal in constant focus, yet it was never a viable long-term strategy to have 
both coexisting. Sooner or later one would have to make way for the other.39 
After all, the greatest threat to those trying to build popular political support 
for their cause is that their violent actions generate higher cost than benefit. 
Fanon noted this in his ‘threefold concern’, arguing that the deaths of ‘possibly 
innocent victims’, preventing a ‘false picture’ of the conflict and trying not to 
isolate popular democratic opinion both domestically and internationally must 
come to bear on how conflict is conducted.40
The applicability of Fanon’s analysis to 1980s Irish republicanism 
is obvious. Deaths of civilians at Enniskillen and elsewhere came danger-
ously close to giving succour to a state narrative of ‘sectarian terrorism’ that 
would undermine electoral advancement. Moreover, it also had the potential 
to strangle the development of a pan-Nationalist front by making Sinn Féin 
politically toxic. Within this wider context, the drawbacks IRA violence had 
for a dual strategy forced Irish republicans to confront long-eclipsed ‘political 
realities’.41 Continuing violence would stifle political advancement and risk 
wasting electoral gains, as had happened during the 1950s amidst the violence 
of the Border Campaign.42 
To this end, electoralism began to replace militarism. On an ideological 
reading this suggests that armed struggle is a tactic rather than a principle. The 
principle would appear to be the end goal of independence, whereas components 
such as abstentionism and armed struggle could be relegated to the status of 
tactic. If the goal is to be reached by ‘any means necessary’, then armed struggle 
simply becomes one tactic that gives way to another tactic of electoralism. The 
ideological flexibility of Irish republicanism enabled Sinn Féin not only to 
label armed struggle a tactic but to change tactics throughout the conflict as 
needs dictated.43 This latter-day ‘republican pragmatism’ not only existed due 
to, but was strengthened by, the lack of an ideologically ‘developed theoretical 
framework’.44 Thus, even if the principle (i.e. end goal) remained the same, the 
argument began to formulate that if it were to be realisable tactical flexibility 
 39 Van Tengen Page and Smith, 2000.
 40 Fanon, 1970, 41.
 41 English, 2006, 380.
 42 Ó Broin, 2009, 199.
 43 Tonge, Shirlow and McAuley, 2011.
 44 Bean, 1995.
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was required. In the spirit of using ‘any means necessary’, Irish republicanism, 
under the Adams leadership, became governed by the ‘principle of success’.45 
This new principle meant that, as conflict reached stalemate, armed struggle 
and abstentionism would be remodelled as tactics and sacrificed on the altar of 
the ‘principle of success’. This ideological reading is suggestive that at the most 
base level the foremost principle of Irish republicanism is the end goal of self-
determination, with a further secondary principle of doing whatever it takes to 
achieve that aim. Such a view epitomised the analysis of one interviewee, who 
argued:
Brian Keenan coined a phrase that ‘wish lists are for Christmas’, and they 
are, because you don’t live in the real world if you think by talking something 
the way it should be it’s going to happen … This phase of our struggle has 
learnt very clearly that sometimes you need to be more practical than 
principled because principles don’t bring about the changes needed.46
A sceptical synopsis from McIntyre contends, however, that an inherent 
reformism within Provisionalism emanating from its evolution in response 
to British strategy inevitably doomed it to ‘pull up short of its stated goals’. 
Rather than ‘switching tactics’, the Provisional strategy was ‘ceding the goal’ 
of a British withdrawal, which he attributes not to ‘farsighted and intelligent 
thinking’ but to ‘following the line of least pressure’.47
If one subscribes to the ‘principle of success’ then something that may at one 
time have seemed anathema to Irish republicanism – endorsing the policing 
apparatus that upholds Northern Ireland’s constitutional status quo – can now 
appear to be in furtherance of the ideological end goal. The inference being that 
it represents not the culmination of Irish republican struggle but yet another 
step in a protracted process working towards the end goal. This was certainly 
the message broadcast by Sinn Féin during the policing debate. Republicans 
were told that even though they were debating policing they should ‘keep 
[their] eye firmly on the big prize … of unity and independence’.48 Moreover, 
the Sinn Féin leadership reaffirmed to their grassroots support that ‘although 
this very crucial debate today is on policing and justice let us be clear that 
all our debates, all our activity is about achieving our primary goal of a free, 
independent and united Ireland’.49 Although it may differ radically from past 
 45 Rafter, 2005, 5.
 46 B, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, April 2013.
 47 McIntyre, 1995.
 48 ‘Seamus Harvey 30th Anniversary’, An Phoblacht, 25 January 2007.
 49 ‘Speech by Gerry Kelly, then Sinn Féin Justice and Policing Spokesperson (SF), 
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tactics such as armed struggle and abstentionism, the logic forwarded seems 
to be that it is nonetheless ideologically sound as it adheres to the ‘principle 
of success’ by doing ‘whatever it takes’ to obtain the end goal. Moreover, 
Dickson and Osborne observe that police composition was increasingly 
addressed by Sinn Féin within a framework of equality.50 With notions of 
equality-based transformation embedding themselves in the Sinn Féin brand 
of Irish republicanism,51 turning an unrepresentative police force that ‘upheld 
the Orange state and repressed everyone else’ into a more representative police 
service that will ‘deliver accountable, civic, non-partisan policing for … all 
of our people’,52 may arguably further a republican equality agenda. That it 
remains a police force protecting the constitutional status of Northern Ireland 
is nonetheless ideologically problematic.
Ideological contestation
Within Irish republicanism division has traditionally been not on what is 
wanted but on how to get it. In pursuit of the end goal what are tactics 
for some become indistinguishable from ideology for others, making them 
principles. Ideological contestation then occurs on different levels. It may be 
contestation over ‘operative ideology’, that being the means by which the aims 
of ‘fundamental ideology’ are achieved.53 Essentially, it becomes a debate over 
tactics:
A lot of this comes down to a disagreement over tactics, over strategy … 
when Sinn Féin says, ‘this is furthering the struggle’, I’m not questioning 
their integrity or I’m not questioning their bona fides or their honest belief 
that this is it, and I can see a lot of reasons we had to bring the armed 
conflict to an end … there’s no question about that. So, therefore then we 
had to sit down. If we are to advance how do we advance? And Sinn Féin 
Delivering the Policing Report to the Sinn Féin Extraordinary Ard Fheis on Policing, 
RDS, Dublin (28 January 2007)’: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/sf/
gk280107.htm (accessed 10 May 2012).
 50 Dickson and Osborne, 2007, 157.
 51 McEvoy, 2000; McGovern, 2004; Bean, 2007a.
 52 ‘Opening Address by Gerry Adams, then President of Sinn Féin (SF), to the Sinn 
Féin Extraordinary Ard Fheis on Policing, RDS, Dublin (28 January 2007)’: http://
cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/sf/ga280107a.htm (accessed 10 May 2012). 
 53 Seliger, 1970.
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put forward the proposal, which, I mean, I can understand some of the 
arguments; it’s just that I disagree with them.54
For others, contestation relates to ‘fundamental ideology’ (principles) rather 
than ‘operative ideology’ (tactics). This reflects a traditionalist ideological 
reading that views armed struggle and abstentionism as principles rather than 
tactics. This is symptomatic of a reluctance to divert from the ‘established script’ 
to the point that defeat is preferable to compromise.55 For these republicans, 
endorsing policing is not a change of tactics but rather a departure from ‘certain 
fundamentals’ at the heart of Irish republican ideology.56 Moreover, the debate 
on ‘fundamental ideology’ goes beyond whether armed struggle is a principle 
or tactic. It also includes a leftist critique of the current Sinn Féin position. 
Several interviewees articulated left-wing opposition to policing, reflective more 
broadly of the left-wing criticism those ‘left behind’ make of the wider transi-
tional process that Sinn Féin are involved in.57 For example, Éirígí has been 
critical of the veneer of post-conflict betterment that masks how areas like West 
Belfast remain defined by a reality where ‘unemployment is rife. Mental illness is 
endemic. Lack of housing and overcrowding as the Stormont government artifi-
cially inflates house-prices via underinvestment and lack of new-builds for social 
housing. This is the real Belfast, kept hidden in the back streets and alley ways 
of a broken city’.58 Colin Coulter has noted the disturbing veracity of criticism 
that the ‘peace dividend’ has bypassed working-class communities in spite of 
 54 Q , critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
 55 Frampton, 2011, 79.
 56 AA, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
 57 Republican Network for Unity, Standing Outside the ‘Peace Process’: A Revolutionary 
Republican Analysis of the Irish Pacification Process by the Republican Network for Unity 
(Belfast: Republican Network for Unity, 2010); Republican Network for Unity, 
Revolutionary Republicanism: National Liberation, Socialism, International Solidarity 
(Belfast: Republican Network for Unity, 2013); ‘Imperialism – Ireland and Britain’, 
Éirígí, 2007: https://web.archive.org/web/20140826184807/www.eirigi.org/campaigns/ 
imperialism_paper.html (originally accessed 12 December 2013); Irish Republican 
Socialist Party, Perspectives on the Future of Republican Socialism in Ireland (Belfast: 
Irish Republican Socialist Party, 2010); Irish Republican Socialist Party, Perspectives 
on the Future of Republican Socialism in Ireland (Belfast: Irish Republican Socialist 
Party, 2010). 
 58 ‘Welcome to West Belfast, Poverty Capital of the Six Counties’, Éirígí, 15 September 
2015: https://web.archive.org/web/20160312145124/http://eirigi.org/2015/09/15/
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an official image of a ‘better’ Belfast.59 It is worth noting too that the Stormont 
executive was recently found to have breached its statutory duty to adopt an 
anti-poverty strategy.60 
This leftist critique has grown in recent years as the realpolitik of austerity 
forced Sinn Féin to address the spectre of welfare reform. The ‘two card trick’, 
as Rafter termed it,61 of opposing government cuts in the 26 counties while 
sitting in a government that imposed them in the six counties finally played 
itself out. Sinn Féin initially agreed to welfare reform under the SHA before 
later backtracking. However, under the ‘A Fresh Start’ agreement they agreed 
that the Conservative government could implement cuts they themselves 
were not willing to impose by temporarily handing back fiscal power to 
Westminster. The move drew considerable derision from leftist opponents – 
not least because Sinn Féin had only secured marginal financial protection in 
a deal that also paved the way for a lowering of corporation tax and allocated 
additional resources to policing paramilitarism. Martin McGuinness defended 
the deal, arguing that Sinn Féin had won extra concessions from the Tories, that 
lowering corporation tax would boost job creation and that it was ultimately 
the best deal that could be secured in difficult circumstances: 
Of course, no one is saying the agreement is perfect or that it shouldn’t 
be scrutinised. But it also needs to be seen in the context from which it 
emerged – a backdrop of economic and political crisis created by Tory 
austerity policies, electoral competition within unionism, and the failure 
of the British and Irish governments to live up to commitments made in 
previous agreements. That is the scenario in which we entered the negotia-
tions and, like all the other parties, Sinn Féin faced a choice. We could 
either work to do the best deal possible for the people we represent, or we 
could walk away and content ourselves with sniping from the sidelines. We 
chose to do the former because that’s what responsible parties do.62 
This held little currency with leftist critics. The IRSP savaged the ‘former 
revolutionaries of Sinn Féin’ for inflicting ‘a wave of cruel and vicious attacks 
on working class families’:
 59 Coulter, 2014.
 60 ‘Northern Ireland Executive Breached Duty Over Anti-Poverty Strategy’, BBC 
News, 30 June 2015: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-33326631 (accessed 
30 June 2015). 
 61 Rafter, 2005. 
 62 ‘Martin McGuinness Opinion Piece on Deal’, Derry Sinn Féin, 4 December 2015: 
www.derrysinnfein.ie/news/3530/ (accessed 14 December 2015). 
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SF may argue that in the circumstances they had no choice but to swallow 
the pill which the Tories were forcing down their throats. This being the 
case, the IRSP in turn poses the question, what is the point in the Sinn Féin 
project? The Sinn Féin project has not forwarded the concept or prospect 
of Irish Unity. It has not ended (merely repackaged) the oppressive features 
of the British State in Ireland. And now it has been seen to accommodate 
the worst ravages of Tory Social planning, leaving the business class the 
winners and the working class the losers.63
For RNU, the lowering of corporation tax and the increased resources 
allocated to policing meant the only beneficiaries of this ‘ideological assault 
on the working class’ were ‘big business, dole touts and unaccountable 
securocrats’.64 The synopsis of veteran socialist campaigner Bernadette Devlin-
McAliskey was that working-class communities had ‘gained nothing from 
the struggle despite giving so much’, having been consigned to a post-GFA 
reality that had brought them ‘continued [reliance on] welfare, poor education 
and now austerity’.65 Seemingly, then, critics subscribe to Bryce’s conclusion 
that Sinn Féin has effectively followed others in embracing the bourgeois 
democracy it set out to destroy.66 In addition to this politicised leftist criticism, 
there has also been some unfamiliar, yet hardly unjustified, criticism of certain 
decisions taken by Sinn Féin ministers from within its own constituency.67 
Despite such observations, the reality remains that Sinn Féin does possess 
a significant electoral mandate. In various elections held in 2016, Sinn Féin 
accumulated 462,104 votes on the island of Ireland, bringing their presence in 
political office to 4 Members of the European Parliament (MEP), 4 Members 
of Parliament (MP) at Westminster, 7 Oireachtas Senators, 23 Teachta Dála 
(TD), 28 Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) at Stormont and 264 
local councillors. Opponents did not deny the existence of such a sizeable 
mandate but chose instead to question where this growing mandate has come 
 63 ‘Make Sinn Féin’s Betrayal the Catalyst for a Real People’s Alternative!’, IRSP, 18 
November 2015: www.irsp.ie/news/?p=2039 (accessed 14 December 2015). 
 64 ‘“Fresh Start” Represents the State’s History of Failure’, Republican Network 
for Unity, 19 November 2015: https://web.archive.org/web/20151123225626/www.
republicanunity.org/fresh-start-represents-six-countys-history-of-failure/ (originally 
accessed 14 December 2015).
 65 Bernadette Devlin-McAliskey, ‘Left Behind by Good Friday’, Jacobin, 21 (2016): 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/04/bernadette-devlin-interview-derry-civil-
rights-troubles-good-friday/ (accessed 2 May 2016).
 66 Bryce, 2013.
 67 Mac Ionnrachtaigh, 2013, 213–14.
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from, with many opining that it was largely a middle-class vote poached from 
the SDLP. The salience of this point can be seen through the results of the 2016 
assembly elections. While Sinn Féin increased their vote in the middle-class 
former SDLP strongholds of South Down and South Belfast, their electoral 
ambitions in Foyle and West Belfast (two of the most deprived regions in the 
North of Ireland) were laid low by the election of anti-austerity People before 
Profit (PBP) candidates and a reduced share of the vote.68 Such an outcome 
had indeed been forecast by Devlin-McAliskey who noted that in ‘moving 
further and further’ to accommodate Stormont’s austerity policies Sinn Féin 
were:
Losing the trust and the support of the people who once voted for them, the 
Catholic working class. Those people have been replaced by the Catholic 
middle class which most benefited from the peace process. These are former 
SDLP voters. They have a vested interest in stability and participation in the 
state, so they now support Sinn Féin.69
This echoes Brian Kelly’s argument that trying to balance an electoral appeal to 
middle-class Catholic voters and upwardly mobile Nationalists with the tradi-
tional appeal to its working-class base has become increasingly unsustainable 
for a Sinn Féin that sits as partners in a post-GFA administration so fond 
of neoliberalism.70 This wider criticism proves that those who do not neces-
sarily advocate continued violence can also draw on the memory of previous 
ideological positions grounded in republican socialism to attack current Sinn 
Féin policy for rupturing with these. Ideological contestation is multifaceted, 
stretching beyond a simple ‘black-and-white’ contestation over the use of 
armed struggle, and cannot therefore be reduced to a peaceniks versus hawks 
understanding.
The breadth of such contestation coupled with the change in Provisional 
strategy has meant their project is incapable of being encapsulated by a single 
narrative. Fundamental changes to ‘Provisional ideology’ created new critical 
counter-narratives of Sinn Féin’s rise to political power.71 Questions relating 
to the motives and integrity of ‘the leadership’ are now being asked by those 
 68 ‘NI Assembly Election: DUP Remains Largest as Assembly Count Ends’, BBC 
News, 7 May 2016: www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2016-northern-ireland-36234717 
(accessed 12 May 2016).
 69 Devlin-Mc Aliskey, ‘Left Behind by Good Friday’.
 70 Kelly, 2012.
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previously viewed as ‘loyal lieutenants’.72 From this, a critical counter-narrative 
of republican involvement in the transition of Northern Ireland has developed. 
This provides what Olick refers to as ‘mnemonic resistance’ to the Sinn Féin 
master narrative.73 The counter-narrative contends that the ‘mutually hurting 
stalemate’ was transferred into the political arena by the Provisional leadership, 
where they were ignominiously defeated but continue presenting this defeat as 
impending victory.74
This counter-narrative has derived sustenance from how the Sinn Féin 
leadership has sought to rearticulate ‘the meaning of republicanism’.75 This 
modern – or, perhaps more aptly, moderate – republicanism has not only culled 
armed struggle and abstentionism but also seen radical socialism ‘expelled 
and expunged’.76 The erosion of radical socialism has seen ‘equality’ emerge 
as the new republican buzzword.77 The irony of course being that whilst this 
may seem out of synch with Sinn Féin’s previous leftist anti-imperialism it is 
arguably closer to the egalitarian permutation of the ideology professed by 
Wolfe Tone. Bean has labelled the Sinn Féin strategy of pursuing their goals 
via transformational equality-based politics from within as a ‘post-republican’ 
position beyond ‘Brits out’.78 This constitutive change means that aspects 
like a rights agenda, that had initially been considered ‘partitionist’, are now a 
‘defining characteristic’ of post-conflict republicanism.79 For a republican critic 
like McIntyre, however, the frank synopsis is that the political project of the 
Provisionals ‘began as Brits out and ended as Paisley in’.80
Irish republicanism is now comprised of ‘establishment republicanism’, 
espoused by those who pursue the ideal within parliamentary forums, 
and ‘dissident republicanism’, adhered to by those outside such forums.81 
Contestation between these strands is attributable to natural hegemonic 
rivalry. Both strands use the same ‘political vocabulary’ but invest their own 
meanings into it.82 What is ‘republican’ depends on which hegemon one is 
listening to because republicanism cannot belong to a ‘sell out’ or a ‘dissident’. 
 72 Frampton, 2009, 191.
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This has birthed two broad ideological models of interpreting the transition in 
Northern Ireland. The first model can be termed the ‘progressive republican’ 
model (Figure 3.1). It interprets Sinn Féin involvement in the transitional 
process as a tactical change which necessitated acceptance of a transitional 
political agreement in the form of the GFA. The transitional nature of the 
GFA has given rise to the endorsement of policing which is interpreted as a 
progressive step towards the ideological end goal of unity. The ‘constitutional 
nationalist’ model (Figure 3.2) reads the Sinn Féin strategy as an abandonment 
of republican principles which culminated in acceptance of a flawed political 
settlement. The out-workings of accepting such a settlement has been working 
the partitionist state from within followed by complete assimilation into the 
state, as evidenced by the acceptance of the policing apparatus that upholds the 
constitutional status quo in Northern Ireland. By necessity, then, the models 
are mutually exclusive, relying on the process of ‘narrative closure’ to preclude 
any alternative meanings to their preferred interpretation emerging.83
What follows is a critical examination of the interface between memory 
and ideology to determine how individuals ‘remember’ in accordance with 
whichever ideological model they subscribe to. Malešević’s argument that 
correlation with master narratives requires the past to be reinterpreted in a 
‘particular ideological light’ is key to understanding this evaluation.84 
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Those subscribing to the ‘progressive republican’ model see no contradiction 
between Irish republican ideology and endorsing policing. This is despite the 
fact that endorsing policing means accepting the state monopoly of the right 
to use force. An inherent tension exists around this issue given that many of 
those who now endorse policing once opposed it militarily. Ideological accom-
modation of accepting the state monopoly of the use of force with former 
combatant activism rests on reading armed struggle as a tactic rather than a 
principle. Movement away from armed struggle becomes a tactical shift rather 
than defaulting of principle. Just as the dropping of abstentionism represented a 
tactical shift that was ‘opening up a new front’,85 policing was similarly a tactical 
manoeuvre into ‘another area of struggle’.86 This is attuned to a wider narrative 
depicting Sinn Féin’s strategy as a tactical shift that will enable ‘participatory 
republicanism’, rather than militant republicanism, to realise ideological 
goals.87 Despite movement away from a traditional militant understanding of 
republican ideology, the ideological end goal nevertheless remains unchanged. 
The ‘progressive republican’ reading has been sustained by leadership claims 
that republicans are winning the peace.88
Former combatants subscribing to the ‘progressive republican’ model 
recalled having a simplistic understanding of the conflict when they were 
younger. This understanding mirrors the belief within the IRA at the time 
that military victory was inevitable. However, political maturity brought the 
realisation that victory will not be attained via armed struggle but through 
a protracted political settlement. Recalling their earlier interpretation of the 
conflict, one interviewee noted:
When we were kids we watched the Yanks being driven from South East 
Asia … we were sitting in jail watching this and saying, ‘this is right; I can’t 
wait to get out of jail and we’re gonna drive the British into the sea just like 
that’. But it’s only whenever you get older and you realise, just because of 
the nature of this place, that the IRA were never going to have the capacity 
to inflict that type of military victory over the British Army … So how does 
 85 Gerry Adams, 1986 Ard Fheis, quoted in Ó Broin, 2009, 254.
 86 ‘Adams Seeks Police Stance Backing’, BBC News, 20 January 2007: http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/6281805.stm (accessed 23 May 2017).
 87 Tonge, 2008, 59.
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conflict end? If you understand that you cannot achieve a military victory 
over your opponent – and you understand also that your opponent isn’t able 
to defeat you … once you arrive at that understanding the only way the 
conflict can end is at the negotiating table.89
A similar reappraisal came from another interviewee who recalled:
Whenever I was younger and in the IRA and then in jail and reading the 
whole revolutionary stuff, you know, and you see yourself driving into City 
Hall in Belfast with an AK47, the same as Fidel and Che, did you know, 
and then it gets to the point where you realise it’s not going to happen that 
way.90
Reaching the realisation that goals would not be met through armed struggle 
was ‘part of the revolutionary process’ of moving beyond being a ‘rebel’ to 
progressively state ‘what we are for’ and to positively pursue that rather than 
remaining ‘negative’.91 In being revolutionary there seemingly comes an ability 
to look at tactics beyond armed struggle and to pursue them if circumstances 
are favourable. This meant that another former combatant – who defined their 
activism as ‘more revolutionary than militant’ – had no ‘major difficulty’ with 
the policing move because being revolutionary: 
Is about negotiation, it is about compromise, it is about steps of trying to get 
where you want to go. And it’s never about, you know, ‘I was fully committed 
to armed struggle’ … there was a time during the struggle – and this struggle 
is still going on – that I believed that was the only way forward, and that was 
the only way to bring this to some type of negotiation, but it was brought to 
a negotiation, you know, and that’s where we have to move on.92
The former combatants above have subscribed to the new ‘principle of 
success’ and in being ‘revolutionary’ have reached the conclusion that 
ideological goals must be pursued by ‘whatever it takes’, and in a transitional 
context this means politics. Although they did not repudiate the armed struggle 
or their own role in it, they nonetheless ‘remembered’ in a way favourable to a 
‘progressive republican’ reading of the past. Reading armed struggle simply 
as a tactic allows these individuals to place their lived experience within 
 89 A, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, April 2013.
 90 M, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 91 M, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 92 AD, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
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the confines of the ‘progressive republican’ master narrative. As individual 
activists, they have neatly located their own past within their interpretation of 
the master narrative of the collective past. What may have been ‘forgotten’ in 
doing this at the individual level, however, is the criticism that had been made 
of tactical changes by others in the past. What this demonstrates is the ability 
to ‘remember’ the past as a different person than the person who experienced 
the events at the time.93 This means ‘life scripts’ become inextricably linked to 
the context that the person narrating the experience today finds themselves 
in rather than the circumstance of the person who lived that experience at 
the time.94 The wise ‘revolutionary’ that now accepts policing displaces the 
naive ‘rebel’ who believed in inevitable military victory as the narrator of past 
activism. While this allows a different reading of the past, the ideological 
motivation remains the same. Continuity is therefore drawn between their 
armed struggle using ‘old’ tactics in the past and their political struggle using 
‘new’ tactics today. In addition to providing an insight into how individuals 
‘remember’ in accordance with master narratives, narratives of transition from 
‘rebel’ to ‘revolutionary’ are also reflective of the fuller contribution former 
prisoners have made to the Northern Ireland transition and the ideological 
debate within Irish republicanism. Using the status obtained through impris-
onment to support narratives of continuing the struggle by ‘other means’,95 
former prisoners have lent ideological credibility to the ‘progressive repub-
lican’ argument through visible involvement in policing bodies.96 A somewhat 
bizarre echoing of the ‘rebel’ to ‘revolutionary’ master narrative also came from 
the unlikely source of PSNI Chief Constable George Hamilton following the 
killing of Kevin McGuigan in August 2015. Although Sinn Féin rejected media 
speculation of IRA involvement on the basis that the organisation had stood 
down in July 2005,97 Hamilton argued that the IRA infrastructure remained 
‘broadly in place’ but now had a ‘radically changed’ purpose as a control 
mechanism for guiding republicans through transition.98
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Transitional settlement
Acceptance of the ‘progressive republican’ model is predicated on acceptance 
of the GFA not as a final political settlement but as a transitional political 
arrangement endowed with an ability to further the republican agenda. Such 
a reading reflects the ‘constructive ambiguity’ that defines the GFA whereby 
different parties can take whichever reading of the deal they prefer.99 For 
‘progressive republicans’ this means that while the GFA may indeed enshrine 
the ‘principle of consent’ it also contains a provision for a future vote on Irish 
unity that can then be subsequently re-held on a recurring seven-year basis. 
The authority to convene such a poll, however, rests with the British Secretary 
of State. As a transitional arrangement, the GFA then represents a building 
block on which a process culminating in reunification can be initiated. The 
‘progressive republican’ task is to create the conditions for a border poll to first 
be called and then eventually won. Patterson, however, argues that it was ‘inevi-
table’ that the new dispensation would be tied to a narrative depicting political 
institutions in the North as a stepping stone to the big prize of unity.100 The 
transition, then, represents ‘not a united Ireland’ but something bringing that 
ideological goal ‘nearer’ than armed struggle ever could.101 Acceptance of the 
GFA thus becomes not acceptance of it per se but acceptance of its potential 
as a ‘work in progress’ that can get to the goal of reunification. Adhering 
to the ‘progressive republican’ model, one interviewee maintained that the 
GFA did not represent ‘the end’ for Irish republicans. Rather, the transitional 
nature of the GFA made it ‘a foundation’ and ‘an opportunity to move things 
forward’.102 If policing is viewed through such a lens, it becomes a progressive 
step towards ideological goals rather than a step away from them. Moreover, for 
those subscribing to such a view it is not only a progressive step, but it is one in 
the absence of any viable alternative. This fact, interviewees argued, had not yet 
dawned on the traditionalist or leftist critics of the Sinn Féin strategy. 
Dismantling the state
In this context, policing becomes one component in a process of ‘dealing in 
the round’ with how Irish republicans ‘move forward’.103 The ability to adopt 
such a reading of ‘critical engagement’ requires republicans to think about the 
 99 Mitchell, 2009.
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issue ‘strategically’ rather than individualising it. The ability to ‘put your heart 
to one side’ allowed one interviewee to get ‘around’ their personal difficulty 
with policing. Although the interviewee still had reservations that were natural 
on any individual level, the prevalence of ‘strategic’ thinking made the issue 
‘easier’. Revealing the thought process behind buying into the ‘progressive 
republican’ narrative the interviewee elaborated:
To look at policing as an individual issue isolated – that’s not the way I 
looked at it. I looked at it as part of the overall strategy of going in and in 
my opinion the only way you can change anything is to go in and work at it 
from within and challenge it and not let the mistakes of the past happen. So 
strategically it was the right thing to do.104
If ‘critical engagement’ is evaluated in combination with other transitional 
processes rather than simply as acceptance of policing for the mere sake of 
acceptance, it would appear from the argument above that it is ideologically 
sound because it is ‘strategically’ right and it is progressive. In accepting the 
need to be progressive interviewees argued that republicans did not have the 
luxury of ignoring policing until attaining reunification. Rather, as a matter of 
political reality, the issue needed to be addressed in advance of securing the 
‘big prize’. The ability to look upon policing as a pro-active process fits neatly 
with the argument of Sinn Féin that ‘critical engagement’ would effectively take 
control of policing ‘off’ their political enemies.105 Accepting this premise enables 
republicans to take a long-term view of the transition, meaning that when it 
comes to the issue of endorsing policing they will be ‘comfortable enough with 
it’.106 Such individual rationalising not only exhibits remarkable resonance 
with Sinn Féin’s master narrative of ‘change from within’ but also indicates the 
ability of memory to become intertwined with strategy. Ideological goals have 
not changed even if the means of attaining them have. Continuity is to be found 
not in tactics but in principles whereby what was sought in the past and what is 
currently being sought in a transitional setting are the same.
For those supportive of ‘critical engagement’, ideological vindication is 
discernible through dividends paid out already. Martin McGuinness declared 
six months after the policing Ard Fheis that republican involvement in policing 
was ‘dismantling the hold that Unionist policemen and strategists had on 
 104 I, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 105 C. Ní Dhonnabhaín, ‘Motion Passed by Huge Majority’, An Phoblacht, 1 February 
2007; E. O’Dwyer, ‘Speakers Exude Confidence and Stress Need for Unity’, An 
Phoblacht, 1 February 2007.
 106 A, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, April 2013.
108 Critical Engagement
policing in the North’.107 The analysis proffered by Mc Guinness gained notable 
traction amongst interviewees who argued that republicans had ‘wrecked the 
Orange state’, ‘devastated’ the policing institutions108 and ‘dismantled’ the 
RUC.109 The acceptance of policing for these republicans would appear to be 
strategic acceptance geared towards long-term ideological goals rather than 
carte blanche acceptance. To this end, interviewees drew on past experiences 
of engaging with the ‘enemy’ by depicting ‘critical engagement’ as another 
step in the post-conflict re-unification process just like engagements with 
the prison administration following the hunger strike, engagements with the 
British Government in the run up to and the aftermath of the GFA, the more 
general political engagement with Unionism and grassroots engagement with 
former loyalist combatants. Irish republicans who have accepted policing have 
nonetheless avoided ‘ideological ditching’ and have come to an accommo-
dation with the ‘enemy’ that is ‘pragmatic not ideological’.110
Although ideological goals remain wed to self-determination, there has 
nonetheless been an evolution from seeking a ‘revolutionary reconquest of 
Ireland’111 to building ‘an Ireland of equals’.112 This has seen Sinn Féin pursue 
what McCrudden terms the ‘two equality agendas’ of the GFA.113 The conso-
ciationalism of the GFA enables ‘progressive republicanism’ to portray itself 
as the defender of particularistic political rights for Nationalists while wider 
equality provisions allow Sinn Féin to assume the mantle of championing 
universalistic rights.114 While the former accounts for the use of equality 
discourse to champion GFA provisions with considerable relevance to its 
own constituency, the latter has seen attempts to utilise equality measures in 
section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 to support wider equality-based 
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transformation of the Northern Ireland state. This has seen the pursuit of ‘an 
Ireland of equals’ beyond traditional interpretations of smashing the ‘Orange 
state’ by supporting same-sex marriage, gender equality and ethnic minority 
rights. The pervasiveness of such a notion in current Sinn Féin discourse is 
evident in Gerry Adams controversially telling an internal party conference, in 
reference to religious fundamentalists in the DUP, that equality is the way to 
‘break these bastards’.115 Pursuing strategic, ideologically tainted and equality-
based reform of policing seemingly mirrors a wider strategy of orchestrating 
equality-orientated destruction of the ‘Orange state’ that will progress towards 
self-determination and ‘an Ireland of equals’. A significant parliamentary 
presence in both jurisdictions continues to underpin the stages rhetoric of their 
narrative on equality-based reform of the Orange state.116 
‘Mild sceptics’
Thinking ‘strategically’ may have made the collective decision easier, yet at the 
individual level acceptance remained difficult for some. Those labelled ‘mild 
sceptics’117 – supporters of the Sinn Féin strategy who struggle with certain 
elements of it on a personal level – revealed individual difficulty with policing. 
One former combatant highlighted the tension between the individual and the 
collective by revealing:
I never contemplated leaving the movement or leaving the struggle over it 
because you know things like this take time and I appreciate that too … it’s 
a struggle a day for to make change as some of the politicians said … and 
I suppose in that concept the same can be said for an overall change of the 
way I thought … I just got it very hard to contemplate how former activists 
just went with the change so fast. I was one of the ones that just couldn’t 
handle that.118
Another interviewee recalled:
I didn’t see the bigger picture right away to be truthful. I was just ‘you know, 
these have been our enemies for so long and now we are going to engage’ … 
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After healthy debates that we had, you know, within Sinn Féin, I could see 
the bigger picture then and I knew it was the way to go. I mean certainly it 
stuck in your throat a lot of times.119
Despite the personal difficulty evident in the above accounts, a belief that 
at a collective level the Sinn Féin strategy is paying dividends is nonetheless 
discernible. This tension is worked through via an internal cost–benefit 
analysis. The cost of individual unease at the policing move is offset against 
the strategic gain at the collective level. What can be deducted from this 
is that a leadership-constructed discourse of strategic thinking can prove 
rhetorically valuable but it can also frame individual rationalising of the move 
for those with a natural reluctance to accepting policing. So, while strategic-
thinking pleas correlate seamlessly with a master narrative of changing tactics 
for the new mode of struggle that provides rhetorical soundbites in Ard 
Feis and commemorative speeches, they nonetheless have a real impact on 
how the individual at grassroots evaluates the move in terms of their past 
activism. Individual difficulty is duly subordinated to the perceived needs of 
the collective good. This is evidenced by how ‘mild sceptics’ who have tacitly 
endorsed policing against their initial feelings do not regard themselves as any 
less republican for having made the decision. The perfect illustration of this is 
the latter interviewee’s assertion that ‘I don’t regret one minute of my past – I 
regret getting caught – but you know I’ve no regrets and I’m very proud of my 
past, but I’m also very proud of where we are now, you know, in the political 
situation’.120
That the interviewee remains ‘very proud’ not only of the past but also of 
the transitional process Irish republicans are embarking on suggests that the 
principles have certainly not changed for those like the interviewee even if the 
tactics have. The result of this is that they feel secure enough in their ideological 
conviction and in the current strategy they support to endorse the policing 
apparatus of the state and simultaneously regard themselves as Irish repub-
licans just as they did when opposing the RUC during the conflict.
 119 F, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.




Those who adhere to a ‘constitutional nationalist’ model believe that current 
Sinn Féin strategy is borne out of a defaulting of principles rather than a tactical 
change. Finding fault with the wider transitional process, they believe that 
‘critical engagement’ represents movement away from reunification rather than 
towards it. For these republicans, ‘policing cannot be detached from the consti-
tutional issue,’121 meaning that endorsing policing in the absence of settling the 
‘national question’ is legitimising the British occupation of Ireland.122 From 
this perspective, policing represents something of an ideological malaise as 
it equates acceptance of the existence of the Northern Ireland state and the 
monopoly of the police force to use force within that state.123 Why policing 
represents a breach of principles to those who take such a view is axiomatic; 
accepting Northern Ireland’s constitutional status quo flies in the face of the 
principle of self-determination whilst acknowledging the state monopoly of the 
use of force removes the right to use armed force. 
Central to this ideological view is the structuralist argument that policing 
and the state are two inseparable sides of the one coin. If there is an ideological 
flaw with the state – and for Irish republicans of all hues there is as the parti-
tioned state is standing in the way of their end goal – then that flaw will be 
replicated in the policing apparatus defending the state. The logical follow on 
from this is that accepting ‘British policing’ is accepting ‘British rule’ in Ireland 
– something anathema to Irish republicanism. One interviewee articulated 
such an argument, noting that ‘we can’t separate the police force from the 
state. The state is ultimately a British state; the police force ergo is a British 
police force’. Elaborating further on this analysis, they argued that to think 
that policing could be solved outside of any ‘radical transformation’ of what 
was for them an ‘irreformable’ state would be ‘illogical’ and a case of ‘putting 
the cart before the horse’.124 Another argued that the ideological argument 
could not be divorced from the wider role of the police in protecting the state. 
In believing that they could undermine the state and advance a republican 
agenda ‘by supporting the organs of the state that prevent all of that’, Sinn 
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Féin was making a ‘profound mistake’ that the interviewee disagreed with 
‘tactically and strategically’.125 The sentiment of those who cannot see merit in 
the ‘progressive republican’ model is that accepting policing equates co-option 
into the very state that Irish republicans seek to dismantle. This structuralist 
argument is attuned to Tonge’s synopsis that accepting policing represents ‘the 
culmination of working rather than removing the state’.126 
Flawed agreement
The policing decision – just as in the ‘progressive republican’ reading – cannot 
be detached from its wider context for those opposed to the move. Central to 
the reading of policing as anathema to Irish republican ideology is a similarly 
dim view of the GFA. Most notable in the anti-policing critique is the fact 
that the GFA enshrines the ‘principle of consent’. For one critic, this made the 
GFA not simply a ‘non-republican’ settlement but rather an ‘anti-republican’ 
settlement.127 Rather than buying into the narrative that the GFA represents 
the banking of concessions won thus far as a foundation for making further 
advances, it is rejected on the basis that it accepts an outcome that not only falls 
short of but actually contradicts the principle of national self-determination. 
Instead of focusing on the transitional potential of the GFA, critics ‘remember’ 
how similar political settlements were rejected as heresy in the past – something 
that those buying into a ‘progressive republican’ reading ‘forget’. McIntyre 
argues that in accepting the GFA the Sinn Féin leadership have implicitly 
acknowledged that what was on offer to Irish republicans via Sunningdale is as 
‘good as it gets’, thus posing the awkward question of why the ‘war’ was waged 
until the mid-1990s.128 Interviewees who engaged in a wider memory politics 
reading of the transition also posed the question of why something that was 
seemingly anathema to republicanism in 1974 became acceptable in 1998:
The Good Friday Agreement, if you read it properly, you know in it you have 
exactly the same things that you had in 1974. Exactly, except you didn’t 
have to decommission and all prisoners were getting out of jail and there 
was going to be an amnesty for all prisoners. They were getting the same 
things in ’74. None of them can answer the question, ‘but why was it not 
accepted in ’74?’129 
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Given the centrality of this ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’ argument to 
republican criticism of the GFA, it is worth drawing it out slightly. While 
there is a certain merit to the substance of this argument, what it overlooks 
is an important contextual difference.130 Sunningdale was rejected against 
a backdrop of republican belief in an inevitable declaration of British 
withdrawal and against a wider global backdrop of post-colonial national 
liberation struggles – as evidenced by the remarks of former combatants in 
previous sections and by the approach taken by the IRA leadership during 
negotiations with the British. As Wolff notes, by the turn of the millennium 
most of these other conflicts had concluded or evolved into protracted 
political settlements.131 By the time the GFA emerged, a ‘mutually hurting 
stalemate’ in the six counties, the ending of the Cold War and movement out 
of political violence elsewhere had significantly altered the political landscape. 
Accordingly, what was rejected 25 years previously in the misguided antici-
pation of inevitable victory was later re-evaluated as a foundation for further 
strategic advancement. Where the ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’ argument 
falters is not on the substantive likeness of the two agreements but on their 
considerable contextual difference. If the latter-day revolutionaries ‘forget’ 
their past criticism of others to justify their current positions, then those 
espousing a ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’ argument similarly ‘forget’ an 
important contextual disparity to support theirs. 
Nevertheless, the identification of an ideological flaw in the GFA – that 
being that any internal settlement short of self-determination copper fastens 
partition – prevents these republicans from accepting the ‘progressive repub-
lican’ premise of the transition being a series of progressive steps building 
towards the goal of unity. The ‘constitutional nationalist’ premise is, rather, that 
if the GFA is ideologically flawed then every step emanating from that becomes 
part of a process that is fundamentally flawed and built on an erroneous 
supposition that it is progressive. Rather than removing the state, it results 
in assimilation into the state and a venture out of Irish republicanism into 
constitutional Nationalism to contest that field with the SDLP. The reality 
would then appear to be that the GFA ‘constitutes an uncomfortable reality for 
anyone who claims to be a republican’ as the actual outworkings do not live up 
to the Sinn Féin stages rhetoric.132 
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Reformist working of the state
What opponents see in the Sinn Féin strategy is not progressive steps towards 
unity but desperation to do ‘whatever it takes’ – including sacrificing principles 
– to wield power within Northern Ireland’s political institutions. The IRSP, 
for example, accused Sinn Féin of signing up to ‘A Fresh Start’ ‘for the sake of 
maintaining positions of power and relevance, along with the perks and privi-
leges that come with the posts of career politicians’.133 For critics, the Sinn Féin 
aim has ceased to be the republican goal of self-determination to now become 
assuming the mantle of power as the dominant force within constitutional 
Nationalism. In contextualising this, one interviewee offered the following 
frank assessment of the Sinn Féin position:
If someone said to me, ‘look listen, after 37 years, I was knackered and 
I’m taking the money and to hell with everybody’, I respect that man or 
woman because they are telling the truth. My next thing would be, ‘Well 
then, don’t call yourself a republican. You’re a constitutional Nationalist, 
which is what the SDLP were. You wanted their prime position and you 
worked long and hard and choreographed yourself very well, and fair play to 
you. You got where you wanted to go. All your nights of study and all your 
nights of manoeuvring, handshaking and back rubbing has paid off. You’re 
in government. Sín é. Now, tell the truth because you can’t be a republican 
who is administering British rule in this country’.134
From this analysis, endorsing ‘British policing’ in Ireland is a natural conse-
quence of a willingness to administer ‘British rule’ in Ireland:
The notion that policing represents a Rubicon for the Provisional movement 
to cross is a distortion of their true political and constitutional predicament. 
Accepting policing is the logical consequence of accepting the legitimacy 
of British parliamentary activity in Ireland. That Rubicon was publicly 
crossed in 1998 and if the Humes/Adams document was to see the light of 
day a private crossing could be acknowledged from an earlier date.135 
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One critic argued that endorsing policing was ‘the price of admission’ that 
Sinn Féin had to pay to get into ‘the political institutions of the six counties’. 
Recalling the wider political context prevalent at the time, the interviewee 
argued:
We remember the November deadline of 2006. They simply had no choice. 
If they wanted to continue along the political path that they’d chosen then 
they had to swallow British policing … they were forced into accepting the 
political anomaly … they have to gloss up the reality of it by using termi-
nology such as ‘changing from within’, ‘putting manners on them’ in the 
words of Martin McGuinness, but they are living a lie.136
It is worth noting that the St Andrews Agreement, intricately linked to the 
choreography of ‘critical engagement’, made positions in the power-sharing 
executive dependent on ministerial pledges of support for the rule of law. ‘A 
Fresh Start’ later extended this to all members of the assembly.137 To that end, 
the argument above may not be entirely without foundation. Indeed, it is given 
further credence by Hayes’ argument that what forced the policing move was 
essentially ‘political pressure’ rather than ideological commitment.138 Nor is 
Hayes alone in this analysis. Wilford and Wilson argue that the change in 
policing policy occurred against a backdrop of threats that elections to the 
local assembly would not take place without this.139 
Frampton notes that Sinn Féin has been able to fend off criticism on the 
basis that other groups have yet to offer an alternative.140 Whiting goes further 
in her analysis, concluding that while Sinn Féin’s detractors may have policy 
documents that can in themselves act as a rebuttal to claims of having no 
strategy, the policies outlined in them hardly represent a viable alternative.141 
Those who supported policing were keen to point this out when interviewed. 
Although there is considerable merit in this point, what it fundamentally 
overlooks is that, unlike the realpolitik, in the realm of memory politics absence 
of a progressive alternative is essentially a non-issue. Memory politics favours 
critics in the regard that they simply have to state that they are continuing to 
do what Irish republicans always did – whether that be mounting military 
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campaigns, politically opposing ‘partitionist’ internal settlements and resisting 
‘British policing’ – and then point to the criticism the Provisionals made of 
other ‘reformists’ in the past. This was certainly not lost on interviewees when 
the Sinn Féin argument that there was ‘no alternative’ was put to them. One 
interviewee responded that even a ‘slight analysis’ of such an argument exposed 
its shortcomings:
I could use all the arguments they used against the SDLP. I could use all the 
arguments they used against the pro-treaty people in the early ’20s about 
buying into the system, about becoming part of the system … If you look 
at the ’70s and ’80s, when the SDLP were basically legitimising the British 
presence in Ireland because they were the largest Nationalist party and they 
were co-operating fully with the British state, they were heavily criticised 
by the Provies. Now the Provies are doing the exact same thing that the 
SDLP were doing in the ’70s, ’80s and ’90s. Yet they don’t see the hypocrisy 
in what they’re saying. Is the only difference because they are talking to us 
now, so that makes it okay?142 
For another interviewee, the mere suggestion that there could be an Irish 
republican ‘alternative’ short of self-determination was in itself ideologically 
flawed. It was held that ‘people talk about republican alternatives. There is 
no alternative to the republic … We can’t have a Northern and a Southern 
assembly. We can’t have any kind of concessions or anything other than the 
republic’. Taking exception to the suggestion that such a stance was ‘backward’-
looking rather than progressive, the interviewee defended their position:
Really and truly, everything has been tried. We’ve had Direct Rule. We’ve 
had partition. We’ve had devolution. We’ve had internment. They have tried 
to kill us. They have tried to lock us up. They have done everything. The one 
thing that they haven’t tried to secure peace in Ireland is full independence, 
and to me that is the only thing that will work. So, while they keep banging 
their head off a brick wall, I think they are looking backwards. They’re 
looking for a solution, an alternative in Ireland that isn’t ever going to 
work.143
Implicit in this argument is a rebuke of the ‘progressive republican’ ‘no alter-
native’ argument whereby instead of there being no alternative to the Sinn 
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Féin strategy it is held that there is ‘no alternative’ to self-determination. 
Adopting this view means that any settlement falling short of self-determi-
nation is ideologically flawed. ‘Equality agenda’ republicanism may afford 
Nationalists increased political power in a reformed Northern Ireland state but 
that is not self-determination. Sustenance for this argument may be found in 
MacGinty’s analysis that Sinn Féin participation in the transition has blurred 
constitutional options, with the effect that many Nationalists are feeling they 
can accept devolution and a place within a reformed Northern Ireland state 
rather than clinging to the historical aim of a united Ireland.144 Interestingly, 
Evans and Tonge note that support for the GFA is strongest among Sinn Féin 
supporters.145 One reading can attribute this to their belief in the transform-
ative capacity of the GFA to deliver self-determination. Another can, however, 
attribute it to the fact that ‘equality-agenda’ republicanism has succeeded in 
placating them via equal status in the Northern Ireland state meaning that self-
determination is no longer regarded as sacrosanct. 
Assimilation
A belief that the Sinn Féin strategy has its antecedents in failed policies of 
the past has been at the heart of criticism proffered by their opponents. The 
fallibility of the ‘reform from within’ theory behind the ‘progressive repub-
lican’ model is the fact that an unrealised practical implementation of it is a 
‘recurring theme of Irish history’.146 For opponents, the onus is on the Sinn 
Féin leadership to differentiate between their current strategy and that of ‘all 
those it had previously labelled traitors’.147 This task becomes arduous in a 
memory politics environment where opponents are only too willing to draw 
such parallels. Morrison notes that this has led to considerable correlation 
between the past narrative of the Provisionals as the ‘original republican dissi-
dents’ and that forwarded by those challenging their position today.148 Critics 
argue that Sinn Féin has adopted Official IRA policies they once ‘vehemently 
opposed’.149 This is both politically and mnemonically charged and it shows 
the growing dimensions of the hegemonic contestation within modern Irish 
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republicanism. It is also reflective, more generally, of how Irish republicans tie 
their views of the transition in the North of Ireland to how they view the past 
and, more importantly, to how they seek to represent that past.150 The ability 
to draw parallels with past failed reformist programmes, is demonstrative that 
Irish republicans adhere to what Wertsch terms a ‘narrative template’ that 
acts as a ‘gist of what happened’, wherein specific actors, dates and times may 
change but the plotline remains constant throughout.151 Where it was Fine 
Gael in the 1920s, Fianna Fail in the 1930s and the Officials in 1969, today the 
Provisionals become the ‘reformist’ villains of the narrative.152 Compounding 
this further is the ability of critics to see vindication in what they had argued 
when they initially opposed the Sinn Féin ‘progressive republican’ project at 
its inception.153 Rejection back then was broadcast as an ‘apocalyptic history’ 
that ‘writes the future as pre-ordained’;154 dropping abstentionism would lead 
to the de-escalation of the armed campaign, which in turn would allow a parti-
tionist internal settlement to eventually enmesh republicans in the system 
that protects the constitutional status of the Northern Ireland state. ‘Critical 
engagement’ represents the latter-day fulfilment of that prophecy. Interviewees 
noted, however, that the ideological drawbacks of this vindication meant that 
they took little solace in being proven ‘right’. The ideological implication of 
this being that Irish republicanism had to come through ‘its weakest point 
probably – if not ever – since the 30s or 40s’,155 meaning that self-determination 
‘is further away than it has ever been’.156 In a damning assessment of where Sinn 
Féin has brought Irish republicanism to today, one interviewee concluded:
See, when big Ian [Paisley] walked away, people thought, fuck all of it. But 
there was something very, very important about that and they missed it 
all. Paisley knew – a sectarian bigot, you better believe it, responsible for 
hundreds of deaths, you better believe it. Stupid? Not a chance. He knew. 
He knew he had them right where he wanted them. They couldn’t go 
anywhere in a political cul de sac. They couldn’t go anywhere. They couldn’t 
renege on stuff. And he had them and he says, ‘Well, go ahead young Peter 
[Robinson]. You take the reins now and I’ll keep a wee eye over you. Just 
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keep them in that corner and throw them an old bone now and again’. And 
Peter’s doing that.157
The picture of the ideological consequences painted by the ‘constitutional 
nationalist’ model therefore stands in stark contrast to the ‘progressive repub-
lican’ model that depicts Irish unity as the inevitable conclusion to the current 
Sinn Féin strategy.
Conclusion
To be understood in wider ideological terms, ‘critical engagement’ cannot be 
divorced from its transitional context or the internal Irish republican politicking 
that conditions competing views of the transition. Ideology and memory inter-
twine to allow long-held belief systems to frame current policy choices through 
comparisons with past positions. For those subscribing to a ‘progressive repub-
lican’ model, memory centres on continuity; it provides continuity between 
the ideological goals sought using current strategy in the political struggle 
and those sought under past strategy during the armed struggle. In drawing 
this continuity, policing becomes a component of a wider strategy that has 
seen Irish republicanism adopt a tactical shift in order to meet the needs of the 
‘principle of success’. This has witnessed the evolution of ‘progressive repub-
licans’ from ‘rebel’ to ‘revolutionary’. Continuity offering ideological assurance 
is grounded in the retention of the goal being sought if not in the tactics being 
used to seek it. Others subscribe to a ‘constitutional nationalist’ reading of 
the transition that is premised on the gradual yet irreversible abandonment of 
Irish republican principles by those prepared to administer ‘British rule’ and 
endorse ‘British policing’. ‘Critical engagement’ becomes the latest phase in a 
process that has consistently subverted republican principles. Memory enables 
the Sinn Féin strategy to be seen from this perspective in terms of rupture 
and continuity; as a rupturing with the ideological principles of Irish repub-
licanism and the continuity of failed ‘reform from within’ strategies that have 
historically plagued Irish republicanism. Contestation has been fuelled by the 
historical failure of Irish republicanism to succinctly adopt a rigid ideological 
framework capable of ascertaining what is tactic and what is principle. This 
wider debate over principles and tactics has also allowed notions of continuity 
and rupture to frame contestation over the legacy of the dead who sacri-
ficed themselves in the pursuit of ideological goals during the armed struggle. 
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Competing hegemons who are vying for the same political space within Irish 
republicanism have sought to use the legacy of the armed struggle to legitimise 
their own reading of the transition in Northern Ireland and undermine that of 





This chapter examines the curious case of how the memory of those killed 
by policing agents could later be used to advocate support for policing in the 
North of Ireland. Leading on from examination of ideological contestation on 
policing to which the dead are inextricably linked, it interrogates contending 
narratives on whether ‘critical engagement’ is in furtherance of or a contra-
diction of the ideological goals for which the Irish republican patriot dead 
sacrificed themselves. It investigates the main components of the policing 
narrative proffered by each side of the debate; ‘critical engagement’ being the 
extension of the courage shown by the patriot dead during armed struggle, 
or whether endorsement of policing represents a self-inflicted defeat of the 
goals for which the patriot dead sacrificed themselves. This is followed by an 
examination of the political utility of the patriot dead to competing ‘memory 
entrepreneurs’ that critically evaluates why each side attaches so much worth 
to the patriot dead and why they go to considerable lengths to distance them 
from intra-communal rivals. 
Irish republican martyrology
Firmly ensconced in ‘Irish republican theology’,1 the patriot dead are 
embedded in ‘the language of sacred soil and the cult of the dead’.2 The 
‘historical determinism’ within Irish republicanism has seen the patriot dead 
provide a mandate to various Irish republican groupings, even if a mandate from 
the living evades them.3 One can say without exaggeration that the patriot 
 1 Arthur, 2007.
 2 Bean, 2012.
 3 Tonge, 2012.
122 Critical Engagement
dead are omnipresent in the memory politics of modern Irish republicanism. 
The ‘cult of the dead’ is, however, hardly exclusive to Irish republicanism. It has 
been indulged in by political actors the world over. Before turning attention 
to the Irish republican case study, it is pertinent to outline why the ‘cult of the 
dead’ has such a strong appeal.
Christ’s position as the ultimate martyr who died for a greater ‘cause’ 
projects a latent divinity onto those who give themselves in furtherance of a 
political cause couched in Christian traditions of self-sacrifice.4 Even those 
who die whilst engaging in violence bathe in this divinity that places them 
beyond reproach. Narratives of those killed in political conflict revolve around 
the selflessness of their sacrifice made for the greater good of the cause.5 
It is the selflessness of this sacrifice that sanctifies and legitimises their very 
cause.6 The mere virtue of death places the fallen on a higher moral plain, thus 
purifying the cause they died for. In Irish republicanism, this manifests itself 
in collectively celebrated Pearsian ideals of self-sacrifice by the ‘children of the 
nation’ in the name of ‘mother Ireland’. However, it is not only those who meet 
a violent end on the battlefield that hold importance to their constituencies. 
The value of Martin Luther King to African American ‘memory entrepre-
neurs’ demonstrates that even pacifists who die ‘political’ deaths become 
revered.7 The mere fact that a death is political endows it with an inherent 
sense of ‘commemorability’ which ‘memory entrepreneurs’ with the requisite 
‘mnemonic capacity’ can turn into collective memory.8
Death in the service of one’s country ‘assumes a moral grandeur’ that 
little else can rival.9 This generated a culture of ‘martyrology’ within Irish 
republicanism that has been used by republican elites to obtain sympathy 
for the republican cause within wider Nationalism.10 It is the inherent ability 
of commemoration to construct collective identity through teaching the 
lessons of the past by using ritualism and symbolism that makes it so useful.11 
Collective identity can be fostered around the dead as they enable ‘memory 
entrepreneurs’ to tie local events and local martyrs to larger national events and 
the collective dead. The dead may be from a particular locality and community, 
yet at the same time they belong to a larger national collective. As such, they 
 4 O’Shaughnessy, 2004.
 5 Cromer, 2004.
 6 Grant, 2005.
 7 Alderman, 2003.
 8 Armstrong and Crage, 2006.
 9 Anderson, 2006, 141.
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transcend temporal barriers by continuing the struggle of past martyrs and 
showing the way for future martyrs.12 The prevalence of the memory of Adem 
Jashari, ‘The Legendary Commander’ in Kosovo, is a case outside of the North 
of Ireland that demonstrates these points. Jashari’s memory has been projected 
beyond the confines of the Prekaz region where he was killed into the collective 
Kosovar Albanian memory that ties him seamlessly with past Albanian heroes.13 
Likewise, muralisation of the dead in Gaza has served a similar purpose for 
Palestinians,14 while competing ethno-nationalist master narratives in Bosnia 
link the local dead of recent conflicts to the memory of the antifascist Partisans 
and the collective memory of the Ottoman era.15 Instructive examples from 
within Irish republicanism are the ‘Loughgall Martyrs’16 and the 1981 hunger 
strikers.17
The considerable value the dead hold for elites is indicated by how ‘acts of 
blood sacrifice have their greatest significance through a kind of hidden “moral 
causation” that eventuates in the desired political outcome’.18 That gunmen 
could have hidden moral value is indeed baffling on one level. However, within 
Irish republicanism the reality is, as Devine-Wright highlights, ‘the status of 
historic figures as soldiers or freedom fighters idealise aggression and fighting, 
thus providing important legitimacy for those who are fighting in the present’.19 
This legitimating function takes on added significance because the dead ‘can 
speak only through the tongues of present day interpreters’.20 Though essentially 
casualties of a past conflict, the dead take on the role of inspiration, guiding and 
directing those pursuing the same objectives today. Nowhere has this been more 
obvious than in modern Irish republicanism. The ability of the dead to ‘lead 
the way’ is demonstrated through the assertion that ‘republicans will always 
remember and honour those who struggled in the past to achieve our shared 
objectives. We do so not merely out of respect and admiration but also to learn 
about the present and to plan for the future’.21 The importance of the patriot 
dead to the wider Irish republican constituency and rival hegemons within 
 12 Di Lellio and Schwander-Sievers, 2006.
 13 Obucina, 2011.
 14 Rolston, 2014a.
 15 Moll, 2013.
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that constituency cannot be underestimated. The patriot dead provide moral 
justification of the armed struggle, are useful in garnering political support, can 
help establish and solidify collective identities and, most importantly, they can 
be seen to posthumously endorse present strategies.22 When present strategies 
differ within a single constituency contestation intensifies, making the memory 
of the dead a potent and deployable resource for competing elites. 
The traditional dominance of the Provisional movement within Irish 
republicanism birthed ‘a fervent rejection of any other political group’s 
ability to represent the Nationalist community’.23 As a consequence, they 
came to dominate commemoration of the patriot dead. Commemoration and 
‘Provisional politics’ are infused, meaning that commemoration is as much 
orientated towards ‘Provisional politics’ as ‘Provisional politics’ is towards 
commemoration.24 The centrality of commemorative rites to Sinn Féin’s post-
conflict memory politics is evident through their widespread use of murals, 
monuments, commemorative lectures and commemorative booklets to keep 
the memory of the dead ‘alive’ amongst their grassroots support. This feeds 
into the point made by Graham and Whelan that whilst commemoration acts 
as a reminder of the sacrifice of the fallen it ‘is concerned too, with the need 
to establish Sinn Féin as the rightful heir to the legacy of Irish nationalism’.25 
The strength of the bonds between the memory of the patriot dead and Sinn 
Féin’s political project has led McDowell to conclude that they are ‘inexorably 
linked’.26 Commemoration of the patriot dead has a political value whereby the 
‘performed memory of violence and sacrifice underlines a transformed politics’ 
thus conveying to the republican support base that ‘Provisional Republicanism 
is aware of its roots and remains true to them’.27 The practical outworking of 
this can be seen in the following extract from a social media advertisement for 
a commemorative event for IRA volunteer Francis Jordan in South Armagh: 
‘People like Francis Jordan are the reason we all enjoy the rights we have 
today and it was their sacrifice that allows us to carry on the struggle for 
freedom peacefully and democratically. They went to war so later generations 
did not have to’.28 Provisional commemorative dominance, however, stops just 
short of a monopoly of the patriot dead. Members of other groups died too 
 22 Hearty, 2017.
 23 Wright, 1991, 126.
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and are commemorated by their organisations. Moreover, these groups also 
commemorate older collective heroes. For example, Belfast once hosted seven 
different Easter commemorations by multifarious Irish republican organisa-
tions.29 During the centenary year, this mnemonic free-for-all became more 
apparent as ‘memory entrepreneurs’ of every hue staked their claim to the 
1916 legacy. Commemorative events ranged from a hard-line commemoration 
in Coalisland, Co. Tyrone that called for the completion of the ‘unfinished 
revolution’ to state-sponsored events in Dublin attended by the President and 
Taoiseach.30 
There is a distinct difference in how the memory of the dead features 
in narratives when a war has been ‘won’ and when it has not been ‘won’.31 
In victory, the dead are hailed as the champions of a cause that was proved 
righteous only through their blood sacrifice. The victory enjoyed by the living 
is the eternal debt they owe to the dead. In defeat, the death of martyrs is a 
‘chosen trauma’ that spurs future generations on to avenge the injustice of their 
deaths.32 The inapplicability of either observation to the patriot dead speaks 
to the peculiarities of the position modern Irish republicanism finds itself in, 
being caught somewhere between victory and defeat depending on which 
perspective of the Northern Ireland transition one wishes to take. Neither 
militarily defeated nor militarily victorious when Irish republicans discon-
tinued armed struggle, the dead of the most recent phase of conflict remain in 
a limbo-like state; their deaths facilitated a political process that has politically 
empowered Irish republicanism yet by the same token their military efforts did 
not drive the British Army into boats swiftly departing Belfast docks as initially 
thought. 
It is from this very matter that the contestation inherent in post-conflict 
Irish republican memory politics stems. ‘Progressive republicans’ argue that 
Irish republicans are only in a strengthened political position today due to the 
sacrifices made by the dead during the armed struggle.33 They argue that as 
republicans move forward politically they continue to be guided by the sacri-
fices of the patriot dead. They are working towards the goal that sacrifice was 
made in pursuit of, albeit in a different manner. For others, this new means has 
essentially become an ‘end’ rather than a ‘means’. This ‘end’ falls short of that 
 29 Bryce, 2013.
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which the patriot dead pursued. These groups who oppose policing – with the 
exception of the IRSP, whose members were keen to point out during interviews 
that unlike other Irish republican groupings they had no ‘shared past’ with the 
Provisional movement – are ‘contesting a shared past’ with Sinn Féin.34 They 
invoke the memory of the same armed struggle and the same martyred dead 
to sanctify their opposition to Sinn Féin’s current strategy. By contrast, the 
IRSP utilise the memory of the INLA dead rather than contesting the memory 
of IRA dead. They have, however, taken issue with the apparent expropriation 
of the INLA hunger strikers by Sinn Féin.35 Rivalry of this nature reflects that 
seen in South Africa over who can legitimately claim the memory of Steve 
Biko and the Sharpeville massacre.36 What was effectively an ‘official memory’ 
of the 1981 hunger strike, as ordained by Sinn Féin, has recently come under 
unprecedented internal challenge from a range of ‘memory entrepreneurs’ with 
varying agendas.37 
With increasing division within Irish republicanism comes increased 
contestation over the memory of the patriot dead. No longer is there the 
unquestioning assumption that the dead actually died for what Sinn Féin say 
they died for. Those in disagreement with Sinn Féin are able to offer a different 
explanation of what the patriot dead died for and what their sacrifice means 
within contemporary Irish republicanism. Competing hegemons endeavour 
to carve a political genealogy that heralds these ‘struggle heroes’ as their 
ideological ancestors.38 This tendency to latch on to ‘struggle heroes’ was also 
noted by Laleh Khalili in Palestine when she observed that hegemons vying 
over the memory of Izz al-Din al-Qassam:
Chose to remember the martyr as it befitted their agenda and their ideology, 
analogizing the martyr’s strategies with those of the current period and 
drawing conclusions on the basis of this analogy … which legitimated the 
claims of the commemorating institution … the organizations instrumen-
talized the martyr and the practice of remembering him.39
The ‘malleability of memory’ gives it an uncanny adaptability, meaning that 
‘struggle heroes’ ‘are evoked at various historical moments, places and contexts, 
 34 Bean, 2012.
 35 ‘New Patsy O’Hara Hunger Strike Mural Unveiled in Belfast’, IRSP, 18 November 
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by interested agents as reverential and referential models of a communicable 
past; they can be used both for and against the same institutions against 
which the martyr once struggled’.40 In this context, the patriot dead become 
invaluable to both sides in the policing debate. What follows is an in-depth 
examination of their respective narratives; a narrative of continuity depicting 
policing as an extension of the sacrifice of the patriot dead and a narrative of 
rupture portraying it as the defeat of the goal for which the patriot dead gave 
their lives. 
The extension of struggle
The greatest difficulty for those supporting policing lay in reconciling support 
for the PSNI with the sacrifice made by republicans fighting the police in the 
past. How, after all, can one pledge support for the same forces that comrades 
died fighting against a short time ago? This involved walking a mnemonic 
tightrope that required extreme dexterity lest a plunge to political suicide would 
result. This balancing act was not made easier by the natural apprehension over 
the move in areas that had suffered most at the hands of the security forces. 
Asking these families and communities to ‘move on’ and embrace policing 
as part of a larger strategy was a monumental task. The families of the patriot 
dead have always been important to the Irish republican collective. They have 
been central to republican commemoration as not only do they ‘remember’ 
the sacrifice as members of the Irish republican collective but they are also 
remembering members of their family.41 They embody the interface between 
republican collective memory of suffering at losing a member of the wider 
collective and the individual memory of loss stemming from losing a loved 
one. Sinn Féin therefore engaged with the families of the dead in an effort 
to get them ‘on board’ with policing. In areas where the issue was particu-
larly problematic, special meetings were convened for families to air their 
concerns and provisions made for them to attend the Ard Fheis.42 At the Ard 
Fheis, special mention was made of the families of the patriot dead and the 
difficulty the move represented for them.43 That such effort was expended by 
Sinn Féin indicates just how important a constituency the families are within 
Irish republicanism. They were likely to be the most hesitant group within the 
 40 DeSoucey, Pozner, Fields, Dobransky and Fine, 2008.
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constituency and if they came ‘on board’ it was likely to persuade others to do 
so. Perhaps there was also an implied assumption that if the families came ‘on 
board’ this de facto meant that the patriot dead were ‘on board’ too.
The dead are immeasurably useful to elites in times of ‘system 
transformation’.44 They become a resource for reassuring doubters at grassroots 
levels and for anchoring the new direction of the present to the struggle of the 
past. The need for this on the policing issue is obvious. The move represented 
such a departure from the militant republicanism the dead had known that a 
link with this past was what ‘the leadership’ proposal would stand or fall on. 
Accordingly, the patriot dead were depicted as leading the way for the new 
political developments that were unfolding. These developments became the 
continuation of the war waged by the dead but by different means. This reflects 
how the Sinn Féin leadership habitually invokes the dead to ‘sanctify current 
strategies’ in a post-conflict setting.45 The irony of this is, as Rolston notes, that 
the party and its current strategy are ‘very different’ from that which the patriot 
dead would have known.46 Despite this, ‘the dead are woven into an advancing 
and evolving narrative of struggle where the “chosen destination” of past IRA 
volunteers and a republicanism now embarked on a peace strategy are the 
same’.47 In this context, memory becomes more than simply commemorating 
the dead. Rather, it involves placing them in a ‘meaningful’ post-conflict narra-
tive.48 There is a distinct difference between ‘remembering’ and narration in 
this sense. While individuals can ‘remember’, it is only political elites that can 
place these memories in carefully constructed collective narratives. The patriot 
dead subsequently became actors in a protracted conflict narrative that led to 
the political project of Sinn Féin. 
Constructing the narrative
The opportunity to write the patriot dead into this master narrative arose in the 
weeks prior to the Extraordinary Ard Fheis, first at the annual commemoration 
of two republican icons killed in a Border Campaign assault on Brookeborough 
RUC barracks and then at a commemorative event in Crossmaglen.49 At the 
first event, Gerry Adams acknowledged the quagmire that policing represented, 
 44 Brown, 2009a.
 45 Patterson, 2011, 81.
 46 Rolston, 2010.
 47 Brown, 2009a.
 48 Zaretsky, 2009.
 49 ‘Policing: Transfer of Powers Would be Advance for Struggle’, An Phoblacht, 4 
January 2007; ‘Seamus Harvey 30th Anniversary’, An Phoblacht, 25 January 2007.
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noting that republicans were ‘very aware of the irony’ of commemorating those 
killed in an attack on an RUC barracks in the middle of a debate on accepting 
policing. There was, however, ‘no contradiction’ in promoting republican 
acceptance of policing while honouring those who died physically resisting the 
RUC.50 For Adams, there was ‘no contradiction’ because he intertwined the 
narrative of the Brookeborough raid with that of the ‘political struggle’ Sinn 
Féin was currently engaged in; both were risky, both moved the republican 
cause forward and both were necessary. To this end, Adams exhorted: ‘like all 
republican initiatives, it is risky. The Brookeborough raid was risky. Struggle 
of any kind is risky. We should remember that those who want to maximise 
change, must be prepared to take the greatest risks’.51 Confronting policing in 
the new ‘political struggle’ was depicted as a bold move that required the same 
courage and tenacity that those who died had shown when taking up arms. 
Failure to confront policing would be a grave disservice to the sacrifice that the 
fallen had made: 
Republicans have never lacked courage. The courage to take up arms like 
Séan and Fergal in their time, and countless other men and women in 
our own time. The courage to confront injustice and discrimination. The 
courage to seize an opportunity for peace. The courage to take risks and at 
all times to move forward.52 
Policing therefore represented an extension not a repudiation of past armed 
struggle. It was the means through which the ideals of those who died during 
the conflict would come to be realisable. This point was reinforced by Adams in 
Crossmaglen when he told republicans that while strategy changed their objec-
tives remained the same as those of the fallen:
The policing debate is the most challenging and difficult we have yet faced. 
But … let us also keep our eye firmly fixed on the big prize – the prize of 
unity and independence. Because everything we do is about taking us one 
step closer to that goal … I believe if we advance together, united behind 
 50 Quoted in Chris Thornton, ‘Adams Backs PSNI as he Honours IRA Men’, Belfast 
Telegraph, 2 January 2007.
 51 ‘Speech by Gerry Adams, then President of Sinn Féin, at an Event to Commemorate 
Seán Sabhat and Feargal Ó hAnnluain, County Fermanagh, 1 January 2007’: http://
cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/sf/ga010107.htm (accessed 10 May 2012).
 52 ‘Speech by Gerry Adams, then President of Sinn Féin, at an Event to Commemorate 
Seán Sabhat and Feargal Ó hAnnluain, County Fermanagh, 1 January 2007’.
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our republican goals, we will win our freedom and build the united Ireland 
for which Seamus Harvey and his comrades gave their lives.53
It is important to bear in mind McEvoy and Conway’s point that ‘an act of 
commemoration is more than a straightforward process of remembrance’.54 
Indeed, the commemorative events helped reinforce ‘the leadership’ position 
as much as paying homage to those being commemorated. These commem-
orations were the platform on which Adams’ performances reinforced the 
pro-policing position, reassured doubters at grassroots level and issued a 
rallying call for togetherness during a time of difficulty. They laid the founda-
tions for a narrative bestowing the courage of the dead onto those who were now 
continuing past struggle politically, thus using the dead to tie two markedly 
different strategies to a common end goal. 
The extension of struggle narrative was further constructed by the preva-
lence of the patriot dead in the consultation process Sinn Féin rolled out across 
the six counties. Constructing a pro-policing narrative around the sacrifice 
and courage of the dead was an ‘important tactic’ during this process.55 Like 
countless other political elites elsewhere,56 the Sinn Féin leadership used the 
dead for the purposes of ‘clarification’ and ‘inspiration’. This was necessitated 
by open recognition from Martin McGuinness that some republicans had diffi-
culty in understanding what accepting policing would ‘mean’ for the republican 
dead. In response to criticism for ‘selling out’ the patriot dead, he argued, ‘I 
could have been one of the republican dead in the past. Many of my friends 
are the republican dead … but I don’t call them to support my case’.57 If others 
relied on ‘knowing’ how the dead would view policing, then the former IRA 
commander in Derry was not prepared to do the same. This reflects how Sinn 
Féin avoided specifically stating that the dead would have accepted policing, 
instead preferring to depict the move as an extension of the armed struggle 
they had waged. What opponents stated with absolute clarity in support of 
their case, Sinn Féin implied through constructing a narrative that depicted 
policing as an extension of past struggle. It would be incredibly difficult, after 
all, to assert with utmost certainty that someone who died firing a gun at the 
RUC would some years later come to endorse the successor force of the same 
RUC. Linking current strategy with past strategy via an overarching master 
 53 ‘Seamus Harvey 30th Anniversary’, An Phoblacht, 25 January 2007.
 54 McEvoy and Conway, 2004.
 55 Brown, 2009a.
 56 Schwartz, 1996.
 57 Quoted in W. Graham, ‘McGuinness Admits Sinn Féin is Playing for “Big Stakes” 
on Policing’, Irish News, 16 January 2007. 
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narrative cleverly implied as much without making such a bold public assertion 
of support from the patriot dead. This reflects how political elites will use 
memory to reduce opposition to proposed political changes by making the 
changes appear consistent with the activities of their forebears.58
In contextualising this reality, one interviewee drew on their personal 
circumstances to argue: 
I’ve family members; one of them was the patriot dead. I don’t know what 
he would think if he was alive. I don’t know if he would have supported it or 
wouldn’t have supported it so I can’t say that he would support it. But when 
he died, he died as an IRA volunteer and it’s the same IRA constitutionally 
that have moved onto the ground that we are on.59
Others picked up on the point that the IRA that the patriot dead belonged to 
had moved as an overall organisation to support the current Sinn Féin strategy:
Well, the problem with all that is that all those comrades are dead and you 
can’t really second guess – it’s impossible to second guess what anyone 
would do. All that I can say is that the vast majority of the guys who were 
active at the period … they have stayed on the path and have stayed true to 
the republican leadership.60
This line of reasoning adopts a ‘weight of numbers’ argument to provide a neat 
corporate transfer of past armed struggle into current political struggle.61 The 
logic of this is that there is an implicit belief that the patriot dead would support 
policing. This enables former combatants to not only ‘keep the faith’ with the 
dead but also buffers them from the criticism of intra-communal rivals that 
allege a ‘sell out’ of the patriot dead.
The counter-narrative of self-inflicted defeat
While Sinn Féin busied themselves convincing their support base that the 
move was not injurious to the integrity of the patriot dead, those opposed began 
countering this argument. They were, of course, in the much easier position of 
being able to rely on the fact that republicans had always militarily opposed 
 58 Bodnar, 1992, 247.
 59 B, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, April 2013.
 60 A, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, April 2013.
 61 Hearty, 2016b.
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rather than endorsed policing. No ‘outside the box’ thinking was required to 
convey the merits of their argument. Simply put, the republican position on 
policing had to, if the sacrifice of the dead was not to be dishonoured, remain 
the same as it was when that sacrifice was made. This counter-narrative defined 
‘critical engagement’ not as the extension of the patriot dead’s armed struggle 
but rather as the self-inflicted defeat of it.
The thrust of the counter-narrative was that endorsing a Northern Irish 
police force as part of a political settlement was not what the patriot dead 
had sacrificed themselves for. It was argued that those sacrifices were being 
wilfully, yet treacherously, traded by Sinn Féin for something falling drastically 
short of the republican objectives they were made in pursuit of. Adhering to a 
traditional ideological standpoint, these republicans asserted that policing and 
a political settlement were not what motivated Irish women and men to take 
up arms. Their ultimate prize was reunification to be gained through violent 
resistance not governing in Stormont or overseeing policing reform. This 
recurring criticism appeared at many crucial junctures throughout the peace 
process. For example, Bernadette Sands-McKevitt once famously proclaimed 
that, ‘Bobby [Sands] did not die for cross-border bodies with executive powers. 
He did not die for Nationalists to be equal citizens within the Northern Ireland 
state’.62 One anti-policing republican invoked the same counter-narrative 
when resigning from Sinn Féin on the policing issue: ‘people did not die, they 
did not take up arms for equality. They did so for Irish freedom … it should be 
remembered that, as republicans, we were committed to fight on until Britain 
made a declaration of intent to withdraw from Ireland’.63 This has remarkable 
resonance with the analysis of one interviewee who dismissed the Sinn Féin 
‘extension of struggle’ narrative by asserting:
If that’s the level of depth of their analysis then the people who have died 
in the last 30 years fighting in the IRA and upholding the sovereignty of the 
nation were led to believe they were fighting for something then they must 
have been used by that leadership that have accepted much less.64
These republicans are correct when they state that the patriot dead did 
not die with these outcomes in mind. What their counter-narrative fails to 
acknowledge, however, is that these outcomes were virtually unthinkable 
during the conflict. The vastly changed political landscape of contemporary 
 62 Quoted in Tonge, 2004.
 63 Brian Arthurs, quoted in S. McKay, ‘People Did Not Die or Take Up Arms for 
Equality: They Did So for Freedom’, Tribune, 24 October 2010.
 64 R, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
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Northern Ireland made these events possible, with the effect that many who 
had fought alongside the patriot dead have come to accept, encourage and 
endorse these moves. Simplistically arguing that ‘this is not what the dead died 
for’ conveniently overlooks this crucially important contextual matter.
Constructing the counter-narrative
Like Sinn Féin, the anti-policing lobby utilised republican commemorative 
culture to their advantage. RSF used the anniversary of the Brookeborough 
raid to reinforce their position on policing and in the process, dismiss as 
perfidious treachery that of Sinn Féin. The event was used to construct the 
counter-narrative by highlighting the obvious differences in armed resistance 
to policing agents and political endorsement of the same agents. Sinn Féin’s use 
of the event to promote policing was criticised on the basis that ‘Sean South 
did not die to reform the RUC nor to take part in overseeing the police. He 
died in the cause of Irish freedom … the latest moves by Martin McGuinness 
and those around him to recognise the police is akin to siding with the force 
that killed Sean South’.65 Further scathing criticism dismissed Sinn Féin’s 
commemoration of the men as ‘nothing more than an act of defilement to the 
memory of these men’. If Adams could not see any contradiction in voicing 
support for the PSNI while commemorating the patriot dead, this outraged 
republican could, venting ‘not only is there massive contradiction but there is 
hypocrisy, treachery, deceit and downright brass neck’.66 Another noted that 
having fallen in action against the RUC it was difficult to conceive of the men 
‘joining the ranks of the enemy – donning a peeler’s coat – and siding with 
them in the inevitable confrontation with former comrades’.67 This commemo-
rative event provided a platform for the counter-narrative to argue that policing 
was not an extension of the armed struggle of the dead as the two men did 
not die endorsing policing but attacking the RUC. If anything, the counter-
narrative contends, those endorsing policing are aiding the defeat of the goals 
of the patriot dead through contrived betrayal of the principles on which past 
armed struggle was fought. The counter-narrative, as fashioned above, moved 
beyond merely placing distance between the patriot dead and Sinn Féin by 
 65 Des Long, quoted in S. Breen, ‘Sinn Féin Told to Stay Away from South’s Grave’, 
Sunday Tribune, 31 December 2006.
 66 Mick McManus, quoted in ‘Sean Sabhat 50th Anniversary Marked in Limerick’, 
Saoirse, 237 (January 2007).
 67 Ruairi O’ Bradaigh, quoted in ‘Neither Ó hAnluain or Sabhat Would Follow “A 
Path of Deceit, Duplicity and Treachery over 20 Years”’, Saoirse, 238 (February 2007).
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implying that endorsing policing was more than just dishonouring the patriot 
dead; it became a process of siding with those who killed them.
In a bid to further strengthen their counter-narrative, anti-policing repub-
licans used their public meetings to put as much distance as they could between 
the patriot dead and the proposals of the Sinn Féin leadership. Supporters were 
told that accepting policing was a ‘sell out’ that could not be dressed up as an 
ideological advancement of the aspirations of the patriot dead. Addressing 
the obvious ideological quandary of supporting the police when republicans 
had suffered and died at the hands of such a force, one critic told supporters 
that accepting policing would have the effect of retrospectively ‘dishonouring 
and criminalising’ those who died for Irish freedom.68 Given the reverence 
the patriot dead are afforded by Irish republicans, such a claim generated 
foreseeable unease with and distaste for the move. 
As the mnemonic debate over the patriot dead intensified, some families 
bought into the counter-narrative by openly questioning whether their loved 
ones would have supported the move. In Derry, a number of families broke 
ranks publicly to oppose the move.69 One family stated their opposition was 
grounded in the belief that ‘if Sinn Féin support the RUC/PSNI then not only 
will the ideals of our volunteers remain unfulfilled they will be reversed’.70 
The mother of one of the iconic hunger strikers went so far as to state that Sinn 
Féin had ‘sold out’ to the establishment. In a damning indictment of the Sinn 
Féin proposal she asserted that ‘if they [the hunger strikers] had known that 
the struggle would end in support of the police they would not have thought 
it worthwhile’.71 It became evident that the families of the patriot dead were 
just as divided on the matter as other sections of the republican constituency. 
Anti-policing republicans were just as able – and willing – to call on the support 
of certain families to bolster their position as Sinn Féin was. The brother of 
Fergal O’Hanlon, for instance, aligned with critics, arguing that the acceptance 
of policing was ‘a betrayal’ of the cause for which his brother had died.72 There 
 68 Francie Mackey, quoted in ‘Dissidents Roar “No, No, No” to SF Policing Plans’, 
Derry Journal, 19 January 2007. 
 69 ‘IRA Man’s Family Accuse SF Leaders of “Dishonesty”’, Derry Journal, 16 January 
2007. 
 70 McBrearty family statement, cited in ‘IRA Man’s Family Accuse SF Leaders of 
“Dishonesty”’.
 71 Peggy O’Hara, quoted in O. Bowcott, ‘The 76-Year-Old Dissident Taking on 
Sinn Féin’, Guardian, 1 March 2007: www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/mar/01/
uk.northernireland1 (accessed 17 May 2017).
 72 Quoted in ‘Neither Ó hAnluain or Sabhat Would Follow “A Path of Deceit, 
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was no unanimity on the matter amongst the O’Hanlon family. O’Hanlon’s 
sister and cousin were prominent members of Sinn Féin who had been present 
at the Sinn Féin event some days earlier.73 This indicates just how divisive the 
policing issue actually was. As a consequence of familial division, not only 
can no one state categorically how the dead would have viewed events but 
little clarity can be gleaned from the considerable disagreement amongst their 
closest relatives who have taken opposing sides in the debate.
A growing gulf between Sinn Féin and families opposed to the move came 
to public prominence. Despite engaging with the families of the patriot dead 
during the consultation process, some families felt that they were not properly 
briefed on the matter by the Sinn Féin leadership.74 Matters came to a head 
following one peculiar exchange at a public meeting in Galbally, Co. Tyrone. 
In a bizarre outburst, Gerry Adams attacked a rival by asking him if the dead 
had contacted him through a Ouija board to express their disapproval on the 
policing matter. The remarks created a media furore and were criticised by 
families in Derry, causing Adams to make a rather ignominious climbdown 
on the verge of the Ard Fheis to apologise for the remarks.75 Several points 
are noteworthy about this. Primarily, its shows the raw emotion involved in 
the debate. Secondly, that the families forced someone of Adams’ prominence 
into a public retreat speaks volumes about just how powerful a constituency 
they are. To slight the families is akin to dishonouring the patriot dead. Such a 
constituency are invaluable to competing ‘memory entrepreneurs’ when onside 
and a formidable foe when in opposition. An acute awareness of this probably 
contributed to Adams’ decision to apologise.
The disconnect between Sinn Féin and certain families has grown in recent 
years, with interviewees highlighting the case of families withdrawing their 
support from Sinn Féin in East Tyrone. As a consequence, ‘independent repub-
lican’ commemorations convened by the 1916 societies in conjunction with 
the families now compete with Sinn Féin commemorations in the area. In the 
aftermath of mass resignations from Sinn Féin, the 1916 societies emerged 
as the localised guardians of the memory of the patriot dead in East Tyrone 
that would prevent the Sinn Féin leadership from misusing it.76 According to 
interviewees, these independent republican events have come to dwarf those 
of Sinn Féin. In contrasting the sizeable Sinn Féin vote in the area with the 
 73 ‘Policing: Transfer of Powers Would be Advance for Struggle’, An Phoblacht, 4 
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dwindling attendance at their commemorations, one interviewee argued that 
it evidences how ‘those currently voting for Sinn Féin are not republican, 
they never supported the IRA or the armed struggle and as witnessed at the 
Sinn Féin commemorations they don’t support its legacy’.77 This analysis, in 
suggesting that there is irreconcilable difference between the current Sinn Féin 
strategy and the armed struggle of the past, challenges the very foundation of 
the ‘extension of struggle’ narrative.
Contestation continues
Mnemonic contestation of the patriot dead rumbled on following the 
Extraordinary Ard Fheis. With assembly elections called as a result of the 
decision, Sinn Féin faced anti-policing candidates that included relatives of 
the patriot dead.78 As it transpired, Sinn Féin easily saw off this anti-policing 
challenge in the March 2007 elections, going on to entrench its position further 
as the largest Nationalist party in the North of Ireland. The results of these 
elections led to the restoration of devolved institutions in May 2007, coinciding 
with the twentieth anniversary of eight IRA members killed by the Special 
Air Service (SAS) at Loughgall. This further fuelled mnemonic contestation. 
For critics, it demonstrated just how far removed Sinn Féin was from the 
‘Loughgall martyrs’, but for Sinn Féin, they were continuing the Loughgall 
fight via different means.79 Sinn Féin re-entering Stormont at such a time was 
derided as a ‘shameful act’, and further criticised as ‘akin to the Provo’s dancing 
on the coffins of dead men. In fact their pathway to political power is littered 
with dead bodies of men and women who believed in the unity of Ireland and 
the all-Ireland republic proclaimed in 1916’.80 Mnemonic contestation along 
this vein continued to simmer in the background before reaching fever pitch 
following successful attacks by anti-policing militarists against the British 
Army and PSNI in March 2009.81 Two British Army sappers were killed in a 
Real IRA gun attack on Massereene Army Barracks in Co. Antrim on 7 March, 
before PSNI officer Stephen Carroll was shot dead by the Continuity IRA in 
Craigavon, Co. Armagh two days later. Having unstintingly supported armed 
struggle in the past and having many senior members that had formerly engaged 
 77 Z, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
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in such activity, the attacks threw up a quagmire for Sinn Féin. Condemnation 
would present the difficulty of having to distinguish between past violence 
and current violence. Nonetheless, the Sinn Féin position was to argue that 
past acts were different from current attacks. This allowed them to protect 
the integrity of past armed struggle on the one hand, whilst condemning 
current activity by militant rivals on the other hand. This has been their default 
position on the matter ever since. 
Rupture or continuity
A narrative depicting armed attacks as a rupture with the IRA of the past was 
moulded out of increasing condemnation that depicted those attacking policing 
agents as different from the IRA that had fought during the conflict. The logical 
implication of such reasoning was that their violence was also different from 
IRA violence during the conflict. Gerry Adams remarked that anti-policing 
militants ‘are not the IRA – the IRA has left the stage’.82 Admittedly, this 
discourse existed prior to the 2009 attacks. It was discernible even during the 
policing debate when Adams argued that ‘there is only one IRA, and that’s 
the one which fought the British for a very long time’.83 However, the 2009 
attacks amplified such criticism due to the increased need to broadcast its core 
message that current militants were not the IRA and that, as a result, their 
violence was neither acceptable nor justified. This was echoed in protests that 
‘the Irish Republican Army leadership and volunteers have long since declared 
that the war is over … the tiny splinter groups that carry out these attacks are 
pursuing a militarist agenda primarily designed to justify their own existence 
and perpetuate their own factions’.84 A growing sense of resentment towards 
those claiming continuity with the IRA of the past can be detected through 
Martin McGuinness’s protest that ‘I was a member of the IRA but that war is 
over now. The people responsible … are clearly signalling that they want to 
restart that war. They do not have the right to do that’.85 
With militants going on to kill another PSNI officer (Ronan Kerr) in April 
2011 and two prison officers (David Black in November 2012 and Adrian 
Ismay in March 2016), this line of argument has remained constant in Sinn 
Féin discourse on current violence. For example, Adams told those assembled 
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at a 2015 hunger strike commemoration in Dundalk that ‘none of the many 
alphabet groups that now claim the proud name of the Irish Republican Army 
have a right to that title’.86 According to this rationale, when the IRA stood 
down in July 2005 it took the justification for, and legacy of, armed struggle 
with it. This legacy was then passed via corporate transfer to Sinn Féin as 
the latter-day political inheritors of that struggle. This overarching notion of 
corporate transfer has also been used outside of internal memory politics to 
buffer against allegations of post-2005 IRA activity. Senior Sinn Féin member 
Bobby Storey dismissed media allegations of IRA culpability for the shooting 
of Kevin McGuigan, arguing ‘the IRA is gone. The IRA is stood down, they 
have put their arms beyond use, they have left the stage, they’re away and they 
are not coming back. So there is no current status of the IRA. There are no 
IRA members. The IRA has gone’.87 Basically, this argument contends that any 
current violence, whether that is attacks on the PSNI or the work of maverick 
elements, cannot be the deeds of an organisation that has since retired itself.
The thrust of this narrative has percolated down from elite level to grassroots 
level, where former combatants have used it to frame their own understanding 
of current armed activity and how it differs from the armed campaign they 
fought. They have drawn on macro-level criticisms about the scale, absence of 
support for and motivation of current militant activity, many of which were, 
ironically enough, once levelled at their own campaign.88 Their differentiation 
encompassed many strands of argument, including that current militants will 
never have ‘the experience and the machine that the IRA were able to put 
together’,89 are ‘a tiny minority’ with ‘virtually no influence in this area’90 and 
are motivated by nefarious personal and ‘securocrat’ agendas rather than by 
ideology.91 Varying degrees of empathy were, however, expressed for former 
comrades who had a ‘genuine’ difficulty with the transition. Contrasting these 
disaffected republicans with current militants engaged in status seeking, one 
interviewee noted: 
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I’ll take criticism – positive criticism – from anybody who has come through 
it [armed struggle] and who has an issue. Of course. Absolutely. They’ve 
invested as much as anybody else and they are quite entitled to make points 
and criticise. But what I don’t do is take criticism from people who have 
played no role in the conflict, who have played no role in delivering for our 
communities and are basically naysayers who for one reason or another find 
themselves in where they are at the moment. Either that’s from a security 
agenda being put there or they feel the need to run about the community as 
some sort of hard man or whatever it might be. I don’t know, but I take none 
of their criticisms for it.92
The upshot of this is a clear separation between the campaign fought by former 
combatants and current armed activity. By extension of this, then, current 
activity can also be seen to differ from the armed struggle carried out by the 
patriot dead in the past. Accordingly, current militants are seen as little more 
than misguided or criminal pretenders unable to lay claim and unworthy of 
laying claim to the legacy of 30 years of sacrifice and hard-fought armed 
struggle.93
The differentiation inherent in the Sinn Féin argument allows them not 
only to criticise current armed activity but to go one step further and call for 
the community to help the PSNI curtail it. The most emphatic manifestation 
of this was when Martin McGuinness labelled the killers of PSNI Constable 
Stephen Carroll ‘traitors’ to the Irish people and urged republicans to ‘whole-
heartedly weigh in’ behind the PSNI investigation.94 In calling for co-operation 
with the PSNI, McGuinness was clearly seeking to draw a succinct line 
between ‘acceptable’ and ‘legitimate’ armed struggle of the past and ‘unaccep-
table’ and ‘illegitimate’ armed activity in the present. Despite encouragement 
to furnish the PSNI with details relating to militant activity, ‘informing’ still 
remains a spectre of the past within the wider Irish republican community. 
Not only has this been conceded by the PSNI95 but it has also been acknowl-
edged by supporters of Sinn Féin who disagree with current militant activity. 
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One interviewee referred to an ‘inherent element’ within Irish republicanism 
that ‘it’s just not what you do’, but cautioned, ‘that shouldn’t be mistaken as 
support for them groupings’.96 One ‘mild sceptic’ encapsulated the anomaly 
that such calls had for former combatants, frankly conceding that ‘for me 
personally, I would never encourage anybody to do that against somebody 
that would lift a gun for Irish freedom. I just wouldn’t go down that road’.97 
This sentiment validates the view proffered by one anti-policing republican 
who argued that for most Irish republicans ‘deep down they know that being 
an informer is an informer regardless of what generation you are in. You know 
some people say, “oh everything changes”. Well everything changes but some 
things stay the same and I think that people are well aware of what that is’.98 
Thus, despite clear indication from Sinn Féin that co-operating with the PSNI 
on matters relating to militant activity is now acceptable, and despite differen-
tiating between ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ armed struggle, it appears that 
the stigmatisation around informing remains prevalent in the Irish republican 
psyche. Moreover, a residual physical threat does remain given that militant 
groups have continued to kill people – primarily their own members – for 
alleged informing.99 
The Sinn Féin narrative of rupture has not gone unchallenged by those 
engaged in or supportive of current armed activity. A counter-narrative of 
continuity depicting current attacks as no different from those conducted by 
the IRA during the conflict has emerged. The logic of this being that if attacks 
against policing agents in the past were justifiable then attacks in the present 
must be justifiable too. Present attacks are placed in a historical context of 
generations of armed resistance, meaning that any criticism of current attacks 
would equate criticism of attacks carried out by the patriot dead during past 
armed struggle. While Sinn Féin criticised militant attacks as the work of those 
out of vogue with post-conflict political development in the North of Ireland, 
those opposed to policing referred to them as ‘the lessons of Irish history … 
that as long as the British Government and British occupation troops remain 
in Ireland there will be Irish people to oppose their presence here’.100 This 
 96 B, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, April 2013.
 97 L, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 98 AC, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, November 2013.
 99 ‘Man Shot in Donegal Named Locally as 27-Year-Old Andrew Burns from 
Strabane’, Independent, 13 February 2008; ‘Real IRA Murder Victim Kieran Doherty 
is Buried’, BBC News, 1 March 2010: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/
foyle_and_west/8543145.stm (accessed 20 March 2015).
 100 Ruairi O’Bradaigh, quoted in D. Gordon, ‘Republican Sinn Féin Links Soldier 
Murders to “British Occupation”’, Belfast Telegraph, 9 March 2009.
141The Patriot Dead
reflects a ‘root causes’ understanding of Irish republican violence that sees it 
as a natural consequence of continued failure to address the core issue that 
birthed it in the first instance.101 Likewise, in refusing to condemn a November 
2014 mortar attack on a PSNI patrol car in Creggan, Councillor Gary Donnelly 
of the 32CSM likened it to past violence before noting, ‘Sinn Féin have not 
condemned the PIRA and have representatives who carried out violence’.102 So, 
although pro-policing republicans differentiate between ‘acceptable’ attacks 
on the RUC and similar but nonetheless ‘unacceptable’ strikes against the 
PSNI, anti-policing groups do not subscribe to such a skewed reading of the 
policing script.
For one opponent, Sinn Féin criticism of current activity is an attempt 
to ‘jealously protect’ the legacy of the armed struggle in order to fend off 
anyone challenging their hegemony.103 Another dismissed the ‘traitors’ remark 
by reducing it to ‘an ownership thing’.104 Hanley notes that those who have 
continued armed activity after larger sections of republicanism have embraced 
constitutional means have always faced criticism in relation to their tactics, 
motives, ‘war records’ and level of support.105 This was touched on by one 
interviewee who noted that the criticism that current militants were motivated 
by self gain and had not fought the ‘war’ was ‘as old as the hills’, having 
been fallaciously used by the pro-treaty forces during the Civil War.106 But 
the counter-narrative of continuity has become more than a purely defensive 
rhetorical device for anti-policing republicans. It has strategic agency and 
purpose through its ability to challenge the Sinn Féin claim to the legacy 
of the armed struggle. This has seen a corporate-transfer-based argument 
countered by a moralistic argument premised on a ‘root causes’ understanding. 
This is particularly noticeable in the response of imprisoned republicans in 
Maghaberry to Sinn Féin’s attempt via the ‘traitors’ remarks:
To renounce the right to wage war against the British, whilst falsely 
claiming the name Óglaigh na hÉireann. Adams and Co. do not own the 
rights to the Irish Republican Army, and we can assure them that the IRA 
 101 Blackbourn, 2009.
 102 ‘Gary Donnelly: Independent Councillor Refuses to Condemn Bomb Attack 
on PSNI’, Derry Journal, 4 November 2014: www.derryjournal.com/news/gary- 
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6396244 (accessed 20 March 2015).
 103 AA, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
 104 AC, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, November 2013.
 105 Hanley, 2003.
 106 AA, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
142 Critical Engagement
remains alive and well and will continue to bring the fight to the British 
invaders.107
Criticism of the ‘traitors’ remark was not confined to those supportive of 
armed struggle. Many interviewees who disagreed with Sinn Féin and with 
current armed struggle – albeit the latter being from a ‘tactical’ rather than 
a ‘moral’ perspective108 – also challenged the remark. Noting an apparent 
hypocrisy given that Sinn Féin commemorates those who did the same in the 
past, one interviewee opined:
It’s a strange comment from the man because if the same act is something 
in the 70s it’s not something else in 2013. Yeah, political circumstances 
change … but it doesn’t change from for a united Ireland to actively working 
against it, because that there is what the connotation of ‘traitor’ is.109
Moreover, whilst those who have accepted policing may ‘forget’ that many of 
the criticisms they now level at opponents were once levelled at them, this is 
precisely what others ‘remember’. In noting the Sinn Féin attitude towards 
‘dissenting republicans’, it was argued that: 
The people in ‘harrumph house’ [Stormont] were very proud in the ’70s, 
’80s and ’90s to say to the likes of you in an interview, ‘Oh yes, I’m a 
dissenter in the pure tradition of Theobald Wolfe Tone’. But now you’re 
a micro group. Well, when they started they only had 10 or 12 members. 
You’ve no support. They had no support. No one wants you. You know, you 
hear all this and it’s like rewinding back to 1970/71.110
Evidently, then, the IRA name and legacy remain a rich resource within 
modern Irish republicanism. Successfully building continuity with the IRA 
of the past, or, conversely, successfully differentiating one’s opponents from 
the IRA of the past enables hegemons to speak with a moral authority gleaned 
from those who had ‘gone before’ into the arena of battle. Paradoxically, it 
allows one lobby to differentiate between current attacks and remarkably 
similar attacks carried out in the past whilst simultaneously allowing the 
other lobby to buffer themselves from the criticism heaped on them by those 
 107 ‘Statement from Republican POW’s, Maghaberry Jail’, Saoirse, June 2009.
 108 J, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 109 V, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, September 2013.
 110 P, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
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now endorsing policing. This is demonstrative that, as Bean remarks, the IRA 
name is ‘a legitimating memory worth fighting over’.111
While simplistic competing narratives of rupture and continuity can 
usefully demonstrate the intricacies of internal disagreement, they nonetheless 
expose the insularity of Irish republicanism’s views on its own violence and 
epitomise its failure at times to locate itself within a changed global environ-
ment.112 To this end, the internally constructed difference/sameness axis can 
be usefully evaluated against external discourses proffered by the British state 
and the Irish–American diaspora. The events of 9/11 and the subsequent ‘war 
on terror’ has impacted more generally on global interpretations of the use of 
political violence.113 Increased revulsion at the destruction and bloodshed that 
accompanies political violence has created an intolerance that has left current 
militants facing ‘perhaps the most unfavourable climate ever for the physical 
force tradition’.114 Irish republican political violence has not been immune to 
the post-9/11 rethink on the ‘morality of terrorism’.115 An interesting discourse 
on where it fits into this framework has emerged. Although the UK has always 
endured a threat of political violence in the Irish context, the modern focus 
on the threat of ‘international terrorism’ has seen the latter labelled a greater 
and more bloody threat than the former due to its deliberate mass targeting 
of civilians.116 The implication of this would be that the IRA campaign on the 
British mainland was a ‘lesser evil’ than the current activities of jihadi funda-
mentalists. This conclusion has even seen a differentiation being made between 
both forms of violence by a decorated British Army war hero.117 Indeed, the 
approach of the Blair government both rhetorically and legislatively, through 
the failed Northern Ireland Offences Bill, defeated in the Commons in 2005, 
was to differentiate clearly between the two.118 The thrust of this differen-
tiation is directed at historical Irish political violence and less, it seems, at 
current militant activity. The changing nature of anti-terror legislation suggests 
that any differentiation is premised only on distinguishing past Irish political 
violence, rather than current militant activity, from ‘new terrorism’. The shifting 
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parameters of anti-terror legislation from the specific to the general means that 
those engaged in political violence in the Irish context are being combated 
under the same legislation as those involved in ‘new terrorism’.119 Moreover, 
MI5 ‘terrorism’ risk assessments frequently cite threats from Irish republicans 
along with threats from jihadi fundamentalist groups. This is suggestive that if 
prevailing state discourse on ‘terrorism’ differentiates between Irish political 
violence and that of ‘new terrorism’ it applies only to past instances given 
that anti-terror legislation does not treat current Irish republican activity any 
 differently from ‘new terrorism’. 
The same applies to changed attitudes among the Irish-American diaspora. 
Their traditional view of Irish republican violence was couched in the roman-
ticism of a struggle for national liberation. Armed struggle enjoyed favourable 
interpretations in light of violent political struggle against apartheid in South 
Africa and against Western imperialism in Vietnam. It was interpreted and 
presented in simple black-and-white terms as a struggle against injustice, not 
only by overtly republican support groups like Noraid,120 but also, in the early 
years of the conflict, by leading Irish-American politicians.121 The events of 
9/11, in tandem with the development of the peace process, heralded signif-
icant changes in attitudes towards support for and financing of Irish republican 
violence. After 9/11, Irish-American support moved away from armed struggle 
waged for a British withdrawal to favour instead full implementation of the 
GFA and republican commitment to constitutional politics.122 Thus, despite 
there being virtually no substantive difference between the aims and method-
ology of current and past armed struggle, external discourses offer succour to 
the pro-policing argument that current militant activity is somehow different 
from previous armed struggle. This is unlikely, however, to register any signif-
icant change to the ideological self-justification espoused by current militants 
who rely on ideological purity and ‘root causes’ arguments to assuage any 
criticism, whether that be internal or external.
Analysing Irish republican memory entrepreneurship
Contestation over the patriot dead revolves around the fact that no one can 
categorically state how they would view contemporary political developments. 
There is no doubting the accuracy of this simple fact, yet it has not prevented 
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rival hegemons from making a deluge of claims about the patriot dead. One 
critic argued that to claim that the patriot dead would support current strategy 
‘is to take a liberty where none was granted … it is to steal a sacrifice and 
put it in a place other than its rightful one’.123 Although there is merit in this 
argument, there is no recognition that the same applies to arguments that 
they would have definitely rejected current strategy. It may appear somewhat 
macabre or perhaps just plain frivolous to an onlooker to claim that a dead 
person would view events in a particular way, yet this is essentially the crux of 
mnemonic contestation over the patriot dead. 
To fully appreciate this point it is necessary to critically examine the role 
of the competing sides as ‘memory entrepreneurs’ and to establish why the 
patriot dead are invaluable in this regard. Before such an examination it is vital 
to acknowledge that the role of ‘memory entrepreneurs’ is not simply to create 
shared references to the past but also to regulate how the past is used and by 
whom it is used.124 To a certain degree, their role is to monopolise the past in 
furtherance of a particular agenda. The mechanics of this becomes evident 
upon examination of the battle between competing ‘memory entrepreneurs’ 
within contemporary Irish republicanism. 
Pro-policing memory entrepreneurship
On an obvious level, using the memory of those who engaged in armed resistance 
to the state and its policing agents represents a quandary for the pro-policing 
lobby. However, the reality remains that they had to use the patriot dead to sell 
their position to the grassroots. There are two reasons for this. First, the armed 
campaign of the past has been of such centrality to the depiction of the Sinn 
Féin strategy as another ‘step’ along the winding road to victory that it cannot 
be suddenly dropped. If ‘memory entrepreneurs’ do not use the memory of 
past armed struggle and the patriot dead the only other option is to ‘forget’ it. 
The centrality of this memory to keeping the grassroots on board and the more 
general importance of the patriot dead to the wider Irish republican collective 
largely precludes Sinn Féin from enforcing an ‘overt silence’ that ‘forgets’ this 
‘difficult past’.125 Rather than ‘forget’ the armed struggle, Sinn Féin engages in 
memory entrepreneurship through a process highlighted by Griffin and Bollen 
whereby the past is used in a way that relates to the questions and challenges 
faced by the collective in the present.126 The courage of the dead in the past is 
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passed on to those critically engaging with policing. The armed struggle of the 
dead against policing agents becomes the political struggle of those critically 
engaging with policing. This reflects how the image of the dead and what they 
died ‘for’ changes in tandem with the political needs of elites.127 During the 
conflict, the memory of ‘men of war’ was needed to rally support for the cause, 
but post-conflict this need transforms into the need to convey the patriot dead 
as visionaries with the foresight that the fighting would eventually give way to 
politics.128
Secondly, if Sinn Féin does not ‘remember’ the patriot dead this essentially 
forfeits a powerful political resource to their rivals. If rivals seize the mantle of 
the past uncontested they can unilaterally speak with a mandate from the dead. 
This mandate has echoed for hundreds of years and echoes most voluminously 
at grassroots level. ‘Memory entrepreneurs’ therefore ‘remember’ not simply 
so as to prevent ‘forgetting’ but also for the hegemonic purpose of keeping a 
powerful resource from rivals.129 
Anti-policing memory entrepreneurship
The anti-policing lobby, for their part, are constrained by having to share the 
‘contested space’ of the past with Sinn Féin. By necessity they have to use the 
same martyrs, the same armed struggle and the same past as Sinn Féin. The 
campaign of anti-policing militarists has not reached the level of IRA violence 
prior to the ceasefires. They do not have a rich tapestry of martyrs who died 
post-ceasefire that they can call upon to sanctify their current campaign. 
Anti-policing ‘memory entrepreneurs’ are constrained by the fact that, as 
argued by Majstorovic, emotional symbols and heroes that form the basis 
of collective memory cannot be created out of nothing and must have some 
basis in the experienced past.130 In the absence of a tailor-made hero that 
suits a current agenda unquestioningly, ‘memory entrepreneurs’ are forced to 
write older collective heroes into the collective memory in a way that adheres 
to their current political agenda. For example, the African American civil 
rights movement had to rely on the memory of Abraham Lincoln before the 
memory of Martin Luther King and Malcolm X became available to them.131 
Rather than being able to utilise the memory of those who definitely died in 
opposition to the GFA and policing (i.e. someone killed on ‘active service’ 
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post-GFA and post-policing), they are forced into a mnemonic battle with 
Sinn Féin over what it is that the patriot dead of past armed struggle fought 
and died for. Interestingly, opponents of policing have begun commemorating 
deceased veteran republicans who had ‘fought the war’ and opposed the 
current Sinn Féin strategy.132 With this comes the implicit assumption that 
these critics of Sinn Féin who have plugged the martyr gap had a mandate 
from the patriot dead they had fought alongside. However, the prominent 
role in Sinn Féin commemoration bestowed upon former combatants who 
were active, arrested or imprisoned with the venerated dead133 demonstrates 
that implications of support by association cut both ways. If Irish repub-
lican memory entrepreneurs cannot proffer an unquestioning and irrefutable 
endorsement of current strategies from the patriot dead, they can invoke the 
blessing of what is seemingly the next best thing – their comrades in arms 
and/or their families. 
In this context, memory contestation is not over what happened per se – no 
one contests that there was an armed struggle– but over the meaning of what 
happened in the past. As Hodgkin and Radstone articulate, ‘contestation, then, 
is very often not conflicting accounts of what actually happened in the past so 
much as the question of who are or what is entitled to speak for that past in 
the present’.134 Essentially, the memory of the dead becomes reduced to the 
fact that ‘the dead are supposed to have died for the same reason as what the 
survivors think that they have died for’.135 In such an ambiguous environment 
clarity vanishes as contestation thrives. If memory politics is, as Boyarin defines 
it,136 ‘rhetoric about the past mobilised for political purposes’, then memory 
contestation between competing Irish republican ‘memory entrepreneurs’ can 
be regarded as an apposite microcosm to examine intra-communal memory 
politics more generally.
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Conclusion
The patriot dead were at the heart of the memory politics that underpinned 
the Irish republican debate on policing. Being a venerated sect within the Irish 
republican constituency, their memory was heavily drawn upon by ‘memory 
entrepreneurs’ on both sides of the debate. Pro-policing republicans claimed 
that the patriot dead had fought the hard battle that paved the way for the 
struggle to be continued through peaceful means, whilst their anti-policing 
counterparts claimed that endorsing policing was siding with the very forces 
that sent these women and men to their graves. Commemorative events 
quickly took on increased political meaning, as they became battlegrounds 
for competing elites to ‘sell’ their position to grassroots supporters and to 
build that all-important link with those who had made the ultimate sacrifice in 
pursuit of the republican ideal of a sovereign Irish republic. They also became 
the ideal ground to identify with the families and comrades of the patriot dead, 
thus sealing their approval for current positions. The prominence of the patriot 
dead in the wider policing debate reflects not only their importance within 
Irish republicanism, but also the general importance that war dead have to 
political elites and hegemons across the globe. Although it is impossible to state 
with any clarity how the patriot dead would view events that transpired after 
their deaths, this has not stopped elites from attempting to do so, whether this 
be through the building of new narratives that link present political develop-
ments with past armed struggle or through overlooking the vastly differing 
political contexts in existence today as opposed to when those past sacrifices 
were made. What remains constant, however, is the overarching premise of 
sacrifice that competing Irish republican narratives converge on. While these 
are collectively celebrated in performative and ritualistic commemorations of 
the martyred dead, they can also underpin prevailing narratives of victimhood 
and suffering at the hands of the state that pose challenges for post-conflict 
‘moving on’ agendas. This matter is examined in the following chapter.
Chapter 5 
Transition, ‘Never Again’  
and ‘Moving On’
Transition, ‘Never Again’ and ‘Moving On’
Introduction
This chapter critically examines how individual and collective memories of 
human rights abuses impacted on Irish republicans during the policing debate. 
In doing so, it examines the value that ‘remembering’ past abuses has for 
those constructing a politicised ‘never again’ mantra out of past experiences. 
This has seen increasing emphasis placed on accountability mechanisms and 
a belief that ‘critical engagement’ can prevent the repetition of past abuse 
through republican involvement in these bodies. Although this notion has 
been contested by Irish republican critics who continue to reject policing, 
those who have embraced ‘critical engagement’ have frontloaded aspects of 
accountability and human rights protection that stand in contrast to the 
policing of the past. In the absence of wholesale ‘forgetting’ of past human 
rights abuse, the chapter examines how individuals ‘move on’ in the aftermath 
of such abuse to engage in a new ‘working relationship’ with policing agents. 
Examination then turns to the issue of truth recovery. This leads to a more 
general discussion on perceptions of ‘victimhood’ within transitional 
Northern Ireland, where ‘official’ conflict narratives have largely excluded the 
Irish republican policing experience.
Human rights abuses
Conflicts are characterised by human rights abuses perpetrated by all parties 
involved. The North of Ireland was no exception. When examining the 
memory of past harm, one must remain cognisant of the fact that while Irish 
republicans suffered human rights abuses they also inflicted them. As such, 
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they represent the collective ‘victim–perpetrator’.1 Given that conflict narra-
tives silence ‘in-group’ wrongdoing, the memories recounted in this chapter 
generally lack reciprocity of Irish republican human rights abuses beyond a 
general acceptance of collective wrongdoing on a somewhat abstract level. 
This is premised largely on the fallibility of the combatant and the fact that all 
‘sides’ commit wrongs during ‘war’. The ‘memory of perpetrators’, on the other 
hand, means British state human rights violations are amplified in individual 
and collective accounts. The master narrative constructed through interview 
data is largely inward-looking in terms of recognition of suffering rather than 
commission of harms. This is not to diminish the gravity of human rights 
violations foisted upon Irish republicans by the state; these were manifold and 
of considerable severity.2 Despite state prevarication and denial, international 
and domestic court rulings against the state in relation to the right to life, 
the treatment of detainees, interrogation centres and interrogation practices 
moved republican grievances beyond mere allegation.3 Such abuse was not 
confined to certain individuals or locations or temporal limits but became the 
collective republican policing experience. This reflects the collectivised nature 
of Kitsonian counter-insurgency that believed polluting the ‘water’ through 
collective punishment and wide-scale human rights abuses would defeat the 
‘fish’. When recounting individual experiences of brutality during interro-
gation, house raids and daily harassment, interviewees were able to locate these 
within the collective experience by referencing similar experiences of family 
and friends. Personal narratives become subsumed into the collective past, 
as the fabrics of autobiographical and collective memory become interwoven 
in what Brockmeier labels the ‘manifold layers’ of memory.4 This interaction 
reveals how memory is ‘knowledge about oneself ’ both as an individual and as a 
member of the collective.5 The ‘intricate and recursive connection’ between the 
autobiographical and collective means that while personal memories of human 
rights violations are ‘embodied’ in the individual, they are ‘embedded’ in the 
larger social context of collective experience.6 When human rights violations 
 1 Hearty, 2014.
 2 Human Rights Watch, 1992; Amnesty International, 1978.
 3 For rulings on these matters, see McCann v. UK (1995) 21 EHRR 97; Jordan v. 
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are remembered, they are thus ‘remembered’ as an individual sufferer and a 
member of the suffering collective. 
In ethno-nationalist conflict, suffering transcends the individual level to 
become a group matter,7 allowing ‘suspect community’ policing to naturally 
tie individual memories of police abuse to widespread human rights abuse 
experienced by the collective. Narratives of suffering can thus become collec-
tively relevant. An instructive example of a narrative of collective suffering is 
lynching narratives related by the African American collective in the ‘deep 
South’ where the localised nature of memory helps the individual to ‘remember’ 
as part of a localised group.8 In the North of Ireland, the locality of memory can 
also influence how and what the individual ‘remembers’, with Eilish Rooney 
highlighting the interaction between her personal memories of the conflict 
and localised events in West Belfast.9 This localisation of memory bridges 
the gap between individual and familial memories and those of the wider 
collective. It is particularly notable when individuals ‘remember’ as members 
of a community that has experienced exceptionally high levels of violence, as 
in Ardoyne,10 or as members of a minority community in a certain area, as in 
the case of border Protestants.11 When narrating past suffering, the collective 
terms ‘we’ and ‘us’ replace the individual ‘I’ and ‘me’.12 
In an environment of collectivised suffering the physical manifestations 
of what Nora calls ‘sites of memory’ take on added importance.13 This is 
especially so if the site is readily identifiable with collective suffering. Sites 
synonymous with torture, disappearance and murder such as the Higher 
School of Mechanics of the Navy (ESMA) in Argentina14 and Villa Grimaldi in 
Chile15 can themselves assume mnemonic agency. For Irish republicans, Long 
Kesh prison16 and Castlereagh and Gough barracks interrogation centres have 
assumed a similar centrality in collective memory. These sites were mentioned 
by different interviewees when discussing memories of human rights abuse in 
a way that contextualised their own experiences within the confines of those of 
 7 Bar-Tal, 2003.
 8 Rogers, 1999.
 9 Rooney, 2000.
 10 Ardoyne Commemoration Project, 2002.
 11 Patterson, 2010.
 12 Pennebaker and Gonzales, 2009, 191.
 13 Nora, 1989.
 14 Davis, 2013.
 15 Hite, Collins and Joignant, 2013.
 16 Aguiar, 2015.
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the wider collective. Consider the following account of one interviewee’s ‘first-
hand experience’ of a detention centre:
I got hit over the head … with a Yellow Pages book – which sounds sort of 
funny, but if you’re in a sitting position and you’re 16 years of age and a guy 
in his late forties, 6’ 2”, heavily built, comes flying at you with an implement 
like that – across the back of the head, kicks to the shins, sleep deprivation, 
lack of food, lack of water and lack of washing facilities. Locked up, sort of, 
in between, as they call interview sessions. So, I mean it was brutal but not 
as brutal as some that went before or came after me.17
What is immediately discernible is that not only does the interviewee 
‘remember’ their ordeal in sufficient detail but easily places it into a wider 
experience of those who suffered the same treatment before and after they did. 
The assertion that this was ‘not as brutal’ as that experienced by those that 
‘went before or came after’ is borne out by interview data from other inter-
viewees who recalled more severe brutalisation. 
When examining wide-scale harassment in retrospect, it is difficult to 
fathom the enormity of how it became an accepted part of daily life. Living in an 
environment where this defined rather than disrupted everyday life represents 
a tense existence. Whilst some interviewees reflected on traumatic experi-
ences, others retrospectively examined the ‘black humour’ in past experiences. 
The recalcitrance that birthed this ‘black humour’ was seen as a means of 
survival in an otherwise difficult environment: 
It was maybe more for your own sanity when you think of it now. It was a 
kind of a mechanism you put in there, you know, to keep yourself safe. If 
you didn’t laugh at it you could have been swinging from the trees, really, 
because to put it into context today, there was nothing humorous about 
guns, you know, held at gun point, you know the threats of being killed, the 
threats of being brought to Gough barracks for seven days’ detainment.18
The prevalence of memories of human rights abuse and the ease with which 
they are recalled in remarkable detail demonstrates that these memories 
have not been ‘forgotten’. Indeed, the fundamental question is not if they are 
‘remembered’ but rather if it is even possible to ‘forget’ them. This poses the 
further problem of the impact they have on ‘moving on’ processes. It is simply 
 17 P, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 18 AB, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
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natural that memories of human rights abuse should be ‘remembered’, even if 
more mundane memories have been ‘forgotten’. Some memories are ‘remem-
bered’ precisely because of the impact they had on a person’s life and their sense 
of identity.19 The memories of human rights abuse related by interviewees were 
not only traumatic on a personal level – considering that many took place at a 
young age – but also at the collective level in that they fed into their identity as 
the ‘other’ in a state that deemed them ‘fair game’ for repressive policing. The 
impact such traumatic incidents had at the individual level is seen in the fact 
that they are ‘inscribed and re-inscribed into everyday narratives’.20 Likewise, 
for collectives that have endured the horrors of conflict, there is no luxury 
of determining whether to ‘remember’ or not – remembering is a reality not 
a choice.21 So, while ‘forgiveness’ and ‘moving on’ may be subject to human 
control, ‘forgetting’ is not.22 At the individual level and at the collective level, 
memories of policing continue to revolve around the ‘memory of offence’ – 
defined as memories of past injustice that ‘refuse to let the past go’.23
Interview data demonstrates just how pressing the ‘memory of offence’ 
remains at the individual level. Referring to a traumatic episode of prolonged 
torture they endured during interrogation, one interviewee effortlessly listed 
off the names of the RUC officers involved before concluding that ‘even though 
that’s a long, long time ago I’ll still remember their names to the day I die’. 
Evaluating the difficulty this created in terms of accepting policing at the 
personal level, they argued, ‘I don’t think anybody should look at me and 
say, “well he’s a man of the past that man”, because I definitely wouldn’t be. 
I wouldn’t want anybody to experience what I experienced’.24 In recalling 
an exceptionally harrowing event they had witnessed, another interviewee 
said that they could ‘still see’ the ‘hatred’ on the faces of the RUC personnel 
involved. Accepting that people like this might still be involved in policing 
was ‘difficult’ for the interviewee.25 When it comes to individual memories of 
policing, Sartre’s aphorism, that ‘our victims know us by their scars and their 
chains, and it is this that makes their evidence irrefutable’, rings true.26
Evidently, then, ‘memories of offence’ remain prevalent at the individual 
level. It is logical that this becomes an obstacle to ‘moving on’ with policing. 
 19 Gaskell and Wright, 1997, 177.
 20 Edkins, 2003, 15.
 21 Lundy and McGovern, 2008b, 32.
 22 Amadiume and An-Na’im, 2000, 7.
 23 Bevernage, 2010.
 24 L, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 25 U, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, August 2013.
 26 Sartre, 1967, 12.
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The latter interviewee captured this difficulty, conceding that although one 
may come ‘intellectually’ to accept that endorsing policing ‘needs to happen’, 
it does not lessen how one has ‘emotional’ memories of policing.27 If such 
‘emotional’ memories cannot be ‘forgotten’ how does one who has suffered at 
the individual and collective level attempt to ‘move on’? 
‘Moving on’
Prior to examining the ‘moving on’ process that some Irish republicans have 
embarked on, it is necessary to firstly examine what that term means. In transi-
tional justice lexicon ‘moving on’ refers to the process of societal movement 
from violent conflict to peaceful co-existence to eventual reconciliation.28 This 
creates an environment of ‘positive peace’ which is more than the mere absence 
of violent conflict (‘negative peace’).29 Examples of this conventional ‘moving 
on’ include the ‘rainbow nation’ of South Africa (residual difficulty aside),30 
Chile31 and Colombia,32 where survivors, victims, former combatants and 
perpetrators live side by side. Of course, just because the process has happened 
– or is happening – does not lessen the inherent difficulty of it.
It would be disingenuous to suggest that this type of ‘moving on’ has 
characterised Irish republican engagement with policing. Structural and 
political factors preclude this. First, Northern Ireland remains segregated 
along ethno-nationalist lines – particularly so in working-class localities where 
resources are scarce and contested rather than ‘shared’ as in more-affluent 
‘mixed’ areas.33 Consequently, former RUC officers do not live in working-
class neighbourhoods populated by former republican combatants. Instead 
of enjoying ‘positive peace’, the glass ceiling stops at ‘negative peace’. This 
represents ‘moving on’ from violent conflict into an environment of ‘not war 
not peace’.34 This leads neatly to the second factor, which is that the dynamic 
of conflict in the six counties and those conflicts witnessing a fuller ‘moving 
on’ process vary markedly. In South Africa and Chile, the crux of the matter 
was the nature of those states rather than the existence of those states. In the 
 27 U, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, August 2013.
 28 Buckley-Zistel, 2009.
 29 Galtung, 1967.
 30 Meskell, 2010.
 31 Hite and Collins, 2009.
 32 Prieto, 2012.
 33 Shirlow, 2012.
 34 Sluka, 2009.
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six counties, from the republican perspective, the issue was the very existence 
of the Northern Ireland state. Thus, despite accepting the GFA and endorsing 
policing the Irish republican objective remains dismantling that state in the 
long term. In such a context, one can question if a more conventional form 
of ‘moving on’ is at all possible. Interviewees who endorse policing pointed 
out that this endorsement was tempered largely by the fact that it serves their 
ideological goal of dismantling the state and by the general socio-economic 
reality that their community ‘needs’ a police force. Memory is fused with 
strategy, meaning that endorsement is ‘critical’ and ‘strategic’ rather than one 
of wholesale acceptance. When reference is made to Irish republicans ‘moving 
on’ with policing it is not movement in a ‘positive peace’ sense, but rather in a 
‘negative peace’ sense from historical hostility into a new ‘working relationship’ 
– or, as McEvoy and Shirlow label it, ‘moving out of conflict’.35 
However, the fact that this is ‘moving into’ a new ‘working relationship’ 
rather than ‘moving on’ with former enemies per se does not lessen personal 
difficulty. Many interviewees who have accepted policing at the macro level 
struggle to accept it personally at the individual level. Even limited ‘moving 
on’, such as entering into a new ‘working relationship’, entails engagement 
with former enemies responsible for wrongs inflicted on the collective and 
individual levels. As outlined above, these wrongs are never ‘forgotten’; thus, 
those who enter the new ‘working relationship’ must find a way of dealing with 
them. 
Dealing with such a difficult past is – in the words of those who have 
endorsed policing – to think ‘strategically’ about the issue. This involves 
thinking in collective terms rather than individualising the issue and mirrors 
a similar thought process adopted by pro-policing interviewees in relation to 
ideology. ‘Strategic’ and ‘critical’ seemed to operate as much-used bywords 
for subverting individual difficulty to the ‘common good’. The process of not 
individualising the issue entails concentrating on the future collective ‘end 
goal’ rather than on the difficult personal past. Elaborating on the tension 
between ‘remembering’ past abuse and ‘moving on’ in order to suit ideological 
and community needs, one interviewee argued:
I understand people having an issue with policing. I have issues with 
policing. I’ll always have issues with policing. There isn’t a time or a day 
that you’re not looking at elements of stuff that’s going on within the issue 
of policing and not remembering back to what they’re about. But … you 
need to be understanding your own politics and what you’re about. If you 
 35 McEvoy and Shirlow, 2009.
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don’t have a strategy then you’ll always sit in the house and criticise, but 
if you’ve a clear strategy and understanding of what’s required, where you 
want to be, then you know what has to happen. And some of that is hard.36
Not everyone has been able to relegate past personal experiences to a 
secondary position. Referring to the ‘difficult debates’ and ‘difficult conver-
sations’ involving such people, one interviewee conceded that ‘some people 
just didn’t buy into it and still don’t. I understand that. I respect that. These 
people have suffered, you know, and maybe just can’t get over that. Maybe 
time will help that’.37 For those struggling to see past individual memories 
of suffering, even buying into a critical or strategic ‘working relationship’ is 
difficult; there is friction instead of interaction between autobiographical 
memory and collective memory, while difficult personal pasts and a narrative 
of wider strategic thinking repel rather than intertwine. The violence of the 
past is, after all, ‘highly personalised’ in autobiographical memory, making 
it prone to dissonance with macro-level ‘moving on’ discourses38 – whether 
premised on reconciliation or strategic thinking.
Those who have ‘moved into’ a new ‘working relationship’ have married their 
own perception of ‘moving on’ with their ideological view of policing being a 
vehicle to reach ideological goals. They have ‘moved into’ ‘critical engagement’ 
after accepting that engagement would be ‘critical’ and ‘strategic’, thus subverting 
any difficulty they had on a personal level to the fact that a critical engagement 
was premised on the provision of ‘proper’ policing, whilst a strategic engagement 
represented another means of progressively dismantling the Northern Ireland 
state. This nonetheless involves engaging with people they were once trying to 
kill and vice versa. This has not precluded former combatants ‘moving on’ to 
engage on a professional level even if there is little bonhomie on an interpersonal 
level. This entails acceptance of the ‘others’’ past without repudiating one’s own 
past, to allow community ‘needs’ to be met in the present. Elaborating on this 
balancing act, one former combatant commented: 
The district commander for this area, you know, I know his background. He 
knows my background. But that’s it. You know, you have to park that and 
get on with the job, or else you don’t park it and then we just become bogged 
down in recrimination and all of that, and you know you’re certainly going 
nowhere.39
 36 B, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, April 2013.
 37 I, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 38 Buckley-Zistel, 2013, 140.
 39 AD, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
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If residual difficulty at the interpersonal level nevertheless persists, it is 
likely to be mutual, with the above interviewee opining, ‘I’m in no doubt that 
some of the people I speak to you know they would have reasons to not want 
to necessarily sit in a pub with me having a pint’. The emphasis on not ‘having 
a pint’ with former enemies mirrors a wider pattern noted by Shirlow and 
McEvoy whereby engagement with former enemies is largely limited to areas 
of mutual concern, such as tackling interface violence or lobbying on former 
prisoner rights, rather than on an informal social basis.40 The fact this repre-
sents ‘moving on’ with a purpose enabled those who have taken the step into 
engaging with policing to approach the issue in a manner similar to other post-
conflict engagements with the prison administration, the British government, 
Unionism and loyalists. 
The above should not suggest that there has been no reappraisal of attitudes 
at the interpersonal level. Some interviewees reported something of a thawing 
in their initial attitudes towards the policing agents they were now interacting 
with. Whilst this was gradual and tentative, it was nonetheless progress at the 
interpersonal level: 
I remember my first engagement with the PSNI and there was some there 
who just sat growling at us, yawning, shaking their heads, hanging back in 
their seats. They were so rude and arrogant it was unbelievable … One of 
them who was particularly nasty at the beginning of the day came over to 
me at the end of the day and he says, ‘Well, I suppose my attitude’s changed 
a bit’. He says, ‘But I’m willing to listen’. And I said to him – here’s me to 
him – ‘Well, that’s good, that’s movement’. And here’s me, ‘I’m willing to 
listen too’. Here’s me, ‘But if you ever see me in [place] don’t talk to me’, 
because I wasn’t ready to move that further either. And neither was he.41
Thus, even though the personal animosity had lessened and there was a 
willingness ‘to listen’, the interviewee and the PSNI officer had yet to reach 
the position of ‘moving on’ to converse openly outside the realms of policing 
oversight bodies. Although the republican engagement remains ‘critical’ and 
‘strategic’ and although ‘moving into’ a new ‘working relationship’ has not 
seen the type of ‘moving on’ seen elsewhere, there has nonetheless been some 
reappraisal at the interpersonal level. While they may not be reconciled – and 
one can question if there can ever be reconciliation when republicans and 
policing never enjoyed conciliation in the first place – both parties are certainly 
 40 Shirlow and McEvoy, 2008.
 41 G, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
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interacting in a new manner. To this end, one former combatant admitted, ‘I 
never thought that I would see the day I’d be sitting in the room with police 
and having a civil conversation. You know, instead of “no comment” as in 
Castlereagh’.42
Never again
For Irish republicans who have ‘moved into’ the new ‘working relationship’ 
with policing, one way of dealing with past abuses was to find a positive rather 
than destructive use for such memories. In doing so, the notions of ‘remem-
bering’ and revenge are logically decoupled.43 To this end, a ‘never again’ 
mantra was constructed around memories of past human rights abuse. The 
basic crux of the ‘never again’ mantra is that transitioning societies should 
not ‘forget’ difficult pasts for the sake of present or future political expedi-
ence.44 The moral obligation to ‘remember’ past wrongdoing supersedes any 
self-serving ‘forgetting’.45 Memory assumes a positive rather than a destructive 
role in transitioning societies by contributing to future change,46 hopefully 
through creating a new culture of human rights that precludes repetition of 
past wrongs. If past human rights violations are not ‘remembered’, they will 
not have been learnt from.47 The premise of this argument expands beyond the 
Northern Ireland context and is evident in transitioning societies as diverse 
as Latin America, South Africa and Rwanda.48 While these transitions may be 
diverse and have experienced considerably different scales and forms of harm, 
what remains constant is the inherent usability of memory and the penchant of 
collectives for using it in this way. 
Engaging memory of past abuses
The centrality of the ‘never again’ mantra to the Sinn Féin discourse mirrors 
its heavy emphasis on bringing accountability to policing. As well as repre-
senting ideological advancement towards reunification, Sinn Féin argued 
that ‘critical engagement’ would allow republicans to ‘put manners’ on the 
 42 F, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 43 Assmann, 2008, 219.
 44 Crocker, 1999.
 45 Andrews, 2003.
 46 Lundy and McGovern, 2008c.
 47 Streich, 2002.
 48 Lemarchand, 2008; Hamber, 2007.
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PSNI.49 ‘Putting manners’ on the PSNI would involve entering policing 
oversight bodies to ensure that past human rights violations do not occur 
again. One republican at the time of the debate argued that ‘republicans inside 
the North’s policing institutions will ensure that never again will citizens’ 
lives be endangered by those empowered to protect them’.50 Another argued 
that policing was a ‘challenging issue’ precisely because ‘we don’t want anyone, 
ever again to experience the type of political policing we have had’.51 In a 
mnemonically charged plea for support for the Ard Fheis motion, one senior 
republican told delegates that: 
There are many in this hall who have suffered either directly or indirectly 
from the unaccountable, partisan political policing of the past. I personally 
know how sore those wounds are and I know how they can grip us like a 
vice, trapping us to forever live in the past. Our pain is real and we have felt 
it but I ask each and every delegate here today to think and act strategically 
to ensure that never again do our communities suffer from unaccountable, 
partisan, political policing.52
Rather than trying to enforce ‘forgetting’ of this problematic past, Sinn 
Féin showcased it as a reason why republicans should accept endorsement. 
With the wider collective and individuals failing to ‘forget’ past abuses, the 
value of ‘remembering’ them, so their logic ran, lay in making sure they are 
consigned to the past. 
The ‘never again’ mantra gained increasing traction at grassroots level. 
Several interviewees who now engage with policing recognise that whilst 
they have not ‘forgotten’ past abuse, they can use the memory of such abuse 
within oversight bodies to ensure it is not repeated. That this is difficult is 
not contested but personal difficulty is offset against the collective benefit 
of guarding against future repetition. Evaluating the tension between this 
personal difficulty and the benefits of effecting change from within one 
 interviewee commented:
 49 Gerry Adams, quoted in ‘CIRA Says No to Adams Invitation’, BBC News, 26 
January 2007.
 50 J. Gibney, ‘First Step to Accountable Policing is Support’, Irish News, 25 January 
2007.
 51 Catriona Ruane, quoted in E. O’Dwyer, ‘Speakers Exude Confidence and Stress 
Need for Unity’, An Phoblacht, 1 February 2007.
 52 S. Murray, ‘Address to Extraordinary Ard Fheis’, 28 January 2007: Northern 
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There’s hundreds and thousands of families and activists who could easily 
sit back and say, ‘There’s not a chance of me taking on or supporting this 
issue of policing because of my experience’. I don’t think there is one 
republican family in the occupied six counties at that stage couldn’t have 
done that. Every family could’ve done that. All of us have those levels of 
experience from harassment to particular deaths within the family as a 
result of the RUC in collusion with the loyalists. But that wasn’t what we 
were about. We’re about bringing about change, we’re about tackling the 
issues very much head on and that meant going in and making the changes 
that need to be made.53
Another interviewee who sits on an oversight body similarly opined: 
I know people have an awful lot of memories … I don’t think you automati-
cally have to forget your memories. I really don’t think people have to 
forget the collusion and the murders and the beatings and the torture of 
people you know, because that’s what makes us all what we are, you know. 
But I think if you’re involved in community at all you have to use that. You 
have to use that to change it and to make it better, and while I would still 
remember a lot of those things – and there’s things that I’ll never forget 
from my personal family never mind the wider community – I think we 
have to keep moving forward to strive for a better police force. And that’s 
what it’s about, you know.54
Those who have ‘moved into’ a new ‘working relationship’ with policing agents 
thus subscribe to Brown’s notion of ‘memory as warning’ whereby ‘remem-
bering’ past abuses can preclude future repetition.55
Challenging the mantra
Simply saying ‘never again’ does not in itself automatically preclude past abuse 
reoccurring. The growth of genocide in the twentieth century is testament to 
this. The horrors of the Turkish genocide of the Armenians did not stop the 
horrors of the Holocaust, which in turn failed to prevent later genocide in 
Rwanda.56 Likewise, recent conflicts in Africa can be traced back to coloni-
alism and the slave trade, which questions why the memory of slaughter during 
 53 B, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, April 2013.
 54 G, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 55 Brown, 2013.
 56 Hirsch, 1995, 2.
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colonialism did not stop similar slaughter following decolonisation.57 Instead, 
it is imperative that contentious issues are identified openly, frankly discussed 
and appropriate preventative measures put in place to avoid repetition. 
‘Remembering to prevent’ strategies only have enforceability if they are accom-
panied by a bureaucratic system of accountability capable of discouraging 
repetition through increased sanctions for human rights violations.58 Whether 
taking seats on policing accountability bodies represents Sinn Féin lip service 
to or practical implementation of the ‘never again’ aspiration remains an issue 
of contention. 
For those who have embraced the new ‘working relationship’, their very 
presence on policing bodies means they can implement their ‘never again’ 
mantra in real terms. The fact that one can enter a body that was once opposed 
and effect reform is not in itself a preposterous notion. Werner Fischer the 
former East German ‘dissident’ was tasked with disbanding the Stasi.59 
Moreover, former ANC operatives entered the policing institutions in South 
Africa to effect reform – something ‘critical engagers’ argue they can emulate.60 
This is contrasted with the impunity of the past, where the Police Authority 
of Northern Ireland (PANI) was toothless in holding the RUC to account for 
human rights violations. O’Rawe argues that rather than holding the RUC to 
account, the PANI construed its role as defending the force in the face of criti-
cism.61 To all intents and purposes, claims of policing abuse were essentially 
investigated by the RUC themselves.62 This is contrasted with the current 
accountability mechanisms where republicans – according to those undertaking 
‘critical engagement’ – can effectively force the PSNI to ‘account themselves to 
us’.63 The success of republicans in doing this is evident in the fact that, ‘they are 
more uncomfortable being there than I am’64 and that it is a ‘new arrangement 
that I’d say they’re a lot more unhappy with than we are’.65 A strong emphasis on 
accountability continues to pervade the Sinn Féin narrative: they objected to 
allowing the National Crime Agency (NCA) to operate in Northern Ireland as 
 57 Soyinka, 2000, 25.
 58 de Brito, Aguilar and Gonzalez-Enriquez, 2001, 14.
 59 Andrews, 2003.
 60 D. Doherty, ‘A View from South Africa: ANC Fighter Turned Police Chief Robert 
McBride Visits Derry’, An Phoblacht, 24 June 2004; P. O Faolaín, ‘Policing Debate Part 
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 61 O’Rawe, 2008, 121.
 62 Committee on the Administration of Justice, 1982.
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 64 F, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
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an unaccountable ‘arresting arm’ for MI5,66 while, perhaps somewhat symboli-
cally rather than substantively, they withdrew from the selection process to 
appoint the PSNI Deputy Chief Constable in September 2014 because the 
‘compromised’ process lacked ‘absolute transparency’.67 
Whilst not doubting the sincerity of their belief that they are now holding 
the PSNI to account, the claims of those sitting on oversight bodies need to 
be assessed in a wider memory politics context. The memory of past RUC 
impunity becomes a paradigmatic example of a ‘usable past’ that is adaptable 
for a broader political agenda. A problematic past is juxtaposed with a prefer-
ential present arrangement, allowing memory to act as a legitimating factor 
for current positions.68 This occurs in a wider transitional context where a 
‘zero sum’ lens means any meaningful Irish republican input into running the 
state apparatus is seen as a republican gain at the expense of the traditional 
Unionist hegemony.69 While this may enable those participating in ‘critical 
engagement’ to feel vindication, critics remaining ‘outside’ policing take a 
different view. They rely on their lived experience with the PSNI rather than 
first-hand experience of ‘critical engagement’ to colour their current views of 
policing. 
This becomes problematic as their lived experience of and interaction 
with policing has been characterised by post-Patten ‘political policing’. In 
such a context, it is simply logical that one will question the validity of any 
‘never again’ mantra by likening current experiences with the PSNI to past 
encounters with the RUC. Drawing the distinction between the theory of 
the pro-policing argument and the practical limitations of it, one interviewee 
opined:
See, that kind of thinking, right, I don’t disagree with that kind of thinking 
whereby if you have a memory and you go into something with that there 
memory you try and stop it, right, but that doesn’t happen. The account-
ability structures are set up in such a manner whereby it can’t happen. 
 66 Raymond McCartney, quoted in ‘SDLP Move Undermined the Good Friday 
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I mean, operational policing is still decided by the Chief Constable, so if 
that’s the rationale for going in they went into the wrong structure.70
For critics, the flaws inherent in the accountability mechanisms themselves 
become replicated in Sinn Féin accountability claims. These concerns should 
not be dismissed out of hand. ‘National security’ – long used to justify draconian 
policing measures and hugely problematic where reform and accountability are 
concerned71 – remains a ‘reserved’ policing and justice matter. Despite various 
accountability bodies existing in Northern Ireland, a regressive transfer of such 
powers outward means control over this historically problematic issue resides 
with intelligence agencies in Whitehall. The accountability remit of the NIPB 
does not extend to ‘the most high-risk area of covert policing’, creating ‘a serious 
gap in the accountability framework’.72 This reflects a more global, post-9/11, 
‘war on terror’ trend whereby society is increasingly being asked to entrust 
democracy to intelligence agencies at the expense of transparency.73 Citing 
‘national security’ considerations therefore remains a means of making issues 
requiring significant scrutiny ‘off limits’. One critic dismissed the account-
ability bodies as ‘meaningless talking shops’, on the basis that:
Accountability doesn’t lie within the wrestlings of the few people who sit 
around the policing partnership boards, and the great and the good from 
the community that are allowed or invited to sit on them and get paid again 
£3,000 of the taxpayers’ money to sit and waste time talking shite, basically. 
Because they’re not really hitting these hard issues … It’s silly stuff, maybe 
speeding, and young fellas revving their cars at night. You know, I’m not 
seeing the big difference here or the value or the merits.74 
Failure to see the ‘big difference’ can be attributed to the fact that ‘national 
security’ remains the premise for the ‘political policing’ of those ‘left behind’ 
and also to the PSNI’s ability to refuse to answer any question because of the 
security situation. This contradicts the Patten vision of open and accountable 
policing where matters are disclosed in the public interest and not withheld in 
the ‘police interest’.75 The problem has filtered down from the macro level of the 
NIPB to the local level, where reform has moved local accountability bodies 
 70 V, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, September 2013.
 71 Tomlinson, 2012; Committee on the Administration of Justice, 2003.
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away from the Patten vision by burdening them with a ‘heavily restricted 
remit’ through a role that is consultative rather than critical.76 Moreover, 
whilst the creation of the Office of the Police Ombudsman of Northern 
Ireland (OPONI) has been much lauded,77 the ever-increasing activities of 
MI5 remain outside its remit. 
With MI5 afforded an increasing role in tackling the militant threat (and 
with the PSNI increasingly working in tandem with MI5 on this front),78 
concerns over accountability intensify. First, members of the PSNI that 
should in theory be accountable to Northern Ireland accountability bodies 
are increasingly operating in a system that is not regulated by these bodies. 
Secondly, fundamental shortcomings in the regulation of Covert Human 
Intelligence Sources (CHIS) under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act (RIPA) (2000) means that ‘the potential for abuses and corruption in 
the system remains’.79 This has led to the increased targeting of republicans 
for recruitment by the ‘intelligence services’80 and to cases like the prolonged 
administrative detention of Martin Corey from April 2010 to January 2014 on 
‘intelligence’-based evidence not disclosed in court or to his defence team.81 
Likewise, in March 2016, RNU member Tony Taylor had his licence revoked 
by the British secretary of state, as he was returned to jail without being 
charged, questioned or afforded legal representation.82 More menacingly, in 
the ‘Craigavon 2’ case (John Paul Wooton and Brendan McConville jailed for 
the killing of PSNI constable Stephen Carroll amidst a catalogue of concerns 
about the safety of their conviction), the ‘intelligence services’ embarked on a 
brazen campaign of subterfuge that included: deliberately deleting data from a 
tracking device, arresting and subsequently attempting to pressure a defence 
witness into retracting his statement and implicating a defence solicitor, trying 
to plant incriminating evidence in McConville’s prison cell and spying on a 
defence witness and defence lawyers.83 
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This activity asks fundamental questions of accountability bodies and 
challenges the basis of the ‘never again’ mantra by providing an outlet for 
current activity by the ‘intelligence services’ and PSNI to be linked with 
that which created problems in the past. This creates a sense of continuity 
regarding MI5 that is problematic for Sinn Féin on two fronts: on an account-
ability front given the resistance to change and accountability exercised by 
intelligence agencies84 and on a memory politics front where republicans 
have long memories of MI5 activity that has been to their detriment.85 More 
fundamentally, it exposes how the accountability mechanisms were designed 
to regulate an idealised, rather than the actual, post-GFA reality, meaning 
that the shortcomings seen above are silenced in the public discourse on 
post-Patten police accountability.86 According to one anti-policing republican, 
the breadth of the ‘national security’ rider means that Sinn Féin has falsely 
conflated what is at very best only a limited degree of scrutiny over-policing 
with actual accountability that might be enforced through sanctions against 
the most problematic intelligence elements.87 Had the unmet Patten recom-
mendations on covert policing oversight been adopted the landscape might 
be different.
The cumulative effect of this is that critics not only question the validity of 
the ‘never again’ mantra but also question the role of those espousing the mantra 
from within policing oversight bodies. Contrasting the Sinn Féin account-
ability claims with their own lived experience, one interviewee concluded: 
I think it is delusional on their part that they think they can put manners 
onto the PSNI. It’s been clear that they haven’t. They’ve no real power over 
the PSNI. Harassment and human rights violations are occurring every day 
but as long as their organisation is intact, they see no threat from the state, 
they’re not getting their doors knocked in, they’re not being harassed, then 
they can delude themselves that they have put manners on the PSNI.88
Central to the anti-policing discourse is the notion that Sinn Féin had 
cocooned their own support base from ‘political policing’ whilst ignoring 
or being complicit in that inflicted on intra-communal rivals. Although it is 
impossible to substantiate such claims, what is known is that similar claims 
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 85 Horgan, 2013, 157.
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have been made against the ANC,89 against Yasser Arafat in Palestine90 and 
against Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil in the past.91 Regardless of the accuracy 
or inaccuracy of such claims it is clear that the perception is enough to colour 
current views of policing and the role of ‘former comrades’ on accountability 
bodies. This perception of Sinn Féin involvement in ‘political policing’ fits 
neatly with a critical counter-narrative of their assimilation into the system 
they set out to oppose. Highlighting the disparity between a PSNI apology 
for raiding the home of a Sinn Féin official in Derry92 and a raid on their own 
home, one interviewee commented:
I don’t know the last time I got an apology for my house being raided 
and they found nothing, no charges and I’m intimidated and I’m losing a 
day’s pay and I’m possibly going to be sacked. They are outraged – utterly 
outraged – when anybody dare go to the home of one of their members … 
So to their grassroots they’re doing a great job of holding the police to 
account but they are cherry picking what cases they’re holding to account 
and it seems to be when it comes to their own members that’s all they’re 
interested in. They haven’t intervened in any other case that I’m aware of.93
Whilst those sitting on accountability mechanisms may see the merits of ‘critical 
engagement’, the above accounts demonstrate that what those who continue to 
be ‘politically policed’ see is a situation where ‘former comrades’ are at best 
powerless to prevent this kind of activity or at worst actively complicit in it. 
Hence the assertion that Sinn Féin ‘must carry the responsibility of every act 
carried out against the republican community because that is what they signed 
up to in their acceptance of British policing in Ireland’.94 Sinn Féin representa-
tives on accountability mechanisms are seen not as human rights defenders but 
as a modern permutation of the ‘Broy harriers’ threading a well-worn path of 
using ‘political policing’ to repress dissent amongst ‘former comrades’.95 Given 
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the propensity for this throughout Irish history,96 such an accusation is not only 
mnemonically charged but also fits into an overarching counter-narrative of 
Sinn Féin’s complete assimilation into the state. Unsurprisingly, those sitting 
on accountability bodies reject this accusation. They argue that while they 
have taken the cases of their intra-communal rivals to public prominence and 
addressed them via accountability mechanisms, critics have taken the easy 
option of criticising Sinn Féin from their ‘comfort zone’ of non-engagement.97 
An interesting counter-allegation is that those claiming to be at the receiving 
end of ‘political policing’ are not the victims of a ‘securocrat agenda’ but rather 
a product of it.98 This reinforces the narrative outlined in the previous chapter 
whereby those opposing Sinn Féin are motivated by nefarious personal and 
British agendas rather than genuine ideological commitment.
The cumulative effect either way is that high-profile post-critical engagement 
cases of ‘political policing’ – Martin Corey, the ‘Craigavon 2’ and Stephen 
Murney99 (subjected to ‘internment by remand’ before the dropping of charges) 
– were, according to one sceptic, ‘reality therapy’ that accountability mecha-
nisms did not operate as Sinn Féin suggested.100 For Éirígí, the conclusion 
to be drawn is that ‘despite all of the talk of “accountability” and “transfer of 
powers” the PSNI remains firmly under the control of the British government’.101 
This made policing oversight bodies in Northern Ireland ‘mechanisms of 
unaccountability’.102
Truth recovery
Within the Irish republican constituency there are differing views on how past 
human rights violations by the state should be addressed. Whilst views are 
highly individualised – interviewees stated they were speaking for themselves 
and not for others – they coalesce around the traditional tension between 
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‘truth’ and ‘justice’. Before examining individual views on the matter, it is 
necessary to examine how the issue was framed during the policing debate.
Pushing for truth recovery
In accordance with a political script framed by accountability, ‘critical 
engagement’ was portrayed as being in furtherance of truth recovery. Rather 
than seeking answers from outside policing bodies, it was suggested that 
republicans could more effectively source answers from within. The rationale 
for this being that ‘only by engaging with them can we more quickly uncover 
evidence of the collusion we know existed between the RUC and Unionist 
paramilitaries’.103 The potential for the move to advance truth recovery was 
not lost on one victim who told Ard Fheis delegates, ‘I want you to support 
the motion today but I want you to do so in the context of giving practical 
support to the various support groups, victims and families working to expose 
collusion and campaigning for the abolition of plastic bullets’.104 This theme 
was revisited by Adams in his closing remarks, when he announced that 
campaigns for truth recovery ‘have entered a new phase of activity’.105 These 
assertions all fit neatly with a pro-policing script of increased accountability, 
yet they overlook certain practical impediments. Chief amongst these are the 
fact that attempts at unearthing the truth from within have been undermined 
in the past106 – and this will continue107 – as well as the fact that a black-and-
white paper trail of such matters is unlikely ever to have existed. Indications 
are that avoiding a paper trial was a deliberate tactic used by state agencies.108 
Admittedly, there is reciprocity of the lack of a palpable paper trial when it 
comes to the transgressions of non-state actors, where corporate memory 
(essentially the cumulative information that individual members of a since 
defunct organisation agree to offer) can instead be tactically used to ‘deal with 
the past’. These practical difficulties have not lessened the republican appetite 
for truth recovery. 
Despite undergoing almost two decades of transition, Northern Ireland has 
yet to experience any overarching truth-recovery process. While comprehensive 
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proposals were outlined in the Haas/O’Sullivan document and the later 
Stormont House Agreement (SHA), these have yet to be implemented. The 
‘A Fresh Start’ agreement of November 2015 avoided the ‘dealing with the 
past’ quagmire altogether. The continued absence of a comprehensive truth-
recovery process is a product of how the matter was initially approached. The 
GFA adopted a certain degree of ‘forgetting’ at the macro-level in order to 
prevent divisive issues like policing and ‘dealing with the past’ scuppering 
any prospective deal.109 These issues were delegated to various commissions 
to be resolved outside the process of negotiating the GFA. However, the work 
of these bodies was not without shortcomings. Whilst a body was established 
to address the issue of victimhood, the subsequent Bloomfield Report largely 
refused to acknowledge the victims of state violence.110 Likewise, the Patten 
Report may have ‘inevitably reflected’ on the human rights abuse committed 
by the RUC, but it failed to provide an in-depth investigation or to establish 
any mechanisms to deal with RUC personnel implicated in human rights viola-
tions.111 For the majority of those who suffered at the hands of state actors, their 
experiences have been omitted from the official ‘dealing with the past’ agenda. 
That this would create an appetite for truth recovery is unsurprising. Lack of 
official acknowledgement only fuels grassroots victim–survivor mobilisation 
and memory projects when past human rights abuse is not addressed during 
transition.112 
The accountability gap
The failure to acknowledge, much less punish, killings by state actors created 
and sustained ‘an enormous accountability gap’.113 An opportunity to rectify 
this lacuna followed the Jordan ruling, where the state was held to be in 
breach of its procedural Article 2 obligations to effectively investigate killings 
by state agents. The British government subsequently unveiled a ‘package 
of measures’ purportedly dedicated to satisfying this obligation. The estab-
lishment of the specialist Historical Enquiries Team (HET) police unit to 
investigate unsolved ‘cold cases’ was one such measure.114 The HET remit 
was to ‘reopen and review’ 2,568 unsolved conflict cases (there were 3,268 
unsolved cases in total but cases involving the RUC were given to OPONI to 
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investigate).115 However, it degenerated into farce, lurking from one contro-
versy to another before it was euthanised in 2014 amidst an official discourse of 
police resource restraints rather than a more accurate admission of systematic 
failure. Throughout its turbulent existence the HET had its approach to cases 
involving state actors declared illegal by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the 
Constabulary (HMIC),116 had the NIPB declare it had no confidence in the 
HET leadership117 and saw victims group Relatives for Justice eventually 
advise its members to disengage from HET investigations.118 From start to 
finish it had forfeited its remit to determine the legality of state killings, to 
concentrate instead on ‘controlling the emergence of damaging truths’.119 
The most comprehensive critique of the HET has been conducted by Patricia 
Lundy. Her in-depth research revealed a catalogue of ‘anomalies and incon-
sistencies’ in cases involving state actors, including: the ‘pragmatic approach’ 
of interviewing state actors as witnesses rather than suspects under caution, 
the failure to verify their claims of illness and extensive pre-interview disclo-
sure.120 The cumulative effect of this was that cases involving state actors were 
being treated less robustly than those involving non-state actors. Indeed, one 
Victims Commissioner conceded that state actors had been given ‘favourable 
treatment’.121 This seems to have been official HET policy given that their 
guidelines invoked a ‘rule of law’ narrative on the conflict to differentiate 
explicitly between state and non-state violence.122 Concerns were also raised 
over the potential involvement of former RUC Special Branch personnel 
in historical investigations of past RUC wrongdoing.123 This not only repli-
cated the impunity inherent in old investigations but also proved detrimental 
to confidence that the past will be ‘dealt with’ impartially by the state. 
These concerns were vindicated in a damning HMIC report.124 They were 
also implicitly vindicated through the Haass/O’Sullivan proposals, which 
suggested scrapping the HET and removing cases from the Ombudsman 
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and setting up a new Historical Investigations Unit (HIU) with the ability 
to reinvestigate cases not satisfactorily examined by the HET.125 Following 
the timely disbandment of the HET, its duties passed to the PSNI Legacy 
Investigation Branch in anticipation of the HIU being set up in the aftermath 
of the SHA arrangements for ‘dealing with the past’. HMIC have, however, 
expressed concern that the Legacy Investigation Branch continues to lack 
accountability and transparency.126
The disbanding of the HET was welcomed by many victims – particularly, 
but not exclusively, victims of state violence and families of Irish republican 
combatants.127 The body had in many cases conducted flawed reviews – not 
reinvestigations – that had merely replicated rather than remedied initial 
flaws and biases in the original RUC investigations.128 Unsurprisingly, it failed 
abysmally to fulfil its remit to deliver Article 2 compliant investigations and 
to satisfy victims. Indeed, Rolston has noted that many victims felt their 
engagement with the body had delivered little in terms of truth, justice or 
accountability.129 Moreover, Lundy and Rolston have been scathing in their 
criticism of the body, particularly its claim that the ‘pragmatic approach’ was 
necessary to get at the ‘truth’ of cases. Arguing that the body was set up as 
an investigatory body to satisfy Article 2 obligations, not to perform a simple 
truth recovery function, they conclude that ‘the HET presents a disingenuous 
zero-sum analysis, claiming that without a pragmatic approach any chance 
of establishing ‘the truth’ will be scuppered. This implies a ‘truth recovery’ 
process and not the investigative police process which was understood to be the 
HET’s brief ’.130 Even Nevin Aiken, who is more measured in his analysis of the 
body, concluded that the body was severely limited in delivering any semblance 
of truth and justice.131 
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The cumulative impact of the HET debacle was to further increase 
pre-existing republican misgivings about state commitment to addressing 
its role in the conflict. Typically cynical criticism of the HET, based on the 
observed reality of its performance, that arose during interviews, included 
its failure to pursue state actors and a more general belief that the body was 
compromised on the basis that the state would not fund a body that was 
genuinely capable of meaningfully ‘challenging them’.132 These criticisms 
occurred against a backdrop where both republicans and loyalists had been 
convicted on the basis of HET investigations.133 
There is also a wider context beyond the HET that speaks more emphati-
cally about state failure to ‘deal with the past’ through its ‘package of measures’. 
The state has continued to obstruct inquests into state killings.134 Even when 
convened it is questionable, given trends of prolonged delay, non-disclosure, 
inability to declare unlawful killing and the lack of impartiality of jurors, 
whether they are Article 2 compliant. Some examples demonstrate the 
magnitude of the problem. Former RUC officers were involved in the collation 
and redaction of evidence for an inquest into an RUC ‘shoot-to-kill’ case in 
Lurgan in 1982. Deputy Chief Constable Drew Harris claimed there was 
no conflict of interest or no likely adverse impact arising from this despite 
a considerable delay in disclosure.135 In other cases, it has taken legal action 
to compel the PSNI to release necessary evidence.136 Moreover, the inquest 
ruling into the deaths of republicans Dessie Grew and Martin McCaughey 
was legally contested by the families who were unhappy with a lack of trans-
parency and rigour.137 The upshot of all of this is that despite putting in place 
a ‘package of measures’ following Jordan, the reality remains that ‘over ten 
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years later there are still significant delays, deficiencies and obstruction of 
the implementation of resolution in the very cases which were subject to 
these judgements’.138 The lack of state commitment to truth recovery became 
further evident when it allowed its insistence on holding a ‘national security’ 
veto on information disclosure to excise attempts to ‘deal with the past’ 
from ‘A Fresh Start’. Victims of state violence criticised this as an attempt to 
blunt the potential of the mechanisms outlined in the SHA to uncover state 
complicity in ‘countless deaths’.139 Mary Lou McDonald of Sinn Féin was 
more frank in her condemnation:
The British government has put the need to cover up for their agents, army, 
police and political establishment during the conflict above the rights of 
the families of the victims and the cause of reconciliation … It should be 
remembered that these are events which in many instances happened 30 to 
40 years ago and pose no threat to ‘national security’ in any form. This has 
everything to do with controlling and curtailing the disclosure of infor-
mation and nothing to do with ‘national security’.140
In an incident that broke with convention, a former British soldier was 
arrested and charged in relation to a legacy case in April 2015.141 This was 
followed by a subsequent arrest arising from Bloody Sunday.142 These arrests 
were preceded by the earlier reopening of the internee ‘hooded men’ torture 
case against the state.143 Even here, however, there has been criticism of 
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governmental failure to voluntarily disclose material relevant to the case.144 
Whether this signals the end of state actor impunity is a matter of conjecture 
at this point. However, it can be concluded that it is, at its very best reading, an 
incredibly belated attempt by the state to offer some form of truth and justice 
to its victims. 
Truth, justice and acknowledgement
While the need for truth recovery was unanimously accepted, what remained 
divisive was whether this should entail simply unearthing the truth or actively 
prosecuting former state actors. This division is not unique to Irish republi-
canism, but mirrors disagreement on the matter in transitioning societies more 
generally.145 For some, truth recovery means disclosure of the ‘truth’ devoid of 
any prosecutorial process. According to one former combatant, it was not about 
‘putting torturers and killers in jail’ but about getting ‘the system into the dock’. 
Drawing on the example of South Africa, they added:
They were able to get all these … top notch cops and put them in the dock 
and even get them convicted, which is okay, which is well and good. They 
didn’t get Apartheid into the dock. You know what I mean? They didn’t get 
the system into the dock. All that they got were these individuals. Once the 
system was gone it was very hard to get someone who actually supported 
Apartheid.146 
This view was shared by another former combatant who stated that the truth 
recovery process should entail state acknowledgement that there was a ‘war’ in 
which it had played an integral role:
I think in terms of that, you know, ‘Do you want people brought into courts 
and all’, I think it’s an acknowledgment that there was a war on here, there 
was a conflict on here. Republicans are up front and say, ‘Yeah, we were 
engaged in it and probably did a lot of things that shouldn’t have been done’. 
You want that sort of reciprocal response on their part, you know.147
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One interviewee highlighted that what was most relevant to many victims 
was truthful answers to ‘why’ and ‘where’ and ‘what for’, noting that for some 
the belated conviction of perpetrators would make ‘no difference to their life 
whatsoever’.148 Disclosing the ‘truth’ of what ‘the system’ was implicated in 
rather than securing the ‘justice’ of convicting individuals is the premise of 
this approach to truth recovery. This Irish republican interest in unearthing 
the ‘truth’ and getting acknowledgement that there was institutional abuse of 
power rather than prosecuting individual perpetrators has also been discussed 
by Lundy and McGovern.149
Others take a divergent view, seeing disclosure as a precursor to fuller 
truth recovery that involves ‘justice’ via prosecution. One republican evinced 
a belief that while the disclosure of ‘truth’ would be ‘words’, this needed to be 
followed by ‘action’ to bring state actors to ‘justice’ for killing ‘the very civilians 
that they were meant to be protecting’.150 A former combatant used their own 
experience to draw the distinction between the punishment of non-state actors 
for their role in the conflict and the non-punishment of state actors embroiled 
in wrongdoing:
I ended up in jail for it. I never complained about it. I never criticised 
anybody for putting me in jail … but the question is what about all the 
RUC people who shot and injured and attacked and used guns on innocent 
people and murdered people? They never done a day in jail. Right, so there’s 
that legacy there. There’s that inequality.151
An interesting analysis of this ‘legacy’ of ‘inequality’ was offered by one former 
combatant who was not in favour of prosecutions but nonetheless noted that 
the socio-economic implications of having a conviction were irrelevant for 
most state actors. Drawing on the numerous impediments a conviction brings 
for former combatants, the interviewee pointed out that ‘on the other side 
[security forces] there wasn’t … they don’t have any discriminatory measures 
against them because they were never in court’.152 The real-life implications of 
this can be seen in the Civil Service (Special Advisers) Act (Northern Ireland) 
2013 that discriminates against former prisoners but has no palpable impact on 
former state actors.153 
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The demand for state acknowledgement that there was a ‘war’ in Northern 
Ireland has become central to the Irish republican approach to truth recovery 
– though not necessarily for all victims of state violence, who might only seek 
a simple acknowledgement in official discourses of their victimhood at the 
hands of the state. With the meta-conflict continuing to rage, the classification 
of the conflict remains contested. The Haass/O’Sullivan document recog-
nised – albeit not necessarily agreeing – that for Irish republicans the conflict 
represented a ‘war’ fought by ‘freedom fighters’. Unionists have rejected the 
language of war as a republican rewriting of the past,154 choosing instead to 
retain the rejection of ‘moral equivalence’ that underpins the ‘rule of law’ 
narrative. The earlier examination of the HET demonstrates that a similar 
mentality defines the state view on the matter. Insistence on having the state 
acknowledge there was a ‘war’ has left Irish republicans susceptible to claims 
they are intent on legitimising their own version of the past.155 Demands 
for truth recovery are subsequently reduced to a revisionist rewriting of the 
past that has seemingly duped victims groups and academics into deflecting 
from how the IRA were responsible for most conflict-related death by propa-
gating their postcolonial interpretation that state structural exclusion made 
conflict necessary.156 Dismissing demands for truth recovery among the wider 
Nationalist constituency as such has two significant flaws. First, it assumes that 
any such truth recovery process offers only benefit for Irish republicans without 
in fact conducting a more considered cost–benefit calculation. Secondly, it 
denies victims of state violence any semblance of agency by decontextualising 
their demands through reducing them to misguided ‘fellow travellers’. It is 
worth elaborating on both these points.
State acknowledgement that there was a ‘war’ would indeed be rhetorically 
beneficial to Irish republicans. Most notably, it would support their claim to 
the ‘victim–perpetrator’ identity. After all, every side kills and gets killed in 
‘war’. This would help deconstruct the contrived hierarchy of perpetrators 
that has deemed non-state actors (especially Irish republicans) ‘more guilty’ 
perpetrators than state actors.157 The theme of common suffering from war 
on a basic human level has thus entered the Sinn Féin discourse. Martin 
McGuinness argued that ‘there needs to be an acceptance that human beings 
cry, die, bleed and grieve and are mourned in the same way, and that our 
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common humanity should acknowledge that’.158 This has percolated through 
the ‘uncomfortable conversations’ initiative that Sinn Féin has launched as 
part of its endeavour to ‘deal with the past’ through engaging with Unionists 
and former state agents.159 The initiative has seen republicans express regret for 
certain actions and acknowledge the pain inflicted on victims of IRA violence. 
Declan Kearney thus told an ‘uncomfortable conversations’ event:
I am sorry for the pain experienced by the RUC family during the war, 
the suffering caused to the unionist section of our community, the human 
tragedy of the Shankill bomb being one instance of that. And equally for 
the pain of IRA volunteers killed in this command area here in Derry and 
elsewhere.160
Inherent in Kearney’s statement, however, is a sense of common wrong-
doing that flows from the associated sense of common suffering. This underpins 
republican approaches to their own wrongdoing that is often articulated in 
terms of the fallibility of the combatant or the ‘they did bad things, we did bad 
things’ discourse. The departure from the ‘memory of perpetrators’ therefore 
comes with a certain level of qualification. The memory of ‘us’ as perpetrator 
is inextricably linked in broader terms to the abiding memory of ‘them’ as 
perpetrator. Note, for example, Gerry Adams’ sentiment that Charles Windsor 
(Prince Charles) was indeed a victim of the conflict given that the IRA killed his 
uncle Lord Mountbatten, but that his role as Colonel-in-Chief of the Parachute 
Regiment responsible for massacres in Ballymurphy and Derry also made him 
a victimiser.161 On the one hand, it could be contended that this accurately 
reflects the reality of the victim–perpetrator phenomenon.162 On the other 
 158 N. McAdam, ‘State Helped Perpetuate the Troubles, says McGuinness’, Belfast 
Telegraph, 29 June 2015: www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/ 
state-helped-perpetuate-the-troubles-says-mcguinness-31336336.html (accessed 
23 November 2015).
 159 J. Hedges, ‘“Uncomfortable Conversations” Collection Launched in Linen Hall 
Library’, An Phoblacht, 20 April 2015: www.anphoblacht.com/contents/24916 
(accessed 19 April 2016).
 160 ‘Sinn Féin Chairman Declan Kearney “Sorry” for All Troubles Victims’, BBC 
News, 27 August 2015: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-34069960 
(accessed 27 August 2015).
 161 Quoted in ‘Prince Charles Meets Sinn Féin Leader Gerry Adams’, BBC News, 19 
May 2015: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-32786393 (accessed 22 May 
2015).
 162 Hearty, 2014.
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hand, it could be argued that it follows the more prevalent trend in Northern 
Ireland of trying to mitigate ‘in-group’ transgressions by tying them to the 
perceived wrongness of ‘out-group’ transgressions. For Unionists, this involves 
exonerating the security forces through a macabre numbers game that appor-
tions total blame to republicans on the basis that they were directly responsible 
for the majority of conflict-related deaths. For Irish republicans, this involves 
couching recognition of their own role in the conflict in a discourse of collective 
wrongdoing across the board. 
But truth recovery would incur costs for Irish republicans too. Rhetorically, 
the republican response to their transgressions has been (as the daughter of 
informer Caroline Moreland was told): ‘it was a war and that’s what happens’.163 
If there is a formal admission of ‘war’, however, the rhetorical and legal 
landscape would alter. Rather than being ‘things that shouldn’t have been 
done’, the less salubrious elements of the republican past, like enforced disap-
pearance, would need assessing within the scope of the laws of armed conflict. 
With Irish republicans exercising extreme caution in how they have so far 
labelled their own transgressions,164 a formal admission of war would introduce 
the spectre of war crimes into the discursive equation. This was not lost on the 
son of Jean McConville, who called for her killers to be tried in The Hague.165 
It is also arguable that defences based on corporate responsibility would lose 
their traction. Scrutiny moves beyond the gunman or bomber onto those who 
sanctioned or ordered such acts. Hence the son of informer Frank Hegarty 
called for Martin McGuinness to be questioned on what he knew about the 
killing.166 More fundamentally, increased scrutiny into the state role in the 
‘dirty war’ could unearth further state agents within the IRA. In light of the 
growing catalogue of revelations about the role of the British agent codenamed 
‘Stakeknife’, this could prove to be the most ‘uncomfortable conversation’ of 
all. High-level IRA–state collusion would fail to fit any party’s master narrative 
of the conflict. In totality then, if demands for fuller truth recovery offer post-
conflict legitimacy for republicans this may come at the considerable price of 
the previous taken-for-granted narrative. This questions the veracity of the 
 163 ‘Caroline Moreland: IRA “and State” Blamed over Murder’, BBC News, 10 June 
2015: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-33069102 (accessed 30 June 2015).
 164 McEvoy and Conway, 2004.
 165 F. O’Cionnaith, ‘McConville: My Mother’s Murder is a War Crime’, Irish Examiner, 
7 April 2015: www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/mcconville-my-mothers-murder-is-a-
war-crime-322535.html (accessed 27 November 2015).
 166 ‘Frank Hegarty: Martin McGuinness “Needs Questioned” Over Murder, Son 
Says’, BBC News, 25 November 2015: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-
foyle-west-34918934 (accessed 25 November 2015).
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‘rewriting the past’ claims; inducing a fuller truth recovery process capable of 
piecing together a narrative of war crimes and extensive state penetration is 
hardly a stroke of Sinn Féin revisionist genius. 
Demands for truth recovery must also be evaluated within their broader 
contextual confines of the meta-conflict. As noted earlier, the meta-conflict has 
been characterised by attempts to diminish, challenge and deny the victimhood 
of victims of state violence – particularly if they are Irish republican. This ‘shame 
avoidance’ approach is epitomised by the exclusivist definition of ‘innocent 
victim’ that has failed to move beyond those killed by Irish republicans.167 
More recently, this has moved onto a legislative footing through the hierarchies 
of victimhood and perpetrators inherent in the Civil Service (Special Advisers) 
Act (Northern Ireland) 2013.168 Denial of victimhood to those killed by the 
RUC in particular can be traced to the official discourse that RUC personnel 
killed during the conflict were not ‘combatants’ but simply ‘innocent victims’ 
killed by ‘terrorists’. Such a view propagates false binaries of victim and perpe-
trator that fail to exist so neatly amidst the chaos of conflict.169 This not only 
overlooks the RUC’s counter-insurgency role and their implication in human 
rights violations, but it also creates the curious situation whereby civilians 
killed by plastic bullets become ‘innocent victims’ of other ‘innocent victims’. 
Even if Irish republicans have tacitly accepted the victimhood of state actors 
killed during the IRA campaign, there has been little reciprocation of this 
in the official discourse on policing – although pro-state paramilitaries did 
express ‘true and abject remorse’ for the deaths of their victims.170 To success-
fully recognise the victimhood of differing constituencies it is necessary to 
identify first with the victim, and then reconcile this with the ‘otherness’ of 
the opposing victim constituency to which they belong.171 Preciously clinging 
to a ‘rule of law’ narrative for the purpose of the meta-conflict allows ‘shame 
avoidance’ to prevent this.
When this broader context is taken into consideration, what has been 
falsely labelled as joint enterprise in a rewriting of the past is more accurately 
an attempt to erode the ‘conspiracy of silence’ that has denied victimhood.172 
The agency of victims of the state is predicated not on exculpating Irish repub-
licans of wrongdoing (even Irish republicans, after all, acknowledge their own 
transgressions) but on securing acknowledgement that they exist and that their 
 167 Breen-Smyth, 2007, 96.
 168 Hearty, 2016a.
 169 Borraine, 2000, 128.
 170 Lundy and Rolston, 2016.
 171 Fassin and Rechtman, 2009, 282.
 172 David and Choi, 2009.
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victimhood, pain and right to truth and/or justice are equal to those of victims 
of Irish republican violence. Continued denial of this in a transitional context 
will not cause the appetite for acknowledgement and redress amongst those 
wronged by the state to dissipate.173 Victims of state violence in Spain174 and 
Peru,175 for example, have all persisted with long-standing campaigns for truth 
and justice in the face of impunity, denial and cover-up in official discourses. To 
somehow ‘other’ the victims of state violence in the North of Ireland as purely 
contrived, politically motivated actors is therefore a matter of illogic. Their 
demands for recognition, voice, truth and justice are as natural and foreseeable 
as those of victims of state violence elsewhere and those of victims of non-state 
actors in Northern Ireland. Accordingly, the issue is not one of rewriting the 
past but of trying to correct persistent imbalance on the issue of victimhood in 
official discourse; the hyper visibility of victims of Irish republican aggression 
against the invisibility of victims of state violence, the acknowledgement of 
victims of non-state violence against the denial of victims of state violence, and 
the deconstruction of hierarchies of victimhood and perpetratorship versus 
their political construction and maintenance. While the meta-conflict that 
sustains this imbalance continues, the turn to memory-politics mobilisation by 
victims of state violence (Irish republicans included) will be inevitable.176
Conclusion
Irish republican policing memory comprises a wealth of memories of human 
rights abuses foisted at the individual and collective levels by the RUC. Despite 
the passage of time and the more general movement of Northern Ireland into 
a process of transition, such memories have not been ‘forgotten’. For some 
Irish republicans, individual memories remain a barrier to fuller acceptance of 
policing. For others, their own personal experience has been subverted to the 
collective need to ‘move into’ a new ‘working relationship’ with policing agents. 
In this new ‘working relationship’ they have sought to find a constructive rather 
than destructive use for memories of past abuses. This has seen the political 
construction of a ‘never again’ mantra by those who have accepted policing 
and attempts to enforce this mantra through participation on oversight bodies. 
However, a number of flaws in these bodies coupled with lived experience 
of policing since Sinn Féin acceptance have led many to question and reject 
 173 Immler, 2012.
 174 Aguilar and Ramirez-Barat, 2014, 239.
 175 Saona, 2014.
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the premise of this mantra. For them, ‘never again’ means ‘more of the same’. 
Criticisms of accountability bodies are replicated in wider criticism of the HET 
and attempts by the state to address its past wrongdoing. This failure, along with 
more general rejection of Irish republican victimhood in official discourse, has 
led to increased republican scrutiny of how the past is ‘dealt with’ and has led to 
increased demands within the constituency for the acknowledgement of their 
victimhood and of state wrongdoing. In the absence of such a happening the 
past human rights abuses suffered by the collective remain part of a problematic 
and contested conflict legacy.

Chapter 6 
The PSNI and ‘Community Policing’
The PSNI and ‘Community Policing’
Introduction
This chapter critically evaluates how memory interacts with police reform to 
frame opposing narratives of ‘community policing’. Interrogating changes 
in police symbolism, composition and the PSNI’s supposed core function 
in working-class republican communities, it examines how a problematic 
legacy continues to impact on views of ‘community policing’. The ‘critical 
engagement’ narrative of ‘community policing’ that is framed by assertions of 
newness and change, and the critical counter-narrative of ‘cosmetic reform’ 
dismissing police reform as an attempt to normalise ‘British’ policing are both 
dissected. Although these narratives are intrinsically linked to ideologised 
views of involvement in transitional processes, this chapter looks beyond 
the ‘black-and-white’ views proffered by competing narratives to draw on 
the nuances of the overlapping ‘grey’ areas that define lived reality on the 
ground. Viewing this through competing lenses of continuity and rupture, it 
highlights where reform has successfully cultivated a new image of the PSNI 
and a new attitude towards ‘community policing’ within republican commu-
nities and where reform has struggled to do so. At this introductory stage, it 
must be noted that the generic term ‘community policing’ remains undefined, 
contested and contingent upon context.1 Notwithstanding this, the term 
is used here to denote the Patten vision of ‘policing with the community’ 
whereby a co-operative community–police relationship that tackles and 
prevents anti-social behaviour and crime displaces a previous relationship of 
political hostility and suspicion.
 1 Fielding and Innes, 2006; Brogden and Nijhar, 2013, 2. 
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Symbolism
The Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland recognised 
the divisive impact that the overtly Unionist ethos, culture and composition of 
the RUC had on police ownership in the North of Ireland.2 Culling policing 
of divisive symbolism was a necessary first step in addressing the problematic 
legacy of police ownership. Police reform duly introduced a change of name, 
uniform and symbolism. Striving for inclusivity, reform made the PSNI appear 
overtly neutral where the RUC had been overtly Unionist. Changing the name 
and uniform of contested police forces has been tried elsewhere in a bid to bring 
previously excluded groups ‘on board’. In the Basque Country, the autonomous 
police force was given the Basque cultural name ‘Ertzaintia’ along with a new 
uniform intended to reflect their Basque origins; these reforms did not prevent 
the separatist Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) from attacking the force.3 
Reforms of this nature have an obvious aesthetic impact on policing. 
Policing agents have a new name, new uniform and new symbolism. Physically 
they look different and are known by a different name. Despite this, assertions 
of wholesale newness remain problematic. As the Basque case demonstrates, 
aesthetic reforms are not enough to convince excluded groups of the newness 
of reformed bodies. When memory is added to this, the overarching context 
becomes further complicated. Memories of past policing are not going to 
disappear with the sudden appearance of a new uniform or a new name. 
Irish republican critics of policing reform level the charge that a uniform and 
name change are symptomatic of ‘cosmetic reform’. Their argument contends 
that while these changes remove an overt sense of Unionism on an aesthetic 
level, they fail to change the core policing function of upholding, what is for 
them, an illegitimate state. Cue the assertion of one critic that ‘when Patten 
was making the proposals of the name change, the uniform change and all the 
other cosmetic changes that was being done to make policing more acceptable 
… the fundamentals of policing wasn’t addressed’.4 Believing the entire reform 
process to be ‘cosmetic’ rather than ‘fundamental’, any rupture with the RUC 
is, as per this argument, aesthetic rather than substantive. Promotion of the 
PSNI as a new force with a new ‘community policing’ function is dismissed 
as an attempt to normalise ‘British’ policing. This ‘cosmetic reform’ narrative 
is married to a wider ideological view but it can also function to present lived 
reality on the ground through a lens of continuity:
 2 Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, 1999, 14.1.
 3 O’Rawe and Moore, 1997, 225.
 4 R, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
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Where I live there is still that distrust of the police and the view that they 
are very much a political and paramilitary police force. You know, you 
could change the name of the Titanic to whatever, it’s still going to sink … 
for those who say, ‘yes it’s a new police force’, well, then, the answer to that 
is, ‘Well it’s only cosmetic, it’s only a name change’.5 
Somewhat paradoxically, while these reforms have neutralised the general 
public image of policing without impressing Irish republicans, in the same 
instance they were the focal point for much of the Unionist ire at reform.6 
Despite disgruntlement on either side of the ethno-nationalist divide with 
these ‘first stream’ reforms, Topping notes that this has been where policing 
was most ‘radically transformed’.7 The public image of policing in Northern 
Ireland is now that of a young forward-looking police force.8
Within Irish republicanism, however, the policing debate does not hinge 
on symbolism, uniform or name. These are not regarded as the key signi-
fiers of rupture or continuity. Although viewed as necessary and welcome 
by ‘critical engagers’, they remain a peripheral issue. The crux of the policing 
debate penetrates deeper to more substantive matters of who is wearing the 
new uniform and what their function is and how they conduct themselves. 
Examination now turns to these matters, with an interrogation of how police 
composition is presented by opposing narratives.
Composition
The composition of the RUC was defined by religious imbalance, with Catholic 
representation plummeting to 8 per cent during the conflict.9 The task of 
Patten reformers was to overturn this by enticing the minority community 
into the policing world. If Catholic representation rose, so the logic ran, then 
the PSNI could not be labelled a Protestant police force. Subsequently, a 50/50 
recruitment policy that matched recruit levels from the ‘two communities’ was 
adopted. As a consequence, ‘just over 30 per cent’ of PSNI officers now come 
from a ‘perceived Roman Catholic background’.10 Although not a 50/50 split, 
in comparative terms this is markedly more balanced than the RUC. The tactic 
 5 J, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 6 Byrne and Monaghan, 2008, 25.
 7 Topping, 2008b. 
 8 Roche, 2008.
 9 Ellison and Smyth, 2000.
 10 Freedom of Information request, F-2013-04401, on file with author.
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of getting excluded groups ‘on board’ through recruitment processes has been 
used outwith Northern Ireland. Notable cases are in Tamil-speaking areas of Sri 
Lanka to help recruit for the Sinhalese-dominated police force11 and in Bosnia 
through quotas for Bosniacs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs.12 Quotas 
purportedly increased police ownership by having a common Bosnian identity 
displace narrower lenses of competing ethnicities.13 The recruitment quota 
policy was therefore neither novel nor unique to police reform in Northern 
Ireland.
The level of Catholic representation within policing has evidently increased, 
but heralding this as an unqualified assertion of newness is misleading. As most 
interviewees pointed out, there were always some Catholics in the police force. 
What there was not, they argue, was a substantial Nationalist representation. 
For critics, speaking of ‘Catholic’ PSNI recruits was sectarianising the issue 
of police reform in order to give succour to ‘cosmetic reform’. Concentrating 
on the religion of the police officer rather than their attitude and conduct – 
what Fielding calls police officer ‘demeanour’14 – deflected from the lack of 
substantive change. This was borne out in the analysis of one critic who used 
the memory of ‘demeanour’ to contextualise increased Catholic representation 
in the following way:
The ratio of Roman Catholics to Protestants differs greatly … but having 
said that, these are middle-class Catholics who would view the likes of 
myself with the same disdain and hatred that these people [RUC officers in 
Castlereagh] do. They are a sort of Unionist … they’re called Cormac and 
they are called Fíonnuala and stuff but in any dealings over the so-called 
change from ’94 that I have had … you’re still left in no uncertain doubt, 
you know, that you’re a piece of crap on their shoe.15
In addition to verifying that communicative interaction conditions 
attitudes towards police officers more generally,16 this comment also reveals 
that in this particular localised and politicised context memory reinforces a 
sense of continuity rather than rupture. Remembering and likening the past 
 11 C. Haviland, ‘Ex-Tamil Tiger Rebels “Free to Join the Sri Lankan Police”’, BBC 
News, 30 January 2012: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16795442 (accessed 7 
February 2012).
 12 Cordone, 1999.
 13 Celador, 2005.
 14 Fielding, 1989.
 15 P, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 16 Bradford, Jackson and Stanko, 2009.
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hostile ‘demeanour’ of Catholic RUC officers to that of Catholic PSNI officers 
hampers assertions of newness. 
This speaks volumes about the flawed conflation of the terms ‘Catholic’ 
and ‘Nationalist’ – symptomatic of an erroneous ‘two tribes’ understanding 
of political division within the six counties.17 Within the 8 per cent Catholic 
membership of the RUC there were likely to be few Nationalists and no 
republicans. A Catholic RUC officer was not necessarily a Nationalist one. 
O’Dochartaigh goes so far as to argue that the entire premise of policing made 
it practically impossible for one to simultaneously be a Nationalist and also 
in the RUC.18 Brogden expands upon this observation, arguing that policing 
reform cannot then be premised on getting more Catholics into policing but 
must bring Nationalists into policing.19
The crux of the matter was addressed by one supporter of critical 
engagement who frankly admitted that while the level of Catholic represen-
tation had increased, the reality was that these recruits were still drawn from 
middle-class communities ‘where the houses are about £500,000’.20 Rather than 
representing something of a broad generalisation, this assertion is supported by 
empirical data on PSNI recruitment trends shown in Table 6.1.21 The figures 
 17 Shirlow and McGovern, 1997, 9.
 18 O’Dochartaigh, 1997.
 19 Brogden, 1995.
 20 T, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, August 2013.
 21 Freedom of Information request, F-2013-04401, on file with author. The district 
for 146 recruits could not be determined because of overlapping postcodes. Eighty-six 
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in Table 6.1 highlight that Irish republican scepticism is not a misconception 
shaped by memory but an observation of post-reform reality. 
From 2007 to 2013, 1,706 recruits applied to join the PSNI from 
addresses with a Northern Ireland postcode. The uptake amongst working-
class Nationalist communities was negligible: only 63 recruits applied from A 
District (West and North Belfast) and only 100 applied from G District (Foyle, 
Strabane, Limavady and Magherafelt). These districts also contain some 
Unionist areas, so it cannot be assumed that all applicants were Nationalist 
or even Catholic. Yet even if this was the case, uptake remains minimal when 
compared with other areas. Recruitment to the PSNI remains strongest in 
areas where recruitment to the RUC was traditionally strong – C District 
(Ards, Castlereagh, Down and North Down) 382 and D District (Antrim, 
Carrickfergus, Lisburn and Newtownabbey) 352. These areas have consid-
erable middle-class as well as Unionist populations. Table 6.1 suggests that 
Catholic PSNI recruits are for the most part being drawn from the same milieu 
as were Catholic RUC recruits. 
Table 6.2 indicates that even following a subsequent PSNI recruitment 
drive in late 2013, areas with considerable working-class Nationalist popula-
tions like A District and F District still exhibit the lowest rates of PSNI 
recruits.22 Table 6.3 demonstrates that, even in terms of applicants, trends 
in later recruitment drives are still favourable to traditional rather than new 
recruitment patterns.23 Claims of newness in terms of encompassing previ-
ously excluded groups may not be as watertight as initially perceived. Even 
the level of Catholic PSNI recruits has fallen under scrutiny recently. Since 
the 50/50 recruitment policy ended in March 2011, Catholic recruitment has 
dipped to 17 per cent.24 In the two post-50/50 recruitment cycles only 77 of 
400 new PSNI officers were Catholic, compounding the fact that in 2014, 76 
per cent of PSNI applicants who made the merit pool were from a Protestant 
recruits applied from an address outside Northern Ireland. The time period 2007–13 
was chosen because 2007 marked the beginning of ‘critical engagement’, while 
2013 was the year interviews were conducted and also the year that the Freedom of 
Information request was submitted.
 22 Freedom of Information request, F-2015-01771, on file with author. This relates 
to recruitment Competition 1 that was advertised from 19 September 2013 to 11 
October 2013, with appointments complete by May 2015.
 23 This relates to Competition 2, advertised from 28 May 2014 to 20 June 2014, with 
appointments ongoing at time of request.
 24 ‘Catholic PSNI Applicant Numbers “Down”’, UTV, 30 September 2015: https://
web.archive.org/web/20151002003228/www.u.tv/News/2015/09/30/Catholic-
PSNI-applicant-numbers-down-45963 (originally accessed 17 November 2015). 
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background.25 These recent revelations demonstrate that not only are the 
PSNI failing to attract working-class Nationalists but are increasingly strug-
gling to attract Catholics in general. This clearly runs against the grain of the 
Patten vision of having the community policed by a force that is representative 
of that community. 
This does not deny, however, that the PSNI’s image and ethos are less 
Unionist and more Nationalist than the RUC’s. Regarding the former, the RUC 
 25 Byrne, 2015.
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had strong institutional links to the Orange Order.26 That Orange presence has 
dissipated. Only 1.3 per cent of PSNI members (95) are registered Orange 
Order members, 0.6 per cent (46) registered Royal Black Preceptory members 
and 0.2 per cent (19) registered Apprentice Boys, although by comparison 
no PSNI member is registered as a member of the Knights of Columbanus.27 
In terms of the latter, the PSNI has a GAA team28 and delivers speeches in 
Irish.29 Dependent on how far back one opts to ‘remember’ – memory, after 
all, has no universalistic time boundaries30 – the presence of Irish speakers 
and GAA activists within policing can be seen as either rupture or continuity. 
How far back one chooses to ‘remember’ is necessitated by the end point 
one wants one’s policing narrative to make – either that police reform makes 
the PSNI ‘new’ or conversely that ‘cosmetic reform’ means the PSNI is not 
‘new’. In comparison with the RUC, with a predominant Unionist make-up 
and ethos, a lens of rupture seems most apposite. ‘Critical engagers’ reinforce 
their narrative of newness and change by juxtaposing Nationalists within the 
PSNI with the absence of such people in the predominantly Unionist RUC. If, 
however, one opts to ‘remember’ pre-partition policing, a lens of continuity can 
be adopted. Critics point to the presence of Irish speakers and GAA activists 
within pre-partition policing. Contestation thus reflects the ‘malleability of 
memory’, because how one wishes to represent the PSNI depends on which 
way the memory of cultural Nationalism within policing is moulded – around 
the RUC for rupture or around the RIC for continuity. 
The thread of continuity running through the cosmetic reform narrative 
suggests that whether PSNI officers speak Irish or involve themselves in Gaelic 
games is a non-issue as long as they continue to uphold an illegitimate state. 
To support this argument, parallels were drawn between the RIC and those 
partaking in Nationalist past times within the PSNI today. The former, despite 
their religious creed, indigenous roots and expressions of cultural Nationalism, 
were nonetheless a ‘British’ force and the same now applied to the latter:
Someone being a Gaelic speaker, playing Gaelic football, declaring their 
interest for the unity of Ireland, it doesn’t matter to me. They’re still a 
 26 Guelke, 2012, 61.
 27 Freedom of Information request, F-2015-00806, on file with author. Freedom of 
Information request, F-2015-01864, on file with author.
 28 J. Campbell, ‘PSNI Lined up for Historic Croker Date with Garda’, Belfast 
Telegraph, 17 November 2011.
 29 ‘PSNI Officers Being Trained to Give Talks in Irish’, Belfast Telegraph, 20 May 
2009.
 30 Soyinka, 2000, 21.
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policeman donning a British policeman’s hat in my country. The RIC going 
back to that period, you know, had many Gaelic speakers, many native 
Gaelic speakers and cultural Irish people.31
A lens of continuity suggests that cultural Nationalists within the PSNI are 
‘British policemen’ in the same vein as the ‘British policemen’ in the RUC who 
did not share their cultural Nationalist pastimes and the ‘British policemen’ in 
the RIC that did. In an attempt to substantiate this argument, another critic 
cited how an RIC man shot by Dan Breen at Soloheadbeg in 1919 was from the 
Gaeltacht quarter of West Galway, whilst the son of the RIC man who arrested 
Roger Casement went on to captain Cork to an all-Ireland title decades later.32 
Critics therefore reinforce the anti-policing narrative of ‘cosmetic reform’ by 
engaging in extended memory politics that ‘remembers’ the role that cultural 
Nationalists within the RIC previously played in upholding the state and 
suppressing republicans. 
Others questioned the extent to which speaking Irish or playing Gaelic 
games are even indicative of political Nationalism. For one critic, such a black-
and-white reading of this blurred the lines between cultural Nationalism and 
political Nationalism. Even though PSNI officers may be Irish-speaking GAA 
members they could nonetheless be ‘apolitical’.33 There is little reason to fault 
this assertion as it stands as a simple matter of logic. 
Those partaking in ‘critical engagement’ draw on their lived experience 
with PSNI officers to argue that the cultural Nationalism of recruits clearly 
demonstrates that there are people within the PSNI who would not have joined 
the RUC. These recruits were not motivated to join the police by sectarian 
enmity, thus a lens of rupture is adopted. Alluding to one Irish-speaking Gaelic 
footballer, an interviewee argued that they ‘didn’t join the PSNI to beat up 
Taigs’.34 Another interviewee at the public face of ‘critical engagement’ drew 
on their personal interaction with the PSNI as evidence of a notable rupture 
from the RUC. Comparing recent interaction with what they ‘remember’ in the 
past, they observed that ‘from talking to some of the senior PSNI people they 
are completely different to what my experience was in the past with the big, 
thick, Orange, ignorant, flippant RUC guy who just wanted to put a bullet in 
your head’.35 
 31 AC, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, November 2013.
 32 AA, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
 33 V, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, September 2013.
 34 M, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 35 AD, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
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According to the logic employed by those leading ‘critical engagement’, the 
fact that there are now people present within the PSNI that have no affinity 
with the RUC world view means that the PSNI is a ‘new’ entity. Memory 
enables a lens of rupture to view a ‘new breed’ of police officer not motivated 
by a desire to become embroiled in sectarian ‘suspect community’ policing but 
by a desire to serve their community: ‘from speaking to quite a few there’s ones 
within the PSNI have said very openly and very clearly they never would’ve 
joined the RUC because they wanted to be part of a police service not part of 
some type of counter-insurgency force irrespective of what title it was given’.36 
The ‘critical engagement’ narrative thus becomes one of change and newness: 
new personnel, new motivation and new function. The policing narrative is 
no longer framed by threat but by community service premised on providing 
‘proper policing’ to republican communities:
People do tackle me about, you know, being on the PCSP and stuff like that. 
I keep saying to them, you know, ‘supporting the RUC or supporting the 
police force maybe is the wrong phrase’. What I’m personally supporting is 
our community and our community’s right to a civil police force.37
Memory aids this narrative reframing by enabling those partaking in ‘critical 
engagement’ to ‘remember’ this past sense of threat and juxtapose it with the 
new function they see the PSNI fulfilling today. Research into attitudes within 
the PSNI by Avril Roulton, which found that young PSNI recruits regard the 
RUC outlook to be ‘outdated and living in the past’, gives the argument above 
some credence.38 A similar observation was noted by one community activist 
who spoke of the willingness of younger PSNI officers to ‘step outside the 
box’ – to engage positively with communities on the ground and break away 
from the institutional protection the ‘old school RUC’ presence valued.39 This 
willingness led another community activist to conclude that some within the 
PSNI are ‘very much up for’ addressing the policing issues most relevant to 
republican communities on the ground.40 Although this may simply reflect 
more general inter-generation mentality shifts within policing, for ‘critical 
engagers’ the upshot of the above differentiation nonetheless offers vindication 
that there are now people within the PSNI who are motivated by a desire 
to serve their community. In a master narrative of community service, this 
 36 AD, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
 37 G, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 38 Roulton, 2009.
 39 C, community activist, interview, May 2013.
 40 D, community activist, interview, May 2013.
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warrants assertions of newness, yet in a counter-narrative of ‘cosmetic reform’ 
such claims are unfounded. What merits a deeper examination at this juncture 
is how performance of the PSNI ‘community policing’ function contributes to 
this debate. 
‘Community policing’
Previous researchers have noted the inherent difficulty in measuring attitudes 
towards ‘community policing’ within republican communities because of 
uncertainty over whether criticisms result from legacy issues or post-conflict 
concerns about rising crime and disorder.41 There is undoubted veracity in 
this observation. Even in a post-Patten age of ‘policing with the community’,42 
republican experiences of policing are largely drawn from memories of ‘suspect 
community’ policing, counter-insurgency policing and violent ‘public order’ 
policing. These memories did not disappear because a certain number of people 
held up a voting card at the opportune moment one Sunday evening in Dublin. 
They remain internalised within the collective and individuals. This inescapably 
impacts on current views of the PSNI, even where ‘community policing’ is 
concerned. Another difficulty in measuring Irish republican attitudes towards 
‘community policing’ is that the general mimics the particular, and the local 
mimics the global. The assertion here is that many of the criticisms made by 
Irish republicans mirror criticisms persistently made in criminological liter-
ature on policing more generally. Poor police performance,43 detachment from 
the communities they are meant to be serving due to perceived shortcomings 
birthed by ‘Dixon of Dock Green’ misconceptions,44 a problematic classist 
‘canteen culture’45 and the blurred lines between policing confidence, consent 
and legitimacy46 have all raised their head in societies elsewhere. However, how 
these issues are framed, interpreted and critiqued by Irish republicans have a 
particular local dimension. Northern Ireland is, after all, a post-reform society 
trying to move away from a historical ‘divided-society’ policing model towards 
one premised on ‘policing with the community’. This has produced a peculiarly 
localised analysis of more general policing problems through the invocation 
 41 Ellison, Shirlow and Mulcahy, 2012; Byrne and Monaghan, 2008, 41.
 42 Shearing, 2000.
 43 Bradford, Jackson and Stanko, 2009.
 44 Davies and Thomas, 2008.
 45 Brogden, 1991.
 46 Bradford, Jackson, Hough and Farrall, 2008.
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of memory. If, as Ellison, Pino and Shirlow contend,47 the most apposite point 
to view community–police relations is from the most difficult vantage point, 
this research is well placed. ‘Community policing’ is critiqued by those who 
‘remember’ ineffective ‘normal’ policing in the past and have considerable, 
perhaps even unrealistic, expectations in the present.
Memory acquires a consistent importance in gauging the PSNI’s 
‘community policing’ performance. It allows current ‘community policing’ to 
be measured against what Irish republican communities ‘remember’ from the 
past. The contribution that effective ‘community policing’ can make to having 
the PSNI accepted as a ‘new’ force cannot be underestimated. Even after 
reform, excluded groups rarely accept the police nonchalantly. The ‘new’ police 
force must earn its legitimacy. Improving ‘community policing’ on the ground 
is ‘a key public confidence-building measure’ in this process.48 ‘Community 
policing’ becomes a ‘band aid plaster’ for past legitimacy problems,49 largely 
because concentration turns to the positive present rather than negative past. 
The apparent ‘newness’ of the reformed force is accentuated by contrasting it 
with a problematic predecessor. Groenewald and Peake argue that ‘a police 
force that is seen to have changed its character, making a break from repressive 
practices of the past and working in partnership with communities from which 
it was historically removed has profound symbolic resonance’.50 With memory 
functioning to reinforce but also challenge views of newness, the importance 
of this becomes magnified. With the PSNI having undergone aesthetic reform 
and now comprising Nationalists seeking to serve their community, the next 
piece of the post-reform jigsaw is actually delivering an effective service on the 
ground in previously excluded communities. 
In trying to earn their legitimacy as a community service in republican 
communities, the PSNI faced the task of having to provide not merely a satis-
factory service, but a service capable of ameliorating local policing experiences 
in light of past negative experiences.51 Reality on the ground in republican 
communities suggests that the PSNI has yet to achieve this. Existing research 
has consistently shown that republican communities regard the PSNI as 
having poor response times, poor clean-up rates and a clear disinterest in 
policing crime.52 The PSNI response to this criticism further problematises 
the matter. Byrne, Topping and Martin have noted that rather than being open 
 47 Ellison, Pino and Shirlow, 2013.
 48 Tshwete, 2001.
 49 Brogden and Nijhar, 2013, 13.
 50 Groenewald and Peake, 2004.
 51 Topping and Byrne, 2012b, 175.
 52 Ellison, Pino and Shirlow 2013; Byrne and Monaghan, 2008, 51.
195The PSNI and ‘Community Policing’
with the community about their shortcomings, the PSNI detrimentally reverts 
to defensive operational speak and official figures.53 Similarly, one interviewee 
complained that the PSNI uses ‘facts and figures’ to deflect from policing 
shortcomings on the ground.54 An ‘Excel culture’ might allow the PSNI to 
defend itself, but it carries little advantage in terms of local engagement.55 
Recourse to these ‘facts and figures’ and pleas of resource restraints are viewed 
by sceptical republican communities as a smokescreen for avoiding meaningful 
interaction that might actually solve the problem. 
‘Over-policing’ and ‘under-policing’
Facts, figures and resource restraints may hold currency at the official level 
but at grassroots level within republican communities they are worthless. 
Evaluation occurs through lived observation of ‘community policing’. To this 
end, evaluation is conducted on a comparative basis; comparative to what 
was experienced in the past and comparative with what is the perception of 
policing in other communities. Byrne and Topping highlight the belief within 
working-class republican communities that middle-class and Unionist areas 
benefit from more normalised, community-orientated policing.56 Concerns 
over differential policing coalesce around the dichotomous issues of aggressive 
‘over-policing’ in response to relatively minor issues and ‘under-policing’ via 
failure to solve low-level issues. The contention of those on the ground is that 
while working-class republican communities continue to suffer from ‘over-
policing’ and ‘under-policing’, middle-class and Unionist communities do not. 
‘Over-policing’ and ‘under-policing’ have been historically problematic 
within republican communities, and more generally in historically excluded 
groups, like indigenous communities in Australia and black communities in 
South Africa.57 Any residual manifestation of these problems will challenge 
assertions of newness and a community service narrative. One community 
activist recounted ‘the police raid to end all police raids’ that was mounted 
in their area, opining that such aggressive ‘over-policing’ would not happen 
elsewhere.58 Aggressive ‘over-policing’ represents problematic continuity 
rather than rupture, causing a remembering of similar police aggression 
under ‘suspect community’ policing. Corroboration of this was found in the 
 53 Byrne, Topping and Martin, 2014, 26.
 54 I, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 55 Byrne and Monaghan, 2008, 50; Topping, 2008b.
 56 Byrne and Topping, 2012b, 46.
 57 Cunneen, 2001; Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003.
 58 D, community activist, interview, May 2013.
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admission of one interviewee who noted, ‘I know in this area people don’t see 
much change in policing … they still come in here very, very heavy handed to 
deal with some of the most simplest of issues’.59 ‘Under-policing’ is problematic 
too, reflective not only of the transitional, post-reform context but also more 
generally of how failure to address ‘broken windows’ crime heightens fears 
over crime and disorder.60 Rather than buying into a defence based on resource 
restraints, ‘under-policing’ is attributed to a disinterest in delivering effective 
policing for republican communities. In South Armagh, for example, this led to 
a high-profile community protest in February 2015 amidst local claims that the 
PSNI were wilfully inactive in tackling local criminality and instead blaming 
this on austerity-driven resource restraints.61 The ability to draw a line of conti-
nuity between current inefficiency and past ‘under-policing’ is evident in the 
argument of one sceptic that ‘from my experience and from talking to people 
in my community, when they have rang the police they haven’t got any more 
joy from them than they would have got from the RUC, and that’s the reality 
of it’.62 Highlighting policing inefficiency in republican communities, one 
critic argued that in affluent communities elsewhere, ‘a two- to three-minute 
response time would suffice and you’d be dealt with in a very polite manner 
and efficient manner’.63 While there may be mitigating factors – including 
resource restraints and the use of ‘come on’ attacks by militants64 – these have 
little resonance at grassroots level, where PSNI inefficiency is attributed to 
indifference towards providing a ‘community policing’ service for republican 
communities. Where republicans on the ground ‘remember’ RUC indifference 
towards ‘community policing’, this feeds a suspicion that working-class repub-
lican communities are still adversely effected by an ingrained bias through 
punitive measures like excessive checkpoints for motoring offences.65 Memory 
therefore retains a view of policing being punitive rather than community 
orientated.
Besides merely stating that republican communities are dissatisfied with 
this apparent differential policing provision, it is worth examining why there is 
such dissatisfaction on the matter. A community service narrative places much 
 59 I, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 60 Wilson and Kelling, 1982.
 61 P. Malone, ‘“Border Regions Losing Faith in PSNI” – Murphy’, Newry Times, 27 
February 2015: http://newrytimes.com/2015/02/27/border-regions-losing-faith-in-
psni-murphy/ (accessed 28 February 2015).
 62 J, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013. 
 63 P, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 64 Frampton, 2012.
 65 U, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, August 2013.
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emphasis on the fact that republican communities ‘need’ a police service to 
curb socio-economic ills. Republican communities are therefore acquainted 
with the reality that ‘fair and effective policing offers opportunities and promise 
as opposed to threats and antagonism’.66 The ire of republican communities 
emanates from the fact that they are now aware of the benefits of ‘fair and 
effective policing’, but, as lived experience recounted in the interviews suggests, 
they are yet to benefit from these ‘promises and opportunities’. Perhaps, then, 
republican communities feel they are ‘missing out’ on the benefits they believed 
endorsing the PSNI would bring. One outcome of this is that the door has not 
yet fully shut on the practice of ‘rough justice’. It was believed that the Patten 
vision of ‘policing with the community’ would replace ‘punishment attacks’ in 
republican communities.67 However, PSNI failure to effectively tackle crime 
in republican communities is increasingly being met by militant attempts to 
garner community support by dealing with crime in the traditional manner.68 
In addition to a historical precedent for ‘rough justice’, the continuation of the 
practice can also bestow some sense of legitimacy onto militant groups. In turn, 
this feeds into the wider politicking of the ‘hearts and minds’ debate within 
Irish republicanism on the issue of policing. This should not detract from 
how Community Restorative Justice (CRJ) initiatives have helped republican 
communities look beyond ‘rough justice’.69 This has seen belated recognition 
that while ‘rough justice’ may have filled the policing vacuum in the short 
term, it was inadequate in tackling a wider societal problem that only commu-
nities working with a policing service can address. One pro-policing republican 
retrospectively critiqued ‘rough justice’, arguing that, ‘people will say “Awh 
sure you did that years ago and this happened years ago” and whatever, but 
that’s looking back. And did it work then? No, it didn’t  … you have to find 
alternatives’.70 
A deeper explanation for republican dissatisfaction with ‘community 
policing’ may be found in the expectations they now have of policing. The 
historical detachment of republican communities from policing obfuscated 
what civic policing ‘means’, creating a context where the ‘community policing’ 
bar might be set ‘unrealistically high’.71 This occurred against the backdrop 
of a ‘critical engagement’ narrative reframing policing from being a threat to 
being a community service. The narrative constructed during the policing 
 66 Ellison, Shirlow and Mulcahy, 2012.
 67 Shearing, 2000.
 68 Topping and Byrne, 2012a; Horgan and Morrison, 2011.
 69 Eriksson, 2013, 73.
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debate frontloaded talk of accountability, ‘community policing’ and ‘putting 
manners’ on the PSNI. A staple diet of tough talk may have been sufficient to 
persuade sceptical communities of the ‘need’ for ‘community policing’, yet at 
the same time it presented a somewhat idealised view of how it would be rolled 
out. While the benefits of ‘community policing’ were engorged, cognisance 
of resource restraints, limited ‘clean-up’ rates and slow response times was 
conspicuous by its absence. It also completely overlooked the thrust of struc-
turalist critiques of policing. Cocooned from the lived reality of these wider 
issues, republican communities would struggle to reconcile them with the 
expectations on which ‘critical engagement’ was premised. With interaction 
with the PSNI regarding ‘normal’ crime being a new experience for republican 
communities, it was always probable that their expectations would outweigh 
policing realities. In one sense, then, difficulty can be attributed to the PSNI 
having to impress ‘awkward customers’.72 
It must be acknowledged nonetheless that in certain cases dissatisfaction 
stems from actual PSNI shortcomings rather than unrealistically high expecta-
tions. A catalogue of stark PSNI failings recounted by interviewees included: 
the victim of a house break-in being told that the PSNI did not have the 
resources to attend the crime scene, with further instruction for the victim to 
take their door off its hinges and bring it to their local PSNI station to be tested 
for fingerprints there; the PSNI phoning a young woman who had previously 
made a complaint, not with the intention of addressing the initial complaint 
but to ask her either to confirm or deny reports that a dead body was lying in 
an alley beside her house; the failure to prevent or intervene in a fatal attack on 
an elderly man outside a PSNI station equipped with extensive surveillance 
equipment; and an excessive delay in responding to the reported theft of a 
handbag from a car because officers were busy investigating the death of a cat 
that had been killed by a neighbour’s dog. The natural reaction in these cases is 
to ‘remember’ shortcomings in the past and pose the rhetorical question, ‘What 
has changed?’ Although admittedly extreme examples, these cases suggest 
that what Mulcahy calls ‘the routinization of the unprecedented’73 – when 
the bizarre becomes the normal, previously synonymous with RUC counter-
insurgency policing – has now seeped into PSNI ‘community policing’ in 
working-class republican areas. Such glaring shortcomings are irreconcilable 
with the previously identified importance of delivering a vastly improved 
policing service to republican communities in order to ameliorate their views 
of the PSNI. In light of the shortcomings identified by interviewees above it 
 72 Topping, 2008a.
 73 Mulcahy, 2013, 139.
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is little wonder that republican communities believe the PSNI has ‘missed the 
mark’ on ‘community policing’.74 
Community–police relations
Competing narratives on ‘community policing’ utilise the memory of the 
historical animosity that defined interaction between republican communities 
and policing in the North of Ireland. On the one hand, those involved in 
‘critical engagement’ portray tentative improvement as vindication of asser-
tions of change and newness and the recalibration of an understanding of 
policing as a community service. On the other hand, critics argue that residual 
difficulty belies the cosmetic nature of police reform. Existing research on 
community–police interaction is instructive in contextualising these narra-
tives. Byrne and Topping note that even though the ‘raw political basis’ for 
communal disengagement from policing is diminishing, detachment still 
remains, contrary to the ‘official picture’ on community–police engagement.75 
The reasons for continued detachment may not reside solely with the natural 
reluctance of republican communities to engage. Partial explanation may lie in 
the nature of post-Patten ‘community policing’ itself. Despite the Patten vision 
of ‘policing with the community’, community safety remains ‘unfairly police 
orientated’ because the PSNI were installed as the ‘main powerbroker and 
agenda setter’.76 What has transpired is the retention of a system largely based 
on centralised authority that stands in contrast to the Patten vision of a service 
that will ‘police with the community’.77 Any general communal engagement has 
pre-imposed limitations, meaning that even if republican communities were 
willing to engage with policing the scope for meaningful engagement is limited 
by structural factors. Topping has noted that the operational ‘second stream’ 
of Patten proposals on ‘community policing’ have been far from successful.78 
Greater success is dependent on the PSNI actively building ‘community 
policing’ partnerships with ‘hard to reach’ communities which must recip-
rocate rather than keeping one eye fixed on the past.79 Topping’s well-made 
argument is placed into context by the wider reality that endorsement and 
engagement at a political level are very different from grassroots engagement 
where developments have been much slower. Joanne Murphy labels this a 
 74 Byrne and Topping, 2012, 15.
 75 Byrne and Topping, 2012, 15.
 76 Ellison and O’Rawe, 2010.
 77 Hillyard and Tomlinson, 2000.
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‘schizophrenic approach’ whereby official ‘buy in’ is not mirrored at grassroots 
level.80 Within the historically excluded group, attitudes towards the PSNI’s 
‘community policing’ function are therefore ‘highly variable’.81 The ‘highly 
variable’ nature of attitudes towards the PSNI was borne out in interview data 
where interviewees evaluated lived reality on the ground today with what they 
‘remember’ from the past. 
For critics constructing a narrative of ‘cosmetic reform’, continued 
hostility found a natural home with the memory of RUC hostility. Continuity 
in ‘demeanour’ again reinforces their narrative that there has been little 
substantive change in terms of attitudes towards republican communities. 
Referencing an exchange (with the father of a PSNI officer stationed in a repub-
lican community) that highlighted a continued ‘us’ and ‘them’ attitude within 
policing towards republican communities, one critic noted: 
I was talking to a guy a couple of weeks ago … he was saying his son was 
in the police. It was ‘right in the heart of [area]’. You know that ‘right in 
the heart of [area]’. Now that’s what way they think. ‘Right in the heart of 
[area]’, because the son has went home to him and said the heart of [area].82
As further evidence of continuity of ‘demeanour’, the interviewee 
highlighted an incident in which a PSNI officer referred to residents in the 
same republican community as ‘you people’. Another critic drew continuity 
with current less than cordial experiences and previous ones:
My experience of them has not been good, just put it that way. Hasn’t 
changed. They haven’t done or said anything that’s made me say, ‘Oh hold 
on a minute’. They would say, ‘Well, that’s your politics dictating that’, 
but it’s not really. It’s a human condition. If someone is treating you with 
respect, is listening to you, is treating you as a human being, then you 
know you are going to say, ‘Well hold on a minute here. Maybe I have got 
this wrong. Maybe that was the bad old days’, but they don’t. I mean they 
seriously don’t.83 
These accounts indicate that, in spite of Topping’s well-placed argument, for 
some people the natural view of policing is through one eye fixed on the past.
Where community–police relations have improved, underlying cynicism 
 80 Murphy, 2013, 135.
 81 Ellison, Shirlow and Mulchay, 2012.
 82 N, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
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remains. Improved relations are seen as a product of a ‘charm offensive’ 
spawned by ‘cosmetic reform’ seeking to normalise ‘British policing’. One 
cynic argued that the PSNI was only being superficially accepted into repub-
lican areas because funding criteria stipulating mandatory PSNI involvement 
in community projects leaves community groups with no other choice but 
to engage. Arguing that the PSNI is ‘literally being forced on people’ by this, 
the interviewee opined it was designed to ease the ‘rolling out’ of policing in 
republican communities.84 This scepticism mirrors previously noted concerns 
about the impact on previously excluded communities when funding is tied to 
police acceptance, and also observations on how funding was previously used 
in a divisive politicised manner in Nationalist communities.85 Another sceptic 
contended that the PSNI was engaged in ‘a real hearts and minds battle’ in a 
bid to ingratiate themselves to republican communities. This entailed funding 
community events in a bid to ‘win over’ republican communities. Citing the 
PSNI funding of a concert featuring Irish rebel group the Wolfe Tones during 
an annual community festival, they commented:
You have to think – now I see right through it – but I mean some people 
might go ‘Awh, sure it’s grand now, it’s all over; sure the police are funding 
the Wolfe Tones; that’s okay by me you know’ … some people are suscep-
tible to standards so if they get that there they’re happy enough with how 
things have changed.86 
The same community festival hosted an unprecedented event in August 
2015 where Martin McGuinness and PSNI Chief Constable George 
Hamilton shared a platform to discuss ‘dealing with the past’ and improving 
‘community policing’ in front of a largely republican audience.87 From the 
scepticism above, it appears that such improved community–police relations 
are not necessarily viewed favourably. For critics, this type of interaction 
merely normalises ‘British policing’ rather than signifying genuine rupture 
with past policing. Not only does this reinforce their master narrative on 
‘cosmetic reform’ and the ‘normalisation’ of ‘British policing’, it also has an 
obvious resonance with the claims that republicans used to make in relation 
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to road safety presentations made by the RUC in Nationalist schools. More 
notably, it reflects the ‘iron fist in the velvet glove’ structuralist critique of 
‘community policing’ that sees it as a calculated effort to gain access to and 
influence within communities with legitimacy problems through seemingly 
benign community-oriented activity.88
Those involved in ‘critical engagement’ use their lived experience of 
improved community–police relations to construct a sense of rupture that 
feeds into their ‘community policing’ narrative of newness and change. Where 
positive community–police relations have started to take root, this is seen as 
evidence of movement away from viewing policing as a threat to viewing it as a 
community service. One interviewee who had previously recalled the hostility 
towards the RUC in their area noted that policing on the ground was now being 
seen as less threatening and in terms of being a community service:
Every year there is an increase in numbers phoning the police. There is a 
different attitude and there’s a lot of people like even in [area], you know, 
who do. We were slagging the cops; they were saying about the ‘tea houses’ 
they have around [area]. You know, the people invite them in for tea and all 
the rest. And those houses do exist.89
Police officers visiting houses in republican communities for tea rather than to 
raid them certainly conveys a sense of communities viewing policing in terms 
of being a community service rather than a threat. Another supporter of ‘critical 
engagement’ used the memory of RUC violence in republican communities to 
demonstrate how policing was no longer premised on threat. Recounting a 
conversation they had that highlighted this, they argued:
I remember about six months ago being in this taxi … and the guy was 
telling me this story … he was saying about these young ones in [area] and 
they were talking about ‘And they’re as bad as the RUC. They stopped the 
other night and they were giving off to us about something’. And your man 
says, ‘They’re as bad as the RUC? Wait to I tell you about the RUC. You used 
to be standing, they’d pull up in the jeeps, they just jumped out battered 
the living daylights out of you. Threw you in the jeeps, battered the living 
daylights out of you, and then dumped you somewhere in the city’. They’d 
say to you, ‘The PSNI pulled up and got out and spoke to you. Argued with 
you or something?’ Just get real … There’s no comparison even given any 
 88 McLaughlin, 2007, 66.
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sort of abuse that cops still do and cops being cops will do, but to compare 
it with the RUC.90
Tacit acceptance of this is detectable in the concession of one critic that ‘there 
is a change in the way that the PSNI deal with people. You know you would 
have to be silly not to see that. You’re not going into a police station anymore 
and getting ten bells knocked out of you when you’re being interviewed. That’s 
a reality’. Despite conceding this, the interviewee did not view it as a rupture 
with the past given that when it comes to ‘their aggression, their lies, their set 
ups I don’t think anything has changed’.91
Active co-operation
In promoting a narrative of community service those leading ‘critical 
engagement’ stress that increasing numbers of people within republican 
communities are contacting the PSNI on matters of ‘normal’ crime. To this 
end, one interviewee spoke of ‘a complete and utter sea change’ whereby people 
within republican communities are now ‘more helpful’ and ‘more willing’ to 
contact the PSNI. Elaborating on this change in mindset, the interviewee 
opined, ‘The political element I think is no longer as overt or as in their face. 
They’re confidence now is about will the wee drug dealer in the street who they 
provide information on be arrested and be put in jail. And that’s where people 
measure their success’.92 Likewise, another interviewee pointed out that people 
in their area had ‘no problem’ contacting the PSNI on ‘ordinary crime issues’. 
Despite this change in outlook the PSNI response did little to instil confidence 
because: 
I don’t know how many people have said to me there’s no point ringing the 
police. They don’t respond; if they do it’s two days later … that’s what sticks 
in people’s minds. You hear that more than ‘I was robbed last night and I 
was really impressed with the service I got’.93 
While the link between unsatisfactory victim–police contact and low confi-
dence is certainly not unique to the PSNI,94 what is crucial is the overarching 
post-reform, post-‘critical engagement’ environment it occurs in. In such a 
 90 M, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
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context, as Byrne, Topping and Martin note,95 confidence is an operational 
matter ‘to be lived and experienced on the ground’. Operational shortcomings 
create a problematic thread of ‘under-policing’ continuity that runs through any 
‘community service’ narrative.
Despite some reported increase of contact on ‘normal crime’, empirical 
research indicates that contacting the PSNI remains an option of ‘last resort’ 
for some.96 A tendency to contact community groups or local republicans as 
had been the case prior to ‘critical engagement’ still persists.97 This has been 
used by critics to assert that the fallacy of ‘cosmetic reform’ is being exposed by 
lack of change on the ground: 
I can’t say I’ve noticed a massive shift in attitude of the public towards 
support for the PSNI just because Sinn Féin says that they now support the 
PSNI. You know it would be wrong to say elements of the community don’t 
use the PSNI. You know elements of the community do but elements of the 
community also used the RUC … I see just as many cases of criminality 
and that being referred to republicans as in the past.98 
This comment interestingly exposes a ‘silence’ in relation to how some people 
in republican communities did report ‘normal’ crime to the RUC. Other inter-
viewees who touched on this suggested it resulted from the necessity to do so 
for insurance claims. Contextualising the matter within these confines, one 
critic noted, ‘It’s like everything else. People are trapped. Republicans have 
never – from 1916 – have never accepted the police but they phone the cops 
if they get their house broke into if they need to get a claim or compensation 
either directly or indirectly paid up’.99 Critics therefore draw continuity with 
this by arguing that any increased level of contact between republican commu-
nities and the PSNI today is attributable to the same grounds of practicality 
rather than any change of outlook to recognise the PSNI as a new community 
service. Highlighting the reality of this, one opponent of policing outlined that 
if they were burgled:
I would ring the police and that is because they … are the people who will 
give me a crime reference number for my insurance. I think though if it was 
something relatively minor, that maybe in a normal society you would ring 
 95 Byrne, Topping and Martin, 2014a, 25.
 96 Topping and Byrne, 2012a.
 97 Ellison, Pino and Shirlow, 2013.
 98 O, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 99 N, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
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the police about, probably not. I think people do think twice about ringing 
the police if I’m being realistic.100
The fact that republican communities still approach community groups 
and republicans is also observed by community activists. One community 
activist conceded that people in their area ‘don’t see the PSNI as a service like 
the ambulance or nurse or doctor’.101 Instead, they still approach community 
groups, former republican prisoners or Sinn Féin activists who then have to 
direct them on to the PSNI. It is worth identifying why people contact local 
community or republican activists rather than the PSNI. An obvious factor is 
the lack of confidence that has been created not only by historical detachment 
but also by continued ‘under-policing’. Commenting on this, a community 
activist stated that where people in their locality have engaged with the PSNI 
they have been discouraged from doing so again due to the fact they ‘never get 
the right response’ in terms of follow up and results.102 
A more fundamental cause is the lack of local people in policing struc-
tures. An obvious caveat to this is that prolonged detachment from policing 
has somewhat blinded republican communities to the fact that police officers 
in general do not patrol their own areas. ‘Community policing’ everywhere 
involves some degree of ‘policing strangers by strangers’.103 This does not 
detract, however, from the fact that there is no openly identifiable local police 
presence – whether that is a local from working-class republican communities 
patrolling their own area or simply being visible in the PSNI even if based 
elsewhere. Nor is ‘community policing’ in these communities fronted by those 
from a similar socio-political background. Not only are locals not patrolling 
their own area but they are not patrolling other areas either, largely because, 
to all intents and purposes, there is no visible existence of such officers in the 
PSNI. This creates an overarching disconnect between the PSNI and working-
class Irish republican communities. Even if ‘community policing’ officers 
elsewhere are geographically and socially unfamiliar with the community 
they are assigned to in the first instance, they can nonetheless develop a 
sense of being part of that community over time.104 Empirical evidence of the 
continued apprehension among Irish republican communities suggests this 
can hardly apply to PSNI officers. The implication of this for community–
police engagement is obvious, with Gordon noting that how representative a 
 100 AC, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview November 2013.
 101 D, community activist, interview, May 2013.
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reformed police force is of the community it is tasked with serving is a ‘critical 
barometer’ for how engaged that community will ultimately become.105 Given 
the above, it is therefore unsurprising that a degree of disconnect remains 
between working-class republican communities and PSNI officers who are 
still viewed as ‘outsiders’. 
Outsiders
State policing in republican communities has traditionally been performed by 
heavily armed ‘outsiders’. Even Catholic RUC officers were, as one interviewee 
articulated, ‘as foreign as the guys from Birmingham or wherever whenever 
they came on my streets’.106 Although a ‘community policing’ narrative has 
recast PSNI officers as community servants rather than armed invaders, the 
view on the ground of policing agents as ‘outsiders’ remains. Illustrating this 
point, one interviewee noted that, ‘Whenever I went to [holding centre] in 
1975 there was cops from Newtownards and there was cops from Bangor and 
there was cops from Portadown and there was cops from all Unionist places in 
the North. What’s changed?’107 The ability to ‘remember’ past ‘outsiders’ and 
liken them to the PSNI is problematic for any ‘community policing’ narrative 
as there is clear incongruence between the notions of ‘outsider’ and community 
servant. Rather than reinforcing assertions of newness or change, memory 
serves to construct continuity between RUC ‘outsiders’ and PSNI ‘outsiders’. 
If a rupture can be drawn with the RUC on the basis that, as the ‘critical 
engagement’ narrative contends, the PSNI function is to serve the community, 
similarly then continuity can be derived from the fact that the PSNI is still not 
an integral part of republican communities. One community activist touched 
upon this when admitting that within republican communities PSNI officers 
are ‘not liked’ and ‘not respected’ because they are not ‘of the community or 
from the community’.108 This admission is telling for the importance it places 
upon being ‘of ’ or ‘from’ the community. Republicans, as the quintessential 
‘other’ in the Northern Ireland state, have traditionally relied on their own 
community rather than the state. In the face of threatened and real violence 
from the ‘other’ and the state, ‘community’ became a source of collective safety 
and strength.109 Local problems were largely solved by the local community 
without any outside interference. The prevalence of ‘rough justice’ meted out 
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by republicans to petty criminals is testament to this.110 Even as violent conflict 
subsided, republican communities continued empowering themselves from 
within rather than relying on the state.111 With PSNI officers being ‘outsiders’ – 
both literally and metaphorically – ‘community policing’ runs contrary to the 
long-established grain of internalised ‘self-help’. A continued detachment from 
and general failure to build ‘community policing’ rapport with these ‘outsiders’ 
results. 
Illustrating the extent to which the ‘outsider’ perception feeds a continued 
disconnect, one republican in favour of ‘critical engagement’ conceded:
Like there’s a community police officer in this area. I don’t see her. She’s not 
part of this community. Does she know the needs of the community? I’m 
not sure. You know, so it’s all right having these nice titles, and these public 
meetings take place and there’s a presentation and this word ‘community 
police officer’ is available, but then no one in the community knows who 
she is. It’s a contradiction in itself.112
A similar sentiment was evinced by another interviewee who noted that 
despite endorsing ‘critical engagement’ they had little affinity with the PSNI 
‘community policing’ officers assigned to their area:
I’ve no idea who the top police officer is in [area]. I don’t know what time 
[area] police station opens to, you know, because there isn’t anybody there 
that you know and trust. It’s just a name, it’s just a face, whereas if there 
would have been people brought in from the local community then, yeah, 
I think it would have been easier and the transition would have been much 
more smooth.113
Even if not overtly Unionist, PSNI officers remain ‘outsiders’ in the sense that 
they are not local. The prevalence of this parochialism leads some to question 
how a PSNI lacking local knowledge and trust can deliver for a community 
they are not part of. What merits further examination at this juncture is why 
policing in republican communities remains the task of ‘outsiders’ rather than 
young locals eager to serve their community.
An obvious deterrent to anyone considering joining the PSNI is the threat 
to their safety from militant republicans. Targeting PSNI recruits from within 
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Nationalist communities is not only easier in terms of intelligence work and 
access but also helps to distance the PSNI from these communities. This 
targeting strategy was initially designed to undermine the 50/50 recruitment 
policy.114 Both PSNI officers killed so far by militants (Stephen Carroll and 
Ronan Kerr) were Catholic. Many Catholic PSNI officers have relocated in 
order to avoid a similar fate. At least 78 PSNI officers have done so since 
the Sinn Féin endorsement.115 More recently, militants have even taken to 
targeting PSNI recruitment events in a concerted bid to dampen their appeal 
to prospective recruits within the Nationalist community.116 As a matter of 
logic, one could deduce that the persistent level of threat and the likelihood of 
becoming an ‘outsider’ to some extent dissuades prospective PSNI recruits in 
republican communities.
The impact of the militant threat on PSNI recruitment in republican 
communities was openly acknowledged by interviewees. One interviewee 
argued that whilst in relative terms it may have been ‘more dangerous back 
then’ to be a member of the RUC, refined targeting by militants meant that 
in comparative terms joining the PSNI was ‘still very dangerous for young 
republicans’.117 This view was shared by supporters of ‘critical engagement’ 
who expressed the same concern for the well-being of prospective recruits 
from republican communities. Such concern has two discernible benefits: it 
reinforces assertions of change and newness that underpin the ‘community 
policing’ narrative and it differentiates between past and current republican 
violence for the benefit of internal politicking over the legacy of past armed 
struggle. It was also shared by opponents, who expressed a similar belief 
that the job was ‘still very dangerous’. The latter used the continuity inherent 
between current republican violence and past republican violence to reinforce 
their narrative that ‘cosmetic reform’ was not enough to fool republicans into 
subscribing to the normalisation of ‘British’ policing. One critic referred to 
the killing of Stephen Carroll as a ‘wake-up call’ that serving in the PSNI 
was ‘still a dangerous job to be in’. Elaborating further, the interviewee asked, 
‘Is £24,000 a year enough to put your life on the line?’ before concluding, 
 114 Perry, 2011.
 115 It is worth noting a general decline in this pattern more recently. In 2007, 10 PSNI 
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‘I don’t think so.’118 The belief that successful militant attacks might function 
as a ‘wake-up call’ was also present in the views of another republican. Opining 
that ‘everybody knows the name now, Ronan Kerr’, the interviewee concluded 
that threat of a similar attack ‘could be a reason not to do it’. This remark was 
qualified by the argument that whilst threat of attack was no doubt a reason, 
other ‘underlying fundamental reasons’ should not be discounted.119 
The latter observation is worth drawing out. The threat of attack 
is undoubtedly a reason but that does not necessarily make it the reason. 
Accepting that it is the reason automatically discounts other factors, and 
replicates the shortcomings of previous state narratives on ‘hidden support’ 
examined earlier in the book. The current PSNI fatality rate from militant 
activity stands at two. Whilst anachronistic in a society increasingly depicted 
as ‘moving on’ and having solved the policing ‘problem’, the fatality rate is 
nonetheless unremarkable and far removed from that previously incurred by 
the RUC. Moreover, an examination of the PSNI ‘roll of honour’ reveals that 
those killed by militant republicans represent only a fraction of those killed 
during PSNI duty – statistically speaking, road traffic accidents represent 
a greater source of PSNI loss of life.120 Contextualising the militant threat 
strengthens the assertion that it offers only a partial explanation for lack of 
recruitment in republican communities as a reason rather than total expla-
nation as the reason.
While Horgan rightly identifies an increase in militant activity post-critical 
engagement,121 the reality remains that even this increased level is not on a 
par with pre-GFA violence. Tonge estimates that current militant activity is at 
12 per cent of the IRA campaign during the 1980s and 30 per cent of the rate 
in the 1990s.122 Current militant activity therefore does not match ‘the range 
and tempo of the PIRA campaign’.123 Even if some causality is accorded to the 
increased targeting of Catholics, the threat of violence to PSNI members is 
evidently not as omnipresent as it was for members of the RUC. As a logical 
follow-on, the threat of violence can only provide, at best, the same level of 
explanation for lack of republican PSNI recruits as it did for lack of RUC 
recruits. That increased level of threat was not the sole reason for the lack 
of Nationalist recruits in the RUC. This is suggestive that threat of attack 
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today provides only a limited explanation for the absence of PSNI recruits 
from republican communities. Further explanation may be found in the wider 
impact the threat has beyond consideration of the mere physicality of it. A 
newspaper article penned by a PSNI officer based in a border area highlighted 
as much, with the officer relating a daily routine that consists of a two-hour 
drive to work, getting ‘down on my hands and my knees in all weathers’ to 
check under their car for viable devices and restrictions on where to shop and 
eat lunch while on work breaks.124
Another contributory factor is the prolonged detachment that followed 
Patten reform. In the initial absence of any tentative movement towards 
working with the PSNI, for the first five years of the force’s existence, republican 
communities continued to work in liaison with community groups outside the 
ambit of policing agencies. The most successful endeavour during this period 
was the growth of CRJ schemes.125 Providing a non-punitive local solution to 
local problems and fronted by local people, the schemes gained considerable 
traction in republican communities.126 The schemes – which were not designed 
to supplant the formal state system127 – used statutory agencies like Social 
Services as referral services in light of legitimacy problems with policing.128 
More recently, CRJ has developed an ‘active and ongoing’ partnership with 
a range of statutory bodies including the PSNI.129 CRJ has received criticism 
within the wider Irish republican constituency, with opponents of Sinn Féin 
arguing that they represent an extension of Sinn Féin hegemony130 – a claim CRJ 
rejects.131 Key to the grassroots success and credibility of CRJ schemes was the 
involvement of former combatants and republican activists. As Jarman notes, 
factors such as political affiliation, local residency and former combatant status 
give credibility to those involved in community-based initiatives in republican 
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districts.132 The success of such schemes is often attributable to the ‘social 
capital’ of former prisoners and community activists leading them.133 This is in 
stark contrast to the fact that PSNI officers enjoy little trust within republican 
communities because they are not ‘of ’ or ‘from’ the community. One may 
infer that had this ‘social capital’ been used to bring republican communities 
towards the PSNI during its infancy rather than towards community initiatives 
the gap between these communities and the PSNI would have lessened.
In order to draw out the nuances of the above argument it is necessary to 
look to reform processes elsewhere. This is not to make simplistic like-for-like 
comparisons or to deny the particularised challenges posed by each localised 
context. Such an examination instead provides an overview of how the problem 
of prolonged detachment has been addressed outwith Northern Ireland. In 
El Salvador (former Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMNL) 
combatants),134 South Africa (ANC personnel),135 post-Oslo Accord Palestine 
(Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) activists)136 and Namibia,137 those 
formerly opposed to state security structures were integrated into reformed 
police forces. Without denying the specificities of each reform process, it is 
discernible that allowing former combatants into reformed police forces helps 
previously excluded communities place trust in such forces. If those previously 
seen as communal defenders are admitted into the new police force, barriers 
of trust and local familiarity erode. These remain considerable barriers in 
republican communities. One reason for this is that police reform in Northern 
Ireland failed to assimilate former combatants into reformed policing struc-
tures. Former combatants were debarred from joining the PSNI and also 
debarred from being independent members of District Policing Partnerships 
and the NIPB.138 These prohibitions formed part of a concerted effort to curb 
any input that former combatants might have on ‘community policing’.139 This 
was part of a wider problem whereby the state was intent on keeping policing 
a ‘top-down’ issue steered by the state rather than by the community.140 This 
‘defensive formalism’ limited the impact that traditionally estranged yet 
strong communities could have, by keeping policing and justice a state matter 
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controlled by statutory bodies.141 It is likely that another calculation in prohib-
iting former combatants was how the move could assuage Unionism in light of 
disquiet over symbolism and the 50/50 recruitment policy. Admitting former 
combatants would have increased Unionist disillusionment with police reform 
and bolstered the growing strength of anti-GFA elements within that constit-
uency. A ‘zero sum’ approach kept Unionism on board by excluding former 
combatants. Moreover, there was also considerable resistance in the initial 
Patten era among RUC members to the idea of former IRA and INLA members 
being integrated into the PSNI.142
As a consequence, the ‘social capital’ of former combatants was not utilised 
to bring people from republican communities into the PSNI during the crucial 
early phases of the force’s existence. Instead, it was invested in community 
groups and schemes within republican communities. Rather than bridging 
the relationship gap post-reform, this strengthened detachment from policing. 
That republican communities still remain aloof to PSNI ‘outsiders’, still 
approach local republicans to deal with local issues and have not yet enlisted 
in the PSNI following ‘critical engagement’, are glaringly evident symptoms 
of this. One former combatant at the cold face of ‘critical engagement’ argued 
that the difficulties in getting young republicans into the PSNI would have 
been lessened had former combatants been given a more hands-on role in post-
Patten policing. Stating that they had ‘no doubt’ that former combatants would 
have been willing to utilise their ‘skills, contacts, experience’, they argued that 
such involvement would have been ‘a step in the right direction’ that would 
have made getting people from republican communities into the PSNI ‘much 
easier’. The interviewee acknowledged that this would have presented a ‘big 
difficulty’ for Unionists but such a difficulty was ‘no bigger a difficulty’ than 
getting republican recruits into the PSNI.143
Although a ‘community policing’ narrative frontloads the notion of policing 
now being a community service, it remains clear that at grassroots level this 
has not produced open acceptance of people within working-class republican 
communities joining the PSNI. Enlisting in policing remains something of a 
‘taboo’ within such communities. This not only hampers assertions of newness 
but also begs the question of how the complaint that the PSNI are ‘outsiders’ 
with no local knowledge can be resolved without movement away from this 
taboo. One republican stated that individuals who had merely ‘talked about 
applying’ in their area were ‘given the worst end of people’s tongues’. The 
salience of this point is that the interviewee lived in a ‘big Provisional Sinn 
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Féin supporting’ area, yet the notion of locals enlisting in the PSNI remained 
anathema to most.144 The fact that joining the PSNI remains ‘taboo’ has led 
others to question to what extent the PSNI is being accepted as a community 
service at grassroots level. Alluding to the ‘ill feeling’ created by a local joining 
the PSNI, one republican asked:
Can Matt Baggot [then PSNI Chief Constable] tell me – if he tells me this 
whole situation in [area], ‘Yes, we’ve won the hearts and minds of people’, 
then can he explain to me why nobody has come out of [area] to put their 
hands up in the wide open air and say, ‘Listen I want to join your police 
force Matt’?145 
This identifiable failure to ‘put their hands up in the wide open air’ reveals the 
untenable paradoxical situation Nationalist PSNI recruits are faced with. They 
are told to be open and proud of their role so as to increase uptake and support 
in their own communities, yet on the other hand they are advised not to be too 
open about it and to exercise caution for the sake of their safety and peace of 
mind in light of a militant threat and communal antagonism.146
In light of the fact that there is a threat to their safety that impacts heavily 
on their daily life, there is no local person of influence they can identify with, 
and that they would have to deal with a certain level of communal negativity, it 
is little wonder that there is little appetite among young people from working-
class republican communities for joining the PSNI.
Future developments
Examination of ‘community policing’ has thus far been confined to a lens 
turned towards the past and present. The likelihood of the landscape changing 
further in the future is, however, an interesting topic of debate (albeit one 
premised largely on conjecture) with which to conclude this chapter. On one 
level, personal opinions simply mirror master-narrative positions. To this end, 
one critic opined:
I cannot see anybody from [area] getting into the car in the morning with 
his big iron on his hip and his RUC/PSNI hat under his arm and his wee 
white short sleeved shirt, you know what I mean. You know, if you walk like 
a duck, talk like a duck, you are a duck and that’s how they’re seen in those 
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communities. You know, if you’re a cop, you’re a cop, you’re a cop. Doesn’t 
matter that your wee uniform has changed and that you’re less aggressive 
looking.147
On the other hand, there was sufficient fluidity for personal views to 
depart from master-narrative positions. For example, one supporter of ‘critical 
engagement’ felt that a ‘cultural thing’ within republican communities invar-
iably precludes wholesale acceptance of locals in the PSNI.148 Likewise, one 
critic espoused a belief that it is an inevitability, given the concerted effort by 
the church, cultural Nationalism and politicians to have the PSNI become an 
‘accepted part’ of the wider community.149 
Those wishing to see local republicans in the PSNI may be heartened by 
the fact that some former combatants now have no ideological opposition to 
their relatives joining the PSNI. They did express concern for the safety of 
relatives – only natural on a human level – but evinced a belief that they would 
be joining for the ‘right reasons’ of wanting to serve their community. This 
view not only reinforces a narrative of policing as a community service but 
also encapsulates the enormity of the sense of rupture subscribed to by these 
former combatants. It is apt to conclude the examination of republican views of 
‘community policing’ with the following remark from one former combatant:
If any relative of mine said they wanted to join the PSNI I wouldn’t have a 
problem with it at all. I made the decision and I made the transition through 
a process of analysis on what is best for taking us forward and bringing our 
people forward and the best was to transform the PSNI … so why would I 
bake a cake and not want anybody to eat it? It wouldn’t make sense.150 
Conclusion
Memory underpins competing narratives on ‘community policing’. At the 
collective level, it can be usefully moulded to bolster wider master-narrative 
positions, yet at the individual level it provides contextualisation for and 
evaluation of change within policing or the lack thereof. When constructing 
a narrative of ‘community policing’ it juxtaposes current policing with 
‘suspect community’ policing to sustain assertions of change in relation to 
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composition and function. This engineers a sense of rupture from the RUC 
whereby memory distinguishes the ‘new’ from the ‘old’. This narrative of a 
more inclusive community service cannot be divorced, however, from a more 
general progressive republican narrative of equality-based transformation of 
every aspect of the ‘Orange’ state. 
Memory functions, however, as a double-edged sword. It can challenge 
as well as reinforce assertions of newness. This has given rise to a narrative 
of ‘cosmetic reform’ that uses residual difficulty on the ground in republican 
communities to draw continuity with past policing problems. It has been 
sustained by a natural drawing of continuity between past and current patterns 
of ‘over-policing’ and ‘under-policing’, general reticence in contacting the police 
force and the persistence of a view that PSNI officers are ‘outsiders’. Assertions 
of newness become strained by the fact that, despite some obvious improve-
ments, reality on the ground does not adhere neatly to the ‘critical engagement’ 
narrative of ‘community policing’. Rather than representing a rupture with the 
past, this lived reality is tied seamlessly with past experiences in republican 
communities and is seen as a continuity of older problems. The willingness 
of former combatants to accept relatives joining the PSNI is optimistically 
suggestive that scope for tentative emergence out of the current ‘stand-offish’ 
mentality does exist. The realisation of the latter would certainly strengthen 
assertions of PSNI newness within working-class republican communities. 
Until then, however, any assertion that the PSNI is a new community service 
will be challenged by lived reality in republican communities.

Chapter 7 
The PSNI and ‘Political Policing’
The PSNI and ‘Political Policing’
Introduction
Establishing the overarching contexts of institutional crossover and heightened 
usage of ‘anti-terror’ legislation within which competing ‘political policing’ 
narratives are fashioned, this chapter conducts a thematic examination of how 
these opposing narratives are framed. The ‘critical engagement’ narrative is 
premised on the notion of rupture and assertions of change. It comprises 
themes such as disaggregating the policing monolith, proactively fighting the 
‘roll back’ and of police reform being a component of an ongoing process of 
wider equality-based transformation. Although this narrative uses memory to 
draw a boundary between present and past policing, there is nonetheless an 
element of fluidity in its use of memory that blurs the lines of any neat separation 
by importing critical agitation from prior republican memory to frame current 
strategic interaction. Conversely, the narrative of opponents is again premised 
on continuity, and encompasses themes such as the continued abuse of ‘anti-
terror’ legislation, the retention of RUC ‘political policing’ methods and the 
refined targeting of Irish republicans by the PSNI. In order to construct this 
narrative, critics use memory to draw a line of continuity between their current 
lived experience of the PSNI and previous individual and collective experi-
ences with the RUC. They construct this narrative through ideological appeals 
with a basis in deeper cultural memory that is more conducive to their master-
narrative position and through adoption of wider human rights discourse in a 
global post-9/11 climate. 
Institutional crossover
Competing narratives are not constructed in an apolitical vacuum but against 
a politicised backdrop of contestation over police reform. Given that these 
narratives are built on assertions or denials of change, it is unsurprising that 
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institutional crossover underpins them. More fundamentally, this reflects the 
reality of police reform in Northern Ireland, in that while many within the 
RUC availed themselves of the Patten ‘golden handshake’ many others trans-
ferred into the PSNI. This is problematic because, as seen with reform processes 
elsewhere, those forces exhibiting crossover from discredited successor forces 
become susceptible to claims of being tainted by the old.1 While the nature 
of the conflict and policing problems in the North of Ireland and the political 
climate that spawned reform may differ from other cases, police reform here 
has not been immune from such criticism. 
To draw out the relevance of this, a brief examination of institutional 
crossover levels should suffice. Table 7.1 indicates extensive institutional 
crossover from the RUC to the PSNI more than a decade after Patten.2 This 
has been most concentrated at senior command level, but also in historically 
problematic branches dealing with intelligence, serious crime and public 
disorder. As seen above, former RUC members outnumber those recruited 
as PSNI members in these branches. Even within ‘community policing’ – 
considered the preserve of the ‘new breed’ of PSNI officer – there is a hardly 
negligible 40 per cent crossover rate. A rehiring debacle, whereby former RUC 
personnel were rehired under the guise of ‘civilian staff’, has further problema-
tised this matter. Figures from 2012 revealed that of the 399 Grafton associate 
staff hired by the PSNI, 304 were former RUC personnel who had supposedly left 
policing since 1 January 2001.3 Epidemic re-entry of this nature further strains 
 1 Malan, 1999.
 2 Based on Freedom of Information request F-2013-04401, on file with the author.
 3 G. Kelly, ‘In the New Beginning to Policing, There is No Place for an Old Boy’s 
Network’, An Phoblacht, March 2012.
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Chief Inspector or above 60 53 88%
C3 Intelligence Branch 658 502 76%
Serious Crime Branch 432 259 60%
Task Support Group 419 213 51%
Community Policing Officers 815 328 40%
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any assertions of newness. Considering the magnitude of crossover, it is little 
surprise that Evans and Tonge found that 18 per cent of Nationalists believed 
the PSNI to be ‘very similar’ to the RUC, a contention perhaps strengthened by 
the fact that, as highlighted in the previous chapter, recruitment to the PSNI 
remains highest in areas where RUC recruitment was traditionally strong.4 
It is not the mere presence of this crossover element that causes concern 
but also their potential to frustrate reform and to exert a negative influence 
on new recruits. These observations are not necessarily exclusive to the PSNI: 
internal resistance to any police reform is ‘only natural and to be expected’.5 
While such resistance should be anticipated,6 the more concerning outworking 
is that, as highlighted by Hillyard and Tomlinson,7 crossover elements have a 
‘material interest’ in preserving a culture of ‘political policing’. In the specific 
North of Ireland context, this is troublesome given that crossover has been 
strongest in branches historically associated with human rights violations and 
the ‘dirty war’. If those formerly engaged in wrongful policing are admitted into 
reformed forces there is, as Stanley and Call note,8 the likelihood that they will 
attempt to preserve an old institutional culture tolerant of wrongful practices 
directed at those deemed the enemy. One senior Sinn Féin official thus attacked 
‘the in-house cabal of reactionaries still motivated by an unchanged wartime 
mentality’.9 
At this juncture it is worth examining how institutional crossover has 
intertwined with memory to shape views of police reform at grassroots level. 
Its impact can be seen on two levels: the abstract level and the personal level. 
The former sees crossover interpreted at a generalised level, while the latter sees 
it interpreted through examples where crossover has been personalised. An 
example of the former is a concession by one endorser of ‘critical engagement’ 
that the policing void created by the Patten ‘golden handshake’ arrangement 
was filled by ‘bastards with the same mentality and same background’.10 
High-profile examples of the latter include current Chief Constable George 
Hamilton and, more notably, Deputy Chief Constable Drew Harris, who 
previously worked in the hugely controversial RUC intelligence field.11 Perhaps 
 4 Evans and Tonge, 2012.
 5 O’Neill, 2005.
 6 Wulf, 2004.
 7 Hillyard and Tomlinson, 2000.
 8 Stanley and Call, 2008, 307.
 9 D. Kearney, ‘Standing Up to the Dark Side of Policing’, An Phoblacht, January 
2012.
 10 U, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, August 2013.
 11 B. Rowan, ‘Profile: Drew Harris of the PSNI’, Belfast Telegraph, 20 September 2014: 
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the most problematic instance of crossover for Nationalists was, as Murphy 
notes,12 then RUC Chief Constable Ronnie Flanagan retaining his position 
to automatically become the first Chief Constable of the PSNI in November 
2001. The ability of crossover to create a difficult sense of continuity at the 
personal level is evident in how one interviewee ‘remembered’ the roles that 
two PSNI officers central to the promotion of the new policing image were 
said to have played in contentious episodes while they were RUC officers 
during the conflict (one through a prominent role in recruitment drives, the 
other through involvement with the PSNI GAA set-up).13 When individuals 
crossed over from the old to the new they took problematic pasts with them, 
and with this the suspicions of republicans who ‘remember’. Accordingly, 
then, whether on the abstract or personal level, memory impedes claims of 
newness when intertwined with institutional crossover. Having drawn out 
the institutional reform backdrop to the policing debate, this chapter now 
turns to a thematic examination of how this sense of continuity and the previ-
ously established sense of rupture have shaped master narratives on ‘political 
policing’.
‘Critical engagement’, ‘rupture’ and ‘political policing’ 
Disaggregating the monolith
Although ‘critical engagement’ is intrinsically built on assertions of newness 
and change, there is, by the same token, a surprisingly frank acknowledgement 
of institutional crossover. This results from the fact that the prominence of the 
problem through coverage of the rehiring scandal means it cannot be denied, 
that lived experience of interaction with former RUC officers is a post-conflict 
reality and that as early as 1996 Sinn Féin recognised the inevitability of insti-
tutional crossover in any process of reform.14 Drawing on a wider narrative 
of republican involvement in the transition being based on the maxims of 
pragmatism, negotiation and progression towards an ideological end goal, 
reform is framed as a process of negotiation and pragmatism in the face of 
any side to the conflict having failed to secure a clear victory. In framing the 
www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/life/features/profile-drew-harris-of-the-psni-30600926.
html (accessed 25 August 2015).
 12 Murphy, 2013, 105.
 13 Z, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
 14 J. Gibney, ‘Address to 1996 Ard Fheis’: Northern Ireland Political Collection, 
Linenhall Library, Belfast.
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narrative as such, the republican aspiration for ‘a root and branch clean out of 
that apparatus’15 is juxtaposed with the post-conflict reform reality that this 
was ‘never going to happen’.16 Reform required ‘compromise’ and ‘negotiation’ 
rather than simply expelling all RUC personnel from reformed institutions.17 
Despite accepting that there is institutional crossover, those partaking in 
‘critical engagement’ are keen to stress a rupture with the RUC as a policing 
monolith. This occurs through accounts that differentiate between the ‘new 
breed’ of the PSNI and the RUC ‘old guard’. The rupture between those 
labelled ‘RUC’ and those labelled ‘PSNI’ becomes further apparent in a 
disaggregation of the policing monolith into good community policing and 
bad political policing. Through disaggregation, those championing ‘critical 
engagement’ separate the ‘new breed’ of PSNI officer intent on serving their 
community from the RUC ‘old guard’ intent on retaining ‘political policing’. 
Their critical support is given to those involved in ‘good’ policing, while they 
continue to oppose those exercising ‘bad’ policing. The most pronounced 
disaggregation of the policing monolith followed the arrest of Gerry Adams 
in April 2014. The move was declared an attempt to ‘settle old scores’ by ‘an 
embittered rump of the old RUC’.18 Upon his release Adams described the 
episode as the work of the ‘old guard using the old methods’.19 Sinn Féin 
reaffirmed their commitment to ‘critical engagement’ with policing and their 
willingness to work with the ‘reformers’ within the PSNI who were at odds 
with the ‘dark side’ within the force.20 Similar sound bites followed the 
arrest of Sinn Féin’s Northern chairperson Bobby Storey in September 2015, 
following the shooting of Kevin McGuigan the previous month.21 Storey, 
who was never actually confronted during extensive questioning sessions 
with any evidence to justify his arrest, was ‘personally livid’ and politically 
 15 L, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 16 I, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 17 AD, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
 18 Martin McGuinness, cited in ‘Gerry Adams Arrest: Attempt to “Settle Old Scores”’, 
BBC News, 3 May 2014: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-27268739 
(accessed 5 May 2014).
 19 D. McKittrick and P. Apps, ‘Gerry Adams Slams “Malicious and Sinister” Arrest 
Over 1972 Murder of Jean McConville’, Independent, 4 May 2014.
 20 ‘Gerry Adams Arrest: Sinn Féin Claims “Dark Side” to NI Police’, BBC News, 
1 May 2014: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-27244878 (accessed 5 May 
2014).
 21 M. Moloney, ‘Gerry Adams “Seriously Concerned” by PSNI Arrest of Sinn Féin 
Chairperson for North’, An Phoblacht, 9 September 2015: www.anphoblacht.com/
contents/25339 (accessed 20 May 2017).
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outraged by his ‘unlawful detention’ but would not allow the malign work 
of ‘opponents of the Peace Process’ to impede his continued support for 
policing.22
Disaggregation is also detectable in the accounts of those actively involved 
in ‘critical engagement’. Having lived experience of the ‘new breed’ of PSNI 
officer that differs drastically from their lived experience under the RUC, 
interviewees construct a narrative of rupture between such PSNI officers 
and the ‘securocrats’ adhering to the RUC ‘war mentality’. This can be seen 
in the terminology used; the ‘new breed’ is referred to as ‘the PSNI’ while 
the ‘old guard’ remain ‘the RUC’. The deliberate avoidance of labelling all 
PSNI personnel with the RUC tag sustains broader disaggregation. When 
discussing ‘political policing’ interviewees referred to ‘some’ within the PSNI 
or ‘elements’ within policing rather than the PSNI as a whole. Thus, while 
the narrative acknowledges that an ‘old guard’ exists it nonetheless suggests 
that they are an outdated minority that are not representative of the entire 
PSNI. As a consequence of this, they should be separated from the ‘new 
breed’ with genuine aspirations to serve their communities. The positivity 
of this motivation, as seen in the ‘community policing’ narrative examined 
previously, was heralded as a sign of change within policing. Conversely, what 
earmarks the ‘securocrats’ is the retention of an RUC ‘war mentality’ intent 
on ‘settling old scores’.
Consider the following acknowledgement of institutional crossover: 
The people who were involved in the early stages of the PSNI were the 
old guard, were the Special Branch, were the securocrats, were the real 
dominant Unionist sort … they obviously came into the PSNI. And, yes, 
there is elements within the PSNI that hold that view, some of them still 
within the higher echelons.
Expanding on the ‘securocrat’ motivation, the interviewee continued:
Their focus wasn’t about trying to draw republicans in on the issue of 
policing. Their focus was about trying to keep republicans completely away 
from the issue of policing. That republicans would have absolutely no say 
in how the six counties were policed, would have absolutely no say in deliv-
ering complaints and how they were addressed, would have absolutely no 
 22 J. Hedges, ‘Exclusive – Bobby Storey After his Arrest, Still Totally Committed 
to Peace Process’, An Phoblacht, 13 September 2015: www.anphoblacht.com/
contents/25344 (accessed 10 November 2015).
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role in going to the Ombudman’s or Ombudsperson’s office and bringing 
issues and asking for accountability or asking for answers.23
Disaggregation of the policing monolith means that the presence of the ‘old 
guard’ with a ‘war mentality’ does not detract from assertions of newness or 
change. Even if institutional crossover is acknowledged, disaggregation allows 
a ‘political policing’ narrative to be constructed in a manner that does not 
necessarily contradict the essence of the ‘community policing’ narrative. A 
problematic minority, so the logic runs, cannot be taken as embodying the 
values of post-Patten policing in its entirety. This is evident in the remarks of 
one partaker of ‘critical engagement’:
There is still an element of that old RUC and I see it still quite often. I’m a 
community activist and I’m a member of [area] PCSP and I would still see 
that wee, small element, but the police force here has changed radically. 
And anybody that says it hasn’t changed, they’re wrong.24 
An arena of struggle
With the PSNI comprising the new in favour of change and the old obstructive of 
change, ‘critical engagement’ has been increasingly referred to as the ‘new arena 
of struggle’.25 As with all sites of struggle, then, this necessitates an effective 
strategy. The following extensive account of one former combatant actively 
involved in ‘critical engagement’ is instructive of how critically engaging repub-
licans construct their narrative in terms of having a proactive strategy in this 
‘new arena of struggle’. Conceding that there remained a ‘massive issue’ with 
covert policing and with people within the PSNI who ‘shouldn’t be there’, the 
interviewee argued:
We can do one of two things; we can either ignore it, but it will definitely 
not go away it will just get worse, or else we can confront it. And the people 
that sit on the sidelines taking the sort of easy position in their own comfort 
zones will never change anything. In fact, what they’ll do is they’ll reinforce 
what they claim to completely oppose.
The issue is presented as a ‘good versus evil’ battle being played out within 
 23 B, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, April 2013.
 24 G, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 25 ‘Adams Seeks Police Stance Backing’, BBC News, 20 January 2007: http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/6281805.stm (accessed 23 May 2017).
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policing between the new who favour reform and the old who want to obstruct 
reform. It is the critical engager role to empower the new and thwart the old:
There’s elements within the PSNI as well who also want to see reform, they 
want to see a proper service, you know, and it’s really important that we 
empower those people by working along with them, because if we don’t, 
the ones that want things to roll back, you know, you’re just giving them an 
open opportunity to do that.
A narrative of strategic thinking in a ‘new arena of struggle’ correlates with 
the broader argument during the debate that policing would be a ‘battle a day’ 
for republicans seeking to ‘put manners’ on regressive policing elements. This 
shaped the interviewee’s recollection of the 2006–07 debate and the practical 
application of it today:
I went to all the policing debates and I went to the Special Ard Fheis and it 
was never said that this was going to be a case where we could dictate what 
the PSNI could do or what they couldn’t do. We said from the very outset 
this was a critical engagement and again people have to understand what 
people meant by that.26
‘Critical engagement’ is seemingly not simply about endorsing policing but also 
about using ‘strategy’ to combat regressive elements in the ‘new arena of struggle’. 
Premised on strategic interaction with policing, it becomes a combative type of 
reform that adheres to an overarching political strategy. The use of the termi-
nology ‘new arena of struggle’ reflects not only how the discourse is framed by 
those partaking in ‘critical engagement’ as being strategic, but also how this 
allows them to draw on the memory of previous republican struggle. Although 
the ‘critical engagement’ narrative creates a separation between the new and the 
old, the importance of having an effective ‘strategy’ to fight opponents in the 
‘new arena of struggle’ allows a certain degree of critical agitation from prior 
republican memory to be imported into the ‘critical engagement’ narrative. 
Given the continued presence of ‘securocrats’ within policing, the critical 
engager task is to use ‘strategy’ to combat such opponents:
There are elements within the system who are … still attempting to gain 
little victories against people like me and against the general direction of 
the political project … All that we can do is attempt to build a bulwark 
 26 AD, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
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against them type of activities. If you catch them, you know, in a new 
dispensation when you’re going to hopefully make them accountable … 
they’re not going to go away.27
When you’re involved in a transitional period coming out of a colonial 
conflict there’s always hiccups, there’s always difficulties, there’s always 
battles. You know, while we have a strategy you have to be rest assured 
your opponents have a strategy as well, and part of their strategy is to roll 
back as much as they possibly can of any gains that we have made.28
In addition to having a certain rhetorical value, a narrative of using 
strategic interaction to defeat opponents reflects the peculiarities of the post-
reform context critical engagers find themselves in. Although keen to liken 
their endorsement to that of ANC engagement with post-reform policing in 
South Africa, a glaring oversight of this is that Irish republicans have not had 
the extensive access to the policing apparatus’s most problematic branches 
as did the ANC. Not only were former combatants debarred from joining 
the PSNI but what Patten called the ‘force within a force’29 transferred en 
masse from the RUC into the PSNI. This crossover is itself compounded 
by the fact that the shortcomings of the accountability mechanisms prevent 
their remit from encompassing the more problematic activities of those 
‘rolling back’ reform. Nor is this helped by the fact that MI5 was handed the 
lead role in the problematic area of ‘national security’ – and critical engagers 
frankly acknowledge the extreme difficulty in anyone, Sinn Féin or otherwise, 
managing to hold MI5 to account.30 This creates a paradox whereby those 
involved in ‘critical engagement’ champion a ‘community policing’ narrative 
that frontloads the notion of policing being a community service worthy of 
support while simultaneously having a ‘political policing’ narrative of ‘critical 
engagement’ being a ‘battle a day’ in trying to prevent an ‘old guard’ concerted 
‘roll back’ of reform.
Rhetorically disaggregating the policing monolith and engaging a narrative 
of strategically fighting the ‘roll back’ does not, however, detract from the 
impact on the ground of ‘political policing’. Where the PSNI is seen to unfairly 
target republicans a ‘remembering’ of past ‘political policing’ materialises. At 
grassroots level this can arise from minor issues, one example cited being the 
arrest of a former prisoner for a minor motoring offence while on their way to 
 27 A, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview April 2013.
 28 AD, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
 29 Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, 1999, para 12.10.
 30 A, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, April 2013.
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partake in one of the first post-Sinn Féin endorsement meetings in a republican 
area – something that temporarily stalled improvements in community–
police relations.31 A more general example was a mobilisation in West Belfast 
in response to the ‘upswing’ in PSNI targeting of hurlers and camogs for 
possession of an ‘offensive weapon’.32 High-profile cases of ‘political policing’ 
also impact at grassroots level. One community activist noted that macro-level 
events can have the unhelpful effect of driving people at grassroots level back 
into their ‘comfort zones’. Where this happens, people are more reticent than 
before about re-emerging out of these ‘comfort zones’.33 This difficulty vindi-
cates Nelid’s observation that any new-found confidence historically detached 
collectives place in reformed policing bodies can be ‘eroded rapidly’ when past 
problems are mirrored in post-reform policing.34 
The cumulative effect of all of the above is that the onset of ‘critical 
engagement’ did not make policing ‘a settled issue’ but merely marked the 
beginning of a long and difficult depoliticising process that is ‘still ongoing’.35 
The magnitude of the process, and its ongoing nature, means that all the 
cultural and structural factors that cultivate ‘political policing’ ‘doesn’t change 
overnight’.36 ‘Critical engagement’ being an ongoing process enables progress 
already attained to be juxtaposed with the need for further advances to be 
made. To this end assertions like, ‘We dismantled the RUC. As much as we 
may not claim it because there is no sense in annoying people but it’s self-
evident that the RUC isn’t here today’,37 are tempered by similar recognition 
that ‘There is still a terrible lot needs to happen’.38 Despite this recognition, 
an underlying theme of rupture remains detectable and is framed by a wider 
narrative of republicans having dismantled the ‘Orange state’ to change the 
political landscape in the six counties irrevocably. 
Couching itself in wider terms of equality-based transformation of the 
‘Orange state’, this again creates scope for pre-transition Northern Ireland to 
be invoked as part of a ‘usable past’ whereby even if policing today remains 
problematic on certain levels it is better than the ‘suspect community’ policing 
 31 I, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 32 J. Hedges and P. Whelan, ‘PSNI Clash with Hurlers Opposed by Young 
Republicans’, An Phoblacht, 10 March 2014: www.anphoblacht.com/contents/23832 
(accessed 23 July 2014). 
 33 D, community activist, interview, May 2013.
 34 Nelid, 2001.
 35 AD, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
 36 M, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 37 H, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
 38 F, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, May 2013.
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of the past. Again, a preferable, yet nonetheless imperfect, present is compared 
with a difficult past in a way framed by rupture:
There is no doubt there is people within the PSNI who are former RUC 
would like to see things rolled back. There’s no doubt about people within 
Unionism would like to see things rolled back. You know it was their force. 
But I think there’s a wee bit of naivety in that because things are never going 
to go back to the way they were. It’s just never going to happen. You’re never 
going to have a one-party Unionist regime running the North.39 
The ‘critical engagement’ narrative on ‘political policing’ therefore invokes 
several strands of the ‘progressive republican’ master narrative, including 
themes of progression, equality-based reform and disempowering opponents. 
Premised on the notion of rupture with the past, the narrative contends that 
while policing is certainly not flawless – and there is acknowledgement that 
nowhere in the world can flawless policing be found – it is nonetheless more 
community orientated and less politicised than the ‘suspect community’ 
policing they ‘remember’. 
Anti-policing rejection of disaggregation 
If the ‘critical engagement’ narrative uses disaggregation of the policing 
monolith to engineer a sense of rupture, then the anti-policing narrative rejects 
disaggregation in order to engineer a sense of continuity. This rejection is 
ideological but also organisational. The ideological dimension – mirroring 
a ‘cosmetic reform’ narrative – is that no distinction can be made between 
a community police officer and a political police officer. The core policing 
function in upholding an illegitimate state makes all policing, regardless of 
how it is labelled, inherently political. Continuity in the core function enables 
an ideological rebuke that ‘the PSNI is the political policing of today. It was the 
RUC prior to the name change. It was the RIC prior to that. There is absolutely 
no difference whatsoever’.40
The organisational dimension contends that those involved in ‘community 
policing’ have to take orders from ‘the wire pullers’.41 This allows ‘political 
policing’ to control ‘community policing’. Such a view subscribes to the struc-
turalist view of policing whereby policing of every hue is ultimately state 
coercion. The practical outworking of this is that any given PSNI officer ‘one 
 39 AD, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
 40 R, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
 41 X, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
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day could be sorting out a domestic dispute but the next day actively maybe 
arresting a political protestor’.42 This critique also draws on the enhanced role 
of MI5. ‘Community policing’ PSNI officers thus become the front line in 
MI5-led ‘political policing’ by harassing ‘names that come down on a list’:
I’ve been told that they come from the intelligence services sector, you 
know, and I’m led to think, obviously, MI5. Now the names that are on that 
list are handed into [area], and I’m told by the Super down there they don’t 
question those names … they take it as read, right. So your community 
police officer on the ground, they know the name, ‘whatever, de de da, there 
he is’, and they’re driving after him and it’s the whole Justice and Security 
stop and search, humiliation tactics out on the road, you know; all that 
carry on.43
Difference in views seemingly hinges on lived interaction with post-reform 
policing. Those endorsing ‘critical engagement’ have come into contact 
with the ‘new breed’ of PSNI officer and detect a willingness to serve their 
communities. ‘Critical engagement’ has opened up a post-conflict platform 
for interaction with a different kind of police officer from that encountered 
in the past. Those outside this ambit have no such interaction. Interaction is 
largely limited to continuing negative experiences with problematic branches 
that remain predominantly Unionist and tainted by institutional crossover. It 
is only natural in the face of continuing negative experiences to ‘remember’ 
similar past experiences with the RUC. From this perspective, the new PSNI 
is seen to be operating in the same way as the old RUC did. Rather than 
have memory recast current lived experience as a combative type of reform, 
current lived experience is tied to an ideologised memory whereby rejection 
of ‘British policing’ reinforces a narrative of continued police repression. 
The anti-policing narrative of ‘continuity’ in ‘political policing’
Building on from a narrative of ‘cosmetic reform’ that challenges assertions of 
change, the anti-policing narrative uses current lived experience to construct 
a sense of continuity with past ‘political policing’ by drawing on the abuse 
of ‘anti-terror’ legislation, the retention of RUC ‘political policing’ methods 
and the refined targeting of Irish republicans. It is worth highlighting the 
 42 AC, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, November 2013.
 43 AB, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
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type of memories and lived experiences drawn upon to construct this conti-
nuity. Interviewees recounted past and present cases of abuse under ‘stop and 
search’ provisions, violence and/or sectarianism during house raids and arrest, 
the monitoring, harassment and physical assault of those attending political 
pickets and prominent miscarriages of justice. Interestingly, these are the 
same memories that are invoked by those in support of ‘critical engagement’ 
to engender a sense of rupture through their narrative that policing is now 
a community service. Perhaps it is worth highlighting why these particular 
memories proliferate throughout dichotomous policing narratives. At the 
individual level, it reflects how autobiographical memory – which primarily 
concerns individual experiences rather than master-narrative positions44 
– ties current lived experience to past personal experiences. These experi-
ences are ‘remembered’ due to the impact they had, thus they provide a lens 
through which current lived experience is interpreted and reform processes 
evaluated - whether this be a likening of current and past experiences or a 
differentiation between them. At the collective level, these memories reinforce 
dominant master-narrative positions. For supporters of ‘critical engagement’ 
these memories support assertions of newness and change given that from 
their current lived reality they are reflective of a problematic past rather than 
present. Likewise, while such experiences are reflective of the current lived 
experience of those ‘left behind’, they also reinforce a central narrative plank 
that ‘cosmetic reform’ has not changed the nature or function of policing. 
The anti-policing narrative is constructed within a dualistic framework 
that draws heavily on external factors through human rights discourse in a 
post-9/11 context but also draws heavily on memory that is ideologised and 
localised. At particular times the narrative is insular and contextually specific 
to anti-policing Irish republicans yet at other junctures it has wider relevance. 
It draws on historical lived experience of ‘anti-terror’ legislation to provide 
context for current experiences, yet these can also be placed in a globalised ‘War 
on Terror’ context. In an insightful critique of attempts to ‘normalise’ policing 
and security in post-GFA Northern Ireland, Jessie Blackbourn highlights how 
the challenges of the global and the local most neatly converge on the matter of 
‘anti-terror’ legislation.45 Accordingly, it is worth turning our initial attention 
to this. 
 44 Schuman and Corning, 2014.
 45 Blackbourn, 2015.
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The abuse of ‘anti-terror’ legislation
The events of 9/11 provoked a global move away from a ‘rule of law’ model 
towards using an ‘extraordinary measures’ model to tackle ‘terrorism’,46 
mainly via increased global passage and usage of ‘emergency’ and ‘anti-terror’ 
legislation.47 However, there is nothing new about the application of such 
legislation in an Irish context. ‘Emergency’ legislation involving special 
courts and detention without trial has existed there from as early as 1761.48 
A genealogy of emergency ‘anti-terror’ legislation spanning from the 1883 
Explosive Substances Act to the more recent Justice and Security (Northern 
Ireland) Act 2007 duly emerged. On the one hand, justification is grounded 
in the belief that the state must tackle security threats proactively.49 On the 
other hand, there remains the fact that in a Northern Ireland context such 
legislation has been historically problematic. The thread of continuity running 
through this conundrum is notable in the likening of past ‘stop and search’ by 
the RUC using ‘suspect community’ policing with those experienced under 
current ‘anti-terror’ provisions used by the PSNI. Showing contextualisation 
of a current incident of ‘political policing’ against their previous experiences 
under the RUC, one interviewee argued:
Stops and searches at that time could have been anything from the minimum 
of ten minutes to three hours. And the legislation they used at that time was 
no different to the repressive legislation that we see today with the Justice 
and Security stop and search … today in 2013, you know, 20 and 30 years 
on, I’m after meeting a very hateful, nasty bunch from [area]. You know, 
people who are coming into what they call the jurisdiction under nobody’s 
authority but some other faceless person from [area] and they can throw 
out whatever legislation at younger people.50 
Current difficulties over detention without trial and ‘stop and search’ 
mirror previous difficulties under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1974) and 
the Emergency Provisions Act (1973).51 Thus, despite police reform and the 
GFA, similarity with a historical ‘anti-terror’ context and the encroachment of 
a global ‘anti-terror’ context means that the current climate of Northern Ireland 
 46 Guelke, 2012, 36.
 47 Brysk, 2007.
 48 Landman, 2007, 80.
 49 Dyzenhaus, 2008, 42.
 50 AB, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
 51 Hillyard, 1988; Walsh, 1983; McVeigh, 1994.
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‘remains highly susceptible’ to human rights violations.52 The global context 
has become more pressing, with Gearty arguing that the sheer scope of ‘anti-
terror’ legislation now at the disposal of the state has transformed the ‘War on 
Terror’ into the ‘War on human rights’.53 ‘Stop and search’ and ‘internment by 
remand’ are indeed common complaints among anti-policing Irish republicans 
but they are merely localised variants of the global ‘War on Terror’ zeal that 
has birthed, as Lucy Bond lists,54 black site prisons, extraordinary rendition, 
enhanced interrogation techniques and secretive military commission trials.
The convergence of the local and global becomes apparent upon exami-
nation of the two most offending legislative provisions: the Terrorism Act 
(2000) (TACT) and the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 
(JSA). The former is a UK-wide legislative provision enacted to tackle all forms 
of ‘terrorism’, while the latter is a provision tailored to the threat of ‘spoiler’ 
violence in post-GFA Northern Ireland. Unlike previous and subsequent ‘anti-
terror’ legislation, TACT was more considered and less of a knee-jerk reaction 
to a specific event,55 making its enormous encroachment on human rights all 
the more menacing. Both acts contain ‘stop and search’ provisions that are 
prone to misuse and abuse. Under section 43 (1) TACT the security forces 
may stop and search persons and vehicles based on ‘reasonable suspicion’.56 
A similar provision that was based on police ‘authorisation’ in section 44 
was subsequently held to be illegal and in contravention of Article 8 rights.57 
Section 47A subsequently amended section 44 powers whereby an ‘authori-
sation’ for ‘stop and search’ must be necessary to prevent an attack rather than 
simply being expedient to preventing ‘terrorism’,58 although a police officer 
retains the power to stop and search any vehicle or person without ‘individual 
 52 Wartchow, 2005. 
 53 Gearty, 2005.
 54 Bond, 2015, 137.
 55 Blackbourn, 2009.
 56 Section 43 (1) TACT reads: ‘A constable may stop and search a person whom 
he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist to discover whether he has in his possession 
anything which may constitute evidence that he is a terrorist’. Section 43 (2) continues: 
‘A constable may search a person arrested under section 41 to discover whether he has 
in his possession anything which may constitute evidence that he is a terrorist.’
 57 Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom (Application 4158/05) (2010) 50 
EHRR 45.
 58 Section 47A (TACT) states that a senior police officer may give authorisation if 
the officer ‘reasonably suspects that an act of terrorism will take place; and reasonably 
considers that the authorisation is necessary to prevent such an act; [and that] the 
specified area(s) or place(s) [in the authorisation are] no greater than is necessary to 
232 Critical Engagement
reasonable suspicion’ where it is premised on searching for evidence that the 
person is a ‘terrorist’ or that the vehicle is being used for the ‘purposes of 
terrorism’.59 Section 21 JSA allows for a police officer to stop and question an 
individual to ascertain their identity and movements.60 There is no ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ requirement attached to this power.61 Section 24 JSA permits powers 
of stop and search for ‘unlawful munitions and transmitters’.62 The flaws of 
JSA ‘stop and search’ powers were exposed by a court ruling that they were 
unlawful in the absence of a Code of Practice preventing arbitrary abuse.63 The 
PSNI has, however, been able to use TACT and JSA interchangeably in light of 
these unfavourable legal rulings.64
Concerns over ‘anti-terror’ legislation cannot, however, be confined to 
‘stop and search’ powers. More fundamental problems exist. For example, the 
offence of ‘glorifying terrorism’ can become a ‘dangerous process’ that blurs the 
contours between ‘the expression of views seen as unacceptable and offensive 
to mainstream opinion in the UK with the perpetration of acts of violence’.65 
Moreover, as Hodgson and Tadros have argued,66 the enormous breadth 
of ‘anti-terror’ provisions can essentially ‘make a terrorist out of nothing’. 
With ‘extremism’ superseding ‘terrorism’ as the evil that must be tackled, 
these problems will only inflame rather than dissipate. Because ‘extremism’ is 
defined in an imprecise manner that encompasses non-violent ‘vocal or active 
opposition to fundamental British values’,67 the scope for misapplication seems 
limitless. Not only are non-violent political opponents of the state at risk from 
‘counter-extremism’ provisions in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 
2015, but religious and cultural organisations could find themselves similarly 
prevent such an act; and the duration of the authorisation is no longer than is necessary 
to prevent such an act.’
 59 Committee on the Administration of Justice, 2012a, 21.
 60 Section 21 JSA reads: ‘(1) A member of Her Majesty’s forces on duty or a constable 
may stop a person for so long as is necessary to question him to ascertain his identity 
and movements. (2) A member of Her Majesty’s forces on duty may stop a person for 
so long as is necessary to question him to ascertain – (a) what he knows about a recent 
explosion or another recent incident endangering life; (b) what he knows about a 
person killed or injured in a recent explosion or incident.’
 61 Committee on the Administration of Justice, 2012a, 22.
 62 Committee on the Administration of Justice, 2012a, 23.
 63 Re Fox, McNulty and Canning [2013] NICA 19.
 64 Blackbourn, 2015, 148.
 65 Guelke, 2007.
 66 Hodgson and Tadros, 2009.
 67 Her Majesty’s Government, 2015, 6.
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threatened.68 The cumulative effect of this, in a localised context, is that while 
Northern Ireland has always witnessed the pitfalls of wide-ranging ‘anti-terror’ 
legislation, the provisions birthed in a post-9/11 context are not only more 
expansive but also more permanent in nature than many of the ‘temporary’ 
Northern Ireland-specific provisions of the past – something that flies in the 
face of the GFA commitment to ‘the removal of emergency powers in Northern 
Ireland’ and ‘as early a return as possible to normal security arrangements’.69 
Blackbourn goes further in her analysis of this, arguing that the only token by 
which policing and security seems more normalised in Northern Ireland is not 
that the GFA normalisation vision has been realised but because wide-ranging 
‘anti-terror’ provisions have become the norm elsewhere.70 
Theoretical concerns are concretised by the practical outworkings of such 
provisions. The anti-policing narrative has been built around the misuse of 
‘stop and search’ that targets legitimate political opponents of the post-GFA 
state. It is constructed from lived reality of ‘stop and search’ as a ‘disruption 
tactic’.71 Defence of this ‘disruption tactic’ is grounded in the fact that it is 
apparently ‘intelligence led’, although it has not been ascertained whether said 
‘intelligence’ targets someone on the basis of involvement in unlawful activity 
or because of legitimate political activity. The matter is further obfuscated 
when one considers that in the North of Ireland there is a historical record 
of using ‘intelligence’ to target ‘politically unpopular individuals’72 and of 
‘fair enquiry’ use of ‘stop and search’ happening to ‘degenerate into delib-
erate harassment’.73 The lack of successful convictions flowing from ‘stop and 
search’ operations strengthens these assertions.74 Furthermore, cases raised 
in the interview process spoke to the truth of this observation. In one case the 
heavily pregnant partner and infant child of a political activist were forced to 
stand in heavy rain while the activist was subjected to a ‘stop and search’.75 In 
 68 ‘Cameron’s Extremism Orders “Could Criminalise Traditional Christian 
Teaching”’, Daily Telegraph, 15 June 2015: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/ 
11671547/Camerons-extremism-orders-could-criminalise-traditional-Christian-
teaching.html (accessed 28 August 2015).
 69 ‘The Agreement: Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations’ (Good 
Friday Agreement), Belfast, 10 April 1998, 25: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/
docs/agreement.htm.
 70 Blackbourn, 2015, 183.
 71 Committee on the Administration of Justice, 2012a, 25.
 72 Hirsch, 2001. 
 73 Committee on the Administration of Justice, 1995.
 74 Northern Ireland Policing Board, 2013, 34. 
 75 Z, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
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another case the partner of a republican prisoner was subjected to a section 
24 JSA search shortly after returning from a prison visit.76 It is difficult in 
either case to identify how practical application met the specified aims of 
‘anti-terror’ provisions; subjecting a heavily pregnant female and infant to a 
‘stop and search’ in heavy rain is hardly tackling the militant threat, while an 
individual returning from a prison visit is highly unlikely to have explosives or 
transmitters on their person. The cases above point towards ‘stop and search’ 
being used as a means of harassment rather than being used to disrupt militant 
activity.
With Northern Ireland yet to move beyond ethno-nationalist residential 
segregation, a geographical breakdown of ‘stop and search’ figures serves as 
a ‘proxy indicator’ of any differential application on the ground.77 CAJ note 
that there is an undeniably heavier usage of JSA ‘stop and search’ provisions 
in republican communities like West Belfast, Foyle and Strabane than in more 
Unionist-dominated areas like East Belfast, Carrickfergus and Antrim.78 The 
skewed use of ‘anti-terror’ provisions has led CAJ to conclude that there are 
currently two ‘policing regimes’, as ‘dissident republicans’ are policed in a way 
revanchist loyalist elements are not.79 The deleterious impact this has on 
policing ‘buy in’ among previously excluded Irish republican communities is 
obvious. The NIPB has conceded that despite amendments the operation of 
TACT and JSA continues to raise ‘significant and warranted concerns’ within 
the communities affected by them.80 Likewise, CAJ has argued that the 
misuse of ‘stop and search’ is seen as targeting ‘some working-class Nationalist 
communities at a time when precisely those who have not recognised the police 
as a legitimate body are being asked to do so’.81
The ‘cosmetic reform’ narrative extends beyond the misuse of ‘stop and 
search’ powers to assert more generally that provisions purportedly designed 
to tackle the militant threat are being used to curtail legitimate political 
opposition to the Northern Ireland transition – claims with significant 
historical resonance.82 Within the confines of this argument one republican 
offered the following synopsis: 
 76 V, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, September 2013.
 77 Committee on the Administration of Justice, 2012a, 26.
 78 Committee on the Administration of Justice, 2012a, 26. 
 79 Committee on the Administration of Justice, 2012b, 67.
 80 Northern Ireland Policing Board, 2013, 12.
 81 Committee on the Administration of Justice, 2012, 74. 
 82 Hillyard, 1988; Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard, 1980: Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard, 
1980; McVeigh, 1994.
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The person who is on the trigger end of an AK-47 becomes the person that 
all of this emergency legislation and secretive type policing is about, right? 
But if you make the decision a month later, because there isn’t anybody 
pulling the trigger of an AK-47 – well, do you see the ones who are actually 
talking in terms of sedition: they could be next year’s finger person on the 
trigger of an AK-47. So let’s do something about them now rather than 
waiting until next year. What you can do, then, is you can very easily go 
from looking to investigate someone for something you think they’ve done 
to investigating someone because of the potential you think they possess.
This led the republican to observe not a rupture whereby policing now repre-
sents a community service but ‘the line of continuity between the way in which 
policing was done in the early ’70s and the way in which policing is now being 
done in this century’.83 
Rather than summarily dismissing this assertion as an anti-policing gripe, it 
is worth examining it – increasingly so given the recent turn towards ‘counter-
extremism’. As with similar concerns in the past, the temptation to dismiss 
them as the contrived work of the disgruntled should be resisted. Nor should 
critique of ‘anti-terror’ legislation be misrepresented as condoning the activity 
it purports to prevent. 
Several interviewees evinced a belief that they were targeted by ‘political 
policing’ on the basis of their legitimate political opposition to the transition 
rather than any involvement in ‘spoiler’ violence. Acknowledging their political 
opposition to the status quo in the North of Ireland, one interviewee argued:
Yes, I’m in [political party]. Yes, I’m a political activist. Yes, I advocate 
peaceful and dignified opposition to British rule in Ireland. Is that not a 
legitimate aspect of the Good Friday Agreement? Of course it is. So why 
does the police target people like me? Why do they mistreat me? Why do 
they mistreat my family? Why do they prevent me from asserting my rights 
in a political nature?84 
Perhaps more insightful are the following extensive comments of another 
political activist who referred to ‘political policing’ as ‘just a normal everyday 
thing of being a political activist’, before elaborating that ‘you have to expect 
your door being knocked in. You have to expect being arrested and harassed, 
but that’s just a part of the job I suppose’. Noting that their first-hand 
 83 Y, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
 84 S, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
236 Critical Engagement
experience of ‘political policing’ began ‘when I became involved with politics 
and joined a political party’, this is interpreted through what was witnessed 
in the past:
Personally, when I was younger, the RUC never directly affected me. But 
now the PSNI is. Like, they’re harassing me, they’re harassing my friends, 
they’re kicking people’s doors in, they’re putting comrades in jail for nothing 
… So, in my experience of the PSNI, I think that they are just the same as 
the RUC, from looking at the RUC. Not from my own experiences of the 
RUC – but from looking at the RUC and what they were, to now the PSNI. 
It’s unchanged and I would have that same view looking at the PSNI now as 
what the RUC would’ve been.85 
Interestingly, this account highlights the interaction between autobiographical 
and collective memory. Although there is an inability to ‘remember’ human 
rights abuse by the RUC in their autobiographical memory, the interviewee 
draws on the collective memory of human rights abuse to frame their current 
lived experience. This provides the interviewee with an outlet to frame their 
current lived experience of ‘political policing’ with past collective experiences 
and to locate these experiences within the confines of the anti-policing master 
narrative of ‘cosmetic reform’. Individual experiences become rooted to both 
collective experiences in the past and collective experiences in the present in a 
manner that draws a line of continuity between them. 
According to the above accounts, those targeted under ‘anti-terror’ legis-
lation were pursued on the basis of legitimate political opposition to policing. 
This speaks to the flaws of ‘anti-terror’ legislation more widely but also to the 
specific post-GFA political context in Northern Ireland that has seen a flawed 
categorisation of all those opposed to the GFA and/or policing under the 
‘dissident’ tag. The propensity for using this ‘catch-all’ tag falsely conflates 
someone who is shooting at the PSNI with someone who has a legitimate 
non-violent opposition to policing. This myopic view is demonstrably 
erroneous. Primarily, it overlooks the existence of what Horgan and Morrison 
call ‘non-violent dissident Republicans’ ‘who have demonstrated their dissi-
dence through political activity and other non-violent methods’.86 Secondly, it 
wrongly presupposes that any opposition within the Irish republican constit-
uency to the Sinn Féin brand of pro-GFA ‘mainstream’ republicanism is 
somehow illegitimate. The reality is, as pointed out by Morrison, that:
 85 X, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
 86 Horgan and Morrison, 2011. 
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There is clearly nothing wrong with disagreeing with the direction taken, 
and decisions made, by the Sinn Féin leadership. It actually promotes 
democratic voice within republican and nationalist communities. It allows 
for these communities to question direction. However, it is when this dissi-
dence is manifested in violent, threatening and paramilitary activity that 
there is a real problem to deal with.87
Local government elections in 2014 revealed the existence of and appetite for 
legitimate political opposition to policing and to Sinn Féin, with a number of 
anti-policing candidates duly securing seats.88
Militants who actively target the PSNI may legitimately expect to be 
targeted under ‘anti-terror’ provisions. This is, after all, part of the rough 
and tumble that comes with involvement in political violence. Legitimate 
political activists adhering to non-violent opposition, despite the earlier 
assertion that it is ‘part of the job’, should not. The pitfalls that come with 
ignoring this reality in favour of carte blanche use of ‘anti-terror’ legislation 
against anybody opposing the status quo are obvious. First, it impinges 
on freedom of political thought – a freedom enshrined not only in inter-
national human rights law89 but also in the GFA.90 If ‘political policing’ is 
used to curtail the legitimate expression of opposition to the GFA, the self-
contained right to ‘free political thought’ becomes reduced to a right to ‘free 
political agreement’ with the GFA. Secondly, targeting legitimate political 
groups under ‘anti-terror’ legislation will not reduce the militant threat. 
Instead, it only closes off ‘an alternative venue’ for those wishing to express 
 87 Morrison, 2013, 2.
 88 ‘Independent Republican’ candidates successfully elected in the 2014 local 
government elections were Barry Monteith, Bernice Swift, Padraig McShane and 
Davy Hyland. Gary Donnelly (32CSM) and Paul Gallagher (IRSP) were also elected 
on an ‘Independent Republican’ ticket. Another ‘Independent Republican’ candidate 
Dee Fennell narrowly missed out on a seat in the Old Park ward of North Belfast. 
RNU and Éirígí also ran candidates in North and West Belfast. 
 89 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) Art. 9 (1) enshrines the 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and reads: ‘Everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change 
his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance.’
 90 ‘The Agreement: Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations’ (Good 
Friday Agreement), Belfast, 10 April 1998, 20. 
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their political opposition in a peaceful way.91 Failure to appreciate this in 
post-GFA Northern Ireland has led to legitimate political opponents of the 
GFA becoming the ‘enemy other’ as much as have those involved in ‘spoiler’ 
violence.92 This has become central to the ‘political policing’ narrative of 
those ‘left behind’, where perceptions of continuity with past ‘political 
policing’ have enabled the persistence of a view that policing continues to 
represent a threat rather than a community service.
In portraying policing as a continued political threat, the anti-policing 
narrative has expanded beyond ideological opposition to ‘British policing’ to 
instrumentalise a discourse of human rights. This resonates with Sinn Féin’s 
previous use of human rights discourse in the 1990s.93 On one level, adopting a 
discourse of human rights can usefully reinforce dominant narrative positions 
– human rights abusers are, after all, the antithesis of community servants 
– but on another level they can take root more generally to alter political 
outlooks.94 This is articulated through opposition to legislation like JSA and 
TACT that is premised on human rights considerations rather than regurgi-
tation of an ideological position. Opposition to covert policing, the abuse of 
‘emergency legislation’ and ‘internment by remand’ becomes more legalistic, 
human rights orientated and places greater emphasis on procedural ‘foul play’. 
This dimension has been reinforced by the length of time between trial and 
sentencing and by the lack of successful convictions against those remanded 
and charged under ‘anti-terror’ legislation.95
This is particularly notable in criticism of high-profile cases. Consider the 
following commentary on the (then ongoing) Martin Corey case:
He is supposed to be up in court at the end of September for a parole 
hearing. He was supposed to be every 12 months brought before a parole 
hearing and he hasn’t had one in 24 months. Now how is that a new 
dispensation? How is that human rights and civil liberties being processed 
through this new Good Friday Agreement when you have a man in jail 
there 63 years of age for three and a half years?96
A similar observation was made in relation to the detention of (since 
acquitted) Éirígí activist Stephen Murney:
 91 Horgan and Morrison, 2011.
 92 Whiting, 2012.
 93 Bean, 2007a.
 94 McEvoy, 2000.
 95 Horgan, 2013, 160.
 96 W, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, September 2013.
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They still won’t say Stephen Murney was a member of a bona fide political 
party and he had stuff in his house. I’m the [position] of [political party]. 
My fucking house is coming down with stuff. What are they going to do? 
Put me in Maghaberry beside Stephen Murney? For what? Being a member 
of a registered political party? … Is that not part of your democratic human 
rights and so-called freedom in a democratic society to be a member of a 
political party?97
So although there is inescapable ideological opposition to ‘British policing’ 
among critics, opposition is also predicated on rejection of ‘political policing’ 
that involves ‘the manipulation of the judicial system in order to put opponents 
of the state behind bars by any means necessary’.98 This de-ideologised strand 
of the narrative again draws sustenance from the wider post-9/11 climate:
The state in Ireland, Britain, the US and most Western states in recent times 
have enacted laws in order to outlaw even a whiff of political dissent. They 
usually call them offences against the state, anti-terrorism legislation, the 
patriot act and so on, and they do their best to put political activists and, 
CIA built, mass terrorists under the same category.99
This therefore means ‘when you look into it … it’s never about Martin Corey. 
It’s the legislation that they want accepted here’ – legislation that was effec-
tively ‘internment by another name’.100 Likewise, while the ‘Craigavon 2’ case 
may have its own particular concerns, the wider relevance of the case lies in ‘the 
battery of additional powers that are always sitting there’, that are initially used 
against ‘dissident republicans’ but can extend to ‘dissident lawyers, the week 
after it could be dissident journalists, the week after that it could be dissident 
thinkers’.101
The salience of the above is that critics not only have a historical political 
backdrop to frame their grievances within but can also adopt a wider ‘War 
on Terror’ context to frame opposition to policing within a human rights 
discourse rather than an ideological one. Where opposition premised on 
the latter questions the legitimacy of policing, that predicated on the former 
questions how policing operates. As a consequence of locating itself in transi-
tional ‘legitimacy politics’ and a wider ‘War on Terror’ context, Irish republican 
 97 P, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 98 O, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 99 ‘Republican Socialist Youth Movement’, Starry Plough, Easter 2007.
 100 W, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, September 2013.
 101 Y, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
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criticism of ‘political policing’ possesses a malleability allowing it to be highly 
ideologised on the one hand, yet grounded in human rights considerations on 
the other hand. 
The ‘PSNI/RUC’
The crux of the ‘cosmetic reform’ counter-narrative is a sense of continuity 
assuming nothing of substance has changed within post-Patten policing. A key 
means of reinforcing this has been referring to the PSNI as the ‘PSNI/RUC’ or 
continuing to refer to them as simply ‘the RUC’. Current experiences become 
an extension of generations of ‘political policing’, meaning that:
prior to 1969 policing in the North of Ireland was miserable. After 1969 it 
was also miserable. From the earliest days of policing in Ireland it has been 
discriminatory, it’s been draconian, it’s been oppressive, it’s been milita-
rised, it’s been political. Nothing has changed since 2007.102 
Given the historical backdrop to ‘political policing’ and that the central plank 
of the anti-policing narrative is one stressing continuity rather than rupture, 
it seems natural that those currently experiencing ‘political policing’ would 
liken such experiences to those experienced under the RUC. Just as those 
promoting a ‘critical engagement’ narrative of ‘community policing’ use their 
lived experience of policing to support assertions of newness and change, 
those opposed to policing use lived experience to challenge such assertions 
by using a lens of continuity to view current ‘political policing’. A narrative 
must necessarily gravitate towards the end point it wishes to make.103 This 
means that critics use their lived experience of current ‘political policing’ 
to draw direct parallels with what they ‘remember’ RUC tactics and the 
RUC mentality to be. One critic made a blatant assertion of continuity with 
RUC tactics by opining that ‘the PSNI are determined to remain a political 
police force. They are determined to hold on to the old tactics of the RUC’.104 
Another noted, ‘there’s still the same political policing goes on’ even though 
since ‘critical engagement’ the PSNI has ‘probably got better at it, probably 
more professional in their approach’. Continuity, however, is grounded in 
the outworking that, ‘if we call a protest out here tomorrow I guarantee the 
police would be up and down harassing us, videotaping us etc. for their own 
 102 S, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
 103 Davis, 2002, 14.
 104 O, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
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nefarious purposes. That’s exactly the same thing the RUC did, you know, so 
there is no real difference’.105
In addition to reinforcing master-narrative positions, memory can also 
contextualise lived reality by providing a reference point for what those subjected 
to ‘political policing’ see unfolding around them. One former combatant, who 
had previously recounted how dawn raids on their family home politicised 
them in their youth, drew a parallel with what they witnessed developing in 
their own children. Drawing continuity not only in the aggression and sectari-
anism experienced during a recent arrest but also in the politicising effect it 
had, the interviewee commented:
I told the cops in the Land Rover that ‘You have made a serious mistake’ – 
not by arresting me – made a serious mistake in that now my kids are going 
to grow up hating the cops because they seen their Da getting handcuffed 
and dragged out of his own home in a pair of boxer shorts with nothing 
else on and threw into a Land Rover and held for a number of hours and 
no explanation given. What he said to me was, ‘I don’t give a fuck, you’re 
nothing but a Fenian bastard’. So, as far as I was concerned, the PSNI were 
not much different to the RUC in that context. My kids now will not talk to 
them, will not engage them, will not speak to them, will not look anywhere 
near them. They see them as oppressive, and that’s not my fault. That’s their 
fault.106
The ability of ‘political policing’ to have the effect described above is not 
new.107 
Interviewees use autobiographical memory to ‘remember’ in a way that 
feeds into a collective memory of past ‘political policing’ and a master narrative 
of ‘cosmetic reform’. These experiences become located not only in a collective 
memory of ‘political policing’ under the RUC but also in the current lived 
experience of PSNI ‘political policing’ endured by those ‘left behind’. This 
entails a juxtaposition of what is observed on the ground with the PSNI today 
and what is ‘remembered’ of RUC ‘political policing’:
I like to believe and consider myself as a professional and somebody who is 
open minded. So, regardless of the hateful experience I as an individual and 
my entire family and neighbours had, I like to think that I can separate that, 
you know, and look at any individual on any level. That said, the current 
 105 J, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
 106 S, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
 107 McVeigh, 1994, 101. 
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PSNI in my opinion – informed opinion and experience – are not doing 
anything much differently than the old RUC did in the past.108 
A similar thread of continuity based on comparative lived experience runs 
through the assessment of another republican that:
My experience of the PSNI is – how can I say it – of no difference between 
the RUC to put it in better terms. The characteristics, the attitude and the 
central task of the PSNI is identical to that of the RUC … I fail to see any 
difference between the RUC and the PSNI.109 
This is the flip side of how those engaged in ‘critical engagement’ use memory to 
promote a ‘community policing’ narrative. If memory is used in the ‘community 
policing’ narrative to frame policing as a community service on the basis 
that change in composition and mentality represent a rupture from the RUC, 
then the ‘political policing’ narrative uses memory to retain the framing of 
policing as a threat on the basis of continuity with RUC attitudes and tactics. 
In drawing a mnemonic line of continuity, the implication of the ‘political 
policing’ narrative is that if the RUC was a threat to republican communities 
then the PSNI that acts in the same manner and has the same attitude must, as 
a matter of simple logic, also be a threat. Drawing a comparison based on lived 
experience as a republican activist under the RUC and current lived experience 
as a republican activist under the PSNI, one republican commented:
Sinn Féin in the mid ’80s – we were out there confronting policing and we 
were stopped on a regular basis and we were harassed and we were arrested. 
We’ve had false accusations put against us. We were dragged in front of 
local magistrates’ courts and we were given criminal convictions. All part 
of the criminalisation process for republicans. That’s still going on. It’s just 
not as large because the republican base is fragmented and it’s easier for 
them to handpick or target individuals for this type of treatment.110 
The assertion that a ‘fragmented’ republican base has led to the refined targeting 
of ‘political policing’ has entered the anti-policing narrative more generally, 
thus it is worth drawing out.
 108 AB, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, October 2013.
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Targeted minority
While the anti-policing narrative is built on the premise that the substance 
of ‘political policing’ has not changed, there is implicit recognition that the 
scope has. Considering that master narratives need a basis in observed reality 
to gain credence,111 the anti-policing narrative reflects movement away from 
indiscriminate RUC ‘suspect community’ policing to ‘political policing’ that 
now specifically targets republican activists. Feeding into wider narratives 
of ‘cosmetic reform’ and the normalisation of ‘British policing’, the ‘political 
policing’ narrative becomes one of refined targeting rather than any meaningful 
change. This is not to suggest that aspects of policing at a wider level do not 
remain problematic in republican communities. After all, policing in republican 
districts remains somewhat reactive and is still notably militarised.112 Although 
certainly more normalised, a continuing emphasis on ‘anti-terror’ policing and 
public order policing means that it is yet to become entirely ‘normal’ in any 
visible sense.113 Consequently, even supporters of ‘critical engagement’ readily 
concede that:
Any police that drive about in armoured cars and carry sub-machine guns 
– it’s very hard to see them as your ordinary Bobby on the beat that you 
can go up and ask a question to or that you can feel totally secure with. You 
still see when they’re in shopping centres and they’re carrying guns, you 
still feel a wee bit uneasy because you remember back to what things were 
like before, and I think to a certain extent that hasn’t changed.114 
As a result of this, Topping and Byrne have concluded that the ‘community 
policing’ and ‘counter-terrorist’ strategies of the PSNI ‘have become mutually 
exclusive policing tasks’.115
Notwithstanding this, house raids, vehicle checkpoints and ‘stop and 
search’ are no longer the defining characteristics of policing for most within 
republican communities – something ‘critical engagers’ use to support asser-
tions of change. Anti-policing republicans have been forced to accommodate 
this lived reality into their policing narrative by acknowledging a refinement 
of ‘political policing’ to concentrate more rigorously on republican activists 
rather than the wider community. The following is an insightful synopsis of 
 111 Benford and Snow, 2000.
 112 Topping and Byrne, 2012b, 163.
 113 Topping, 2015, 150.
 114 T, supporter of Sinn Féin policy, interview, August 2013.
 115 Topping and Byrne, 2012b, 163.
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the difference in scope between RUC ‘suspect community’ policing and PSNI 
‘political policing’:
If you look historically, right: the ’30s, ’40s, ’50s they can intern a small 
republican group. That resolves the issue. The ’60s again. Late ’60s there’s 
an explosion of republicanism and you have to use this here widespread 
approach because you don’t know. ’70s, ’80s and ’90s the same. Even up to 
the early 2000s and then the splits occur and you can sort of pick off group 
by group and go ‘right, there’s a small protest, that’s who is involved’, and 
start all over again to build intelligence up and target those people rather 
than targeting the community at large.116
Continuity is nonetheless found through the assertion that Irish republicans 
– regardless of their numerical strength – have always been politically policed. 
This entails a remembering of previous generations when Irish republicanism 
was numerically weak. This also permeated the views of another republican 
who noted that ‘I always compare now to the ’40s and ’50s when you had small 
groupings of people dotted up and around the country’. The interviewee felt 
that the absence of a mass movement today ‘certainly does make their job 
[political policing] easier because there’s less of us to deal with’.117 
Just as anti-policing republicans ‘remember’ pre-conflict eras to dismiss 
an argument that cultural Nationalism represents change in policing, 
they similarly ‘remember’ a collectively inherited, rather than personally 
experienced, memory of previous eras when Irish republican activists 
were a persecuted minority, to dismiss the argument that policing is now a 
community service rather than a threat. Where the latter phase of conflict 
does not provide a neat fit with their narrative end point, they ‘remember’ 
previous eras that do. Anti-policing republicans are therefore able to reach 
further back in time to frame their current narrative and contextualise 
current lived experience. This represents a strategic reach into collective 
and cultural memory when experienced forms of memory are insufficient. 
They draw on the memory of ‘political policing’ that is ‘remembered’ yet not 
experienced. With the identity of victimhood capable of being drawn down 
from previous generations,118 anti-policing republicans utilise the identity of 
the targeted minority to frame their narrative of ‘political policing’ in a post-
Patten environment. This prevents what Jensen refers to as the post-reform 
 116 V, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, September 2013.
 117 AC, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, November 2013.
 118 Assman and Shortt, 2012.
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‘invisibilisation’ of police wrongs that often seeks to reinforce the image of 
the ‘new’ police and the image of the ‘new’ post-conflict state.119 Extended 
remembering that ‘remembers’ beyond 1969 feeds into over-arching themes 
of the anti-policing narrative such as ideological purity, ‘cosmetic reform’, 
policing remaining ‘political’ rather than community orientated and the 
assimilation of ‘former comrades’ into the state leading to increasingly invisi-
bilised ‘political policing’ of Irish republican dissenters within the post-GFA 
state. 
This has found its way into the commemorative culture of the purist RSF, 
where older collective heroes killed by ‘former comrades’ in the Free State 
establishment are commemorated.120 These heroes, though few in number, 
are eulogised as the embodiment of ideological purity sent to their death by 
corruptible ‘former comrades’ doing the dirty work of the foreign enemy.121 
In addition to being a powerful resource for mobilising in collective remem-
brance, this memory can also be mapped onto the present-day context. The 
implication being that like the collective heroes of yesteryear, the present-day 
persecuted few – imprisoned and politically policed Irish republicans – are 
today derided and marginalised by ‘former comrades’ siding with the jailer. 
This has seen increased importance afforded to republican prisoners and 
their protests in the anti-policing discourse. This is drawn on to undermine 
claims of post-GFA normality by highlighting the continued repression 
and imprisonment of Irish republicans who disagree with Sinn Féin.122 The 
ability of prison protest to achieve such an end was not lost on the prisoners 
themselves:
The refusal of Republican prisoners to be broken, our challenges to the Jail 
regime and the mobilisation of our comrades on the outside are obviously 
proving to be a challenge to the normalisation narrative. The colossal 
response from the DUP, NIPS/POA and the PSNI, along with the puppet 
master engineering of MI5, stands testament to that. We also await the 
responses of Sinn Féin and the SDLP to this matter given their knowledge 
of the context of our struggle and the involvement of their new and ‘Civic 
Police Force’ in propping up the unaccountable repressive Maghaberry 
regime … the new tactic of political prosecution against RPPs [Republican 
Political Prisoners] will not silence us. Our resolve today is as strong as 
 119 Jensen, 2009, 76.
 120 ‘Liam Mellows remembered in Wexford’, Saoirse, December 2013.
 121 ‘Charlie Kerrins commemorated in Tralee’, Saoirse, December 2013.
 122 Whiting, 2015.
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that of Republican prisoners who resisted criminalisation in the H Blocks, 
Crumlin Road and Armagh Gaol.123
Notable too, is the placing of current prison protests against the backdrop 
of previous protests, something aided by the fact that recent protests have 
mirrored the tactics previously used in the past.124 A discourse challenging 
criminalisation attempts by ‘former comrades’ assimilated into the state under-
lines this but also reverts again to the dominant theme of ‘true’ republicans 
being persecuted by those since corrupted:
Previous attempts by the Brits and their puppets to criminalise us was 
met with the necessary resistance and this is still the case today … we are 
Prisoners of War and we will continue to oppose all attempts to criminalise 
us. In today’s struggle we are being labelled as traitors and worse by Martin 
McGuinness and his colleagues, and by the continuation of the Brit black 
propaganda machine. This is an old British tactic formulated in London 
by MI5, and ably assisted in their work by our former comrades led by 
Gerry Adams. We are not the traitors. The former Republicans who sit in 
the bastion of Unionism and administer British rule are the real traitors to 
Ireland and her dead generations.125
An unmistakeable ideological dimension persists whereby the prisoners are 
‘proof of the dedication of men and women to the full freedom of Ireland’.126 
However, it has also drawn from human rights discourse too. This demands 
‘an end to the vile, degrading and abusive practice of strip-searching’127 and 
protests at ‘the physical and mental torture and the ongoing human rights 
abuses faced by Republican prisoners on a daily basis’.128 It is therefore not 
only that Irish republicans are captive in ‘England’s Maghaberry Prison’ that is 
wrong as an ideological matter, but the fact that they are forced to endure strip 
searches that are ‘close to rape’ that is also wrong as a human rights matter.129
 123 ‘Statement from Roe 4 Republican Political Prisoners Maghaberry’, 20 March 
2015: http://107cowgate.com/2015/03/20/statement-from-roe-4-republican-political- 
prisoners-maghaberry/ (accessed 24 August 2015).
 124 Whiting, 2015.
 125 ‘Statement from Republican POWs, Maghaberry Jail’, Saoirse, June 2009.
 126 ‘Easter Statement from the Leadership of the Republican Movement’, Saoirse Nua, 
Spring 2013. 
 127 ‘Maghaberry’, Poblacht na nOibrithe, 2012.
 128 ‘Campaign Stepped up in Scotland’, Sovereign Nation, February/March 2014.
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Despite the cumulative effects of ‘political policing’, anti-policing repub-
licans remain defiant that it will not defeat or deter them. In fact, they assert 
that it will only strengthen their resolve. Such reasoning draws on the observed 
realities of ‘repression-mobilisation’ theory,130 and seemingly relies on much-
cited ‘cyclic’ phases of Irish history for validation. Accordingly, current ‘political 
policing’ will fail to defeat radical Irish republicanism and will only regenerate 
an environment conducive to conflict. In reaching such a conclusion, one 
critic of policing suggested a replaying of history whereby post-Patten ‘political 
policing’ was creating the context for ‘round two’ of conflict: 
People are being smoke-screened and being told smoke and mirrors, told 
lies, told half truths, threatened with, ‘Well you go down that road and you 
know what’s going to happen’. But Irish republicans have been going down 
that road for 900 years. Imprisonment and death does not deter them.131
Conclusion
Narratives on ‘political policing’ are inescapably reflective of competing master 
narratives on the wider issue of policing in the North of Ireland. Intertwining 
memory with current lived reality, they are used to reinforce the ‘end point’ 
of competing master narratives – either to make or challenge assertions of 
newness and change, so as to engineer a sense of rupture or continuity with 
the policing of the past. ‘Critical engagers’ draw on the matter to reinforce a 
narrative of strategic interaction with post-reform policing being ‘a battle a 
day’ in the ‘new arena of struggle’. Disaggregating the policing monolith into 
the new and the old, their task is empowering the new and thwarting the old 
intent on rolling back reform. This feeds back into a wider narrative of ongoing 
‘progressive republican’ equality-based transformation of the Northern Ireland 
state. Anti-policing critics, however, juxtapose their current experiences with 
autobiographical and collective memories of ‘political policing’ to draw a line of 
continuity between past and current policing problems in republican commu-
nities. Autobiographical and collective memories of past ‘suspect community’ 
policing provide the lens through which current ‘political policing’ is viewed, 
portrayed and interpreted. Where present-day policing is seen to be biased, 
oppressive and predicated on the wrongful direction of ‘anti-terror’ legislation 
against those partaking in legitimate political opposition to the GFA, opponents 
 130 Campbell and Connolly, 2003.
 131 P, critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, June 2013.
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of policing find a natural home for these lived experiences in a catalogue 
of verisimilar episodes from the past. While demonstrating an ability to be 
highly ideologised and distinctly localised on the one hand, the anti-policing 
narrative has also adopted wider human rights discourse and changing global 
contexts on the other hand too. In this capacity, memory functions not as a bar 
for measuring the success of reform in making policing a community service 
to republican communities but rather as one measuring the lack of success of 
policing reform in making policing seem less threatening. The malleability of 
‘political policing’ memory means that in as much as it has been used by ‘critical 
engagers’ to make assertions of newness and change that recast strategic inter-
action as combative reform, it has simultaneously been used by their critics to 
challenge these by asserting that policing remains a ‘political’ threat to Irish 
republicans who oppose the political status quo in post-GFA Northern Ireland.
Conclusion
Conclusion
This book set out to critically examine the role of memory in the Irish repub-
lican debate on policing. In doing so, it addressed the interlocking research 
questions of what role memory plays in the debate and how it performs this 
role. The conclusions reached herein have been drawn from an in-depth case 
study conducted across a broad spectrum of opinion within contemporary Irish 
republicanism. Drawing on the interaction between autobiographical memory 
and collective memory, this book highlights how memory helped condition 
attitudes towards policing during the 2006–07 debate and that, in conjunction 
with lived reality since then, it continues to condition views of policing in the six 
counties. Interestingly, this interaction in itself illustrates how any examination 
of the role of memory in the Irish republican policing debate should not be 
restrictively confined to memory politics. It is only by looking beyond specifi-
cally political usage of memory that a fuller appreciation of its role in the debate 
can be attained. To this end, it must be recognised that the role of memory in the 
debate is not restricted to hegemonic memory politicking but is central to how 
individuals interpret transitional processes too. Hence, as Susanne Buckley-
Zistel has argued, while memory is adaptable for competing political discourses 
it is also ‘highly personalised’ for those with lived experience of the violent past.1
Irish republican policing memory is multifaceted. It operates in different 
ways on different levels for different ends. The ‘malleability of memory’ means 
that memory, even if remaining substantively constant for the most part, is 
capable of being moulded to suit whatever context it needs to function in. 
In terms of what role memory plays, it has been both an enhancer of and an 
impediment to the transitional process in Northern Ireland – particularly so if 
one subscribes to a ‘thick’ version of transitional justice that expands beyond 
the ‘thin’ legalistic notion of punishing past wrongs via the courtroom.2 
 1 Buckley-Zistel, 2013, 140.
 2 McEvoy 2008; Buckley-Zistel, 2013, 134.
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In order fully to appreciate this point, it is instructive to reiterate how transi-
tional justice scholars have conceptualised transition in the six counties; it 
represents movement from a state that was beset by political violence and 
human rights abuse into one characterised by consociational power sharing 
and other reforms that have removed the worst excesses (but not every 
instance) of political violence and human rights abuses. This has not seen 
society or opposing political entities forsake conflicting ideological aspira-
tions but it has unarguably led to the forging of new ‘working relationships’ 
with ‘former enemies’ that are designed to prevent the recurrence of conflict 
and human rights abuses. Memory has been at the core of accommodating 
these new peace-building engagements even though it has also been at the 
heart of competing efforts to politically define the past by transforming the 
old ‘propaganda war’ into a new post-conflict ‘war by other means’. An exami-
nation of how it performs these roles reveals a moulding of memory through 
competing notions of memory as continuity that likens the present to the past 
and memory as rupture that differentiates between the present and the past. 
The consequences of using memory in the Irish republican policing debate are 
acceptance of police reform that aids ‘moving on’ processes and, conversely, 
continued rejection of police reform that frustrates these processes. Irish 
republican policing memory, in being malleable and multifaceted, operates on 
three contextual levels:
•	 the	 conventional	 level	 –	 reflecting	 how	 the	 Irish	 republican	 constit-
uency faces the same challenges that all collectives undergoing the 
process of transition face;
•	 the	 inter-communal	 level	 –	 reflecting	 how	 Irish	 republican	 memory	
acts as counter-memory in meta-conflict memory politics;
•	 the	 intra-communal	 level	 –	 reflecting	 how	 memory	 has	 come	 to	 be	
politically contested within rather than between ethno-nationalist 
collectives.
It is the role that memory performs in the last context that is most markedly 
political, thus it is here that the academic understanding of memory politics in 
the Northern Ireland transition moves beyond a restrictive study reducing it 
to dissonance between Orange and Green master narratives. This new insight 
into internal memory politics, however, should not detract from how memory 
functions on the other levels. Before elaborating on intra-communal memory 
contestation, the role of memory at the conventional and inter-communal 
levels must be sufficiently summarised.
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Memory at the conventional level
The Irish republican community, like any other collective emerging from 
prolonged conflict, is undergoing the arduous process of ‘dealing with the 
past’. At the individual and collective levels, memory underpins this process. 
A cursory glance evidences how Irish republican memory facilitates ‘remem-
bering’ that performs conventional roles like preventing ‘forgetting’ in order to 
benefit future generations3 and commemorating collective and individual loss.4 
Admittedly, these functions are in no way endemic to the Irish republican debate 
on policing, yet neither are they alien to it. It is through operating at the conven-
tional level that partial explanation can be found for wider transitional justice 
phenomena – such as a never-again mantra, demands for truth recovery and 
increased emphasis on human rights and post-conflict accountability – coming 
to bear on the debate. This reiterates how the Irish republican policing debate 
cannot be detached from the transitional context in which it plays out. The 
debate is shaped not only by highly charged internal memory politics but also 
by an external transitional process. This means that the role that memory plays 
in transitional contexts more generally will undoubtedly come to influence the 
debate. The implication of this is that while Irish republican policing memory 
operates at the conventional level through demands for truth recovery, increased 
accountability etc. it is also adaptable to political strategy.
A snapshot of memory’s role at the conventional level should not be taken 
as the totality of its role in the policing debate. If it were, the more elaborate 
uses tailored to localised specificities of the transitional context of the North of 
Ireland would be overlooked. Acknowledging the operation of memory at the 
conventional level provides an insight into the importance of ‘remembering’ 
for the individual and collective trying to ‘deal with the past’ yet it fails to 
appreciate the political usage of that past. Limiting an understanding to the 
conventional level makes Irish republican memory appear benign by divesting 
it of political value. This masks the (counter)hegemonic power memory holds 
during transitional processes. The ‘remembering’ process seen in the policing 
debate may be reflective of the conventional role memory plays in transition 
but at the same time it cannot be regarded as an entirely apolitical process 
stemming from an entirely apolitical need to ‘remember’. Accordingly, when 
evaluating the role of memory in the debate one must navigate between over-
politicising its role by restricting this to a memory politics examination that 
overlooks conventional uses, on the one hand, and the danger of depoliticising 
it entirely, on the other hand. 
 3 Brown, 2011.
 4 Waldorf, 2010.
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Memory at the inter-communal level
The political value of Irish republican memory becomes obvious when evaluated 
at the inter-communal level. This involves mnemonic contestation between 
ethno-nationalist blocs that reflects traditional tension between competing 
Orange and Green master narratives. At this level, Irish republican memory 
is located within a contested realm of memory politics defined first by the 
long-term absence of any truth recovery process and secondly by continued 
delay in implementing ‘dealing with the past’ processes contained in recent 
political deals. In the absence of any process that might birth a ‘shared narrative’ 
reflecting the conflict experiences of all ‘sides’, Irish republican memory is 
a case par excellence of counter-memory. As such, it serves to counter the 
silencing of Irish republican experiences in official state, Unionist and RUC 
narratives. The counter-narrative progresses beyond an attempt to have experi-
ences recognised to feed into wider meta-conflict memory politics over who 
is to ‘blame’ for the death and destruction of the conflict. The political value 
of Irish republican memory in this context is inextricably linked to the value 
of victimhood claims that can challenge or reinforce attribution of collective 
guilt.5 Irish republican memory becomes a memory politics statement that 
Irish republicans were not exclusively to blame for the conflict nor were they 
immune from the misery of it. In doing so, it challenges the construction of 
dubious hierarchies of victimhood and fundamentally challenges traditional 
understandings of victimhood that are premised on an illogical dichotomy 
between victimhood and perpetratorship. 
Leading on from this latter point, Irish republican memory has highlighted 
the role of the RUC and other state agencies in systematic human rights abuse 
that stretched well beyond direct responsibility for conflict-related death to 
encompass brutalisation of detainees, violence meted out in the jails and the 
daily intrusion into the lives of the ‘suspect community’. Given the extent of 
state human rights abuse and the continued impact of its legacy, it is evident 
that any ‘dealing with the past’ process must adequately address the issue. 
This necessitates acceptance that wrongdoing was not confined to the political 
violence of the dubiously, if politically convenient, labelled ‘terrorist’. The first 
step in this process is confronting, and then ultimately dismantling, politi-
cised hierarchies of victimhood and perpetratorship that seek to fallaciously 
exonerate the British state for the destructive role it played in the conflict.6 
On the other hand, critics have been (perhaps too) quick to equate such 
 5 McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012.
 6 Hearty, 2016a.
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calls with an Irish republican ‘rewriting’ of the past that legitimates their 
political violence by attacking the conduct of the state.7 There is, for sure, 
meta-conflict currency in highlighting state wrongdoing. However, dismissing 
the non-hierarchal approach to ‘dealing with the past’ in its entirety on this 
basis only replicates the pitfalls of over-politicising the role of memory at the 
expense of recognising its other functions. While Irish republican demands for 
truth, justice, accountability and victim recognition can indeed be politicised 
through pursuing a meta-conflict agenda, at the same time they represent 
the natural yearnings of those emerging from a prolonged conflict that had a 
deleterious impact at both the individual and collective levels. As observations 
made of transitions elsewhere testify to, when victimhood is denied in official 
discourse, those silenced and overlooked will mobilise to assert their counter-
memory.8 Irish republicans are no different from other collectives undergoing 
the process of transition in this regard.
This is not to foolhardily imply that the Irish republican policing counter-
narrative is not itself exclusivist. It is a conflict narrative, and conflict narratives 
are by their very nature selective. This means that just as the interviewees in 
this case study can fault the state, Unionist and RUC narratives for overlooking 
the Irish republican policing experience, so too can those who have articulated 
these narratives elsewhere similarly fault the Irish republican counter-narrative 
for its ‘silences’. The inherent mnemonic selectivity caused by reliance on the 
‘memory of perpetrators’ in opposing policing narratives justifies this mutual 
criticism.
In terms of the wider Northern Ireland transition, Irish republican memory 
at the inter-communal level can be seen to perform conflicting roles as both 
an impediment to and an enhancer of transition. By feeding into contested 
memory politics in the continued absence of any overarching process to ‘deal 
with the past’, it may be seen as an obvious impediment to further transition 
by becoming ‘war by other means’ in the meta-conflict. Disagreement over the 
past is locked in to existing master narratives favourable to ‘us’ and critical of 
‘them’. However, it is the very absence of any overarching process to ‘deal with 
the past’ that may paradoxically endow Irish republican memory with a certain 
redemptive quality that transforms it into an enhancer of transition. In the 
absence of a ‘shared narrative’ in the North of Ireland, Irish republican memory 
can contribute to a broader understanding of past conflict and the underlying 
reasons for that conflict.9 Chapter 2 certainly suggests that such potential 
exists, whether that be through attempts to engage with former RUC officers 
 7 McGrattan, 2013; Hopkins, 2015.
 8 Jelin, 2007; Kent, 2011.
 9 Hearty, 2014.
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in order to provide them with the Irish republican perspective on policing, the 
willingness ‘to listen’ to the experiences of the ‘other’ or belated acceptance of 
the reality that a tradition of ‘policing families’ within Unionism means not 
every RUC officer was motivated by sectarian enmity. Even if such engagements 
only birth an acknowledgement of the ‘other’ perspective that is decidedly 
‘thin’, the implication is, nonetheless, that it can help reduce the scope for the 
recurrence of violence and provide a deeper understanding of the past that aids 
‘moving on’ processes. That Irish republicans would seek to use memory in this 
way correlates with the more prevalent peace-builder role former combatants 
across the board in the North of Ireland have  enthusiastically embraced.10 
Memory at the intra-communal level
Memory being contested within, as well as between, ethno-nationalist collec-
tives, irrevocably dispels the notion that memory politics in transitioning 
Northern Ireland can be neatly reduced to flawed ‘two tribes’ interpretations. 
Although this may be the most easily understood manifestation, the ‘dealing 
with the past’ process must acknowledge that contestation stretches beyond 
Orange and Green binaries to include contestation premised on the binaries 
of having ‘moved on’ with or being ‘left behind’ by transition. A fuller under-
standing of hidden discourses in transitional justice and peace processing can 
only be attained by looking beyond dominant master narratives and engaging 
with the narrative of those ‘left behind’. By doing so, this case study has shown 
how hidden discourses can be identified, how they are framed, how they are 
constructed and how they are circulated. In transcending the strict param-
eters of memory politics, there is recognition that while these processes are 
consciously undertaken by those wishing to ‘spoil’ transition, they also help to 
frame understandings of missing out on the ‘peace dividend’ at the individual 
level and, as such, can frame lived experience of the transition.
That memory politics contestation can manifest at the intra-communal 
level provides an insight into the interaction between memory and ideology 
and memory and reform processes during periods of transition. Interaction 
in both cases can be understood through the competing notions of memory as 
continuity and memory as rupture. Given that memory has an ability to contex-
tualise and give political meaning to the exigencies of the present by providing 
reference to the past, it is perhaps merely foreseeable that it would manifest 
through these lenses. Additionally, given that memory is malleable and context 
 10 Shirlow and McEvoy, 2008.
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specific, it is equally foreseeable that political disagreement within the Irish 
republican constituency would force competing hegemons to interchangeably 
adopt these competing lenses dependent on the particular challenges memory 
politics posed at any given point. 
Memory and ideology
By interacting with ideology, memory subjects transitional processes to inter-
pretation through long-held belief systems. This compares positions currently 
adopted with positions held in the past. Such a comparison creates political 
claims of what is ideologically sound and what is ideologically flawed. Ideology 
can therefore facilitate as well as restrict concessionary moves in transitional 
processes. To this end, it assumes a bipolar ability both to enhance and impede 
transition. In order fully to demonstrate this point, it is worth reverting to the 
competing lenses of continuity and rupture. Where memory interacts with 
ideology to create the ‘progressive republican’ reading of ‘critical engagement’ 
it functions as memory as continuity. ‘Critical engagement’ is mapped into a 
wider process whereby the destruction of the ‘Orange state’ by equality-based 
reform from within is the natural continuity of ‘armed struggle’. Memory and 
strategy become inextricably linked to the extent that transitional strategy is 
framed by the understanding that it is the continuation of past armed struggle 
by other means. This can help the individual ‘make sense’ of the transitional 
process, as evidenced by the expression of narratives mapping a progression 
from ‘rebel’ to ‘revolutionary’. However, it can also be utilised for memory 
politics purposes by elites at the collective level via the ‘extension of struggle’ 
narrative. The result of both is that former combatants once militarily opposed 
to policing agents now ‘critically engage’ with them yet feel no ideological 
betrayal. As ‘progressive republicans’, they are now pursuing the same end 
goal albeit by different means. Memory, when inextricably linked to strategy 
in this way, can be simultaneously regarded as an enhancer to transition and 
an impediment to transition. As an impediment, memory contributes to the 
entrenching of dichotomous ideological goals and political positions that 
impose a ‘negative peace’ limitation on ‘moving on’ processes. By drawing a 
line of continuity with a process designed effectively to remove the Northern 
Ireland state, memory only facilitates peaceful coexistence alongside rather 
than any ideological renegotiation with former enemies. However, the impor-
tance of memory as continuity in bringing into being a peaceful coexistence of 
this kind should not be overlooked. It is the reassurance that one has not ‘sold 
out’ on long-held principles and ideological end goals provided by this sense of 
continuity that creates scope to pursue them through non-violent means. The 
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ability to constructively engage with former enemies via a means other than 
sustained political violence makes it an enhancer to transition.
Interaction between ideology and memory can also be an impediment 
to transition by hardening absolutist positions. In accordance with a ‘consti-
tutional nationalist’ reading of the transition, memory as rupture depicts 
‘critical engagement’ as a departure from long-held ideological goals. ‘Critical 
engagement’ becomes the continuity of previous failed ‘reform from within’ 
projects, rather than the continuation of past struggle by other means. Memory as 
rupture becomes an impediment to transition by hardening absolutist positions 
through a value-laden understanding that precludes the compromise necessary 
for a ‘working relationship’ with former enemies. As is the case with memory as 
continuity seen above, this can help rationalise the transitional process at the 
individual level, yet it is also politically expedient for those wishing to ‘spoil’ 
transition. This hardening of absolutist positions may manifest itself in residual 
armed activity but it is also given expression through legitimate non-violent 
political opposition.
It has become glaringly evident that any examination of ideological 
opposition to the transition within Irish republicanism cannot be reduced to 
a flawed understanding that opponents are ‘conflict junkies’. The multitude of 
views proffered throughout this case study demonstrates that there is a spectrum 
of attitudes towards current armed activity, ranging from outright rejection to 
firm support. Not everyone who opposes the GFA, transition or policing should 
be automatically assumed to be in favour of ‘spoiler’ violence. In fact, some 
non-violent political opponents argue that sporadic armed activity only serves 
to curtail the expression of legitimate political criticism.11 Irish republican 
opposition to the transition cannot, then, be examined through a simplistic ‘war 
or peace’ approach. It must comprise fuller examination of non-violent leftist and 
class-based critiques if the true extent of disenfranchisement with the transition 
within the constituency is to be grasped. Although these dimensions have always 
been prevalent in academic coverage of Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist disillu-
sionment with the Northern Ireland transition,12 it has only been more recently 
that academic coverage of Irish republican opposition has ventured beyond 
examination of militant groups. Admittedly, this case study does not conduct an 
exhaustive Irish republican critique of the transition and policing that is leftist 
or class based, but in acknowledging that such critiques do exist and that they 
remain neglected, it has moved current academic  understanding further beyond 
an erroneous ‘war versus peace’ dichotomy.
 11 Q , critic of Sinn Féin policy, interview, July 2013.
 12 Lundy and McGovern, 2008a; Shirlow, 2012.
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Memory and reform processes
This case study offers an original empirical insight into how police reform is 
interpreted and presented through the medium of memory among two key 
constituencies: those who resisted the state policing apparatus in the past 
but who now endorse it, and those who continue to resist it. Such an in-depth 
interrogation of how memory underpins individual interpretation of police 
reform and how it shapes the master narratives of competing hegemons 
provides a deeper insight into how memory politics can enhance or impede 
transition through enabling or disabling previously excluded groups to ‘buy 
into’ reformed institutions.
Competing lenses of continuity and rupture are again the most apposite 
for examining this interaction. Memory as rupture can enhance transition 
through assertions of newness and change in a post-reform environment. These 
assertions seek to differentiate between present policing in a post-reform, 
transitional context and pre-reform policing during past violent conflict. This 
provides a neat, if simplistic, separation of the ‘old’ from the ‘new’ by juxta-
posing lived experience of the PSNI with lived experience of the RUC. This 
enhances transition by creating scope for new ‘working relationships’ to be 
built with the ‘new breed’ of policing agent, as well as allowing constructive 
post-conflict engagement predicated on community ‘needs’ with those once 
considered the enemy. The interaction of memory as rupture and police reform 
has generated a ‘community policing’ narrative whereby policing has been 
framed as a community service rather than a political threat.
A further manifestation of memory as an impediment to transition is found 
in the line of continuity drawn between current policing problems in Irish 
republican communities and those encountered in the past. Memory as conti-
nuity possesses a negative capacity that challenges the assertions of newness 
and change inherent in memory as rupture. It impedes transition by preventing 
any differentiation between pre-reform policing and post-reform policing. This 
shapes current attitudes towards policing by linking rather than separating 
current and past ‘political policing’, current and past ‘over-policing’ and current 
and past ‘under-policing’. Rather than nourishing post-conflict ‘working 
relationships’ with former enemies, memory as continuity sustains residual 
suspicion towards policing ‘outsiders’. This has been reinforced by short-
comings that are perhaps a foreseeable product of all reform processes, such 
as institutional crossover and the retention of a ‘canteen culture’. However, it 
is also reflective of more substantive localised problems with the police reform 
process, such as the ‘rehiring’ debacle and the impotence of local accountability 
mechanisms on a seemingly infinite list of ‘national security’ matters. Like 
much else, this demonstrates the convergence of general globalised policing 
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problems with problems that are specific to the transitional context of the 
North of Ireland. 
Memory as continuity therefore assumes a duality of purpose; it contextu-
alises what the individual perceives to be change – or lack thereof – following 
‘critical engagement’, and it is also used to underpin competing master narra-
tives on the issue within Irish republicanism. The applicability of the latter 
is evident first in the ‘new arena of struggle’ narrative that ‘critical engagers’ 
have adopted in relation to the RUC ‘old guard’, and secondly in the ‘cosmetic 
reform’ narrative where anti-policing republicans mirror post-Patten experi-
ences of ‘political policing’ in past collective and individual experiences of 
the RUC. In drawing this issue out in Chapter 7, this book demonstrates 
that, contrary to official discourse, the policing problem has not been ‘solved’ 
following ‘critical engagement’. Although there is an unprecedented level of 
acceptance of policing in the North of Ireland, there remain considerable 
legitimacy problems borne out of the past in some republican communities. 
Moreover, aspects that are commonly misconstrued as symptoms of the 
‘policing legacy’ – the misapplication of ‘anti-terror’ legislation and ‘political 
policing’ – still plague post-Patten policing. One could legitimately question 
whether these issues can be effectively addressed as a legacy issue when they 
remain all too familiar during transition. Examining these issues has prevented 
post-‘critical engagement’ invisibility of continuing policing problems, and has 
provided the impetus, and indeed highlighted the need, for a more expansive 
and robust critique of how political opposition to the transition in the six 
counties is policed. 
Intra-communal memory politics during transition
Memory politics is a key component of the hegemonic battle between drivers 
of transition and ‘spoilers’ of transition within the wider Irish republican 
community. Although memory is used at the individual and collective levels 
to ‘make sense’ of transition, at the political level it is deliberately used as a 
political resource by competing hegemons. Competing actors within Irish 
republicanism assume the role of ‘memory entrepreneurs’ that monopolise the 
past to promote their current agendas. This has seen the past used to shore up 
the electoral mandate of those driving transition and to plug a legitimacy gap 
for those ‘spoilers’ who do not have or do not seek such a mandate. 
Sinn Féin has adopted an ‘extension of struggle’ narrative that uses 
memory as continuity to portray their strategy of working the transition as 
a natural post-conflict pursuit of the ideological goals sought during the 
armed struggle. The strategies (or lack thereof) of opponents are dismissed 
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as futile militancy, an ignorance of revolutionary political change and the 
malign work of British ‘securocrats’. They are no different from any other 
political elite in the sense that they strive to build continuity between the past 
and their present strategy at the expense of their rivals’ claim to that same 
past. In this context, intra-communal memory contestation becomes about 
‘owning’ rather than understanding the past. It is less about making sense of 
the transition and more concerned with making a fit between current and past 
positions. The importance of making the past fit the present is evident through 
the effort they expend in laying claim to the patriot dead and the legacy of 
the IRA’s armed campaign. The necessity of this has been heightened by 
two closely connected factors: increased movement away from the tradition-
alist stance leaving them susceptible to claims of ‘sell out’ and, flowing from 
this, the emergence of new political and militant ‘spoiler’ groups within the 
constituency to level such accusations. 
These groups use memory to impede transition by challenging the Sinn 
Féin claim to the past. This is achieved through a dual process of presenting 
their positions and strategies – political and/or military – as the continuity of 
the orthodox Irish republican position and strategy, and through portraying 
Sinn Féin strategy as a rupture from this. This has seen ‘spoiler’ groups utilise 
republican commemorative culture to challenge the Sinn Féin claim to the 
patriot dead and the retention of Sinn Féin’s previous rhetorical positions on 
the inevitability of Irish republican resistance as long as occupation continues. 
For those of a less militant hue, there has been a reversion to a radical leftist 
form of Irish republicanism that Sinn Féin (in the North of Ireland at least) has 
increasingly moved away from. Inasmuch as memory is a shield for the drivers 
of transition, it too can be seen as a sword for ‘spoilers’ who use it to mobilise in 
opposition to transitional processes, to critique processes of transition and to 
compete with intra-communal rivals driving the process of transition. 
It is precisely because memory is malleable that it simultaneously functions 
on differing levels through the mediums of memory as continuity and memory 
as rupture both to impede and enhance transition. The constant interchange 
between these typologies demonstrates that memory is contingent upon the 
context in which it is being used, the purpose for which it is being used and 
the actor by which it is being used. This accounts for the nuances of how it is 
used in the inter-communal and the intra-communal contexts, how it is used 
to own the past and to understand the past, how it is used by the individuals 
at grassroots level and by elites at the collective level. Irish republican memory 
has shown memory to be dependent on an amalgam of these variables, with the 
memory of the same past used for very different purposes and ends.
The malleability of Irish republican memory is compounded by the fact 
that it exists in a transitional context that necessitates more steps into the 
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relative unknown. The paradox is that when faced with a venture into the 
unknown, the tendency of Irish republicanism is to look backwards for 
guidance. This reveals its Janus-like nature: it looks forward in indefinite 
anticipation of the certain future day of self-determination but it simultane-
ously surveys the long and unrelenting road already traversed in search of 
that day. Therein lies the crux of the mnemonic debate within modern Irish 
republicanism. That debate can best be understood not as contestation over 
what happened in the past but as contestation over what that past now ‘means’ 
in a political climate that has changed dramatically both internally and exter-
nally. Contestation is reduced not to issues of what Irish republicans sought 
in the past or what they seek in the future (arcane disagreements over the 
particular relevance of socialism aside), but to marked differences in current 
strategies purporting to work towards the common, historical goal of national 
self-determination. 
At the time of writing, the centenary year of the Easter Rising has drawn to 
a close. How and when the sovereign (and socialist) Irish Republic declared by 
Pádraig Mac Piarais in 1916 will come to be realised remains more uncertain than 
ever before. The broader Irish republican constituency is more fractured than it 
has ever been at any time since 1916, while opposing strategies for attaining the 
vision of 1916 remain limited by their own inherent shortcomings. Sinn Féin’s 
electoral performances in the centenary year failed to live up to expectations – 
their vote dropped in the assembly elections by 2.9 per cent (the biggest drop 
by any major party), causing their hopes of being the largest political party 
in the six counties to dissipate, while an impressive rise in the vote in the 26 
counties was not enough to see them enter government or become the largest 
opposition party there. Previous notions of driving forward the agenda for Irish 
unity while being in government in both jurisdictions post the 1916 centenary 
year have, for the time being at least, come to pass. Likewise, securing a border 
poll on Irish unity as per the provisions of the GFA has proven problematic 
almost 20 years after the accord was signed. In the aftermath of ‘Brexit’ – a 
considerable political game-changer by all accounts – both Theresa Villiers 
and her successor James Brokenshire have ruled out holding a border poll.13 In 
light of this, Sinn Féin efforts in the closing stages of the centenary year were 
diverted into opposing a ‘hard border’ post-Brexit rather than challenging the 
 13 ‘EU Referendum: Theresa Villiers Rules Out Sinn Féin’s Border Poll Call’, BBC 
News, 24 June 2016: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-36622120 (accessed 
12 October 2016); ‘Northern Ireland EU Dream DESTROYED: James Brokenshire 
Says NO Referendum after Brexit’, Express, 20 July 2016: www.express.co.uk/news/
politics/691435/Politics-James-Brokenshire-no-Northern-Ireland-EU-referedum-
Brexit (accessed 12 October 2016).
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border itself.14 Perhaps these structural limitations are a reminder of the reality 
that being able to reform the Orange state out of existence under the terms of 
the GFA is not the same thing as being able to reform British involvement in 
Ireland out of existence.15 Early 2017 has, somewhat paradoxically, brought 
more uncertainty yet renewed vigour for Sinn Féin and its ‘progressive repub-
lican’ project. Amidst the scandal caused by a Renewable Heating Incentive 
(RHI) scheme, Martin McGuinness (since deceased) resigned as Deputy First 
Minister, attributing his decision to Arlene Foster’s refusal to accommodate 
an inquiry into the RHI affair and, more notably, to DUP intransigence on 
equality matters. Consequently, the Stormont assembly the party had invested 
so much in collapsed and fresh elections were held in March 2017. This election 
saw the party reassert its traditional dominance in West Belfast while also 
moving further ahead of the SDLP in South Down (also going on to take both it 
and Foyle off the SDLP in the June 2017 general election), increase its share of 
the vote by nearly 4 per cent and come within 1,200 votes and a single assembly 
seat of the DUP – a monumental reversal of the fortunes seen at the polls less 
than a year previously when it was stung by a PBP-driven protest vote against 
Tory cuts. The loss of a Unionist majority at Stormont for the first time ever has 
emboldened their discourse about dismantling the ‘Orange state’, given their 
renewed calls for a post-Brexit border poll some added bite and reaffirmed its 
election pledge that there will be no return to the pre-collapse ‘status quo’. On 
the one hand, this could be the defenders of equality-agenda republicanism 
further flexing their ‘ethnic tribune’ muscle while still high on electoral success 
directly attributable to doing just that but, on the other hand, their pledge begs 
the question of how the GFA institutions long championed as a stepping stone 
to unity can actually aid the strategic advancement of that objective if they are 
now, by the party’s own admission, failing to deliver as initially envisaged when 
‘critical engagement’ began. Sinn Féin was led into these elections by Michelle 
O’Neill after McGuinness retired from elected politics due to ill health. Many 
have seen this move as the harbinger of a generational transition within the 
upper echelons of the party. If the ‘progressive republican’ blueprint devised by 
the Adams leadership does eventually come to fruition (and that admittedly is 
a huge ‘if ’) it seems increasingly likely that it will not be at the political helm 
when it does so. 
For their part, the critics of Sinn Féin strategy hardly set the world alight 
in the centenary year either. Despite predictions that the centenary year would 
 14 ‘Anti-Brexit Protests Held at Six Locations on the Border’, BBC News, 8 October 
2016: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-37595774 (accessed 12 October 
2016).
 15 Catney, 2007, 30.
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be used as a launching pad for a more protracted military campaign,16 at 
the time of writing there is little evidence to suggest this was the case. While 
militant activity has certainly grown in recent years,17 this has still fallen 
considerably short of matching the intensity of the Provisional campaign and, 
more fundamentally, there is little suggestion as to how it can deliver where 
the Provisional campaign did not – or for that matter how it can deliver where 
Sinn Féin’s reform from within strategy cannot. Politically, opponents of Sinn 
Féin, like Éirígí and RNU, have not managed to use the patriotic fervour of 
the centenary year to mount a serious electoral challenge to the Sinn Féin 
hegemony. Granted, anti-policing candidates did previously win a number of 
local council seats, but disaffection with the Stormont administration largely 
translated itself into votes for PBP in the 2016 assembly elections. Perhaps 
‘mild sceptics’ had a point when they argued that whatever its shortcomings 
the Sinn Féin strategy should not be rejected by republicans in the absence of 
a viable alternative.18 In the centenary year, Saoradh put itself forward as this 
alternative. Whether it is in fact the magic bullet that anti-GFA republicans 
have long sought cannot be determined yet given its infancy. What is certain is 
that the task facing the party in challenging Sinn Féin hegemony is sizeable. It 
chose not to contest the March election.
Evidently, then, even if the end goal for Irish republicans is crystal clear, the 
waters of how to attain it remain muddied. Memory has provided reassurance 
and comfort, perhaps even inspiration, but it has not produced consensus. 
Splits and departures too numerous to recite have created a plethora of actors 
claiming to possess the unerring blueprint to achieve the as of yet unattained 
holy grail. For these hegemons, a rich tradition of struggle and sacrifice is an 
immeasurably valuable political resource worth contesting. Given that memory 
is integral to hegemonic claims of ownership over the past during periods of 
contested transition, the intra-communal memory politicking of Irish repub-
licans certainly seems more inevitable than it does remarkable.
 16 Morrison, 2013.
 17 Morrison, 2016b.
 18 Ó hAdhmaill, 2007, 35.
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